


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**Selected
works of
Jawaharlal
Nehru**






Selected works of Jawaharlal Nehru

Second Series

Volume Four

A Project of the
Jawaharlal Nehru
Memorial Fund


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FOREWORD

Jawaharlal Nehru is one of the key figures of the twentieth century. He symbolised some of the major forces which have transformed our age.

When Jawaharlal Nehru was young, history was still the privilege of the West; the rest of the world lay in deliberate darkness. The impression given was that the vast continents of Asia and Africa existed merely to sustain their masters in Europe and North America. Jawaharlal Nehru's own education in Britain could be interpreted, in a sense, as an attempt to secure for him a place within the pale. His letters of the time are evidence of his sensitivity, his interest in science and international affairs as well as of his pride in India and Asia. But his personality was veiled by his shyness and a facade of nonchalance, and perhaps outwardly there was not much to distinguish him from the ordinary run of men. Gradually there emerged the warm and universal being who became intensely involved with the problems of the poor and the oppressed in all lands. In doing so, Jawaharlal Nehru gave articulation and leadership to millions of people in his own country and in Asia and Africa.


That imperialism was a curse which should be lifted from the brows of men, that poverty was incompatible with civilisation, that nationalism should be poised on a sense of international community and that it was not sufficient to brood on these things when action was urgent and compelling—these were the principles which inspired and gave vitality to Jawaharlal Nehru's activities in the years of India's struggle for freedom and made him not only an intense nationalist but one of the leaders of humanism.

No particular ideological doctrine could claim Jawaharlal Nehru for its own. Long days in jail were spent in reading widely. He drew much from the thought of the East and West and from the philosophies of the past and the present. Never religious in the formal sense, yet he had a deep love for the culture and tradition of his own land. Never a rigid Marxist, yet he was deeply influenced by that theory and was particularly impressed by what he saw in the Soviet Union on his first visit in 1927. However, he realised that the world was too complex, and man had too many facets, to be encompassed by any single or total explanation. He himself was a socialist with an abhorrence of regimentation and a democrat who was anxious to reconcile his faith in civil liberty with the necessity of mitigating economic and social wretchedness. His struggles, both within himself

and with the outside world, to adjust such seeming contradictions are what make his life and work significant and fascinating.

As a leader of free India, Jawaharlal Nehru recognised that his country could neither stay out of the world nor divest itself of its own interests in world affairs. But to the extent that it was possible, Jawaharlal Nehru sought to speak objectively and to be a voice of sanity in the shrill phases of the 'cold war'. Whether his influence helped on certain occasions to maintain peace is for the future historian to assess. What we do know is that for a long stretch of time he commanded an international audience reaching far beyond governments, that he spoke for ordinary, sensitive, thinking men and women around the globe and that his was a constituency which extended far beyond India.

So the story of Jawaharlal Nehru is that of a man who evolved, who grew in storm and stress till he became the representative of much that was noble in his time. It is the story of a generous and gracious human being who summed up in himself the resurgence of the 'third world' as well as the humanism which transcends dogmas and is adapted to the contemporary context. His achievement, by its very nature and setting, was much greater than that of a Prime Minister. And it is with the conviction that the life of this man is of importance not only to scholars but to all, in India and elsewhere, who are interested in the valour and compassion of the human spirit that the Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund has decided to publish a series of volumes consisting of all that is significant in what Jawaharlal Nehru spoke and wrote. There is, as is to be expected in the speeches and writings of a man so engrossed in affairs and gifted with expression, much that is ephemeral; this will be omitted. The official letters and memoranda will also not find place here. But it is planned to include everything else and the whole corpus should help to remind us of the quality and endeavour of one who was not only a leader of men and a lover of mankind, but a completely integrated human being.



New Delhi
18 January 1972

Chairman
Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund

EDITORIAL NOTE

This volume covers the months from 15 August 1947, when India became free and Jawaharlal Nehru was sworn in as the Prime Minister, to 31 December 1947 when India took the issue of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir to the United Nations. The joy of freedom was mixed with pain and sorrow because of the communal rioting that came with the partition of the country. The migration of Hindus and Sikhs to India and of some Muslims to Pakistan was accompanied by bloodshed, extensive loss of property and severe dislocation of normal life. In the Punjab alone about three million people were displaced and forced to seek a home elsewhere. In Delhi tension grew as increasing numbers of refugees from the Punjab poured into the city. The reports of atrocities brought by refugees worsened the atmosphere on both sides.

This state of relations between India and Pakistan was aggravated by the problem of the accession of the three princely States, Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. Nehru and the Government of India held that in each case the issue should be decided by the people themselves. When the inhabitants of Junagadh opted to join India, Pakistan connived at the entry of 'tribesmen' into Kashmir in order to force accession to Pakistan. But the invasion united the people of the State under their leader, Sheikh Abdullah, who advised accession to India. Meanwhile, the Nizam of Hyderabad did not come to terms with the Union and tried secretly to purchase arms.

On the various issues concerning the two countries, Nehru carried on correspondence, interspersed with many conferences, with the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan. But little tangible came out of these efforts. Within India, with the calming influence of Mahatma Gandhi and the help of Lord Mountbatten and Vallabhbhai Patel, Nehru organised the forces of order to curb the communal frenzy. The rehabilitation of refugees was also a major problem, particularly given the shortages of resources. In addition, India had to begin the task of building the future. Nehru laid down the secular path to strengthen the unity of the country, expedited the drafting of a new constitution, visualised social change through planned development and projected a picture of what India might one day achieve and become. Beyond India he set about formulating a positive foreign policy.

The Nehru Memorial Library has been good enough to provide access to the papers of Jawaharlal Nehru and other relevant collections in its

custody. Shrimati Indira Gandhi made available to us a large number of documents in her possession, and these papers have been referred to in the footnotes as the J. N. Collection. The India Office Library in London has allowed the printing of some material in its custody. The Broadlands Archives Trust has permitted us to reproduce extracts from the Mountbatten Papers. The Secretariats of the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Ministries of Law, Home and External Affairs and the National Archives of India have authorized the reproduction of some notes and letters in their possession. Much of it is classified material, and some portions have necessarily been deleted. A few items from the volumes of *Sardar Patel's Correspondence* have also been included. Shrimati Bela Devi Nayar and Shrimati Sushila Nayar were kind enough to give us permission to reproduce letters from Shri Pyarelal's papers.

The biographical footnotes and glossaries in the earlier volumes of the *Selected Works* are not repeated; but references to biographical footnotes in those volumes are given in the index. Eight items, which were located too late for inclusion in the relevant place in this or earlier volumes, have been printed in the appendix.

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
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ABBREVIATIONS

A.F.P.F.L.	Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (Burma)
A.F.R.C.	Armed Forces Reorganization Committee
A.I.C.C.	All India Congress Committee
A.I.R.	All India Radio
A.P.	Associated Press
B.O.A.C.	British Overseas Airways Corporation
B.S.N.	Bombay Steam Navigation Company
C.P.	Central Provinces
C.S.I.R.	Council of Scientific and Industrial Research
D.P.C.C.	Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee
E.C.O.	Emergency Commissioned Officer
F.C.	Financial Commissioner
F.S.	Foreign Secretary
H.M.G.	His Majesty's Government
I.C.S.	Indian Civil Service
I.G.P.	Inspector General of Police
I.N.A.	Indian National Army
I.O.L.R.	India Office Library and Records
J.D.C.	Joint Defence Council
M.E.A. & C.R.	Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations
M.E.O.	Military Evacuation Organization
M.H.A.	Ministry of Home Affairs
N.A.I.	National Archives of India
N.M.M.L.	Nehru Memorial Museum and Library
N.W.F.P.	North West Frontier Province
P.M.S.	Prime Minister's Secretariat
R.I.A.F.	Royal Indian Air Force
R.I.N.	Royal Indian Navy
R.S.S.	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
U.N.D.P.	United Nations Development Programme
U.P.	United Provinces

1947
at the time of partition



COMMUNAL RIOTS AND THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

1. To Preserve and Foster Peace¹

We have pledged ourselves to the service of India and her people and we have taken the oath of allegiance to the constitution of India. Our first act on assuming charge of the government of free India today is to make earnest appeal to all our people to put an end to violence in every shape and form. We have all to face tremendous problems which affect the well-being of the masses of India. Violence and conflict aggravate these problems and make their solution even more difficult. It is the duty of Government to preserve peace, for all orderly progress and even the normal life of the community depend upon the preservation of peaceful conditions. It is equally the duty of a free people to maintain peace, for their very freedom is limited and even endangered by violent conflict. The present Government is responsible to the people of India. It cannot exist without the consent and goodwill of the people.

We have proclaimed that we as a nation and a people stand for world peace and cooperation among nations. We can only work for that great objective if we have peace in our own country and cooperation among ourselves.

We stand for democracy. The method of democracy is to find peaceful solutions for all problems. That is the way of a free people. By violence and hatred no problem is solved.

We appeal, therefore, with all the earnestness we can command that violence must cease and whatever differences we may have must be resolved by peaceful and democratic methods.

We would venture to extend this appeal to those who live now in Pakistan. For though Pakistan may be separated from India by political boundaries, the essential spiritual unity of the country, like its geographic unity, cannot and should not be broken up. Any injury to one part of the country hurts the other parts.

We are a free people today. Let us act then as free men and women.

1. This appeal, drafted by Nehru, was issued to the people of India as a message by the Cabinet following a special meeting on 15 August 1947. *The Hindustan Times*, 17 August 1947.

2. The Honour of the Flag¹

We have gathered here on a historic occasion at this ancient fort to win back what was ours. This flag does not symbolize the triumph of individuals or the Congress but the triumph of the whole country. The free flag of India is the symbol of freedom and democracy not only for India but for the whole world. India, Asia and the world must rejoice on this great day.

This fort has witnessed many vicissitudes. You also know what happened during the last 27 years when we struggled and made sacrifices under this flag. I need not tell you all that happened during this period. What is worth recalling is that we had taken a pledge that we shall lay down our lives for the honour and dignity of this flag and would never allow it to be lowered whatever might be the consequences. That pledge has been fulfilled. The country has achieved freedom under the brilliant leadership and guidance of Mahatma Gandhi. Our technique of fighting was different from that of other countries. Sometimes we had faltered and stumbled but finally we reached our goal. If credit is due to any man today it is to Gandhiji.

On this day we must remember those who have made sacrifices and suffered for the cause of independence. It is needless for me to name all of them, but I cannot help mentioning Subhas Chandra Bose who left this country and formed the Indian National Army abroad and fought bravely for the freedom of the country. He hoisted this flag in foreign countries and when the day came for hoisting it on the Red Fort, he was not to see his dream fulfilled. This should have been the day of his return, but alas he is no longer in this world.

The first charge of the Government will be to establish and maintain peace and tranquillity in the land and to ruthlessly suppress communal strife, for no government worth the name can look on while law-abiding citizens are leading a precarious life; while dealing with lawlessness there can be no discrimination. It is wrong to suggest that in this country there would be the rule of a particular religion or sect. All who owe allegiance to the flag will enjoy equal rights of citizenship, irrespective of caste or creed. But those who create mischief or trouble are our enemies and they shall be dealt with severely. The Government cannot do this work without the full cooperation of the people.

The second task before us is to wipe out poverty, disease and illiteracy and raise the standard of living of our people.

1. Speech at the Red Fort, Delhi, 16 August 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 17 August and the *Indian News Chronicle* and *The Statesman*, 18 August 1947.

We have to make India a strong and powerful country. Only those countries can become great which have strong foundations. The dawn of freedom has placed great responsibilities on us and we have to carry them out in an efficient manner. We cannot move forward without the people's cooperation. We are not here as Prime Ministers and Ministers, but as humble servants of the country. My Government would strive to be truly representative of the people. The masses have now become the real rulers in the country and the strength or the weakness of the Government would depend upon the people. All of us are in the Government because people want us to be there. We will quit when the people wish it.

All of you know what a tremendous influence India had in the past and it can have even greater influence today. Our nation can either stand or fall. If it stands it will stand higher than many other nations. This is the time for her to stand and aid other nations. In fact our freedom signalizes the freedom of other nations not only of Asia but of the whole world. Therefore, this is a day of rejoicing not only for us but for the whole world. You who are gathered here in lakhs must remember that the eyes of millions of people all over the world are turned towards you.

I must mention our armed forces who are a source of pride to the nation. They now belong to the nation and not to any foreign power. It would be their duty to guard and protect the honour of the nation and its flag. We must all take a pledge that we shall live as one and work to perpetuate our freedom and prosperity to the masses. We have to reach that stage when no one in this country will be poor and starving or without clothes and education. Although we have achieved our freedom, that is only a milestone—the first stage on the journey to the higher goal of universal peace and prosperity. We have a long way to go.

3. Dissatisfaction with the Boundary Commission Award¹

Pandit Nehru said that he had never considered that the allocation of the Chittagong Hill Tracts to East Bengal was possible under the terms of

1. Extracts from the proceedings of a meeting in New Delhi on 16 August 1947 attended by Mountbatten, Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Baldev Singh, Liaquat Ali Khan, Fazlur Rahman, Mohammad Ali, V.P. Menon and V.F. Erskine-Crum to consider the awards of the Boundary Commission. File No. L/P&J/10/117, I.O.L.R.

reference of the Boundary Commission.² Eminent lawyers had confirmed this point of view. These tracts were an excluded area, and were not represented in the Bengal Council. He and his colleagues had given assurances to petty chiefs from the Chittagong Hill Tracts who had come to see them that there was no question of the territory being included in Pakistan.³ The population of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, though small (approximately 1 million) was 97% Buddhist and Hindu. There was not the least doubt that the people themselves would prefer to form part of India. On religious and cultural grounds, the Chittagong Hill Tracts should form part of India. Sir Cyril Radcliffe had had no business to touch them....⁴

Pandit Nehru's view was that India should undertake the administration of the whole territory; a strip on either side of the river allocated to Pakistan would cut the territory in two. If the Chittagong Hill Tracts were given to India, an agreement between the two Dominion Governments, whereby Pakistan would obtain all desired facilities, could well be made....⁵

Pandit Nehru said that he considered that the award of the Boundary Commission in the Punjab was likely to have a bad effect among the Sikhs, who presented a particularly difficult problem....⁶

Pandit Nehru suggested that he and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan should also visit Lahore and Amritsar the following day, and this was agreed. Pandit

2. The Commission was to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Bengal after ascertaining the contiguous areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. The Congress had staked its claim to 59 per cent of the area and 46 per cent of the population of the undivided Bengal. Under the award, only 36 per cent of the area and 35 per cent of the population came to West Bengal. Chittagong Hill Tracts, which had a Muslim population of hardly 3 per cent and Khulna, an overwhelmingly Hindu-majority area, had been transferred to Pakistan. Further, Darjeeling, a part of West Bengal, had been totally cut off from the rest of the province.
3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 3, pp. 164-165.
4. At this point of the discussions Fazlur Rahman, then Pakistan's Minister of Interior, supported the Commission's competence to allot the Hill Tracts to East Bengal. He disputed the allocation of Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts to India. Mountbatten explained that economic reasons necessitated the inclusion of the Hill Tracts in East Bengal. However, adjustments could be made by allotting a strip of land on either side of the river to East Bengal while India could administer the rest of the Hill Tracts.
5. Liaquat Ali Khan said that the award, taken as a whole, was unfair to Pakistan and therefore no adjustment could be considered. Mountbatten suggested the allotment of some predominantly Muslim areas to Pakistan in exchange for the Hill Tracts.
6. The joint demand of the Congress and Sikhs that protection of the cultural and religious life of the Sikhs, strategic conditions, economic security and a national distribution of the irrigation systems, river waters, canal colonies, etc., be made the basis for boundary demarcation had been bypassed. In all, 38 per cent of the area and 45 per cent of the population were assigned to East Punjab. West Punjab was awarded 61 per cent of the area and 55 per cent of the population plus a major share of the income of the undivided province.

Nehru said that he had received particularly alarming reports⁷ from Lahore, where many hundreds of Sikhs and Hindus were gathered together in relief camps without proper protection and without rations....⁸

Pandit Nehru finally emphasized that he and his colleagues felt themselves to be in a moral impasse about the Chittagong Hill Tracts, because, throughout the previous two or three months, they had given countless assurances to the representatives of that territory that it could not be included in Pakistan. Furthermore, this action had been taken after consultation with lawyers....

7. On the night of 15 August 1947, Dera Saheb Gurdwara of Lahore, where thousands of Sikhs had taken shelter, was burnt down by Muslim mobs.
8. Liaquat Ali promised that steps would be taken to ensure the safety of the refugees in West Punjab.

4. Joint Action to Subdue Violence¹

Three days ago, transfer of power took place in India and Pakistan and new Governments were installed. This historic event was celebrated with great enthusiasm almost everywhere except in the Punjab. In both West Punjab and in East Punjab, instead of rejoicing there was continuing disaster and terrible suffering.

The first act of our Governments was to consider this serious situation in the Punjab and statements and appeals were immediately issued.² On the morning of August 17 we visited Ambala and a conference³ was held there consisting of the Governors, Ministers and the senior officers of West Punjab and East Punjab. Sardar Baldev Singh, Defence Minister, India, was present, as also the Deputy Supreme Commander (Army)⁴ and the

1. Joint statement issued by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, Amritsar, 18 August 1947. *National Herald*, 21 August 1947.
2. See *ante*, item 1.
3. Steps were taken at this conference to improve liaison between the two civil Governments and between them and the military, to set up a joint committee for the coordination of administrative measures and to enlarge the Punjab Boundary Force.
4. Lt.-Gen. Sir Arthur Francis Smith.

Commander⁵ of the Punjab Boundary Force. We had also the advantage of conferring informally with the various leaders of communities, including Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh.

At this conference, it was unanimously decided that every possible step must be taken immediately to put an end to this orgy of violence, arson and crime both in East and West Punjab. These steps will include administrative and military arrangements, as well as an appeal by the leaders of the people. No government worthy of the name can tolerate such lawlessness and crime. The present Governments, whether at the Centre or in the Punjab, are new Governments, three days old, and they want to break from the past. They are fully responsible today for everything that occurs and they are determined to bring peace and order and security to the Punjab. It is clear that every community has suffered and will suffer if disorder continues. Arrangements have, therefore, been made for concerted action between the Governments of East and West Punjab, supported by the Central Governments and with the full cooperation of the leaders of all communities, to put down firmly and immediately all elements of disorder.

All officers of whatever grade and standing are desired to act according to this policy and they will be fully supported in any action taken in a bona fide manner. If disorder continues in an area this means the failure of any officer on duty there. The Governments of East and West Punjab and the Central Governments expect every officer, whatever his grade, to do his duty at this critical juncture without showing any partisanship or weakness.

Any steps that the Governments may take must necessarily depend on public support and we appeal, therefore, to the public of East and West Punjab to forget the past and give their full support to this policy and thus to help in suppressing anti-social elements which are a grave menace to all communities.

Both the Governments of the Punjab and the Central Governments will do their utmost to give help and succour to the evacuees and refugees.

We are confident that the measures which have now been initiated will succeed. Indeed, a marked change for the better is already noticeable. The Central Governments are giving first priority to the Punjab situation and will render the fullest assistance to the two provincial governments. Whatever the cost, peace and order will be restored.⁶

5. Maj.-Gen. T.W. Rees.

6. After the Ambala meeting Tara Singh toured the East Punjab in military transport, appealing to the Sikhs to refrain from violence. Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan went on together to Lahore and Amritsar, where they issued this statement. These visits were reported to have helped in restoring confidence of the regional minorities.

5. The Unhappy Land of the Five Rivers¹

On the 15th and 16th August India celebrated the coming of independence; not only India but Indians, wherever they happened to be in this wide world. I have received thousands of messages of greeting from abroad. They have come from representatives of great nations, from famous men and from Indians from every remote corner of this world. While I have been deeply moved by these messages from the leaders of other countries welcoming India into the fellowship of free nations, nothing has affected me more than the very touching messages from our countrymen overseas. Cut away from their motherland they have hungered for India's freedom even more perhaps than we have, and the coming of this freedom has been a tremendous event in their lives. May the new India always remember her children abroad who look to her with such pride and affection and give them all the succour she can.

Nearly the whole of India celebrated the coming of independence, but not so the unhappy land of the five rivers. In the Punjab, both in the East and the West, there was disaster and sorrow. There was murder and arson and looting in many places and streams of refugees poured out from one place to another. One of the first tasks of our Government was to think of the Punjab and so I hurried thither on the 17th morning, accompanied by my colleague, Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, and some of his colleagues. I want to tell you what we found there and what we did there. There have been wild rumours enough and people's minds all over India are naturally agitated because whatever happens, the people of the Punjab, whether they live to the east or to the west, are our own kith and kin and anything that affects them affects us.

You must remember that till the 15th August there was a different regime in the Punjab as a whole. The province was governed under Section 93 of the Government of India Act. The change-over took place on the 15th and the new provincial governments thus are only four days old. So also are the new Central Governments. These governments, Central or provincial, are directly responsible only since the 15th August. The provincial governments of East and West Punjab had to face a terrible crisis in the very hour of their birth, even before they had settled down to work or had proper offices functioning.

1. Broadcast to the nation from A.I.R., New Delhi, 19 August 1947. A.I.R. Tapes' N.M.M.L.

The story of disastrous happenings in the Punjab takes us back many months to March of this year. One disaster has followed another, each producing its reaction elsewhere.² I am not going to narrate the story, nor am I going to apportion blame. There has been sufficient murder and arson and crime of all descriptions in many parts of the Punjab, and this fair province, so rich, has suffered untold agony during these months. It would serve little purpose to go into this long story. We began our new life from the 15th August.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Baldev Singh and I went to Ambala first and held a conference there with ministers of East and West Punjab and various civil and military officers. We met also the leaders of various communities, notably the Akali Sikh leaders—Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh. We went then to Lahore and had a first-hand account of occurrences there and then to Amritsar.

In both Amritsar and Lahore we heard a ghastly tale and we saw thousands of refugees, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh. There were some fires still burning in the city and reports of recent outrages reached us. We were all unanimously of opinion that we must deal firmly with the situation as we found it and not enter into acrimonious debate about the past, and that the situation demanded that crime must be put an end to immediately at whatever cost. The alternative was complete chaos and ruin for the land and for every community. Anti-social elements were abroad, defying all authority and destroying the very structure of society. Unless these elements were suppressed, to whatever community they belonged, there was no freedom or even security for any person; and so, all of us who were present, whether we belonged to the two Central or the two provincial governments, or whether we were leading members of the various communities, pledged ourselves to do our utmost to put an end to this orgy of murder and arson. We have taken steps to this end, effective not only from the administrative and military points of view, but what is even more important, from the point of view of a popular approach to all our people. We have established high-level committees of the two provincial governments of the Punjab and liaison officers between the civil and the military authorities, so that there should be the fullest amount of cooperation between the two provincial governments and the military forces. We have pledged the Central Governments to help in this task. Popular leaders have assured us of their fullest cooperation. I am convinced that we shall deal with this situation effectively and that fairly soon security will return to the Punjab, but that requires the utmost effort and constant vigilance from all concerned, whether they are officers of government or others. Each one of us who cares for his country must help in this business of restoring peace and security.

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 2, pp. 291-312.

In the past we have had unfortunately communal troubles on a large scale. They are not going to be tolerated in the future. So far as the Government of India is concerned, they will deal with any communal outbreak with the greatest firmness. They will treat every Indian on an equal basis and try to secure him all the rights which he shares with others. Our state is not a communal state, but a democratic state in which every citizen has equal rights. The Government is determined to protect these rights.

I have been assured by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan that this is also the policy of the Pakistan Government.

We have made arrangements for the transport of refugees from Lahore to Amritsar or Amritsar to Lahore. They will be carried by railway trains and motor lorries and we hope that very soon most of those who so want will be carried to their destinations. We are further making arrangements for their proper accommodation and food. The Government of India have sanctioned today a sum of five lakhs of rupees to the East Punjab Government for the care of refugees. They have sanctioned a further sum of five lakhs of rupees for the help of refugees who have come to Delhi and elsewhere. Our Refugee Commissioner, Mr. Chandra³, is proceeding immediately to Amritsar. We are appointing a Deputy High Commissioner⁴ in Lahore to look after our interests there and, more especially, to look after the refugees who wish to come to East Punjab. We hope to provide a number of tents to the East Punjab Government for accommodating the refugees. In every way that is possible to us we shall help the unfortunate sufferers in the Punjab. So far as the eastern Punjab is concerned, it is our direct responsibility and we shall act accordingly.

While we shall give every help to those who wish to come to East Punjab, we would not like to encourage mass migration of peoples across the new borders, for this will involve tremendous misery for all concerned. We hope that peace and order will be established and people will have security to carry on their avocations.

While we have done all this, ultimately the future depends on the cooperation we receive from the people. It is with confident expectation of this cooperation that we are proceeding and declaring with conviction that we shall settle this Punjab problem soon. We can make no progress there or

3. C. N. Chandra (1896-1968); joined I.C.S. in 1922; after serving in the Punjab for several years was posted in Amritsar as refugee commissioner, 1947; Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1948-57; member, Land Administration Commission, Malaya, 1957; edited *Philatelic Journal of India* for many years.
4. K. L. Panjabi (b. 1898); joined I.C.S. in 1922 and was posted in Gujarat; Secretary, Ministry of Food, 1946; posted as Deputy High Commissioner in Pakistan, October 1947; Secretary, Ministry of Agriculture, 1948; retired as Chief Secretary, Bombay Government, 1959; author of biographies of Rajendra Prasad (1960) and Vallabhbhai Patel (1962).

passed and he was less hard-worked, I would be prepared to show him a report which I had asked Sir Evan Jenkins to write which was designed to meet precisely the charge he was now making.³ The Prime Minister said he would be pleased to see this and would be glad to find that he was wrong.

4. He told me that at the meeting that he and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had had with Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh,⁴ Master Tara Singh had candidly admitted that the Sikh leaders had been openly inciting their followers to violence and had approved of most of what they had done up-to-date. He agreed, however, that things now had gone too far and were becoming extremely dangerous for the Sikh population itself. He and the other Sikh leaders were therefore prepared to throw their influence into the scales to stop the fighting.

5. A disturbing feature of the troubles was the hostile action taken by the crowds against leaders of their own community. The Prime Minister quoted the case of the Nawab of Mamdot (Chief Minister of the West Punjab) whose house was surrounded by a hostile Muslim League crowd who threatened to stone him.

6. The Prime Minister also quoted the case of a Hindu-Sikh crowd at Amritsar who burnt down the newly requisitioned houses to which the Government of the East Punjab had transferred their records. The excuse that the houses were owned by Muslims was clearly inadmissible in view of the fact that they were then occupied by the Government.

7. The Prime Minister went on to say that the middle classes of all communities were now thoroughly frightened, and he felt that everybody was really going to make an effort to make this warfare end.

3. In a memorandum to Mounthatten dated 4 August 1947, Jenkins dealt with the criticism and allegations of partiality made against him for his handling of the 1947 disturbances.

4. On 17 August 1947.

7. Telegram to Mahatma Gandhi¹

May I offer you my respectful congratulations on the wonderful change in

1. New Delhi, 21 August 1947. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.

Calcutta.² Situation in Punjab still very grave though slowly improving. We are grappling with it with all our might and hope to succeed. Punjab will require your healing presence.

2. Mahatma Gandhi, who was in Calcutta on 9 August 1947 on his way to Noakhali to resume his peace mission, was pressed by Muslim leaders including Suhrawardy, former Prime Minister of Bengal, to stay on to prevent the outbreak of communal riots. On 13 August 1947, he moved with Suhrawardy to a house in an area considered unsafe for Muslims. He preached peace in his prayer meetings and walked with Suhrawardy through streets tense with religious frenzy. Violence subsided wherever they went. Thousands of Muslims and Hindus embraced one another greeting, "Long live Mahatma Gandhi" and "Long live Hindu-Muslim unity". After 14 August 1947 no disturbances were reported in Calcutta. Mountbatten hailed Mahatma Gandhi as the "one-man boundary force" whose miracle had transformed Calcutta overnight.

8. Closer Coordination between Civil and Military Wings¹

Prime Minister, India, explained that he and his colleagues were much exercised over the existing situation and were anxious only to help. He outlined certain measures that the civil authorities were taking e.g. additional air services, loans of tents to supplement normal facilities that had broken down. He felt that there was room for closer coordination between the military authorities and the two civil Governments, although there was no intention of disturbing the chain of responsibility from the Joint Defence Council through the Supreme Commander² and Gen. Rees³ for overall control of all troops in the Boundary Force. He said that one of the main problems was that of refugees, and that Hindu and Sikh refugees, from the psychological aspect, should be handled by Hindu and Sikh officials, and that the

1. Minutes of the Joint Defence Council meeting, Delhi, Extracts. 21 August 1947. R/3/1/171, I.O.L.R. This meeting was attended by Jawaharlal Nehru, Mountbatten, Baldev Singh, Claude Auchinleck, Zahid Husain, the High Commissioner of Pakistan to India, G.S. Bhalja, Defence Secretary, India, A.D.F. Dundas, Defence Secretary, Pakistan, Brigadier J.G. Elio and Lt.-Col. Erskine-Crum.
2. Claude Auchinleck.
3. Major-General Thomas Wynford Rees (1898-1959); served in two World Wars; Major-General, 1947; Commander, Punjab Boundary Force, Aug-Sept., 1947; Head, Military Emergency Staff to Emergency Committee of the Indian Cabinet, Sept.-Dec., 1947; retired 1948.

opposite would apply to Muslims in the West Punjab. He had had transmitted to him through Gen. Rees a somewhat alarming report from the Khan of Mamdot indicating that the situation was deteriorating and even suggesting that he personally should move into East Punjab.⁴ Prime Minister, India, and Defence Minister, India, announced their intention of visiting the area. . . .

4. Auchinleck said that the Nawab of Mamdot's information "was out of date and perhaps influenced by alarmist reports which were inevitable in the conditions now existing".

9. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram.² West Punjab Premier's message appears based on incorrect reports. We have been in close touch with happenings in East Punjab and receiving reports both from Governor and Boundary Force Commander. These agree that situation improving and being gradually controlled. Serious occurrence took place in Hoshiarpur some days ago. We are doing our utmost to put an end rapidly to lawlessness and disorder. Governor and Ministers, East Punjab, fixed headquarters at Jullundur touring daily surrounding districts. Sardar Baldev Singh and Brigadier Thimayya³ in Jullundur today for conference and touring affected areas. I intend going there myself on Sunday. Considerable number of persons including Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh touring rural areas to bring peace. All these having marked effect. Have every hope that we shall bring situation under full control soon with your Government's cooperation in West Punjab.

1. 22 August 1947. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 248-249.
2. On 22 August, Liaquat Ali Khan had alleged serious deterioration in the situation in a number of places in East Punjab, the news of which had heightened tension on their side. He requested Nehru to shift his headquarters to East Punjab.
3. K.S. Thimayya (1906-1965); commissioned into Indian Army, 1926; commander, Indian troops in Kashmir, 1947-50; Chairman, Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission for Korea, 1953-54; Chief of Army Staff, 1957-61; died in air crash when he was Commander, U.N. Forces in Cyprus, 1965.

10. To Mahatma Gandhi¹

New Delhi
22 August 1947

Dear Bapu,

Thank you for your letter.² I do not ask you to go to the Punjab immediately. We must face the situation now. Later I might request you to go there.

2. The situation there during the last three or four days has been bad, very bad. My visit there on the 17th and 18th produced good results in Amritsar and, to some extent, in Lahore. Amritsar, both the city and villages, has been fairly quiet. But just about that time the southern districts, which had been free from any major trouble, blew up unexpectedly so far as we were concerned. The districts of Hoshiarpur and Jullundur especially have witnessed some horrible deeds and large-scale massacres of Muslims. It is quite impossible to form any estimate of people killed. I imagine, however, that during the last month the number killed in eastern Punjab might amount to 7 or 8 thousand. These figures may be completely wrong as they are guess-work.

3. In western Punjab probably the number of those killed is much less, may be half the other figure. This, of course, applies to recent weeks only and not to the previous Rawalpindi and Multan killings. There has been far more arson and looting in western Punjab than in eastern.

4. All this killing business has reached a stage of complete madness, and vast populations are deserting their habitations and trekking to the west or to the east. A large number had left western Punjab in previous months, as you know. Now the process is repeated on both sides.

5. The present trouble started about three weeks ago in Amritsar rural areas. The Sikhs were the aggressors. Within a week Lahore retaliated, the Muslims being the aggressors. Since then it has spread on both sides, perhaps more so in eastern Punjab where well-armed bands, chiefly Sikh, partly Hindu, had been roaming about and attacking predominantly Muslim villages. Normally Muslims are safe in a village where they are in a minority. Their neighbours do not attack them. Armed bands go specially to Muslim majority villages in eastern Punjab. Something of this kind happens in western Punjab too, but our information is limited.

1. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Mahatma Gandhi had written on 22 August 1947: "Noakhali demands my presence. Bihar too will take a few days. Under the circumstances I do not know when I shall be able to go to the Punjab. You will guide me."

6. It appears that most of the petty Government officials join in this business, including policemen. Sometimes soldiers also. The whole thing is revolting in the extreme.

7. Dr. Zakir Husain tried to go to Kashmir for a holiday three days ago. The train service was not running properly and he had to get down in Jullundur. At the station itself he narrowly escaped being killed by an armed band and some Indian soldiers standing by merely looked on. Ultimately a Sikh captain in the army rescued him at some risk to himself. Zakir Husain returned this morning, safe and unhurt, but minus all his belongings and money. I rather hesitate to write to you about all this as I do not wish to add to your worries. But I think that you should know what is happening. I have no doubt that we shall put an end to this business within the next few days, at any rate, so far as major events are concerned. But what a terrible legacy! The Punjab will be a ruined province, both West and East, and vast numbers of human beings will be destitute.

8. At present there is no doubt that the Muslim League leaders as well as Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh are trying to stop the slaughter and arson, having previously lighted the fuse. I am going to Jullundur on Sunday morning.

9. The press message you have sent is largely untrue or greatly exaggerated.⁵ So far as Maulana Azad is concerned, no request has been made for any grant for furniture. The question of furnishing his new house did arise when an estimate was made by some firm. He said it was excessive and rejected it.

10. About Asaf Ali, there has been no special demand for any large sum. Some petty demands come from time to time. As for Sarup, she is having an exceedingly difficult time in Moscow where apparently nothing is obtainable and everything is frightfully expensive. She intended giving a small party to the diplomats on August 15th. She wanted to invite about 200 persons. The estimate for this party came to 100,000 roubles which means about Rs. 36,000/-. Naturally she gave up the idea. Living in Moscow, for foreigners at least, is quite astonishingly expensive, especially in a hotel which is very second rate. She hopes to move to a house fairly soon. She

3. On 20 August 1947, *The Bombay Chronicle* alleged that Vijayalakshmi Pandit wished to furnish her house in Moscow with Swedish furniture estimated to cost £25,000 and Maulana Azad desired to furnish his official residence at a cost of Rs. 36,000. It was further said that a proposal from Asaf Ali, India's Ambassador to the United States, for buying new crockery and cutlery had been rejected.

has been very fortunate in getting a house, and this is supposed to be a very rare privilege which the Soviet Government has accorded to her. Normally Ambassadors do not get houses for a year or so. This house, which will function as the Embassy, has to be furnished both for the Embassy offices and for living purposes. The equipment and furniture are not obtainable in Moscow except at very high prices indeed. Normally, therefore, foreign embassies buy their furniture etc., from Stockholm which is relatively near. Being a stranger there she consulted the Russians, of course, as well as the Chinese Ambassador who is the doyen of the diplomatic corps. She made it clear that she wanted to do things as simply as possible but tastefully, of course. She was advised that she should get most of the things she wanted in the shape of office equipment and furniture from Stockholm. She was further told that a certain standard has to be kept up in the Embassy, or else the Russians would consider it as a mark of disrespect. She decided, therefore, to go herself to Stockholm to have a look round. She hasn't gone thus far. The estimate prepared by her staff in consultation with people there, for furniture and equipment of the Embassy, was for £20,000/-. The pound, having fallen in value, doesn't buy as much as it used to. We have suggested to her to reduce this sum fairly considerably. As a matter of fact I knew nothing about this till yesterday. Some of my office people were dealing with the matter. We made enquiries here from various embassies and legations who had experience of conditions in Russia and they all told us that the furnishing of a whole building for office and living purposes was a very expensive affair.

11. In view of circumstances we have cut down our expenditure on the expansion of foreign missions very greatly. Indeed we have stopped expansion. We couldn't very well leave out Russia as Moscow is highly important today, the other two important places being London and Washington. Both the latter places are on a much bigger scale than Moscow. The only other places we are thinking of at present are Iran and Egypt and they have a very special importance for particular reasons.

12. As you know, Chandralekha has gone with Sarup. I suggested to her to do some regular work and to function as a kind of Public Relations Officer. This is entirely honorary work and she is not paid for it. I mention this as some reference has been made to it in the press.⁴

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. On 12 August 1947, *The Hindustan Times* carried a Reuter report from Moscow about her appointment.

11. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
22 August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have just received per messenger a letter² from Governor Trivedi from Jullundur. I enclose copy of this letter. While there has been improvement in Amritsar and some other districts, in the southern districts of Jullundur etc., the last three or four days have been bad.

I am sending this letter to you in your capacity as Chairman of the Defence Council for such action as you may think possible and desirable.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. R/3/1/171, I.O.L.R.
2. Trivedi found the existing police force inadequate to deal with the deteriorating law and order situation in parts of East Punjab, particularly in Hoshiarpur, Jullundur, Ferozepur and Ludhiana. He wanted the Punjab Boundary Force to be reinforced by two additional brigades.

12. No Retaliation¹

Disturbing news have been reaching me from some areas of West Punjab where the situation has deteriorated lately.² I understand the anxiety of the people for the well-being of their kith and kin in West Punjab, but retaliation in any form or shape is certainly no remedy. Once complete peace is restored in East Punjab, our energies can be fully devoted to ensuring the safety of the minorities in West Punjab.

Every citizen must help in creating an atmosphere in which the wrongdoers, whoever they might be, will not be tolerated. It is the duty of the

1. Speeches at several roadside gatherings in Jullundur and Amritsar, 24 August 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times* and *National Herald*, 25 August 1947.
2. Riots had been breaking out in Jullundur and Amritsar from the beginning of August 1947 and, it was alleged that the Sikhs in an organised form had been butchering hundreds of Muslims daily, forcing thousands to flee westward and burning Muslim villages and homes. It was said that Amritsar and Jullundur became quiet because there were no Muslims left. Meanwhile, the Muslims retaliated. Before long the cities of the Punjab were in flames, while armed bands of Muslims and Sikhs roamed the country committing unbelievable outrages.

Hindus and the Sikhs in the East Punjab, irrespective of what is happening elsewhere, to protect the minorities. That is how we can safeguard the interests of the minorities in West Punjab. Peaceful conditions must be restored and every citizen must share his responsibility. The responsibility of officials in this respect is even greater and they must be ever vigilant and impartial in the discharge of their duties.

All possible assistance will be provided in evacuating the people who have been rendered homeless or have suffered otherwise. However, I am not in favour of wholesale migration of population.³ Certain people who were stranded had to be evacuated, but it is certainly not in the interest of the majority of the people to be uprooted from the soil. Their lives and interests have to be protected and both the Governments of India and Pakistan are responsible for the well-being of the minorities in their areas. I appeal once again to the people to create a peaceful atmosphere in the province and help the administration in restoring law and order.

3. When partition had become a reality certain leaders thought that a planned exchange of population was the only way to save people from a communal holocaust. Swaran Singh, leader of the Panthic Assembly Party, said on 10 July 1947 that the transfer of populations was the solution which would be to the ultimate good of both Pakistan and Hindustan. Nehru, however, thought that this was only a very temporary phase. But towards the end of August 1947 innumerable multitudes, from towns and villages alike, left their homes and all their possessions, except perhaps what they could carry with them, and trekked to the hoped-for safety of the west if they were Muslims, or the east if they were Sikhs or Hindus.

13. Cable to Zafrullah Khan¹

Your telegram.² Have just returned from visit to Jullundur and Amritsar where I enquired about Qadian.³ We are doing our utmost to protect

1. 25 August 1947. R/3/1/171, I.O.L.R.
2. Zafrullah Khan, who was the leader of the Ahmadiya community, alleged that the Ahmadiya headquarters and his home at Qadian in East Punjab were surrounded by hostile Sikhs and requested for adequate protection.
3. In fact Qadian was the operational base of the Ahmadiyas who sallied into the non-Muslim areas of West Punjab. These men wore military uniform and were led by former military officers. They had jeeps, guns, army ammunition and civilian planes, which acted as 'observers' and communicated to 'headquarters' the result of attacks on non-Muslim villages and sent wireless calls for re-inforcements. When the Indian military authorities started combing out Qadian they recovered arms and ammunition. The offending planes had to be grounded by threats. The non-Muslims of the area were so incensed by these depredations carried out by the Qadianis that only a strong Indian military guard could save the colony from retaliation.

minority communities in East Punjab and Qadian has in this connection been visited by Boundary Force. I was informed by responsible officers that well armed private regiment kept at Qadian also two aeroplanes which had been used for firing from air on people in surrounding areas. Wireless messages intercepted from these planes which demonstrate that organised attacks made by people from Qadian on surrounding villages. This has excited people that area. Please inform Ahmadiya¹ leaders at Qadian that any such aggressive action will not only endanger them, but also cannot be tolerated by East Punjab Government. Matter has been referred to General Rees, Commander, Punjab Boundary Force.

4. The followers of the Muslim sect founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1889.

14. To Sushila Nayar¹

New Delhi
25 August 1947

My dear Sushila,

You have been having a very bad time at Wah camp.² One can face almost any risk or danger, but complete isolation from one's friends without even the possibility of communication is a much harder thing to bear. We have had practically no news of happenings in the West Punjab districts. But the little news we have had has been bad enough.

2. We are doing our utmost to bring relief to the Hindu and Sikh refugees in West Punjab and to evacuate them as soon as possible. Sardar Sampooran Singh is functioning as our Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore and it is his chief job to help the refugees and evacuees. Today Sri Prakasa with a considerable staff has gone to Lahore and he is taking up this matter immediately with the authorities there. He proposes to visit our principal camps to see things for himself.

3. We have asked the Pakistan Government to arrange for Hindu or Sikh guards for Hindu and Sikh camps. We are trying to fix up some air-

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Mahatma Gandhi visited a refugee camp at Wah in the Gujrat district of West Punjab on 4 August where 9,000 Hindu and Sikh refugees were awaiting evacuation. The refugees appealed to Mahatma Gandhi to stay with them till 15 August as they feared for their lives. Expressing his inability to stay on as he had to go to Noakhali the Mahatma sought to allay their fears by referring to Jinnah's assurances of protection to refugees. He also left Sushila Nayar behind in the camp.

craft to evacuate our refugees in distant places in Western Punjab. I intend going to the Punjab in another three or four days' time and I might be able to visit some of the camps. Sri Prakasa also proposes to go round. Perhaps he might visit you at Wah.

4. There are, of course, considerable difficulties in going about any part of the Punjab now. I hope we shall be able to overcome most of these though I fear that plenty of obstruction will remain.

5. Bapu has asked me if he should go to the Punjab. It is a difficult question to answer. I think he should go but a little later. In present conditions it would be difficult for him to go about and visit places. He would personally prefer going to Noakhali first for a few days. I am writing to him accordingly.³

6. You must know of the very great success of Bapu's visit to Calcutta. Instead of the trouble everyone feared there was peace and embracing between Hindus and Muslims on the 15th August and later. This was nothing short of a miracle.

7. Here in Delhi there are vast numbers of Punjabi refugees, probably over a 100,000. Indeed these refugees from the Punjab and the Frontier crowd all over the place in North India and create many problems.

8. I earnestly hope that nothing untoward will happen to your charges before full relief arrives. You should cheer them up and keep them in good heart and assure them that we are doing our utmost.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

3. See next item.

15. To Mahatma Gandhi¹

New Delhi
25 August 1947

Dear Bapu,

I have received your letter of the 24th.² Evidently this was written before

1. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Mahatma Gandhi had stated that in view of the happenings in the Punjab, he was willing to postpone his work in Bengal and Bihar and proceed to the Punjab, if necessary.

you received my last letter.³ I returned this morning from the Punjab after a short visit.

2. In my last letter I gave you some idea of conditions in the Punjab. The second visit⁴ has depressed me even more. During the past year we have had a pretty full dose of horror and brutality and sadistic violence in Noakhali, Bihar, Rawalpindi, Hazara, etc. The new phase in the Punjab, which might be said to have started about a month ago and to have come to a crisis in the second week of August, has, I think, on the whole surpassed in horror its predecessors. The results also are likely to be far more far-reaching. This is, of course, due to a combination of circumstances among which is the partition⁵ of the Punjab and the establishment of Pakistan. Normally even after the worse riots most people stick to their homes. Now with the coming of Pakistan the urge to get out of it has added to the normal urge to escape from a dangerous zone. On both sides of the border in the Punjab people are affected in this way and mass migrations are taking place on a vast scale. These are largely spontaneous. Inevitably this is resulting and will result in misery for hundreds of thousands of people. It will mean also a tremendous burden on all Governments concerned, Provincial and Central, on both sides.

3. In my last letter I gave you some kind of an estimate of deaths. It is just impossible to approach accuracy. But there is no doubt that mass massacres have taken place in the most cruel manner in cities and rural areas alike. I imagine that during these last three weeks more people have been killed (Muslims) in eastern Punjab than in western Punjab (Hindus and Sikhs). The Muslims of Amritsar district, that is the survivors, told me that 50,000 of them had perished in the district. This is certainly wild exaggeration. But we should not be surprised if anything upto 10,000 were killed in eastern Punjab. On the other side the figure might be somewhat lower. We really do not know. There has been widespread killing on both sides and large numbers of refugees have been massacred. In eastern Punjab probably the Akali Sikhs have indulged in killing more than anyone else.

3. See *ante*, item 10.

4. Nehru visited the Punjab on 24 August 1947.

5. The Radcliffe award, announced on 17 August 1947, gave to East Punjab the control over three of the five rivers the Beas, the Sutlej and the upper waters of the Ravi. About thirty-eight per cent of the area and forty-five per cent of the population were assigned to it. The non-Muslims of the Punjab, especially the Sikhs, bitterly resented the loss of Lahore and the canal colonies of Sheikhupura, Lyallpur and Montgomery, though Amritsar was given to India. As countless numbers of Sikhs from West Punjab began a mass trek eastwards, their fellow-Sikhs in the east, driven by an overwhelming sense of loss and betrayal, unleashed violence.

4. Worse than the killing have been the horrible outrages on women on both sides.

5. At the present moment major killings have stopped. But this continues in a small way in many places.

6. It is said and rightly that Lahore and Amritsar are quiet. The fact is that there are not many people left there to be killed. That is to say that Lahore has become almost entirely a Muslim city and Amritsar a Hindu-Sikh city. Not more than 10% of the original Hindu-Sikh population remains in Lahore and perhaps even less than 10% of the original Muslims are now in Amritsar. Large numbers of these people are in refugee camps.

7. It is not much good my giving you any details. The present problem is to put an end completely to this business of killing and arson and to look after the refugees who are pouring in and out. Arrangements in East Punjab are highly unsatisfactory partly because the Government there is still in a formative stage and hardly functions. We are sending immediately Sri Prakasa, our High Commissioner in Pakistan, with a staff to Lahore, to get in touch with all the refugee camps there and help in evacuation and transport. We have also sent a number of other persons to western Punjab to help in this business. In eastern Punjab we are thinking of the Central Government taking charge of the refugees. The Provincial Government is not capable of looking after them.

8. I have little doubt that the Pakistan High Command is desirous of establishing peace in the Punjab. They are a new state and cannot afford long continuing troubles which sap their strength and ruin their economy. Also they are rather afraid of developments in the Frontier⁶ and do not want to get entangled in the Punjab. They are trying, therefore, in their own way, to stop this lawlessness. But more and more, both in the East and West Punjab, habitually lawless elements are coming to the front and they are not prepared to listen to the leaders. There are internal conflicts also in both Provinces. In western Punjab there is conflict between Mamdot, the Prime Minister, and Feroz Khan Noon.⁷ Noon appears to be encouraging the wilder elements in the League. In eastern Punjab, there is a good deal of

6. The Frontier Province had voted by a narrow majority to join Pakistan and when the Muslim League took over on 15 August 1947 the Khan brothers were arrested, their supporters were hunted down and the influence of the Khudai Khidmatgars was almost wholly broken.

7. There was political rivalry between Feroz Khan Noon and the Nawab of Mamdot. Both contested for leadership of the Muslim League Party in the Punjab Assembly. But Noon, at the time of the election on 5 August 1947, withdrew his name as he was not supported by Jinnah.

stress and strain between the Sikhs and the Hindus. The Akalis, or some of them, do not hesitate to talk in terms of establishing a Sikh State as a result of this turmoil. Their logic is not very good but there is little doubt that many of them have vague hopes that something advantageous to them might happen if trouble continued. Some of these think that they can force India to go to war with Pakistan. In such a war they imagine that Pakistan is bound to be defeated and then Sikhistan will emerge.

9. Master Tara Singh and Giani Kartar Singh, however, have been trying to get peace restored. Their influence does not seem to go as far as many people imagined.⁸ The wilder elements among the Akalis have joined hands with some of the R.S.S. people.

10. An incident, which is symptomatic, occurred two days ago in Amritsar. The Sikhs attacked a Hindu village and are said to have killed some Hindus and raped some Hindu women.

11. The situation in the Punjab raises a variety of difficult problems. We are dealing with them to the best of our ability. I hope to go back to the Punjab in another three or four days and intend staying some days there.

12. As for your going there, it is exceedingly difficult for me to advise. This morning, at a meeting of the Joint Defence Council, Mountbatten urged me to request you to go to the Punjab and he hoped that you would repeat your Calcutta miracle there. I told him that I was myself not clear about this. I feel you should go but not just yet.

13. We are making special efforts to have news of the Wah camp and to get it protected or evacuated.

14. So far as the army is concerned, in the Punjab, there can be no doubt that it is influenced by communal feelings and given the chance has acted up to them. But outwardly and generally it has observed discipline and carried out orders. The police has been much worse.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

8. For example, when a vast column of Muslims was about to pass through Amritsar Indian Army officers tried to get Master Tara Singh to guarantee its safety. As the city was full of Sikh refugees from the West in an ugly mood, he could give no such assurance. The column was therefore diverted along another canal road.

16. To Sardar Ishan Singh¹

New Delhi
26 August 1947

Dear Sardar Saheb,²

I have received your letter of the 22nd August and have read of the plight of Hindu and Sikh residents in your area. We fully appreciate your difficulties and dangers and we are taking all the measures that we can to bring relief to you and others in that area. We have not been unconcerned about the killing and arson in western Punjab though detailed information has not been available. We have now made arrangements not only to get this information from western Punjab but also to give immediate help to the Hindu and Sikh refugees there.

2. Our High Commissioner for Pakistan, Shri Sri Prakasa, went today to Lahore with a full staff. In Lahore we have also our Deputy High Commissioner for Pakistan, Sardar Sampooran Singh. We are trying to appoint agents in every district of West Punjab.

3. As regards evacuation of refugees, we are making arrangements both by air and otherwise. I hope that within a few days these arrangements will be completed. I can assure you and our friends in western Punjab that we are doing our utmost in this matter. But naturally we have been handicapped in many ways.

4. Some of us propose to visit western Punjab districts soon.

5. I hope you will be able to get in touch with some of our agents in the districts of western Punjab. If this is difficult, I hope you can certainly reach our High Commissioner or Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore who can easily communicate with us. Shri Sri Prakasa proposes to tour the various Hindu and Sikh refugee camps in West Punjab.

6. I hope that our friends in West Punjab will not lose heart. We shall help them to the utmost of our capacity.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N. M. M. L.

2. At this time Manager, Gurdwara Committee, Sri Punjab Sahib, Attock, Pakistan.

17. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
27 August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I do not quite know why I am writing to you. There is no particular purpose behind this letter except to unburden my mind a little.

2. The last few days have been difficult ones because of the progressively bad news from the Punjab. Today many reports reached me from one or less reliable sources, and these have distressed me greatly. Our High Commissioner for Pakistan, who was present in Lahore, sent a message through the telephone to say that, according to information received by him, a very large number of persons were being done to death daily and he felt quite helpless about it as he could do nothing. I do not mention the figure he gave because it is incredible. No doubt the reports he had must have been exaggerated. Still he is not a man to be easily led away.

3. Our Relief Commissioner, who had gone to Lahore and who returned this morning, personally visited² Sheikhupura yesterday accompanied by Brigadier Thimayya. Sheikhupura³ is about 25 miles or so to the north-west of Lahore. His report is that he saw soldiers firing indiscriminately and deliberately at Hindus and Sikhs who were trying to escape. Casualties were very heavy. The attention of the West Punjab Government was immediately drawn to this fact.

4. I find that one Muslim company belonging to Pakistan was stationed at Sheikhupura and it is possible that some men of this company misbehaved in this way. It is bad enough when people riot and kill each other, but when armed soldiers start shooting at refugees who are trying to escape terror seizes people. Reports of very widespread killing have been received by us

1. R/3/1/71, I.O.L.R.

2. A report of Nehru's remarks at Sheikhupura on 31 August 1947 carried by *The Leader*, 2 September 1947 read: "A group of Muslims stood on the road and stopped Mr. Nehru's car crying 'stop this war. We beg you to stop it.' Nehru replied, 'Are you not ashamed of yourselves? Have you no conscience left? What do these houses and these dead bodies show? Who is conducting this war?'"

3. The Muslim majority district of Sheikhupura, wherein Nankana Sahib, the birth place of Guru Nanak, was located had a substantial minority of Sikhs who had also been responsible for much of its economic prosperity. The announcement of the Radcliffe Award on 17 August 1947 led to killings estimated at about 10,000 people by the Fact Finding Committee set up by the Government of India early in 1948.

from West Punjab. There is apparently no sufficient protection for the refugees and they live in constant danger. I find that a far greater part of the Boundary Force is concentrated in eastern Punjab. Just a few companies are spread out in western Punjab where this killing is taking place now at a rapid rate. Every day and every hour makes a difference between life and death for many persons.

5. I feel peculiarly helpless. In action one can always overcome this feeling whatever the result of the action might be. But as I cannot take immediate action that can have any effect, the burden becomes heavy.

6. I suppose I am not directly responsible for what is taking place in the Punjab. I do not quite know who is responsible. But in any event I cannot and do not wish to shed my responsibility for my people. If I cannot discharge the responsibility effectively, then I begin to doubt whether I have any business to be where I am. And even if I don't doubt it myself, other people certainly will.

7. I am not an escapist or quitter and it is not from that point of view that I am writing. The mere fact that the situation is difficult is a challenge which must be accepted and I certainly accept it. But I wished to unburden my mind a little to you and hence this totally unnecessary letter.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Mountbatten replied on 28 August 1947; "Your letter enables me to keep in touch with the way your mind is working.... You are absolutely right in wishing the Boundary Force to be split in such a way as to enable the two Dominion Governments to take full control of the situation.... I feel that the friendship, which exists between us, cannot fail to continue to have an important bearing on the very difficult days that lie ahead of us."

18. Lord Mountbatten's Note of Interview with Nehru¹

The Prime Minister said that he would come to Princess Elizabeth's wedding in November if he felt able to do so at the time.² He appeared doubtful of the psychological effect that his presence at the wedding would have on the people of India. I pointed out that it would be a golden opportunity for him to meet Prime Ministers of the other Dominions, and particularly Field Marshall Smuts with whom he would be able to discuss the Indian problem in South Africa. He gave his consent to my attending the wedding in an official capacity.

2. We next discussed the future of the Punjab Boundary Force and Nehru was throughout very balanced and reasonable. I told him that militarily speaking I considered that the Force was essential and had justified itself.³ He did not dispute this and had no arguments to offer on the military side. It was only from the psychological aspect that he wanted a change. He pointed out that the Punjab Boundary Force was being blamed for killings which had taken place, and that it would not be proved to the people that these killings would have been more if there had been no such Force. He wanted it to be proved to the people that the Dominion Governments had a closer control over the situation. He asked that some compromise should be made militarily but left it in my hands as to what exactly this should be. I suggested that a quicker retrocession of districts was probably the best answer.

3. Nehru was surprised that the situation in the Punjab as a whole had not improved at the rate it had been hoped for. He was convinced that every leader was doing his best to stop the present disturbances. He was coming to the conclusion that it would now be best for minorities to leave both the new Punjab provinces. He quoted further cases of the Government of West Punjab refusing to release Hindus and Sikhs.

1. Delhi, 27 August 1947. R/3/1/172, I.O.L.R.

2. The wedding took place on 20 November 1947. Nehru was unable to attend owing to pressure of work.

3. Writing to Nehru on 28 August 1947, Mountbatten agreed that the Punjab Boundary Force "be split in such a way as to enable the two Dominion Governments, under their respective Prime Ministers, to take full control of the situation, military, administrative, as well as political."

4. I drew his attention to the articles and cartoons which had appeared in the press that day attacking British officers.⁴ I asked him whether it was his desire that the press should be allowed to make such attacks and pointed out that by convention attacks on officers who were unable to reply were not made in other countries. He saw the danger and fully agreed with what I had said. I pointed out that it was a question of educating the press to their responsibilities. He gave no permission to quote his views in my interview with the two editors concerned that afternoon.

5. I told Nehru the full story of the negotiations with Hyderabad⁵ and obtained his complete sympathy. He fully understood that all my promises of help had been based on Sir Walter Monckton⁶ staying.⁷ I emphasised to him and he concurred that he should be no party to underhand methods against Hyderabad; but I gave my opinion that it would not be unsuitable for the Government of India to support a demand for a referendum in that State.

19. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram twentyseventh August. Conditions all over Punjab have been most deplorable ever since massacres of Sikhs and Hindus in Rawalpindi, Multan and other places in March last. Petty incidents have continued, Sikhs and Hindus being chief sufferers. Lahore city practically destroyed by arson and looting. Sikhs continuously taunted by Muslims for being cowards. This led to great resentment among Sikhs. Early in August, Sikh uprising in Amritsar city and district. Muslims massacred. This immediately followed by Muslim retaliation in Lahore and elsewhere. Since then large-scale killings alternately or simultaneously in both eastern and western Punjab. Great brutality everywhere. On the whole eastern Punjab situation under control, but not so in western Punjab where at present massacres going on. Many towns in ruins and vast migrations of populations from one side to other. Police which was almost entirely Muslim in Punjab took sides and killed many people. Troops also accused of this.

Eastern Punjab allowed Muslim refugees to go across, not so western Punjab where Muslim National Guards and mobs attack refugee camps and convoys.

East Punjab Government began fifteenth August without any equipment and hardly an office. All communications previously through Lahore were cut off now being gradually established. Organised effort made by Government and leaders to stop lawlessness has had effect.

In western Punjab no such organised effort and leaders' statements including Jinnah's equivocal.² Evidently western Punjab Government cannot control Muslim League National Guards or violent mobs. Our High Commissioner for Pakistan now in Lahore reports he is helpless and Government there can do nothing effective. Obstructions placed in way of Hindu and Sikh refugees leaving.

Unfair to place blame on Sikhs alone when Muslims started killing and arson in Punjab. Now all equally to blame. Sikhs even hard hit by many recent occurrences and are in mood of despair.

We are trying to organise evacuation of refugees from West Punjab by air, train and motor road transport, but cooperation of Pakistan authorities

1. New Delhi, 28 August 1947. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. For instance, on 24 August 1947, Jinnah said, "The orgies of violence in Eastern Punjab have taken such a heavy toll of Muslim lives and inflicted indescribable tragedies." He warned the Muslims "to beware of their enemies who do not wish well to Pakistan and would not like it to grow strong and powerful."

lacking. Boundary Force has proved complete failure and is looked upon by people as alien force. No responsibility anywhere, we have been urging therefore that each Dominion should be made responsible for its own territories. Quetta also largely gutted and Hindus, Sikhs killed in hundreds recently. Situation still grave. No help being sent by Pakistan Government.

I have visited Punjab twice during last ten days. I am going again tomorrow and have invited Pakistan Ministers to accompany me on tour through both West and East Punjab. Am likely to be away for some time.

Punjab is a ruined province at present. First fruit of Pakistan and ideology of hatred and violence which Muslim League has spread for years past.

Position of Hindus and Sikhs in other Pakistan areas also precarious except in Bengal where Gandhiji's influence has brought about miraculous change. In Frontier Province present calm, but situation tense as between Muslim Leaguers and Badshah Khan's followers.³

Entirely agree with you that foreign propaganda most unfair and organised attempt to discredit some groups. I am addressing press conference today about Punjab.⁴

3. While accepting the verdict of the referendum, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters persisted in their efforts to establish Pakhtoonistan. This brought them into conflict with the League.

4. See next item.

20. No Private Vengeance¹

As all of you no doubt realise, conditions in the Punjab are very serious from many points of view and therefore a very great responsibility falls on us functioning as a Government. As a matter of fact, we have been giving more time and energy to this matter than to anything else. You may not have public intimation of our daily meetings in the Cabinet, formal, or informal, for this purpose, but every day we have been meeting and trying to devise means of dealing with this situation.

Next only to the responsibility of the Government, I would say, is the responsibility of the press, because a great deal depends on what the press says and how it says it. In a serious matter like this, it is not proper for either the Government or the press to shut out truth or in any way to keep facts from the public, because if any such attempt is made it simply means that garbled

1. Interview to the press, Delhi, 28 August 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 29 August and *Indian Information* (Delhi), 15 September 1947.

accounts and exaggerated accounts spread. But it is obviously the duty of all of us to avoid giving publicity to completely unauthorised accounts and rumours with which we are flooded from day to day. Things are bad enough as it is. To make them worse does nobody any service.

Delhi and large parts of northern India are full of unfortunate refugees from the Punjab and it is difficult not to be moved by their stories. Various accounts have been appearing from Karachi, Lahore and elsewhere where some high officers of the Government have not shown that sense of responsibility which the Government expects at the present moment. They have tried to cast the blame on, let us say, the East Punjab, and a special attempt has apparently been made to blame the Sikhs for much that has occurred.

It is rather easy to go into past history and to trace the causes of what has happened and is happening, and that past history will not be complimentary to many of those who are condemning people in the East Punjab. That history, at any rate the recent history, began six months back in Rawalpindi and Multan. It never really stopped, and throughout this period and before there has been ceaseless campaign of hatred and violence in the Punjab. We saw its fruit six months ago and we are seeing its bitter fruit now. I do not want to go into past history. But there must be a certain balance in considering these matters and it is absurd just to see one side of the picture and ignore the rest.

Coming to the present and recent events, early in August there were outbreaks in Amritsar city and district, accompanied or followed immediately by outbreaks in Lahore. Since then there has been simultaneous or successive action, if you can call it action. There has been brutality and bestiality to an extreme degree all over the place.

Now, it is obvious that in dealing with such a situation retaliation is not the method. I am not talking about its ethical but about its practical aspects. If there is to be retaliation or punishment, it should be governmental retaliation and governmental punishment, which would mean war. Private vengeance and private retaliation means rendering your own Government incapable of taking proper action. Therefore, the first point to be remembered by any sensible person is that the worst possible course of action from the narrowest point of view, apart from considerations of any ideals or anything like that, would be private retaliation. We have laid stress on this although we realise that passions are aroused.

Quite apart from who is the guilty—party and we have our views about that—it becomes essential that we should have peace and order in our own territories so that we can exercise our full power to protect others who may not be in our territories and who require protection. Otherwise, if there is competition in retaliation, the very persons we seek to protect cannot get protection. This is a very simple matter which anybody ought to understand. Yet some people seem to imagine that to protect a person far away, you should kill some person near you. That is not even the way of war between nations.

Now, the press can help very greatly in making this clear. No matter what happens, the punishment ought to be thought of in governmental terms, not in private terms.

It is not my desire to give you a long list of happenings in West or East Punjab. Among our present problems I would give the first place to bringing relief to isolated minorities anywhere and to evacuating them wherever necessary. But the first essential to deal with this is to have a measure of peace and order in our own territories. That really is the first aspect. Otherwise our action becomes limited and in fact obstructed by our own internal difficulties.

You will remember that the new provincial governments in the Punjab have been in existence for less than two weeks now. The East Punjab Government had to start from scratch with hardly an office and with hardly any apparatus of government. What they had was in Simla which they had to leave. The whole communications system of East Punjab—the railways, the telephones, the telegraph and the postal services—used to be connected with Lahore. Suddenly, after August 15, that communications system broke down. It need not have broken down if there had been cooperation. But there was no cooperation and there were these troubles, and so, suddenly in the midst of a great crisis, the communications system broke down because Lahore was not helpful. If we wanted to make a telephone call to Amritsar, Jullundur or any other place, we could only go through Lahore and we could not get through. It was the same in regard to telegrams. So, we have had to face the extraordinary difficulty of a breakdown of communications.

The West Punjab Government had something solid to go upon. They had their governmental apparatus functioning from Lahore with their communications and the rest of it. So they had a considerable advantage. Nevertheless, in spite of that advantage, the governmental apparatus in West Punjab, as in East Punjab, did not function very satisfactorily after this changeover and new orders and circulars apparently did not reach the parties concerned.

I cannot speak for West Punjab, because as is well known, there was almost a complete news black-out from West Punjab. It is only recently that some news and accounts have reached us and these accounts have been pretty ghastly. It is true that many of the accounts that are being spread in the bazaars are very much exaggerated. As a rule, even the so-called eye-witness accounts tend to get exaggerated because an eye-witness sees only a small part of the picture and he imagines the rest. But it is true, I think, that in certain parts of West Punjab, notably in Sheikhupura, Jhang, Chiniot² and partly

2. Violence against non-Muslims which broke out on 22 August in Chiniot, the second biggest town in Jhang district in West Punjab, continued unabated for three days while the police and the army stood by.



TAKING THE OATH OF OFFICE AS PRIME MINISTER,
15 AUGUST 1947



WITH LORD AND LADY MOUNTBATTEN, 16 AUGUST 1947

in Sialkot³ major occurrences have taken place and large numbers of people have been killed. Refugees have been attacked by mobs.

A major incident was the attack on the convoy carrying refugees from Sialkot across the Ravi river to Amritsar three days ago. It was stopped, in spite of the convoy, right at the border of the Ravi river and quite a number of people in this convoy were killed and a large number of wounded arrived in Amritsar that evening.

It is frightfully difficult to form any estimates of these killings on either side. They have been on a big scale and there has been a very great deal of brutality on both sides. At the present moment, as far as I can understand from the newspapers, the East Punjab situation is more under control than the situation in the West Punjab. Amritsar, Jullundur, Gurdaspur and Ludhiana districts are more or less under control. That does not mean that armed gangs are not functioning here and there. They are. On the other side, I imagine, from the accounts reaching us, that conditions are worse, though they have shown a slight improvement in the last day or two. I think this is partly due to a number of our people having gone there and visited some of these places and drawn the attention of the Pakistan authorities.

I just mentioned to you that our first problem is to evacuate the refugees. We are trying hard to make every possible arrangement by air, rail and road transport, both military and civil. But in the nature of things, this organisation takes a little time and it requires, what is more, the cooperation of people on the other side. Suppose we take our aeroplanes, they can only land in some places. The refugees have to be brought there and transported in batches. A great part of this job of the refugees securing any protection must be done on the other side whether by us or by them. Thus far we have not received the formal concurrence of the Pakistan Government to our schemes of evacuation by road transport. I imagine that we shall get it but we have not got it yet.

The danger in some places may be so acute that while we are just organising all this many people may be overwhelmed by a sudden attack. The only possible way to deal with it would be to try to get some kind of protection for them immediately. That protection can only come for the moment, from the troops available there at present. Any other arrangement will take time. So we have sent there our High Commissioner, our Deputy High Commissioner and a fairly large staff, including one or two military officers. Their first business was to try to get protection organised for these refugees wherever they were. I cannot say how far they have succeeded, but they have succeeded in some measure. This is only a temporary arrangement.

3. Trouble began in Sialkot on a small scale on 11 August with the local Muslim Leaguers urging Muslims to avenge the killings in Amritsar. Then an organised massacre of non-Muslims started and continued for three days. Such as were still alive were evacuated on the 16th.

As you know, we have tried not to encourage what might be called mass migration, because that is a terrific problem and that means misery for the migrating masses. Nevertheless, conditions being what they are and what they have been, we have to think in terms of a fairly large exchange of population, and this matter will no doubt be discussed.

If people have to go from the West to the East as well as the other way round, it is far better that it should be done methodically in an organised way and with official help rather than in the unorganised and hysterical way in which it is taking place today. Perhaps, if this fact were recognised by both the Governments, it might bring some slight relief to those who wish to migrate from either side. We are prepared to give all help and facilities for this though it is a terrific problem.

I might mention that in regard to the refugee problem or any other problem connected with the Punjab, the Central Government is giving every conceivable kind of help to the East Punjab Government. There is no question of our allotting to them this sum of money or that. We are prepared to shoulder every burden relating to this problem—be it financial, administrative or any other. It is only a question of coordination. Much of the work can obviously be done best by the East Punjab Government. We have helped them in every way and if they want us to undertake anything, we shall gladly do so or send our men there.

So far, there has been no question of any friction between the East Punjab Government and the Central Government. But in the nature of things, we have to deal with the West Punjab Government also, specially for the refugee problem, raids and the rest.

There have been, especially since the Boundary Commission Award, a number of raids from West Punjab into East Punjab, not far from Amritsar, between Amritsar and Lahore. A large number of these raiding parties have burnt villages on this side of the frontier. You know that all this area is in charge of the Boundary Force. The question of the future set-up of the Boundary Force or whatever force which has to look after these matters is under urgent consideration. It is a difficult matter at this stage because of what has happened so far. However, our objective is that each Dominion should assume responsibility, as far as possible, and as rapidly as possible, for its own territories.

Now, as I told you, we have to deal with the West Punjab Government as well as the Government of Pakistan. This involves delays and until two days ago it was very difficult to get in touch with West Punjab either by telephone or by telegram. Now, there has been some improvement and a number of our people are there and more people are being sent. It is essential that there must be cooperation between these Governments, if the problems are to be solved. It was because of this that it has been decided to hold a number of conferences from tomorrow onwards. The first one begins at Ambala tomorrow forenoon

to be followed in the afternoon by a conference in Lahore. This will be followed by tours in both West and East Punjab.

I should like to impress upon you that at this time of grave crisis and imminent danger to large numbers of people, the only way really to save the situation is by taking swift action, as far as possible, in cooperation between the two Governments. In any other way—whatever may happen in the distant future—it is a continuing conflict with such results as we may not be able to foresee at present. We will not save the people whom we want to save. Therefore, both from the immediate as well as from the distant viewpoint, it becomes essential for us to seek cooperation, and even though it may be half-hearted cooperation on one side, nevertheless it helps us to go ahead.

Quetta has not come very much in the picture but the conditions in Quetta have been very bad in spite of statements made to the contrary.⁴ The number of deaths runs into many hundreds there, a good part of Quetta town has been burnt down and a very large number of Hindu and Sikh refugees there are stranded. They cannot come by train and it is not easy to come by air. Naturally we should like to help them too, and the only help for the moment, apart from the one of making arrangements through the Pakistan Government which we are trying to make, and our friends in Karachi are trying to make, would be by air evacuation, but that when it concerns ten or fifteen thousand persons it is a big job.

One of our great difficulties has been railway travel. You have no doubt heard about derailments and attacks on railways between Ambala and Ludhiana chiefly, but little mention has been made of the state of affairs of the railways between Lahore and Peshawar which is very bad, or the railway line between Quetta and Karachi which is also bad.

The princely States have an important function in protecting the railways and in preserving peace and order in these troubled areas. The States exist chiefly in East Punjab and not in West Punjab so much, and these States, if they are not properly controlled by the authorities there, make it difficult for us to deal with the situation. People come out of the States to create troubles not under the sanction of the authorities; but those people who seek refuge there, they come out and we cannot deal with them easily. Much of these troubles are probably due to armed bands coming out of the States. We have appealed to the eastern Punjab States to help us in dealing with the situation.

4. Serious riots broke out in Quetta on 20 August 1947 following a quarrel between the Pathans and Punjabi Muslims over the issue of flying the Pathan flag over a mosque. The minorities regarded as supporters of independent Pakhtoonistan were also made the target of attack. Abdur Rab Nishtar, Minister of Communications, visited Quetta on 23 August and claimed that the situation was absolutely normal and well under control.

You must have seen our joint statement issued about property.⁵ There has been a tremendous burning and loss of property. Everywhere by far the largest sufferers have been Hindus and Sikhs, partly because they were the largest owners of property. And not only private property, but public institutions also—hospitals and the rest—have been burnt.

As you know, in Lahore and elsewhere, private houses are being occupied by large numbers of these refugees under Government sanction. Well, perhaps, where houses are empty and people are homeless, there is no reason why one should object to these houses being utilised for the purpose, provided it is done properly and without any loss to the owners. How far this is done I do not know. But one joint statement we did make namely that any forcible seizure of property—houses or other—will not be recognized. We are trying in the matter of these houses too to get these regularised as far as possible so as to prevent any loss, though I am afraid, under the present conditions, it is very difficult to protect property when we cannot protect even human life.

Finally, I should like to say again a word to the representatives of the press. I would beg of them to deal with this situation, certainly frankly, but with all restraint. What has happened in the Punjab is bad enough. We want to put an end to it. But there is grave danger of these passions and feelings being carried elsewhere and poisoning the atmosphere in other places. Heavy responsibility, therefore, rests on the press.

May I say a word to the foreign correspondents here, though perhaps what I say may not be applicable to them, but to others who may not be here today? We have had reports of the kind of messages that have been sent recently from India abroad. Many of those messages have been highly tendentious and one might almost say that they were deliberately intended to run down some groups or some parties.⁶ So far as we are concerned we do not wish in any way to come in the way of the freedom of the press. But there is such a thing as abuse of hospitality; there is such a thing as saying things now which will embitter relations between us and other foreign countries.

It might be remembered now, if it was not thought of previously, that the 15th of August has made a difference, and the habit with some correspondents

5. At the meeting of the Joint Defence Council in Delhi on 25 August 1947, it was agreed that persons who had seized refugee property would not be recognised as owners by either Government, who would continue to recognise the rightful owners only.
6. For example, *The New York Times* on 22 August 1947 reported that about 30,000 Muslims had been driven out of Jullundur by "fierce, bearded, sword-swinging Sikhs". On 24 August, *The Times* (London) said that experienced officers, both British and Indian, felt that the slaughter in East Punjab was "more horrible than anything we saw during the war". It added that "the Sikhs were clearing East Punjab of Muslims, forcing thousands to flee westward, burning Muslim villages and homesteads. . . . This violence has been organised from the highest levels of Sikh leadership. . . ."

of patronising India will not be to the advantage of the country which they represent or the cause which they represent. We will stand no such patronage and we will stand no other action which leads to an abuse of the hospitality which we give.

We have to face grave troubles as every country has to face today, and we are going to face them and get over them. It does not help, especially for outsiders, to be very virtuous and point out the error of others. We are not saying now what these troubles are due to, but if it becomes necessary, we shall say that it is due to the past handling of the situation and not to the present. In the Punjab, for months and months past, there was Section 93 regime in which we had no hand and against the doings of which we protested repeatedly. We have not a shadow of doubt that what we are having today is the result of last year's activities as also of the inactivities and misdeeds in the Punjab. If there is to be criticism, let there be also an analysis of what has led to all these happenings.

So, I would beg of you—all of you—to help us in this very grave crisis. It is not grave in the military sense of the word, though that is bad enough. Of course, the army and the soldier triumph in times like this. It is grave even more so because of the misery caused to vast numbers of human beings and the psychological results flowing from that misery embitter their lives, I do not know for how long. We cannot lose our heads in our excitement. We must do act in balance and with perspective. If we do that, I think, we shall get over this sooner than is imagined.

Question : Could not the Pakistan Government be told that unless conditions were brought to normal in West Punjab the situation in East Punjab would get out of control?

Jawaharlal Nehru : That is exactly what they say. They say if the situation in East Punjab is not controlled they cannot control the situation in West Punjab.

Q : There is likely to be some misunderstanding about what you said about property. You said that if a house is lying vacant, refugees could occupy it. But the point is that those who have left their houses have also left behind all their valuables. For the middle classes, from the Lahore area, the household effects mean everything in the world to them.

JN : In theory, the requisitioning of a house by the Government, where the necessity arises, is right, but in practice the whole thing may mean a looting of their property.

Q : It is this which is worrying the people. As regards immovable property you have legal rights. Something has got to be done about the movable property.

JN : We cannot do anything more except laying emphasis on this while talking to the Pakistan Government.

Q : Could you not put the whole area under martial law ?

JN : There is the Boundary Force. I do not see what difference martial law makes. Our present trouble is that the Boundary Force has not sufficiently controlled these manifestations of violence and loot. We are trying to have a different set-up. When they have not been able to control fully the other thing, it is much less likely that they would control things if we hand them over the civil administration.

Q : Is the Government aware that certain communal organisations of Hindus and Sikhs, taking advantage of the situation, are fanning troubles in East Punjab with a view to discrediting the National Government? What steps does the Government propose to take against the people indulging in this?

JN : I have got leaflets issued by communal organisations of the Muslims, the Hindus, and the Sikhs in the most violent language and distributing these all over, asking practically for murder and slaughter. They are not signed of course. They just go about from place to place. Nobody knows who is responsible for such leaflets. We want to stop this. But exactly how to get hold of the people responsible is a difficult matter.

Q : How is the work of the Boundary Force going to be handled?

JN : Taking an overall view of the picture, I think that the military discipline has helped. But where isolated troops have been functioning, they have been functioning as they liked. Most of the trouble has been caused by a large influx of refugees from one side to the other. They come with their tales of horror and they excite the people. East Punjab is full of Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab; and West Punjab is full of refugees from East Punjab and they tell the most lurid tales. More forces have been sent. But we are trying to send additional forces to augment the Indian Dominion's forces and presumably they will gradually take charge more and more of the areas concerned—Ambala, Jullundur, Ludhiana—and so they go forward. The idea is that ultimately each Dominion has its own forces in its own

territory, perhaps with a small neutral zone, say two miles broad—a mile on each side of the border—and some liaison between the two.

Even if we do that, many of the companies or regiments are mixed regiments. They come over on this side, but they are mixed. The proposal is that we should have each Dominion looking after its own territory—on the Indian side predominantly Hindu and Sikh regiments and on the other predominantly Muslim regiments should be primarily for protecting the camps of the Hindus and Sikhs or providing escorts for them and the same with the Muslims in the Hindu and Sikh regiments, viz., that they be used for protecting Muslim refugees on this side.

Q : Would you consider the possibility of mobilising I.N.A. men who would be more patriotic?

JN : As a matter of fact, I do not know where they are. But certainly they, too, have been influenced by these passions and feelings as much as anybody else.

Q : Is there any fear of the armies attacking each other?

JN : Of course, there is always a risk of conflict when two armies face each other. But I think the risk can be avoided.

Q : Are there any troops taking part in the raids?

JN : It is difficult to say. I was talking of the border raids in East and West Punjab. I do not think there were any troops as such. There are plenty of people in uniform and the average villager cannot distinguish them. This is due to the fact that large numbers of ex-soldiers go about with their old uniforms and they have been functioning. The Muslim National Guards⁷ have their uniform and they have been functioning and they have been mistaken for soldiers. I do not know of any specific incidents of raids by army people. But where they have a chance, the isolated groups help the people they sympathise with.

7. This was a volunteer organization of the Muslim League formed in June 1940 with the object of creating a united front of Muslims. After 1944 it became distinctly anti-Congress, anti-Hindu and a para-military arm of the League.

Q : When you went there last time, there were some arrangements made for giving facilities to refugees between certain towns and that the same facilities would be given by West Punjab. Did the other side stick to this arrangement?

JN : There was no agreement. We had no say in the matter. Normally speaking, suppose there is a large number of Muslim refugees in Amritsar. The East Punjab Government wants to get rid of the burden as soon as possible. Feeding 30,000 to 50,000 people when there is food shortage is a burden. What they did was that they merely allowed them to go just with a view not to have the burden of looking after them. But the real arrangements were made by trains. The train arrangements have functioned more or less satisfactorily everywhere. That is to say, the Hindus and Sikhs have come over from the Lahore side to Amritsar. For a number of days there were no restrictions placed by the East Punjab Government on refugees coming in but restrictions were placed by the West Punjab Government and there was a large congregation of Hindu and Sikh refugees near the banks of the Ravi near Narowal.

Q : Is it time that every refugee who has come here has had his or her kit searched?

JN : That is true. But the refugees who have come from West Punjab to East Punjab have almost invariably been minus everything, except their shirts.

Q : Is it possible to reduce the number of refugees coming here from West Punjab ?

JN : The flow of refugees has been going on for many months. They must be 200,000 to 400,000 apart from the recent influx, and I cannot tell you what the recent influx is.

Q : There is a general feeling that the military authorities are not helping the people who are stranded. We have not seen air-dropping of food to meet the situation as happened during the last war.

JN : The job is a difficult one and cannot be easily compared with a war-time job. Take air bombing. Whom are you going to bomb?

21. Telegram to Mahatma Gandhi¹

Punjab situation causing us most anxious concern. Am going Lahore today for important meeting there. Intend touring with Liaquat Ali Khan West and East Punjab for six days. I still think that time has not come for you to visit Punjab but feel your presence in Delhi very desirable so as to keep in touch with Punjab situation and advise us.

1. New Delhi, 29 August 1947. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.

22. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
29 August 1947

Dear Vallabhbhai,

Mridula² telephoned to me after midnight from Amritsar to say that large numbers of Hindu and Sikh refugees had reached Amritsar in a very destitute condition. There was no money to provide for them. It appears that S. Swaran Singh³ wired to you some days ago asking for a lakh of rupees. No answer has reached him yet.

Kindly make some arrangements to have money sent either from your private fund for relief or from Government out of the sums sanctioned.

She also wanted permission for the Amritsar authorities to reproduce news from A.I.R. I told her this could certainly be done. I think formal authority might be sent to the Deputy Commissioner, Amritsar, immediately.

She told me that many of the Hindu and Sikh refugees were held up on the other side of the river Ravi as the boats on the river had been deliberately sunk.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 309.

2. Mridula Sarabhai. She was Nehru's representative at Amritsar working with the Military Evacuation Organisation.

3. (b. 1907); M.L.A., Punjab, 1946; Minister, Punjab Government, 1947; Minister for Works, Housing and Supply, Government of India, 1952-57, for Steel, Mines and Fuel, 1957-62, for Railways, 1962, for Food and Agriculture, 1963-64, for Industry and Supply, 1964; for External Affairs, 1964-66 and 1970-74; and for Defence, 1966-70 and 1974-76.

23. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

Camp Amritsar
31 August 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have received your two telegrams² and I have shown them to Liaquat Ali Khan and others. I shall not discuss these matters in detail here because that will serve little purpose. We are up to our eyes in work and worry. The problems we have to face are stupendous. Nevertheless we will face them.

After a little tour we intend having a meeting in Lahore on 3 September at 11 a.m. to lay down detailed instructions by both Provincial Governments as to what should be done. This is essential as so far only general principles are laid down. At this Lahore meeting, Ministers of the two provinces will be present as well as, I hope, the two Governors. Also Liaquat Ali Khan, Baldev Singh and I, also probably some senior officers. I think it will be very desirable if you could attend this meeting. This is necessary from many points of view. Your presence will energise the people here and you will bring a fresh mind to bear on these problems. I must confess that I feel a little overwhelmed by these difficulties and the urgency which accompanies them.

I suggest to you therefore with all earnestness to come to Lahore for a day. You can come by plane in the morning and return the same evening. Probably I shall return with you. This invitation is also made on behalf of Liaquat Ali Khan.³

Being away from Delhi even for a few days one gets out of touch with developments and that is another reason why I should like you to come and tell us what the general position is.

Generally speaking, agreements have been arrived at between the various Governments on all grounds of principle. The real difficulty is carrying them out in practice. I think something is certainly going to be done but our approach has to be rapid and all-embracing. Therefore very detailed instructions have to be issued to both Governments.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 311-313.

2. In one of the telegrams, Patel stressed the urgency of discussing at the Lahore conference of the two Prime Ministers the highly vulnerable position of non-Muslims in the Frontier Province and the need for their camps to be guarded by non-Muslim troops pending their evacuation. The other telegram is not available.

3. Patel also participated in the conference at Lahore.

I have come to the conclusion that this refugee problem requires very special attention. I am thinking of asking K. C. Neogy to take charge of it with considerable authority in all its many aspects. I am summoning him to Delhi. We shall discuss this matter further afterwards.

Please expedite the despatch of as many trucks and lorries, military or civil, as possible. I am writing separately to the people concerned but you might also do something about it.

The Amritsar Civil Hospital has become a kind of provincial hospital for refugees. It is totally lacking in medicines and other supplies. Amrit Kaur was given a list of some of these things but really much more is wanted. I suggest that a full load of supplies be sent by plane immediately to Amritsar.

It is also necessary in Amritsar to equip another hospital immediately at least for the less serious and convalescent cases so as to make room for the more serious cases. It is impossible to throw out people into the street because they have no homes to go to. Some kind of equipment is necessary for this hospital. A building can be obtained here. It is suggested that some equipment from a military hospital might be lent for this purpose. I understand that this can be done from the Ambala or some other military hospital. All these things should be flown to Amritsar. We have to function as if we were in wartime and every day's delay is vital.

A large number of doctors of all grades, sanitary inspectors, etc., are wanted all over this area. The condition of the camps is pitiful. I suggest that as many of these people as can be raised be sent here. An appeal might be made to other provinces.

In the new military set-up I am insisting that the brigadiers should be Indians. I told our Commander-in-Chief so. Rees is creating difficulties but I propose to insist on this point.

I hope you will pull up the Punjab States, specially Faridkot, Nabha and Jind.⁴ They are centres of trouble and disorders and they must be made to behave. Mountbatten mentioned in Lahore that if necessary order will be kept in these States or some of them by us directly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

P.S.

Since the above was written I have spoken to you on the phone. I am glad you will be coming to Lahore on 3 September.

4. It was said that Sikh *jathas* were organised from princely States such as Alwar and Bharatpur and Nabha with States forces participating. They attacked Meo Muslims during the first half of August 1947.

I think the time has come when Bapu should be asked to come to East Punjab. I am sending him a message accordingly.⁵ I enclose a letter⁶ from him with its enclosures.

Thimayya is going to be in charge of our brigade.

The immediate situation in East and West Punjab is somewhat better, but the refugee problem looms large.

Jawaharlal

5. See *post*, item 25.

6. On 30 August, Mahatma Gandhi wrote to Nehru that pressure was mounting on him to "rush to the Punjab before it is too late. If you wish I would send you all that comes to me. . . . to enable you to come to a true judgment". He also wrote that Mountbatten favoured his "immediate going to the Punjab."

24. To Lord Mountbatten¹

Lahore

31 August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I am sick with horror. Day after day sensations of a painful character accumulate, but today there was a climax when we visited Sheikhpura. I do not remember to have seen ever before such a scene of devastation of a prosperous and flourishing city. What we saw was bad, what we heard was worse. But over and above everything was a creeping sense of horror. There was still an odour of death, a smell of blood and of burning human flesh.

On the road we came across destitute wanderers trying to reach some haven of safety. Among them, it so happened, I saw some old colleagues who were bereft of everything and were trudging along with the rest in the long caravan.

This Punjab business becomes bigger and bigger the more one sees it. There is plenty of violence going on and killing and arson still, chiefly in rural areas. I suppose this will largely stop within a few days but the other problem of refugees remains. And this is terrific. We are doing our utmost to give relief to them and to evacuate them to safer surroundings.

We have discussed the theory of exchange of population and expressed our opinion against it, we have tried to discourage people leaving their homes in large numbers but force of circumstances has compelled hundreds of thousands to be on the move. This is something in the nature of an uncontrollable natural phenomenon. I have no idea of the exact figures.

1. R/3/1/172, I.O.L.R.

But I imagine that quite a million people have been uprooted and have already changed from one place to another. Another million are in refugee camps either in West or East Punjab, or are wandering about without home or belonging. Within a couple of weeks nearly all of these will also be transferred to East or West Punjab. We have to look after these vast numbers for a considerable time and that will strain our resources to the utmost.

I feel that this problem is important enough for us to have a special Minister in charge of it.² That is to say that a new man, particularly suited to this work, should be made a member of the Cabinet. I have not spoken about this yet to any of my colleagues but I hope to do so immediately on my return.

When we met here in Lahore on Friday last we came to an agreement on many principles.³ There is yet no proper organisation to implement them, although we are trying to do so. We have decided to hold another conference of Governors, Ministers, etc., on September 3rd, in Lahore. Liaquat Ali Khan would be here then and I have invited Sardar Patel also to come. We hope to lay down specific directions about future work.

I have been touring about with Liaquat Ali Khan, and Baldev Singh has been touring separately with Nishtar. Our present tours end on September 2nd. I expect to be back in Delhi on September 4th. I fear I cannot stay long there because my mind will be in the Punjab. So I expect to come back here after two or three days' stay in Delhi.

I hope you are really resting in Simla.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 6 September 1947, a new ministry of relief and rehabilitation was formed with K.C. Neogy as the minister in charge.
3. The Joint Defence Council, meeting on 29 August 1947 at Lahore, decided (1) to abolish the Punjab Boundary Force with effect from the midnight of 31 August-1 September, (2) to protect minorities and not to recognise illegal seizure of property, (3) to appoint a Custodian of Evacuee Property, (4) to detain armed bands in concentration camps, and (5) to make arrangements for a press camp at Lahore and facilities to journalists.

25. Telegram to Mahatma Gandhi¹

Received your letter of August 28th. Punjab problem overwhelming in extent and intensity. I feel now that your presence in Punjab is desirable

1. New Delhi, 31 August 1947. *Pyarelal Papers*, N.M.M.L.

and would be helpful in curing insanity and bringing solace to this ruined and heart-broken province. Am returning to Delhi 4th. After brief stay coming back to Punjab.²

2. In his letter of 30 August 1947 Mahatma Gandhi had stated: "About my going to the Punjab, I won't move without your and Vallabhbhai's wish.... Left to myself I would probably rush....and if necessary break myself in the attempt to stop the warring elements...."

26. Telegram to Vallabhbhai Patel¹

Have just seen newspapers press message sent some days ago by correspondents accompanying us.² This message has considerably upset West Punjab Government as likely to lead to retaliation in East Punjab. I was wholly ignorant of this message. I feel strongly that while truth should not be suppressed, every effort should be made to avoid giving publicity in press or by radio to accounts which might inflame public opinion. Unfortunately some local papers here writing virulent stuff.

Situation both in West and East Punjab requires reciprocal and cooperative handling by both Central and Provincial Governments. Undoubtedly conditions still very bad in many areas. Problem of refugees also assuming terrific proportions on either side. Our joint tours have done much good. I am convinced of earnest desire of Pakistan and West Punjab Governments to put an end rapidly to lawlessness and help us in evacuating our refugees. Everywhere Liaquat Ali Khan and Nishtar have delivered strong and good speeches. We are evolving big organisations on either side to deal with problems facing us. Every effort being made to have fullest cooperation between these organisations or else we will both fail to achieve satisfactory results. Would be grateful if you would suggest to press and radio to avoid alarmist stories and emphasise cooperative aspect of work before us. Should also like press statement to appear to following effect :

1. Lahore, 2 September 1947. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 319-320.
2. For example, *The Hindustan Times* of 26 August stated that planned attacks by armed gangs with the active help of the police were being organised in West Punjab to kill and loot Hindus and Sikhs. The report also complained that reciprocal facilities for orderly evacuation of refugees were not extended in West Punjab.

Jawaharlal Nehru desires us to state that since he went to Punjab he has avoided making any press statement till the end of his tour. He has been ignorant of messages sent by press correspondents which he has not even seen. His tour with Prime Minister of Pakistan has revealed harrowing sights wherever they have gone. This tour has undoubtedly done much good and he is grateful for the cooperation which he has received from Prime Minister of Pakistan and West Punjab Government in steps being taken for relief and evacuation on large scale. The various Governments are acting in a spirit of cooperation in putting down lawlessness everywhere and affording relief. They have made it clear that a firm policy is going to be pursued to establish peace and order. Nehru appeals to press and radio to help in every way in furthering this policy. Conditions almost everywhere have been terribly bad. Even now lawlessness exists in several areas but every effort is being made to deal effectively and to help refugees. We have every hope of succeeding in the near future.³

3. A statement was instead issued by Patel on 4 September 1947 appealing to the people to exercise restraint and "utilize the bitter experiences" they had undergone "not for accentuating the misery and danger of those left behind in Pakistan" but for creating favourable conditions for their speedy relief and evacuation.

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27. Telegram to Mahatma Gandhi¹

Received your letter 29th.² I feel sure now that you should come to Punjab as early as possible.³

1. New Delhi, 2 September 1947. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. On being pressed to leave Calcutta for the Punjab, Mahatma Gandhi wrote to Nehru: "You will judge what I should do. Will it be any use my going after life and property are destroyed to the saturation point? Will it not be a mockery?"
3. But meanwhile Mahatma Gandhi's fast against fresh riots in Calcutta had commenced and he could leave for Delhi only on 7 September 1947.

28. The Situation in the Punjab¹

The Prime Minister made a general statement on the Punjab situation adding that the disastrous happenings in the West and East Punjab had brought out one salient fact, namely, that, whether Government wanted it or not, a transfer of population was gradually becoming an accomplished fact. A large exchange of population to the extent of nearly a million had already taken place.²

Certain areas which had been comparatively quiet in the earlier days of the disturbances had now flared up. Among these were Lyallpur³ in the West and Ludhiana, Rohtak and Hissar in the East Punjab. The orgy of communal fury and violence might spread to other parts of the country and result in complete chaos. It was essential therefore that every effort should be made to stave off such a development.

The East Punjab Government did not appear to be in a position to cope with the vast problem which now faced them, namely, of protecting what Muslims still remained in their area and evacuating and providing relief and rehabilitation for Hindus and Sikhs from the West. The East Punjab Government were partially handicapped by the fact that their Government had not had time to settle down. They were besides suffering from a dearth of suitable officers. The police had in a number of instances proved unreliable and the local officials not much better. What was necessary at this stage was an imaginative handling of the whole situation. In the past few weeks administration and organisation had been overtaken by events. This should not happen in the future.

The problem was of a tremendous magnitude and involved three separate aspects, military, administrative and financial. With the dissolution⁴ of the

1. Remarks at a Cabinet meeting, 4 September 1947. Extracts. R/3/172, I.O.L.R.
2. Over 1.7 million non-Muslim refugees had been evacuated from West Punjab between 17 August and 15 September 1947.
3. Because of the comparative peace and the extensive economic interests in the district, most non-Muslims hesitated to migrate from Lyallpur even after the announcement of the Boundary Award. The influx of refugees from East Punjab, however, led to widespread rioting; the first serious incident occurred on 26 August at Tndianwalata when a gurdwara sheltering a number of Sikhs was attacked.
4. A Joint Defence Council meeting at Lahore on 29 August 1947 decided to disband the Punjab Boundary Force of 50,000 men as the army had outlived the purpose for which it was created on 22 July. It was to be replaced by area headquarters in each of the two Punjab provinces, answerable directly to the Commanders-in-Chief of India and Pakistan.

Punjab Boundary Force and the vesting of responsibility for law and order in the respective Governments things might improve. On the administrative and organisational side was the immense problem of providing relief and rehabilitation for the enormous numbers of refugees that came across from the West Punjab. Relief and rehabilitation had also its financial aspect. The grant of five lakhs which had already been agreed upon was totally insufficient. It had in fact been estimated that to feed the refugees for a period of a month it would cost at least Rs. 3 crores. It was obviously impossible for the Provincial Government to bear such a huge expenditure.

On the organisational side the question of transport and of adequate military escorts for such transport was important. There had been several instances where inadequately protected trains had been attacked by mobs. Such a state of affairs could not be allowed to continue. If adequate military protection was not possible it was better that the train services did not function at all.

A special operational organisation termed the Military Evacuation Organisation⁵ had been created under General Chimni's⁶ charge. The duty of this organisation was to work out in close liaison with the civilian officers' measures for the evacuation of refugees and the provision of adequate military protection as necessary.

The refugee problem was so complex and presented such serious implications for the rest of India that a very close attention would have to be paid to it by the Central Government. He proposed that the matter should be discussed at length at the meeting on the following day.

5. The Military Evacuation Organisation was set up at Lahore on 4 September 1947 to superintend the movement of non-Muslim refugees from West Punjab and Muslim refugees from East Punjab. It kept in touch with the Pakistan authorities.
6. Major-General Sardar Bakshish Singh Chimni (1905-1970); commissioned from Sandhurst, 1924; member, sub-committee of Armed Forces Reconstitution Committee to divide the army and its assets between India and Pakistan; founder and head of Military Evacuation Organisation set up after the Lahore Conference on 3 September 1947; later Major-General-in-charge, Administration, Eastern Command, and Quartermaster-General, Army Headquarters.

29. To Sarah Ismay¹

New Delhi
4 September 1947

Dear Miss Ismay,²

I received in Lahore a report³ of the incidents on the train in which you were travelling from Kalka to Delhi on the 1st of September. I was terribly shocked by this report and I can well imagine how you must have been affected by this experience. People have lost their reason completely and are behaving worse than brutes. There is madness in its worst form. As the report itself says the very persons who were supposed to protect connived at these brutalities. I hope we shall be able to punish these offenders adequately and to curb this madness. We shall certainly do our utmost. I feel thoroughly ashamed that you should have had to put up with this experience.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Daughter of Lord Ismay.
3. It was reported that when the train in which Sarah Ismay was travelling from Simla reached Sonapat station, a bomb exploded on the platform. Gangs, alleged to be Hindus, pulled the passengers out of the carriages and butchered them. A Muslim servant was hiding under the seat in the carriage of Sarah Ismay. Two men demanded the right to search for Muslims. When they were firmly refused they left.

30. To Mahatma Gandhi¹

New Delhi
5-9-47

Dear Bapu,

I had some talk with Sushila. Your going to Punjab seems to me proper. But first you should come to Delhi and stay here for a couple of days and then make the further programme. Probably first to Amritsar and then to Lahore. To move about much at this time does not seem proper. From here it would be convenient to go by a plane. Otherwise you can go by a car also halting on the way. I might probably go with you or meet you there itself.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi.)

31. To Lord Mountbatten¹

September 5th, 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have just heard that you have returned.²

I wrote to you from Lahore and mentioned that I was thinking of having an additional member of the Cabinet specially charged with the care and rehabilitation of refugees. This problem has become vast and the East Punjab Government, whose chief responsibility it is, cannot possibly cope with it unaided.

We propose therefore to have an additional Cabinet Member and I suggest the name of Mr. K.C. Neogy. He was, till recently, a leading member of our Legislative Assembly and has functioned as chairman and otherwise in numerous very important committees on planning, railways, coal, etc. I think he will be a real acquisition to our Cabinet. Could you kindly take the necessary steps to appoint him?

I have just decided to go to Rohtak, or rather to some places on the Rohtak Road, where there is trouble.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. President's Secretariat, File No. 20/16/GG/47, p. 2.
2. On 4 September 1947 Mountbatten, who had gone to Simla, was told that the situation in and near Delhi had deteriorated. He returned to Delhi and set up an Emergency Cabinet Committee to deal with the crisis on an hour-to-hour basis. The Committee included, besides Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel, Baldev Singh and Neogy.

32. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram sixth September.² There has been rioting in certain parts of Delhi during last three days. So-called bombing Fatehpuri mosque trivial

1. New Delhi, 6 September 1947. M.E.A. & C.R. File No. 16-1/47/O.S.-V, pp. 5-6/ corr., N.A.I.
2. Liaquat Ali stated that he had received reports of serious rioting in Karol Bagh and Sadar Bazar and that the Fatehpuri mosque had been bombed. He appealed to Nehru to take "most stringent measures" to stop the violence from spreading to other parts of the country.

affair.³ Military fired on several occasions chiefly on non-Muslim looters. Understand military behaved well and showed no marked partiality. At no time was mob out of hand. I toured whole area this afternoon.

Some villages in Delhi province burnt down. Situation in Rohtak district has been rather bad owing to sudden flare-up. I visited rural areas yesterday.

We propose to run no trains without full escorts.⁴

We realise completely danger of rioting spreading to other parts of India and are doing our utmost to control situation and put an end to lawlessness. We have today appointed Emergency Committee of Cabinet to deal with situation in wartime fashion evolving swift technique to collect information and suppress disorders. Governor, East Punjab, and Ministers coming tomorrow for conference in order to coordinate all activities to common end.

We are employing Gurkha troops wherever possible and available and adding considerably to military strength in disturbed areas. Muslim police and magistrates being employed as usual in Delhi.⁵

You must have read today's Lahore area Command's situation giving news of great deterioration of situation in West Punjab and mentioning massacres of minorities in Gujranwala⁶ and many other places also, our troops train in Frontier being fired, train being attacked. All these incidents and many other reports brought to us are very disturbing and are aggravating situation here. Our Deputy High Commissioner and liaison officers in Lahore report utter lack of cooperation by West Punjab authorities in giving protection and escort to evacuees. R.A.F. squadrons taking Pakistan Government personnel from Delhi to Lahore return empty which is against our explicit agreement.⁷

3. Violence broke out in Delhi on 4 September resulting in a number of stabbing incidents and bomb explosions in Timarpur and Karol Bagh. A bomb exploded in the Fatehpuri mosque on 5 September. The situation was brought under control on 11 September. The most seriously affected areas were Karol Bagh, Subzimandi, Sadar Bazar and Fatehpuri.
4. Attacks were made on refugee trains by Sikhs and others. As a result all movement of trains was stopped for a while, though Master Tara Singh issued a statement calling off the attacks. When fresh arrangements for the defence of trains had been made and the conditions were thought to be safe, floods following heavy rains breached the lines, and it was not until the second week of October that movement could be resumed.
5. Liaquat Ali urged the deployment of Gurkha soldiers and Muslim magistrates and police to deal with the situation in place of Sikh soldiers.
6. Nearly all non-Muslim localities in Gujranwala were destroyed and looted. Several hundreds of Hindus and Sikhs were killed. Thousands of refugees from the town and the adjoining areas awaited military protection for safe evacuation. In Hafizabad, Gujranwala district, rice godowns were first pillaged and then set on fire by mobs. In Ramnagar, another small town in Gujranwala district, non-Muslim areas were a mass of rubble.
7. In order to facilitate the speedy clearance of refugees on both sides, the East Punjab Government and the West Punjab Government had entered into an agreement according to which no train or motor vehicle was to cross the border without refugees.

Recent ordinance of West Punjab reported in press freezing bank deposits apparently opposed to standstill agreement and creating great unrest here.⁸

Entirely agree with you that we should keep in constant touch regarding situation. Hope Pakistan Government will also take emergency measures which we are taking here and give full effect to them. We propose issuing stringent ordinance to curb lawlessness and punish immediately all evil-doers.

8. On 4 September, the West Punjab Government promulgated the Punjab Public Safety Act Amending Ordinance imposing restrictions on the removal of bank assets, including fixed and demand deposits, out of the province. Following the Government of India's protest on 7 September the West Punjab Government repealed this ordinance on 10 September.

33. Telegram to State Premiers¹

In view of very large influx of refugees from Punjab, Sind and Frontier areas into Delhi grave menace to security and health of capital. It has become essential therefore to spread them out in other parts of country. Would be grateful if you could let me know immediately number of refugees which you can accommodate in your province and destination where they should be sent by train or air. Defence Department prepared to help by providing unused and surplus military barracks for this purpose. Please treat this as urgent and reply immediately...³

1. New Delhi, 7 September 1947. Extracts. R/3/1/172, I.O.L.R.
2. There were at one time 980,000 displaced persons in 174 camps all over the country. In 1947-48, Rs. 160,000,000 had been spent on relief and rehabilitation.

34. The Crisis in the Spirit of India¹

I am speaking to you as the words come to me, without any script. I have little time to write nowadays, although my mind is full of many happenings.

1. Broadcast over A.I.R., New Delhi, 9 September 1947. A.I.R. Tapes, N.M.M.L.

During the last three weeks, I have wandered about the Punjab—West and East Punjab—and my mind has been filled with the horror of the things which I saw and heard. During the last few days in the Punjab and in Delhi² I have supped my fill of horror. That, indeed, is the only feast that we can now have. And yet, however horrible the events that we may see, we have to face them and we have to prepare for them and we have to conquer them. And so we set about building up an organization which can meet all these great difficulties that we have to face. We have gone a good long way to building that organization.

Our first objective was to remove to safety all those of our people who looked towards us in the West Punjab. We thought of our people in the various districts there, in Lyallpur, in Montgomery, in Rawalpindi, in Jhelum, in Multan, in Gujranwala, in Sialkot, in Jhung, in Sheikhpura, in Gujrat and other places. We made our preparations to remove them as rapidly and as safely as possible by air, train, motor transport and by road. We also built up great camps for the refugees who came to East Punjab and elsewhere. We also tried to facilitate the evacuation of those who wanted to leave the East Punjab for the West. We did all this and we were succeeding in a large measure. The exchange of populations, forced on us by circumstances, was proceeding fairly rapidly. And then other events took place. This trouble spread to some of the southern districts of East Punjab and it spread to Delhi. Here, while I speak to you, Delhi is none too pleasant a place to live in.

What were the consequences of the spreading of this trouble? It was this, that many of the arrangements that we had made for the rapid evacuation of our people from the West Punjab were delayed because, naturally, we have to turn to making other arrangements for other districts in the East Punjab and in Delhi, those people who thought that they were doing something to force the pace of our work, if I may say so, actually delayed and hindered the very thing they wanted done.

It is an extraordinary thing that I have seen. I have seen horror enough and I have seen many people die. People will die of course, as they must some time or other. Death is bad and death is painful, but one gets used to death. But there are some things much worse than death that have taken place. I am ashamed of the acts that my people have done and I fear that

2. Riots had broken out in Delhi on 4 September 1947 with the arrival of over 20,00,00 refugees from the Punjab. The reports of their sufferings stirred up feelings against those Muslims who still remained in the city and caused disturbances for four days from 7 September during which nearly two thousand people died. A military force of 5000 men patrolled the streets day and night and restored order with the assistance of Mahatma Gandhi, who arrived from Calcutta on 9 September.

the disgrace and the consequences of evil deeds will remain with us for a long time, for evil does not end by evil and you cannot by murder put an end to murder. And yet, somehow, many of our people have thought thus, and a maddened populace, influenced, day after day, by stories of terrible events, has gone completely mad and has behaved as only mad people do.

How are we to face this situation? It is absolutely no good to be just sorry for it or bemoan our lot. Let us first realise what the situation is. It is a very serious crisis, not only because of the disorder that prevails, but, even more so, it is a crisis in the soul and spirit of India. Is this the realization of our dreams of the free India that we have aimed at all these long years? If this is something wrong, and everyone must admit that it is wrong, then we must fight this evil with all our might, and we must convince our people that they are utterly wrong, even wrong from the narrowest viewpoint which they might have, even wrong from the point of view of retaliation. For, even though retaliation is bad, this is not even retaliation. It is something which comes in the way of effective action of helping our own people, and, of course, it disgraces us not only before the world, but in our own hearts, and that is a disgrace which takes a long time to overcome.

It is a very serious crisis and it will take time for us to overcome. When I say it is a serious crisis, I am not speaking just in military terms, for I have little doubt that in a military or a police sense we shall overcome it soon. Indeed, the military have the control and will gain more control very soon. Of that I have little doubt. But, surely, we are not going to live in India just with the help of the military, without any self-restraint and desist from evil deeds just because of the fear of the consequences of what the military or police might do to us. Therefore, I say, it is a serious crisis. What kind of India do we aim at? Are we building that or are we doing something which will destroy it?

So, the first thing to decide is that we must put an end to this bad business that is going on. We must have peace and law and order established. We must rescue our people from West Punjab. We must cooperate in the process of exchange of populations wherever that is necessary. But this business of disturbing the peace and of killing and of arson comes in the way of our co-operating and carrying out the very steps that these people desire. So, I want you to consider this matter in all its seriousness, to consider where we are going, what kind of India we are going to leave to our children to live in. If this kind of thing continues, and if you are convinced, as I am, that this bad phase must be ended, then we must set about it with all the firmness at our command. There can be no softness about it. No gentleness is possible in dealing with evil. We have to grapple with it with strength and firmness, and even occasionally, if I may say so, with bad consequences to the people. I did not wish to use the word cruelty; but even cruelty, if I may say so, an occasional cruelty may be the gentlest option in the long

run. There has been cruelty enough and callousness and if we allow them to continue, they will spread, and destroy our people and our hopes.

Therefore, I do appeal to you all to consider this matter and to come out in the open and help. For we do not want to deal with this problem purely in the military sense. We want all people of goodwill and good intentions and all of those who have any hopes of seeing a free and prosperous India. I want them to come out and to help us. I want them to become messengers of good tidings and to stop this evil not only in this city of Delhi but all over the surrounding districts and in East Punjab, realizing that by so doing they will not only help those of our people who are in distress, in West Punjab, in peril and in danger of their lives, but will also be building what we have sought to build for so long.

Remember this, that delay in evacuation from West Punjab endangers our people's lives. Remember this, that what is happening in Delhi and in some other places is delaying that evacuation, is delaying our processes, is tying up our forces, armed and other, here in Delhi and elsewhere, when they ought to be doing better work elsewhere. We have been able to evacuate about ten lakhs of people and would have been able to evacuate ten lakhs more but for the interference caused in Delhi and the surrounding areas.

This morning, our leader, our master, Mahatma Gandhi, came to Delhi, and I went to see him, and I sat by him for a while wondering how low we have fallen from the great ideals that he had placed before us! I go to the countryside and see people and all sorts of dangerous implements in their hands. When they see me, they shout, "*Jai Hind*," "*Mahatma Gandhi Ki Jai*," "*Jawaharlal Ki Jai*". I feel ashamed of hearing these cries from these people who might have committed murder, loot and arson in the name of Mahatmaji. It is not by shouting these slogans that they will wash away all the evil deeds that they have done. We will not get over these evil deeds by just honouring the Mahatma in name and not following what he has told us all these long years. We have been poor followers of his, I know, but what is happening now is something directly inimical and directly opposed to his ideals. The very thought of it makes one ashamed and makes me sometimes doubt if all the good work that we have done these many years is not going to bear fruit at all. And yet that doubt cannot remain for long for I do believe that good work must bear good results whatever the immediate consequences might be, just as I believe that evil work must have evil consequences. There has been enough of evil work in this country. Let us put an end to it and start the good work and try to follow the great lessons that Mahatmaji has taught us.

I have just mentioned to you that we want the cooperation of all the people of good intentions. Maybe the problem is acute in some areas of the Punjab and Delhi. But in a sense, it is an all-India problem and it is up to the people all over India to grip it and stop the rot. Remember this business

may be followed by something even more terrible—by famine and disease all over the places. As it is, we are living on the verge of famine. We do not have enough food, and all that is happening has destroyed crops, has destroyed our agricultural lands; our cattle roam about, and I do not know what the immediate consequences on the food situation might be. So we have to tighten our belts and be prepared for work, very hard, continuous and co-operative work. I invite you to join that. May I also ask you to remember that we cannot now permit arms and the like to be branded about in public streets. All this must stop. Whatever we may permit in peace time, now with a situation which is analogous to war we are going to deal with it on a war basis in every sense of the word. There is going to be no slackening in future about dealing with this situation.

To our army and police, I want to make an appeal. I want to be quite frank with them because I have heard complaints that they are not impartial, that they are often, instead of doers, just active lookers-on. That is not good enough. If a person is in a responsible position, whether civil or military, and he fails to do his duty, he has no business to be there and he has to suffer the consequences of the neglect of his duty. There can be no weakness about this because we are playing with the lives, not only of a large number of human beings, but with the life of a nation—with India whom we have loved so long, whom we have served so long and it is an impossible thing for us to see evil men or men with evil intentions of wrecking the work of a lifetime or a generation. Therefore, I appeal to you, whether you are a part of the civil population, or the army, or the police, or in any employment you must set about the task and put an end to this bad phase. *Jai Hind.*

35. Record of the Sixth Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

Earlier during discussion Major-General Chimni said that internal security should take secondary place to evacuation from West Punjab of

1. New Delhi, 10 September 1947. Extracts. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present included Mountbatten, Nehru, Lt.-Gen. Bucher and Maj.-Gen. Chimni.

non-Muslim refugees who should be evacuated within three or four weeks otherwise there might be none to bring. He required two brigades, armoured cars and civilian transport to do the job and added that there should be one Commander for internal security as well as evacuation.

Lt.-Gen. Bucher personally agreed with the general ideas put forward by Major-General Chimni. Lord Mountbatten thought that no reinforcements should be sent to East Punjab at the expense of Delhi as Delhi should remain the overriding priority...

The Prime Minister said that he agreed that Delhi should continue to have first priority. It seemed to him that the questions of evacuation of refugees and the maintenance of law and order were closely interrelated. To relax on law and order might well increase the refugee problem—new districts might be affected. In his view, however so far as East Punjab was concerned, the evacuation problem should have priority. The extent to which this was done would be a matter for those on the spot. He emphasised that it had been agreed at a meeting at Lahore that evacuation should be arranged on a mutual basis. He emphasised the necessity for tackling the problem with this in mind. Apart from this undertaking, the presence of Muslims waiting to be evacuated in East Punjab—for example 200,000 in Jullundur—was a constant irritant. Each factor reacted upon the other. It came down to a requirement of further troops. The Prime Minister also agreed that the separate Military Evacuation Organisation should be abolished and that one Commander should be appointed to deal with problems of both law and order and evacuation.

36. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram² No. 182 of 9th September has crossed mine No. 39 of same date. Situation in Delhi has markedly improved. All diplomatic missions have been given military protection. As regards High Commissioner, Pakistan,

1. New Delhi, 10 September 1947. M.E.A. & C.R. File No. 16-1/47/O.S.-V, p. 19/corr., N.A.I.
2. Liaquat Ali stated that he had received reports on the deteriorating situation in Delhi: "murder and loot are going on in broad daylight without any check and that there is prearranged plan by Sikhs" and other elements to exterminate the Muslims. He also complained that, despite representations, adequate protection had not been afforded to the Pakistan High Commissioner.

Commander-in-Chief has been to see him personally to make sure that adequate measures have been taken for his safety and I believe that Mr. Zahid Hussain³ is satisfied with arrangements made for his protection. We have also invited your High Commissioner to attend daily meetings of Emergency Committee of Cabinet when factual reports of developments in situation are made.

3. (1895-1957); joined Indian Audit and Accounts Service 1918; Financial Commissioner, Indian Railways, 1943-47; Vice-Chancellor, Aligarh Muslim University, 1947; High Commissioner of Pakistan in India, 1947-48.

37. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Situation in Delhi has been serious for last three days, but under control since yesterday and is being successfully tackled. We are trying to give every protection to evacuees. More troops have come in. Cabinet's Emergency Committee meeting daily under Governor-General's chairmanship and with representatives of military and all departments concerned. We have invited your High Commissioner to come to these meetings to find out exact situation and to place any matters before it he considers necessary. Special Delhi Emergency Committee under chairmanship of Cabinet Minister C.H. Bhabha consisting of civil, military and police officials and some non-officials also formed with joint headquarters.

In order to avoid delay we are arranging to give Government bulletins and directions to Provinces at fixed times through All India Radio. This may be considered official intimation so that action may be taken immediately wherever necessary. Suggest your making arrangements for listening in so that your Government might be kept informed of action being taken by Indian Government. Have given this information also to your High Commissioner and General Messervy. Exact time will be notified later.

1. New Delhi, 11 September 1947. M.E.A. & C.R. File No. 16-1/47/O.S.-V, p. 28/corr., N. A. I.

38. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

We have been having a very difficult time in Punjab and Delhi. Beginning with certain districts in East and West Punjab trouble spread to other districts. Murder, arson, looting and abduction of women and forcible conversions on a large scale. Every party guilty of horrible excesses in both parts Punjab. Little doubt that this organised and carried on by trained bands. But behind it popular elemental upheaval in town and countryside alike. Long continued preaching of communal hatred and two-nation theory had infuriated communities against each other. Coming of actual partition released these forces in each part Punjab. Many officials especially minor ones encouraging evil-doers. Police very definitely partial and Punjab army Muslim Sikh or Hindu also not impartial. Hence difficulty in dealing with situation. Vast numbers of refugees have spread all over North India aggravating position by spread of atrocity stories. Many of these refugees have lost all their property and their relatives and are feeling desperate. Total insecurity for Sikhs and Hindus in West Punjab and for Muslims in East Punjab led to vast spontaneous migrations of population.² Probably over one million Hindus, Sikhs migrated already from West to East Punjab. Similar number of Muslims from East to West Punjab. Movement continuing in great force largely under Governmental auspices. Most Hindus Sikhs remaining in West Punjab concentrated in camps which though protected still in danger. Similarly most Muslims in East Punjab concentrated in camps preparatory to transfer. This unwanted exchange of population has thus become urgent need and first priority in Punjab. These vast migrations upsetting economy of province and resulting in tremendous problems relating to abandoned houses land and upkeep of vast refugees populations. Both East and West Punjab Governments have appointed custodians of refugees property to take charge as trustees.³ These custodians authorised to lease property for limited period and it is hoped that abandoned lands will soon be occupied by refugees and agricultural operations continued which essential in view of approaching harvest. Food problems tremendously aggravated. Disease and epidemics beginning.

1. New Delhi, 11 September 1947, M.E.A. & C.R., File No.16-1/47/O.S.V, N.A.I.
2. It had been estimated that about 15 million people had been uprooted from their homes who had to trek hundreds of miles and live wretchedly in refugee camps before their respective Governments could look after them. Mass murders, lootings, abduction of women, forcible conversions and deaths of the aged and the infirm took place *en route*.
3. The West Punjab Government passed an ordinance on 9 September providing for a custodian in charge of evacuee property. The East Punjab Government passed a similar ordinance on 14 September.

Generally situation in Punjab quieter and to some extent under control but administrative apparatus functioning weakly partly due to magnitude of problems and partly to partiality of officials. We are taking effective measures to control situation and are making some progress.

Meanwhile Delhi province affected and upheaval of Hindu-Sikh population against Muslims. Looting arson and killing. Situation now improving and being brought under control. Partial breakdown of communications has added to our difficulties. Situation⁴ in Frontier Province bad and Hindus Sikhs in grave danger there. In Sind Hindus and Sikhs also beginning to migrate wherever facilities available.

Situation in other parts of India tense especially northern United Provinces.

We have set up emergency committees with large powers to deal with situation. They are beginning to function successfully. We have also set up separate ministry of refugees under K.C. Neogy. We hope to have full control soon. All manner of possible dangers ahead and consequences of what has already happened in any event very bad.

Bright spot⁵ Bengal due to Gandhiji who has come here now.

This picture gloomy but we are facing situation with all our strength and with confidence. Unable to give much time to other matters now. Met Listowel today.

Mountbatten has been of great help. Please show this message to Aruna Asaf Ali. She should not return to India but carry on with her programme.⁶

4. The advent of the Muslim League Ministry in the Frontier Province had been marked by severe repression. More than 1000 previous sympathisers of the Congress had been arrested. The Red Shirts and the Khan brothers were immobilised. A large number of non-Muslims in Hazara, Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar had been massacred. Meanwhile, the non-Muslim population of the Frontier Province had migrated or had to be evacuated by the Government of India.
5. When news from the Punjab reached Calcutta, rioting broke out on 1 September 1947. Immediately Mahatma Gandhi began a fast which was to continue until sanity returned to the city. After four days he received a pledge from Hindu, Muslim and Sikh leaders to keep peace in their own areas, and broke his fast. On 9 September he came to Delhi where communal passions were running high.
6. Aruna Asaf Ali was a member of the Indian delegation to the fourth plenary session of the U.N.E.S.C.O. conference held in Mexico City on 10 November 1947. She had been reluctant to leave India as she felt she would be doing more useful work in the rehabilitation of refugees. She was in London at this time.

39. A Uniform Refugee Policy¹

The disturbances in West and East Punjab have led to vast migrations across the border and an exchange of population is going on. This might be said to have been spontaneous, or under the stress of circumstances. Although exchange of population was occasionally mentioned during the past few months as a possible consequence of Pakistan, few people took it seriously and most of us criticised it as totally impracticable. Even after the disturbances began in the Punjab, we did not definitely encourage such an exchange, though we made arrangements for the removal of evacuees in danger of their lives. These arrangements developed till they became, in effect, arrangements for an exchange of population on a large scale.

2. The process of evacuation by Hindus and Sikhs began in March last from Rawalpindi and some other areas of the Punjab as well as from certain parts of the Frontier Province. There was no organisation behind this and yet probably a large number of people, may be two hundred thousand or so, gradually drifted across. In a small measure this stream continued throughout these months. It was accelerated in August last and became a flood after partition took effect.

3. On the other side, that is Muslims going from East Punjab to West, the process started much later, sometime in August. This was accelerated also by the actual partition. It is difficult to estimate the number of people who have been transferred from one region to another. Very probably over one million and possibly a million and a quarter Hindus and Sikhs have left the Pakistan area, more especially West Punjab and the Frontier Province, upto now. Roughly about the same number of Muslims must have left India, that is, chiefly East Punjab, for West Punjab. This process of transfer is continuing and at least another million on either side are likely to be transferred. That means that more than half the Hindu-Sikh population of Pakistan is leaving Pakistan for India and possibly like number of Muslims are going in the reverse direction. Is this stream to stop there or must it be carried on till East and West Punjab have become entirely non-Muslim and Muslim respectively? If this is going to happen, then we have to think in terms of transferring another few millions.

4. This is the Punjab picture, East and West. In this one might well include the Frontier Province, because it is exceedingly unlikely that many non-Muslims will remain in the Frontier Province or Baluchistan. About

1. Note to Cabinet Ministers, 12 September 1947. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

Sind, it is more difficult to say, though there is a tendency even now for Hindus to leave Sind and come to India.

5. The Delhi disturbances have raised a novel aspect of this problem and we have now to consider it not merely in relation to the Punjab or the Frontier, etc., but in its all-India context. We have indeed to think out carefully the exact policy we should pursue in future on this vital point so that the steps we may take in the present may not come in the way of our general policy. We shall have to make that policy clear to officers of Government. It is obvious today that there is no clarity about this whatever and Government officers do not know what they should aim at. This is not surprising, as no lead has been given to them and members of the Cabinet have not considered this matter jointly or otherwise in all its implications. The Cabinet, however, has to consider it fully and lay down some policy and not allow matters to drift. We cannot be slaves of circumstances, as we have been to some extent during the past few weeks, being driven hither and thither by forces utterly beyond our control. We cannot ignore public opinion, of course, especially when there is strong feeling behind it. At the same time it would be dangerous for us to encourage any policies which might be based on emotional upheaval which exists today. That upheaval will die down to a large extent and then we shall have to face the consequences of any wrong policy that we might adopt. We have to think in terms of the future of India, what kind of India we envisage and hope to build, what its relations are going to be with Pakistan as well as the rest of the world. It is perhaps not necessary or desirable to come to final and concrete decisions immediately. Any attempt to do so might lead us into wrong decisions, because of the prevailing sentiment. Nevertheless, some temporary decisions have to be taken to guide our present policy.

6. The disturbances in Delhi have brought the wider issue before us in all its grimness. The secession of certain parts of India and the formation of Pakistan has left India very predominantly non-Muslim, though it has still a considerable Muslim population. We have guaranteed in the constitution we are making the fullest rights to all minorities.² That is common ground. It is clear, however, that the part that Muslims have played in India

2. Abolition of separate electorates and elections on the basis of joint electorates, reservation of seats for the different recognised minorities on the basis of their population, safeguards and non-justiciable principles to the fundamental rights were the guarantees embodied in the constitution. The Congress Working Committee issued a statement on 24 September 1947 assuring the implementation of these promises.

has been very greatly reduced by the establishment of Pakistan. Such part as they can play can only be a cooperative part, and not one by compulsion which the great majority will never tolerate. There has been this element of compulsion in the past or threats, and this has led to the present unhappy situation and anger between the various communities.

7. Are we to aim at or to encourage trends which will lead to the progressive elimination of the Muslim population from India, or are we to consolidate, make secure and absorb as full citizens the Muslims who remain in India? That, again, involves our conception of India; is it going to be, as it has been in a large measure, a kind of composite state where there is complete cultural freedom for various groups, but at the same time strong political unity, or do we wish to make it, as certain elements appear to desire, definitely a Hindu or a non-Muslim state? If the Hindus think in terms of any domination, cultural or otherwise, over others, that would not only be against our own repeated professions, but would naturally displease other and smaller minorities in India. The Hindu mind has for during the past many years that it has been obstructed by Muslim activities, political and cultural, and, therefore, not allowed full play. Now it is obvious that there can be no such obstruction in future, both because of the numerical preponderance of the Hindus as well as many other reasons. The problem is whether the same free play and open opportunities should be given to other groups and communities, who may in the past have misbehaved politically or otherwise, but who are not now in a position to obstruct effectively or make a vital difference to the general trend in India.

8. The whole history of India has been one of assimilation and synthesis. That has been both the strength and the weakness of India.

9. The Muslim League movement of separatism was a throwback and a contradiction of India's history. The establishment of Pakistan is a further contradiction and, perhaps, many of the troubles we are facing today are due essentially to this attempt to go against the main trends of India's history. What this will lead to ultimately it is difficult to prophesy. Already the results have been disastrous. It is a dynamic situation and can either move to further conflict, including even war between India and Pakistan, or to peace between them and an adjustment. The latter may lead to a closer union, though this seems hardly conceivable in the present temper of the people both in India and Pakistan. A middle static way hardly seems possible.

10. However, these are more distant considerations. For the present let us take Delhi as symbolic of the past, the present and the future. Delhi

has been a great seat of the common culture that grew up during these past two hundred years in India. It has been, more than any other city in India, the seat of Indo-Muslim culture. It has had a large population, about 45 per cent of its total, of Muslims. To some extent, inevitably because of the establishment of Pakistan there will be a drift of Muslims to the Pakistan area from Delhi. Nevertheless, normally speaking, two hundred thousand or more of Muslims would still remain in Delhi. Are we to encourage them to remain in Delhi, or think in terms of most of them going away to Pakistan? If the latter, then why stop at Delhi?—other nearby cities are affected also, Aligarh, Meerut, Moradabad, Saharanpur, Shahjahanpur, Bulandshahr, etc. And if these cities are dealt with in this way, or are affected, then why stop there? Gradually the whole of India functions in this way and progressively eliminates the Muslim population. This process of elimination begins more at the top, so that the higher cultural strata goes first.

11. If this process continues, it will mean not only enormous changes taking place all the time in India with some kind of conflict going on, but also our being unable to do anything else for years. Meanwhile, the economic situation will certainly overwhelm us.

12. It seems to me clear, therefore, that we cannot encourage this business of Muslims leaving India. Apart from other reasons, Pakistan, as it is today, cannot accommodate all the Muslims in India. New difficulties will arise, new conflicts, possibly war.

13. But apart from these political and economic difficulties, I feel convinced that culturally India will be the poorer by any such divorce and all wrong tendencies will hold the field then.

14. This leads me to think that we should deal with the present evacuee problem in Delhi with a view not to push out Muslims as a whole, or in large numbers, but rather aim at a considerable population of Muslims to continue to stay in Delhi. What has happened will, of course, lead to a big migration and we are sending thousands of Muslims to Pakistan. Already ten or twelve thousand were sent yesterday; another ten thousand will go tomorrow, or the day after, and possibly another ten or twenty thousand might go. I suggest that beyond those people who want to go we should not do anything to force the pace. Indeed, we should make it clear by our policy and action that Muslims can stay on in Delhi in security and with free opportunities. We cannot, and we need not, make any definite declaration of policy immediately in the present tension and when popular passions have been aroused. For the present we should concentrate on:

- (i) Sending away those Muslims who are Pakistan employees or their relatives. This is being done;
- (ii) Sending away those Muslims who may be considered as outsiders in Delhi, like the Meos. This is being done;
- (iii) Sending away those Muslims who are determined to go to Pakistan;
- (iv) Build up proper sanitary and decent camps for Muslims who have evacuated from their houses in Delhi city. These camps should continue for a little while. I cannot fix a time limit, as this will depend upon circumstances, but it should be a matter of a few weeks and no more. If possible, we should try to arrange for some kind of work in these camps, preferably productive work.
- (v) Keep the houses in Delhi vacated by Muslims under the charge of Government, so that they may be occupied by their previous owners whenever they can go back to them. If these houses are otherwise disposed of or occupied, then, of course, there is hardly any possibility left of their previous owners returning to them or staying on in Delhi. Many of these previous owners belong to old and respected Delhi families who have been living in Delhi for many centuries.

15. If some such policy is adopted we might get back to normality within a few weeks.

16. I realise that this policy is opposed to the prevailing Sikh and Hindu sentiment in Delhi. Therefore, we should not take any steps in a hurry. At the same time, I feel that this Delhi sentiment is largely the result of the influx of refugees and is not the sentiment of Delhi citizens as a whole. We might aim at dealing with this sentiment when the crisis subsides and people regain their sanity. Any other course seems to me to be fraught with disaster not only for Delhi but for India as a whole.

17. This matter is of the most vital consequence and must be considered fully by Cabinet. I am, therefore, venturing to circulate this note to Ministers of the Cabinet, so that they may give previous thought to it before we meet and consider it. I am also having copies of this note sent to Mahatma Gandhi and H.E. the Governor-General. I would request that this note and this subject be treated as very secret.

40. To John Matthai¹

New Delhi
13 September 1947

My dear Matthai,

As you know, I am going to Lahore for a day.

A suggestion has been made that perhaps some of the trained workers from the Tata School of Social Service,² or whatever the name might be, might be able to help us in dealing with the refugees in the camps. If you think it worthwhile, you might make this suggestion at the meeting of the Emergency Committee. If the suggestion is approved, Jehangir Tata can be informed.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. In fact Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Bombay.

41. To Rajan Nehru¹

New Delhi
13 September 1947

My dear Rajan,

I understand that Habibur Rahman has suggested that I.N.A. men might be asked to help us in some way to cope with the situation in Delhi. I am not quite sure how this can be done and what steps would be feasible. I suggest, however, that for the present we might have a look at the men actually in Delhi and make a selection from them. To begin with at least we must not bring men from outside Delhi. Also the men will have to be very carefully chosen. It does not matter whether they are a few. If a few justify themselves, then others can be taken. Unfortunately quite a number of I.N.A. men have been involved in the disturbances in the Punjab and, therefore, there is a certain hesitation in the minds of local authorities in employing them. If, however, they are carefully chosen and are tested, then more might be employed.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

42. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
13 September 1947

My dear Pantji,

You know that some of the members of the Central Government are not members of the Constituent Assembly or the Legislative Assembly as it is going to be. We would like them to become such members. Is it possible for any of them to get in from the U.P.? There are at least two vacancies in the U.P., possibly more. These vacancies are Vijayalakshmi's and Sri Prakasa's. Among the members that we want elected are Dr. John Matthai, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee and Mr. Bhabha. If it is possible for you to choose Dr. Matthai and Syama Prasad Mookerjee, it would be a great help.

As you perhaps know, we have had and are having a difficult time in Delhi. Some consequences of this you are yourselves feeling in the north-western parts of the U.P.² I hope that you will succeed in keeping the peace in the U.P. I hope also that there will be no migration of Muslims from the U.P. The more I think of these migrations, the more dangerous for the future they appear to me to be. Gandhiji is firmly of this opinion also. Indeed he has disliked utterly the migration even in the Punjab.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. In the wake of the influx of refugees into north-west U.P. a number of violent communal incidents took place forcing the provincial government to declare on 8 September the districts of Meerut, Bulandshahr, Muzaffarnagar and Saharanpur as "disturbed areas". It conferred wide powers on the commissioners, arrested the leaders of the riots, banned *kirpans* over nine inches long, ordered the segregation of refugees into separate camps for Sikhs, Muslims and Hindus and put the police under military control.

43. To General R. Lockhart¹

New Delhi
13 September 1947

My dear General Lockhart,

You must have learnt that in response to an invitation from Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan I am going to Lahore tomorrow morning accompanied by Sardar Baldev Singh. We hope to pick up the Governor of East Punjab from Jullundur and take him also to Lahore. Chimni and Thimayya will meet us there. This is more satisfactory than sending instructions by telegram.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

COMMUNAL RIOTS AND THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

2. You raised the question of priorities today at the Emergency Council meeting as also how far emphasis should be laid on meeting the challenge to law and order.² First priority, it was stated, must inevitably be law and order in Delhi. In regard to the Punjab, the evacuation of refugees was given high priority, the exact steps to be taken being left to the discretion of the people on the spot. The Delhi law and order situation is partly influenced by and influences the surrounding areas. I want to pass on to you certain information I have received about the border areas where it is feared that unless some action is taken fairly soon, disasters might occur. Large crowds are said to have gathered around these places where a number of Muslims live and other Muslims have gathered together. These places are Palwal (Gurgaon district), 36 miles on the Mathura road, and Ballabgarh, 13 miles on the Grand Trunk road.

3. Near the Ajmeri Gate in Delhi city there is the Anglo-Arabic College³ which contains a valuable library. This college is completely empty at the present moment and I am told that it has no police or military guard at all. Nothing has so far happened to it. But an empty house of this kind with valuable property is unfortunately an invitation to evil-doers. It deserves to be protected just like Delhi University and Jamia Millia.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 13 September 1947, the Emergency Committee decided that priority should be given to the transfer of refugees rather than the maintenance of law and order. Mounibatten recorded that he agreed with this decision because the solution of the first problem was alone likely to lead to a solution of the second.
3. Now known as Dr. Zakir Husain Memorial College.

44. The Dimensions of the Refugee Problem¹

The refugee problem is a terrible one. Maybe a million and quarter persons have come from West to East Punjab and a similar number have gone from East to West Punjab. Probably half a million are on the move now on either side and probably another half a million are waiting to be moved. That means that at least two million on each side have been moved or are going to be moved. Maybe more. That is a terrific problem, yet we have given it high priority because if we do not move them, these people would suffer.

1. Address to a press conference, Delhi, 13 September 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times* and *The Statesman*, 14 September 1947.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

But soon after and even now we have to face all manner of other big problems, to settle these people, to prevent disease, famine, etc. It is an enormous problem.

We were not thinking of exchange of population here, but it was forced on us and we had to carry out our duty. This is being done at a time when India is having a fairly severe food crisis.² Like many other countries, India has a big economic crisis. So you can realise the extent of the problem facing us. Whatever the extent, we have evolved a machinery to deal with it and I think we shall deal with it more and more satisfactorily as time goes on.

There are many questions of future policies which will arise when these troubles are over. What is to happen to these refugees is a question which must be decided when passions have cooled down. All I can say at the moment is that no compulsion of any kind would be used.

While we were celebrating the attainment of independence in Delhi, almost exactly at that time things were blowing up in the Punjab. As soon as I heard about it, two days later, on August 17, I went to the Punjab. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and I held a conference at Ambala and then went on to Lahore. Since then we had been frequently going to the Punjab but the trouble has rather spread. I must confess that we have several times underestimated it. I went there on August 17. I did not think it would become what it became a week later.

The East Punjab Government has been facing tremendous administrative difficulties following the partition of the Punjab. The Central Government has, of course, promised all the help that can be given. After the first week or ten days, we, at the Centre, came to the conclusion that this kind of a thing required a much bigger organisation and more efficient central tackling. So, we, first of all, formed an Emergency Committee of the Cabinet and invited the Governor-General to preside over it. And then we asked a large number of departmental heads and other people to attend this meeting.

We were rather taken unawares by these happenings. Perhaps it was our fault and we ought not to have been taken unawares by anything. And if a Government is taken unawares, it must suffer for it. For the first few days we rather underestimated what was going to happen. Having underestimated once, twice, three times, we decided not to do it again. So we built up a machinery which could deal with every possible contingency and a situation of emergency all over India, not merely here or there. That is the organisation we have been building up. Immediate decision is made on every matter that comes up. In the last four or five days it has been functioning

2. At this time there was a deficit of five to six million tons of foodgrains because of the failure of *kharif* and *rabi* crops in 1946 and of the wheat crop in 1947. There were not only breakdowns of rationing but drastic cuts in the existing rations. Rajendra Prasad, Union Minister for Food, warned of a grave famine.

and has already produced good results. I have no doubt it will become more and more efficient. In the same way, a little later, we started the Delhi Emergency Committee.³ In the last two days that has also begun functioning more or less on proper lines, and I think in a day or two it will work much more efficiently. So, we have come to grips with this problem, and we are going to deal with it firmly, and in all its aspects. The results of our dealing with it are already fairly visible. There will be more evidence soon.

One of the chief aspects in dealing with a big situation like this is to understand it in its proper perspective. Sitting in Delhi, we tend to get sometimes more or less overwhelmed by local events and we might even lose sight of the whole of the city of Delhi, much more so of the whole of India.

This brings to my mind some of the press reports that have been sent from Delhi or elsewhere about recent happenings in India. Some of them were quite extraordinarily wide of the mark. For instance, the External Affairs Ministry received a message from Washington that a certain news agency had sent a message there stating that half a million people had died in Delhi. It was an extraordinary statement to make even for a person who had great imagination. So far as I know, no such statement was sent from Delhi even by that agency. Where it emanated from and how it reached Washington, it is for the representative of that agency to find out.

However, looking at the disturbances in their proper perspective, it is a long story. What we have seen in the last month is really a very extraordinary thing, extraordinary anywhere and even more extraordinary in India, for India is generally a more peaceful country than any other country in the world. Many average Indians had behaved with quite excessive brutality in the past few weeks, though normally they disliked to kill even a mosquito or a snake. This meant that something had happened which had almost deranged and completely upset their mental make-up. They had experienced terrible shocks or were going through processes of shock. Therefore, if we want to understand them, we must understand those processes of shocks that had made these peaceful individuals behave in such a savage manner.

I do not propose to talk about the degree of savagery shown by the Hindus, Sikhs or Muslims. It had been bad all round. But I found in reports, especially in foreign reports, statements made to the effect that the blame—if not all the great part of it—lay with the Sikhs.⁴ That is not fair

3. The Delhi Emergency Committee functioned from 9 September to 8 October 1947.

4. For example, *The Economist* of 30 August said, "It was expected that the worst trouble arising from the partition . . . would come from the Sikhs . . . the boundary award has in fact for economic reasons given less of the Punjab to Pakistan than the mere statistics of communal distribution would require, but the fury of Sikhs has not been assuaged and has broken out in an organised campaign to exterminate or drive out all Muslims left on the Indian side . . ."

to the Sikhs. The Sikhs undoubtedly had misbehaved as others had misbehaved, but to cast the blame on the Sikhs is completely wrong.

These events started from August 16 last year when there was the killing in Calcutta. That was followed by Noakhali, each time on an ascending scale of brutality and killing. Then there was very big retaliation in Bihar. It was a kind of peasant upheaval, no doubt not so sudden, but it still seemed sudden. And yet this vast peasant upheaval was dealt with within a week. It was one of those most efficient and effective things that any Government could do in the circumstances.

Then early this year, in March, the Punjab came into the picture—Rawalpindi, Multan, Lahore, Amritsar and also bits of the Frontier Province like Hazara district, which was practically Punjabi. A very large number of villages were burnt and other horrible things happened in these places. That really was the beginning of the new phase of trouble and because of that a considerable number of people migrated from all those areas. There was also a fair number from Lahore, Amritsar and other places. It was not a big wave as it was seen now, but still it was fairly considerable and in the course of three or four months, I imagine, over a quarter of a million people certainly came away from those areas to Delhi and to the northern parts of the U.P. Maybe, their number was three or four hundred thousand—no statistics have been kept or could easily be kept. In Lahore, meanwhile, the trouble continued as in Amritsar and petty troubles continued elsewhere also.

That kind of trouble, unfortunate as it was, had happened on a smaller scale previously. It now happened on a bigger scale. One might say that in the Punjab there was an even balance, more or less, taken as a whole, and that even balance had kept the peace because people knew that if that balance was upset there would be a big trouble. Instead of that, other things happened which led to the trouble and then came the partition business which excited the Punjab greatly. When ultimately partition actually came in the midst of the continuous troubles that were going on, immediately a feeling of great insecurity came to the Punjab. In western Punjab there was a feeling of insecurity immediately among the Hindus and the Sikhs, and in eastern Punjab, there was a similar feeling among the Muslims; whether the feeling was justified or not is another matter. The Hindus and Sikhs had the example of Rawalpindi, Multan, Lahore and other places, while in eastern Punjab, in Amritsar district, there had been a considerable killing of Muslims in the first half of August.

There was immediate reaction in Lahore where Sikhs were particularly picked out as being the enemies of the Muslims. Other non-Muslim Hindus were also attacked, but the Sikhs were particularly picked out and such happenings went on in East Punjab and West Punjab.

Unfortunately, the accounts from the West Punjab till very recently,

or even now, have been far more limited and we have not had any proper accounts from large areas of West Punjab. We are better informed of the happenings in East Punjab.

Regarding the disturbances in Delhi, on the whole, the population of Delhi has been known to be very peaceful and orderly, and Delhi has had a composite Hindu-Muslim life for four or five hundred years. But nearly quarter of the population in Delhi now consisted of refugees. The refugees who came last month have seen the most terrible happenings and many of them may be considered as completely unhinged.

I do not know how many of them would have reacted under similar experiences. Anyhow, the disturbances developed to some extent like a snowball, partly because of the past happenings, and partly because of the refugees who had spread out. I think it would be correct to say that 75 per cent of what has happened in Delhi was directly due to the reaction produced by the stories brought by the refugees from the Punjab.

45. To A.E. Foot¹

New Delhi
15 September 1947

My dear Foot,²

I have your letter. It is difficult to advise you, though of course each one of us can help. As regards your two points, I do not agree with No. 1. There is very little order in West Punjab and hardly any security for members of the minorities. As for No. 2, I hope we shall be able to do so. But just at present North-West U.P. is in a ferment, and we shall have to deal with it.

Probably it would be good if you go to Lahore or beyond. But I think it would be better for you to delay a little escorting the Muslim boys to Dehra Dun from Pakistan till conditions are better.

If you pass through Delhi you can try to see me. But I am moving about a lot and not always to be found.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Headmaster of the Doon School at Dehra Dun.

46. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

The statement we agreed upon yesterday that there should be no searches of evacuees and evacuation camps applies in terms only to West and East Punjab. I suggest that it should also apply to evacuees from other provinces of western Pakistan. The arrangements will of course be reciprocal and I hope you will agree.²

1. New Delhi, 15 September 1947. M.E.A. & C.R. File No. 16-1/47/O.S.-V, N.A.I.
2. Replying on 18 September, Liaquat Ali said that searches were necessary as a number of evacuees from Sind were removing essential goods in short supply which would seriously affect the economy of the province. Besides, considerable quantities of unlicensed arms were also recovered during the searches. He suggested that women on both sides be spared the humiliation of searches.

47. Record of the Eleventh Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

The Prime Minister said that he had visited Lahore the previous day. There he had held long discussions with the Prime Minister of Pakistan on various matters. They had investigated certain complaints which had been made by both the West Punjab and the East Punjab Governments. These complaints had been strikingly similar. He had discussed the telegram from Sir Francis Mudie which had quoted Master Tara Singh as saying: "This is

1. New Delhi, 15 September 1947. Extracts. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present included Mountbatten and Nehru.

war"; it had become obvious that this quotation was based on a misconception of what Master Tara Singh had, in fact, said.²

The Prime Minister stated that two convoys of refugees on foot had already started.³ These stretched for as much as 40 miles; he had flown over one of them on his way back. There were perhaps 100,000 people in this convoy. The one (of Muslims) which was to have marched from Jullundur to Lahore via Amritsar had been held up because of the difficulty of passing through Amritsar where there were 70,000 refugees from West Punjab in an excited state and where the atmosphere was not wholesome. The process of bull-dozing a road round Amritsar would take a week. The representatives of the West Punjab Government had considered that this would involve too long a delay, because the refugees from the province would meet trouble if it was learnt that those from East Punjab had been delayed. If this report went around, the police escort of the convoy from West Punjab would, it was felt, prove inadequate. The possibility of sending the East Punjab lot by a canal road was being investigated—the difficulty about this was that the two convoys might meet. After considerable discussion, it has been left to Major-Generals Cariappa and Chimni to make the best possible arrangements, and it was hoped that the convoy from Jullundur would start that day or the following day.

The Prime Minister said that the question of searching refugees had also arisen. There had been complaints concerning these searches from both sides. Some convoys had been stopped for twelve hours and the people harassed and robbed. The meeting at Lahore had come to the unanimous conclusion that it was not worthwhile continuing these searches—apart from the inconvenience caused, they were corrupting the military and the police. Therefore, it had been decided to issue an announcement. The Prime Minister explained that this statement applied to the two Punjab Provinces only. It did not exclude the unlicensed weapons, if these were carried openly, nor did it exclude searches in permanent camps.

2. At a press conference on 5 September in Delhi, Master Tara Singh had said: "I have a strong suspicion that there are some British officers in the Army who wish to undermine the discipline of the Army and thus create chaos in the country." He charged that British officers of the Boundary Force with shooting down non-Muslims in Gurdaspur district. "As soon as Muslim officials obtained charge of Lahore city, attack on non-Muslims in that city was launched on an unprecedented scale.... Several well-known gurdwaras in the city were destroyed with the help of the military and police."
3. The movement of these columns, one of them 52 miles long, raised many problems. When the supply of food failed, the Government of India had cooked food as well as foodgrains and sugar dropped by R.I.A.F. planes which flew from Amritsar and Delhi to Jaranwala, Lyallpur, Churkhana, Dhabhansinghwala, Balloki head-works and Bhai Pheru. Drugs, vaccines and doctors were rushed by air and road. A field ambulance unit was sent to Raiwind to inoculate refugees before they crossed the border. On the way the columns were often attacked and suffered heavy casualties. Women and children were abducted, or deprived of the few valuables they carried.

The Prime Minister went on to say that another matter which had been discussed at Lahore was the vast number of women who had been abducted and how these could be restored to their families.⁴ According to his own information, there had been a fairly large number of abductions in East Punjab, but a very much larger number in West Punjab. Some women had already returned. He has suggested that this was largely a question for the military and the police; but that women helpers might be associated in their efforts. He had offered to accept in East Punjab any such women helpers nominated by the Pakistan Government. The main duty of such helpers would be to introduce the human element.⁵

4. The recovery of abducted women was a difficult task as they had been frequently changing hands. Some women were with influential persons. For instance, it was reported during the disturbances that an M.L.A. had 500 non-Muslim girls. The social stigma attached to abduction of girls added to the difficulties for their recovery. Many of them were said to have been killed during the riots. Many of them were sold off for as ridiculous a price as Rs. 10 or Rs. 20 and then taken beyond the borders of Pakistan.
5. The Government of India appointed four regional organisers, recognized forty social workers and set up eleven camps for recovery of abducted women from each district of West Punjab. Mridula Sarabhai, Premvati Thapar and Bhag Mehta, among many others, helped to carry out this task. Later, in 1948, Begum Amtul Salam went to Bahawalpur State to rescue Hindu women.

48. To Abdul Qayyum Khan¹

New Delhi
15 September 1947

Dear Mr. Abdul Qayyum Khan,

I should be grateful if you could let me have some information about the non-Muslims in D.I. Khan—how many there are and whether they are in a camp or elsewhere. Is it proposed to send them out of the province and if so when? In particular I should be glad if you could let me have information about Mrs. Bhanju Ram Gandhi² who is at D.I. Khan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Baldevi, daughter of Lala Sekher Ram Java of Dera Ismail Khan and wife of Bhanju Ram Gandhi, an ex-minister of N.W.F.P.

49. Friendship with Pakistan¹

My attention has been drawn to a statement made by Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan, to the Punjab Muslim League Council on September 14 at Lahore, in the course of which he is reported to have said:

- (1) Today we (Pakistan) are surrounded on all sides by forces which are out to destroy us. They (these forces) feel that with the consolidation of Pakistan, their cherished dream to rule all over the sub-continent of India will not be realized;
- (2) That the Muslims in East Punjab were routed only by the bullets and bayonets of the forces of law and order;
- (3) That the Governments of India and East Punjab had not honoured and implemented the decisions jointly taken by the Governments of the two Dominions in Lahore some days ago.²

I am both surprised and pained that these statements should have been made on the very day that representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan met in Lahore to consider ways and means of making more effective the measures previously agreed upon to localize and end the present tragic situation.

It is well known that, before partition came, many of us sought to avert it. Since partition was decided upon, it has been the constant endeavour of the Government of India to discharge faithfully all their obligations flowing from that decision. Some of us still hope that, when the present unhappy commotion has ended and amity between the two communities has been restored, the two Dominions may, of the free will of their respective peoples, unite.

None of us, however, has thought of treating Pakistan as an enemy or harboured an intention to destroy it. It is unfortunate that any such motive should be imputed to the Government of India.

As regards Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's second charge, it is to be regretted, but it is true that there have been instances of dereliction of duty by the forces of law and order. Such dereliction, however, has not by any means been

1. Statement to the press, New Delhi, 16 September 1947. *The Hindustan Times*, 17 September 1947.
2. The conference of the representatives of the two Governments on 3 September 1947 spelt out measures for restoration of law and order and protection of refugees in East and West Punjab. The transfer of refugees from the two States was to be organised by military authorities under proper escorts. Steps were also stipulated to deal with forced conversions, seizure of property and damage to religious sites.

exclusive to the forces of the Government of India or of the East Punjab. It has been practised on both sides of the border. My colleagues and I have publicly condemned it and we are doing our best, and not without success, to eliminate this serious defect.

It is fair, however, to record that, at least so far as the forces of law and order in India are concerned, impartiality rather than partisanship has been the rule.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has regretted that the Governments of India and East Punjab have not honoured and implemented the decisions jointly taken by the Governments of the two Dominions. I am not aware of any deviation from our undertakings. At the meeting in Lahore last Sunday, the only complaint placed before us by the representatives of the Government of Pakistan related to some delay in the movement of a Muslim convoy from Jullundur to West Punjab. The slight delay was due entirely to the need for giving the evacuees adequate protection. In fact, the convoy started soon after and is well on its way.

Every Muslim refugee camp in East Punjab, every group of evacuees has been given military protection. According to our agreement, the Pakistan forces were supposed to protect non-Muslim refugee camps and convoys in West Punjab. This has not been done adequately by them and because of this our task has grown greater and our forces have been stretched to the utmost. They have not grudged the strain. Everything that can be done is being done to discharge the obligations which we have assumed.

Another Pakistan Minister, Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, is reported to have stated in an interview³ in Karachi, after a 21-day tour of the riot-affected areas in West Punjab only, that well over 100,000 casualties have occurred in East Punjab and about 10,000 in West Punjab. The figures of refugees mentioned by Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan are 1,100,000 from East Punjab to West Punjab and between 200,000 and 300,000 from West Punjab to East Punjab.

I am not aware on what data these figures are based; according to our information, they are completely wrong. No one can estimate even approximately at this stage the number of casualties, but we have some reason to believe that the casualties in West Punjab have been greater than in East Punjab. The figure of refugees, which is more accurately calculable, would appear to be roughly equal, at least so far, from both sides. About a million and a quarter have crossed the border from either side.

I do not wish to say anything that will add to the dangers of an atmosphere already surcharged with passion, and of a situation fraught with tragedy. We desire and seek nothing but a rapid restoration of peace and the establishment, on lasting foundations, of amity between Pakistan and India.

3. On 13 September 1947.

That has been the steadfast purpose and endeavour of my colleagues and myself; it will remain so. I can only say, and I say it with profound regret, that statements of the kind on which I have had to comment do not advance the cause of peace or friendship.

50. Record of the Twelfth Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

Zakir Husain said that refugee camps at Purana Quila and Humayun's Tomb in Delhi were "areas in which humanity was dumped."

The Prime Minister pointed out that if the mass migration of Muslims from their homes to refugee camps continued, the whole organisation would collapse. Furthermore, protection and feeding of these people in their own homes ought to be easier than in camps. The question facing the Government was whether the migration should be approved of or not. The alternative to taking measures to stop the migration was mass evacuation.

1. New Delhi, 16 September 1947. Extracts. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present included Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel, Maj.-Gen. Cariappa, Zakir Husain, C.H. Bhabha and Sanjeevi Pillai.

51. Situation in Delhi¹

The recent disturbances in Delhi have had far-reaching consequences already and are likely to have still more serious results both for Delhi city and the country. It is, therefore, necessary to lay down a clear policy which should be communicated to all civil and military personnel as well as to non-officials so that a common policy may be followed.

2. The first essential is to put an end to all lawlessness, murder, arson and loot, and to bring security to the citizens of Delhi. No progress can be

1. Note to the Members of the Cabinet, 17 September 1947. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

made in any direction unless there is this sense of security. This is to be attained both by police and military action and protection and by such other appeals as might influence public opinion and tone down the tension that has existed in the city. As a part of this policy law-breakers must be punished.

3. There are a very large number of Muslim evacuees from Delhi city in various camps. It is not the desire of Government to send away any citizen of Delhi against his will. Government believe that the citizens of Delhi have not originated and have had little part in the recent disturbances in the city. They have lived peacefully together for ages past and there is no reason why they should not do so in the future. Unfortunately events in the Punjab and elsewhere had brought tragedy and extreme suffering and loss to vast numbers of human beings. Many of these unfortunate sufferers have found shelter in Delhi and their presence in large numbers has upset the normal balance of Delhi city. Efforts should be made to provide for these persons as rapidly as possible so that they may settle down and find vocations in some part of India. Till then these refugees, mostly from the West Punjab and the Frontier Province, should be suitably housed and looked after in camps, where other accommodation is not available to them.

4. Muslim evacuees or refugees who are not residents of Delhi should be sent away from the city. Those who may come from surrounding rural areas should be sent there as soon as normal conditions prevail. Others should be sent to Pakistan.

5. Muslim citizens and residents of Delhi should be afforded every opportunity of resuming their normal lives in Delhi city unless they themselves desire to go to Pakistan in which case facilities for their going should be provided. Government, however, wish to make it clear that they do not wish to compel such decision by force of circumstances upon them. They wish to retain in Delhi and in India all citizens who are loyal to India to whatever community they might belong.

evacuees continue to belong to them and that ownership and property in them cannot pass to another. So long as they are not taken possession of by their owners, a Custodian of Evacuees Properties will hold them in trust and no arrangements should be made which come in the way of the return of their previous owners.

9. Steps must be taken as early as possible for the recovery of all unlicensed arms from all citizens, irrespective of the communities to which they belong. A brief time-limit may be given to all residents to surrender all unlicensed arms within that period. In case of such surrender within the time-limit immunity from prosecution will be granted. After the expiry of that time all those possessing unlicensed arms will be dealt with according to law. Every effort will be made to recover all unlicensed arms by whomsoever possessed. It may even be necessary to limit the possession of licensed arms. Arms will include not only fire-arms but other prohibited arms and weapons.

10. During the last fortnight the Government and the citizens of Delhi have had to face a severe strain and the life of this capital city has been put out of joint. This has not only involved great suffering for the residents of the city but also come in the way of the organisation which Government have been building up to succour those who looked to them for help and deliverance in the western Punjab and elsewhere. Owing to pre-occupation in Delhi, Government have been unable to take adequate steps to put down lawlessness in some places and to expedite the evacuation of those in West Punjab and elsewhere who have been in peril. Those who have actively or passively encouraged lawlessness in Delhi have thus done a grave disservice to their countrymen and to those who looked to India for help. They have lowered the prestige of India and prevented the Government from mobilising all their strength to face the severe crisis that confronts them in the Punjab and elsewhere. Though the situation is in many ways improving and is in hand, the crisis continues and there is grave danger if the machinery of Government is weakened in any way or diverted from its primary objects. At this critical juncture these primary objects are to maintain the safety and integrity of the state, to build its strength to meet all contingencies, to rescue speedily all those in the West Punjab or the Frontier Province or elsewhere who stand in peril and look to India for relief. These objects have the first priority; they are interrelated, for only with a strong Government can the rest be achieved rapidly and effectively.

11. Government, therefore, expect every citizen to do his duty in this hour of crisis. They have a right to demand full loyalty and discipline to the state. Any person who is unable to give this loyalty and allegiance to the

state, which is his primary obligation, can expect no rights and privileges in the state.

12. The military and the police have special functions and arduous duties to perform during these abnormal times. On them depends in a large measure the security and the safety of the people. They have to set a high standard of loyalty to the state and of impartiality to all the citizens of the state. Government expect them to maintain this high standard of duty and thus earn the goodwill and confidence of their fellow citizens.

51a. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

17 September 1947

My dear Rajendra Babu,

Thank you for your letter of the 17th.² The various matters referred to by you have been before us and we have discussed them at length in Cabinet and in the Emergency Committee as well as otherwise. So far as your suggestions³ are concerned, I entirely agree with all four of them and I hope they will be given effect to. Delhi and indeed most places in North India are full of illicit arms. During the last year or so everyone who could afford it, whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh, tried to collect arms. The Punjab was and is full of them. They were easy to obtain because of war dumps. Originally little care was taken of them and subsequently they could be had at black market prices. Some of the Indian States, more especially the Muslim and Sikh States, have been a constant source of supply of arms. I hope that in Delhi a thorough search for arms will be carried out throughout the city irrespective of communities.

2. I am keeping our U.N.O. delegation informed of happenings here.

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. Rajendra Prasad wrote that the admission by the leaders of Pakistan of guilt and a half-hearted attempt at a counter-charge "were alienating world opinion as well as our own people against us". He feared that in such circumstances they might not be able to prevent people from acting on their own if the Pakistan Government did nothing to stop the exodus of non-Muslims from major cities.
3. He suggested the removal of all people suspected of disloyalty from positions of responsibility; the placing of magazines and stores of arms in the charge of those of proven loyalty; depriving the citizens in Delhi of arms illegally manufactured or obtained; and furnishing the latest information to the Indian delegation at the United Nations about the happenings in Pakistan to counter the Pakistan delegations charges.

During the last two or three weeks foreign press messages have almost uniformly laid the blame on Sikhs chiefly and partly on others. It is perfectly true, as you say, that the picture has been very one-sided. It is extraordinarily difficult to deal with this kind of thing, as statements by individuals, however prominent, do not go very far in convincing foreign opinion. Censorship is even worse because it makes people believe that we are guilty and wish to hide facts. We have tried to influence the foreign press by placing facts before them in press conferences etc., and this had some result. The fact is that Delhi events have naturally had a powerful reaction on all foreigners in Delhi including ambassadors and their staffs. These events taken as a whole have shown a picture of all Muslims, irrespective of their position or standing or residence, being hunted down and killed wherever possible. Every ambassador's house has been visited by gangs in search of Muslim servants. The Muslim population of Delhi, or at least three-fourths of it if not more, is now living in camps in Purana Quila and elsewhere. All this, which the foreign press correspondents have seen for themselves, has had a powerful effect upon them.

3. I quite agree with you that the statements made by Jinnah and company have been most objectionable and one-sided.⁴ It is difficult for responsible persons to sink to their level. As a matter of fact I have reason to believe that our statements, decently and moderately worded, have influenced foreign opinion considerably and Jinnah's statements have been illreceived because of their obvious partiality. We are continually taking some action in regard to all these statements, but we cannot from day to day give publicity to the action we take.

4. I must confess to you that recent happenings in the Punjab and in Delhi have shaken me very greatly. That would be a small matter; but what is a much more serious matter is that they are shaking my faith in my own people. I could not conceive of the gross brutality and sadistic cruelty that people have indulged in West Punjab, East Punjab and in Delhi, both in the cities and in the rural areas. Of course I know very well that one thing has reacted on another and popular passions have been inflamed. Nevertheless there is a limit to killing and brutality and that limit has been passed during these days in North India. A people who indulge in this kind of thing not only brutalise themselves but poison the environment. Killing on a large scale has stopped in Delhi but individual attacks continue in odd places by

4. Jinnah alleged that India was deliberately driving Muslim refugees into Pakistan in order to bring about administrative and economic collapse. It was a deep-laid and well-planned conspiracy to bring Pakistan to her knees before she had even properly stood up.

the kind of persons who are normally quiet and peaceful. Little children are butchered in the streets. The houses in many parts of Delhi are still full of corpses. These corpses are being discovered as people go inside and find dead bodies which have been lying there for many days. I am fairly thick-skinned, but I find this kind of thing more than I can bear.

5. The future appears to be dark not so much because 50,000 or 100,000 people have been murdered, but because of the mentality that has accompanied this and that perhaps might continue. I quite realise that I am out of tune with this environment and not a fit representative of it. Yet I am entirely convinced that if we surrender to this mentality, then indeed we are doomed as a nation.

6. There was a time when under Bapu's guidance and insistence we used to condemn terroristic acts⁵ even when by normal standards they might have been justified in the cause of national freedom. Now open murder committed in the most brutal way stalks everywhere and we hesitate to say much about it lest we may lose our hold on the people. I must confess that I have no stomach for this leadership. Unless we keep to some standards, freedom has little meaning, and certainly India will not become the great nation we have dreamt of for so long.

7. No one of us is under any delusion about the capacity and desire for mischief of the Pakistan leaders. We cannot take their word for anything and their actions belie their words. We have to prepare ourselves for every possible contingency including war, declared or undeclared, between the two states. We have had something much worse than national war. The only question is how we are to set about this business of being prepared and of how we are to rescue those who look to us for help in the hour of danger; also how in doing this we are to maintain some decent standards, both national and personal. Each one of us has evidently given the closest thought to all these problems and come to some conclusions, though any conclusions now arrived at might have to be varied with changing circumstances. We have faced and are facing the gravest crisis that any Government can have to face, more especially a new Government. The consequences of each step that we might take are bound to be far-reaching. The world is watching us also and the world's opinion counts. But above all we are watching ourselves and if we fall in our own estimation, who will rescue us?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. For instance, at the A.I.C.C. meeting at Ahmedabad in June 1924, Mahatma Gandhi secured the passage of a resolution condemning the assassination of an Englishman.

52. To Mahatma Gandhi¹

17-9-47

Dear Bapu,

I am sending you a press clipping giving the resolutions passed by the joint conference at Lahore on September 3rd.² On the second page you will find the reference to forced conversions.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Both the Governments agreed to establish law and order, protect all refugees and get them safely across the border, run refugee and evacuee camps, organise evacuation by the military, appoint custodians of refugee property and liaison officers, not to recognise forced conversions and forced marriages, trace and restore abducted women to their families, protect and safeguard property belonging to religious, charitable and cultural institutions and restore at public expense religious places destroyed or desecrated, expedite transfer of stranded government officers and issue reports of occurrences to check wild rumours.

53. To Mahatma Gandhi¹

18-9-1947

Dear Bapu,

I enclose a letter from Rajendra Babu and a copy of my reply to him. Also a note² which I am presenting to the Cabinet today. It is meant to be a draft for a declaration on behalf of Government. This is just a rough draft to be finalised after discussion.

Yesterday we discussed in Cabinet this matter for some time in a rather desultory fashion. While superficially people seemed to agree, there were obviously vital differences in approach and objectives. So we are meeting again this afternoon.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. See next item.

54. Relations with Pakistan¹

Points to be discussed with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on September 19th 1947.

Representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan as well as the Governments of East and West Punjab have met repeatedly and passed a number of resolutions. Complaints have been made that these resolutions have not been fully implemented on either side. These complaints can be inquired into. But apart from the implementation of directions given by higher authority, an important question arises as to the general policy being pursued by the respective Governments. Unless there is full understanding and a belief in the sincerity of that policy on either side, it is not likely that any implementation will take place.

2. Without entering into past history and matters of controversy it is clear that on both sides of the Punjab as well as elsewhere many horrible things have happened and people have misbehaved. On the part of the Government of India we have both admonished our own people and taken action against them. On the part of the Pakistan Government no such thing has been done and it has been made to appear that all the fault lay with the Government and people of India, that the Government and people of Pakistan were blameless. This kind of attitude is not only utterly wrong and opposed to facts, but is also very irritating and leads people to think that the responsible authorities of the Pakistan Government are not sincere in their policy or statements.

3. Members of the Government of India and others in responsible positions have scrupulously avoided saying anything in public which might worsen the situation. They have not indulged in recrimination and such statements as have been made have been deliberately worded moderately so as to avoid offence. On the other hand, Mr. M.A. Jinnah's recent statement confined itself to condemning in strong language happenings in East Punjab and Delhi and did not even mention what had happened in West Punjab, the Frontier and elsewhere in Pakistan.² This statement was completely one-sided. Mr. Ghazanfar Ali Khan's utterances have been bellicose and totally irresponsible. Sir Zafrullah Khan's recent statement was amazing

1. *Aide-memoire* prepared by Nehru on 18 September 1947 for his talks in Delhi with Liaquat Ali Khan on 19 and 20 September 1947, and sent to Attlee on 24 September 1947. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. In his statement on 24 August 1947, Jinnah had condemned the violence in East Punjab which had led to many Muslims being killed.

as coming from a representative of the Pakistan Government to the United Nations Assembly. He adopted a warlike threatening attitude.³ Speeches and utterances like these necessarily increase the tension between the two countries and lead people to think that the real policy of Pakistan is not to promote peace but further conflict.

4. Newspapers appearing in Pakistan, notably *Dawn* in Karachi and the *Zamindar* in Lahore, as well as many other papers, have been full not only of the vilest accusations which have no basis in fact but also of threats of war and of extermination of the Sikhs. The attention of the Pakistan authorities have been drawn to these previously, but no action appears to have been taken. The natural inference is that all this is in furtherance of a set policy by the Pakistan Government. If that is so, then there is not much point in carrying on conversations at high levels and coming to decisions which are negated by this baseless propaganda. At one of the Joint Conferences it was decided to have concentration camps for armed bands.⁴ The East Punjab Government has passed an ordinance authorising these to be done. Apparently West Punjab Government has taken no steps.

5. The East Punjab Government and the United Provinces Government have repeatedly imposed collective fines on villagers. No such fines have been imposed in West Punjab. Some months ago fines amounting to Rs. 3,000,000 were imposed in Rawalpindi district. Apparently these fines have been remitted. Thus no real action is taken to punish evil-doers.

6. Repeatedly Indian troops and police have taken strong action against individuals or groups who have attacked camps, convoys or places of residence of Muslims. Heavy casualties have often been inflicted. The action taken by the West Punjab Government has been exceedingly feeble in such matters.

7. In his telegram, dated 17th September 1947, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan stated that evacuees from West Punjab were moving peacefully in large numbers while evacuees from East Punjab were not moving at all. At the Lahore Conference this subject was fully discussed and it was made perfectly clear that we were doing our utmost to expedite the despatch of Muslim evacuees

3. Zafrullah Khan had said in New York on 16 September 1947 that if "deliberate and planned extermination" of the Muslims continued in India, Pakistan would seek U.N. intervention, and, if that failed, would have "to resort to direct methods."
4. At a meeting held in Lahore on 19 August 1947, it was agreed to establish concentration camps to detain armed bands of rioters.

and otherwise, more specially the big Muslim convoy from Jullundur was being fully protected and expedited. The reason for a slight delay was explained. Actually the convoy moved the very first day *via* the Canal Road. Owing to heavy rain later this road became difficult and it was decided that in order to avoid delay the rest of the convoy should be taken *via* Amritsar with sufficient protection. Also the Bulldozed Road skirting Amritsar was rapidly made. Actually the convoy is passing through and we have now got three roads to be used alternately or simultaneously:—

- (1) Canal Road
- (2) Bulldozed Road
- (3) *Via* Amritsar

8. It is clear from this that everything possible has been done to take the Muslim convoy to West Punjab. There has been no real delay. We are also giving the fullest protection. Protection given to non-Muslim convoys from West Punjab is totally inadequate and they have been repeatedly attacked. Only recently these convoys have suffered heavy casualties at Balloke Head. In our anxiety to expedite and give full protection to the Muslim convoys from East to West Punjab we have used up 98% of our forces in East Punjab for this purpose. The West Punjab Government, however, in spite of their agreement with us, have not provided any protection whatsoever for non-Muslim convoys in West Punjab. We claim to have done our utmost to fulfil our obligations. The West Punjab Government has not done so.

9. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan refers to the lack of medical attention and food among the Muslim refugees in East Punjab. He gives no instances and mentions no place.

10. As long ago as the 22nd August it was pointed out to the Pakistan authorities that there was a serious lack of food in East Punjab and they were requested to send foodstuffs which were due from the West Punjab to the East as the East is a deficit area and the West is a surplus. It was suggested that this could be adjusted later. We have tried our best to make our food go as far as possible.

11. It is surprising that in spite of the full explanation given and the real facts of the situation in regard to the Muslim convoys and the steady flow of Muslim evacuees from East Punjab, a threat is given that the lives of non-Muslim evacuees in West Punjab are in danger presumably as a kind of

retaliation. It has been made perfectly clear on our side that we have strained our resources to the utmost to facilitate evacuation of Muslim refugees.

12. As for the statement that lawlessness prevails in Amritsar district and town, if serious occurrences are a test of lawlessness, far more have occurred on the West Punjab side. Recently among the non-Muslim refugees coming from Pakistan to Amritsar there were a number of men and women who have been stripped naked. Others had been searched rigorously and deprived of their belongings. The sight of these refugees and more specially the naked women infuriated people in Amritsar. Many other incidents have taken place as well as reports of attacks made on the non-Muslim camps and convoys. There are cases of refugees having had no food for several days and no adequate protection. Even now the huge convoy of 400,000 which is moving for East Punjab is not sufficiently protected. It is vulnerable and there is a danger of heavy casualties.

13. It is not understood what Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan means by saying that he cannot believe the excuse that troops are not available. We are not presenting any excuses to be accepted but are presenting facts in a co-operative way to further a common task. If the attitude in regard to these conversations and communications is not friendly, then there is no particular purpose in having these conversations. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan knows that we have been anxious to get back our troops from the Frontier Province and have repeatedly asked for it. It has not been our fault if there has been delay in their transfer. A majority of them are on their way to India now and they will, no doubt, be used to the best advantage. It must be stressed, however, that we cannot use up nearly all our troops in protecting Muslim convoys and in allowing non-Muslim convoys, which should be properly protected by the Pakistan Government, to face serious peril and danger.

14. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan refers to the Indian Government's responsibility in the Sikh States. He should be aware that under the terms of agreement and accession the internal affairs of the States are not within the scope of the Indian Government. Nevertheless, we have been doing our utmost to impress upon the States that they should carry out the general policy agreed upon between the Indian and Pakistan Governments and we have intervened on numerous occasions in this matter.

15. In regard to the Pakistan employees and their families in Simla, steps are being taken to evacuate them to Pakistan.

16. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has suggested that I should make Amritsar my headquarters. I shall certainly go to Amritsar whenever need arises. But the control of operations generally rests in Delhi and I can be of more

service by being in touch with these operations in Delhi than by cutting myself away from them. We are trying to keep in constant touch with the East Punjab Government and one of our Ministers is likely to spend much of his time in East Punjab.

17. Numerous reports from West Punjab indicate that the situation there has greatly deteriorated and the condition of non-Muslim evacuees is very grave and full of danger. They have not got adequate protection and repeated attacks are made upon them. These attacks have been made at Balloke Head where casualties are said to number 500, at Dhaban Singh (casualties 60) and at Sacha Sauda. A train from Mia Channu which arrived at Lahore on the 16th afternoon had 12 casualties as well as one Gurkha escort killed and two wounded. A M.T.⁵ convoy escorted by Muslims going to Amritsar and carrying non-Muslim evacuees was attacked at the railway crossing in Lahore, casualties exceeding 15 killed and 30 injured. Sardar Bahadur Charanjit Singh, a retired railway official, was shot dead on the 18th morning near Ganga Ram Hospital. Reports from outlying districts of West Punjab indicate that the conditions are very bad. All this shows a state of lawlessness and lack of adequate protection which prevail in West Punjab.

18. It was decided on the 14th September that there should be no searches of evacuee camps or convoys. Subsequently, however, there was a thorough search at Wah station when everything, including cash, clothes, ornaments and licensed arms were taken away in spite of protests and a reference to the joint statement issued at Lahore. Searches have also taken place at Jhelum. At Wah it is reported that no food has been given at the camp for 4 days, nor has any food been provided for a month. Clothes were taken away by the camp people.

19. From among other places reports have come that licensed arms have been taken away by the West Punjab police. This is against the agreement arrived at some time ago, and these arms should be returned.

20. The position in D.I. Khan is stated to be desperate for the non-Muslim evacuees. It is reported that they are getting no food, and recently there was an attack upon them involving considerable casualties. Apparently, they have no adequate protection.

21. In Sind the situation is said to be progressively deteriorating. At Hyderabad station 15,000 people are reported to be waiting. These persons

are said to be humiliated by the police and the National Guards, and various articles, including clothes, have been confiscated.

22. In West Punjab and Sind forcible conversions are reported to have taken place in very large numbers.

23. Reliable reports have reached us that tribal people from the North West Frontier have been brought, fully armed, in large numbers on motor transport to western Punjab. These H.T.^a convoys carrying them passed through Hasan Abdal and these tribal folks proclaimed loudly that they are going to invade eastern Punjab and they shouted "Chalo Delhi". Their numbers are estimated at 50,000 or more. This act of bringing armed tribal people near the border can only lead to the conclusion that the Pakistan Government has unfriendly intentions towards India and is planning raids or some kind of a coup.

24. Government of India have raised no objection to the stationing of Pakistan representatives in any number in India. It is clear that the situation in the North West Frontier Province is very abnormal and full of danger to the non-Muslim inhabitants there. News does not come from that Province in any regular fashion and only recently there was a riot at D.I. Khan. In other places also the situation is very critical. The refusal for a Deputy High Commissioner to go there leads one to suspect that there is something to hide and there is fear of exposure. It was stated that a Deputy High Commissioner would require some kind of guard. While this may be true, that surely is not an excuse for objecting to his presence. Indeed it is all the more reason for some representative of the Government of India to be there to help and soothe people there who look to that Government for relief.

25. When this proposal was first made, it was accepted by the Pakistan Government in principle although the name suggested was not approved of. Another name was then suggested and it was only then that objection in principle was raised. Later, in conversation with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, even this name was agreed to. But, subsequently, the Prime Minister of the North West Frontier Province raised difficulties. The Pakistan Government will, no doubt, appreciate that this objection to the stationing of our Deputy High Commissioner in Peshawar will not be considered a friendly

act by the Indian Government and will increase the suspicions and apprehensions of our people.

26. When Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar came to Delhi he was given a draft announcement regarding the evacuation which it was proposed to issue jointly by the Governments of India and Pakistan. This formal suggestion was made on behalf of the Government of India. But strangely enough no reply came from Pakistan. We are now informed that the matter has not even been considered yet by the Pakistan Cabinet. This delay in dealing with a vital matter does not lead to the conclusion that the Pakistan Government is applying itself seriously to the problems which have been jointly discussed so often.

27. Mr. Chundrigar, the Minister for Commerce in the Pakistan Government, has recently refused to give clearance to our shipping in Karachi on the ground that they must not go to Kathiawar port but must proceed direct to Bombay. This limitation and obstruction of our shipping plans appears totally uncalled for. The ships we intended sending were special chartered ships for the removal of evacuees and they did not interfere with the regular line.

28. We have been supplying vaccines to the Pakistan Government. A further order for a very large quantity has now been received. It is not clear why such a large quantity is needed and how it is going to be used. Is it going to be used for the non-Muslim evacuees among whom cholera has already broken out? In one of the joint statements of the two Governments it was stated that public institutions should be specially considered as trust property and allowed to function. We understand, however, that difficulties are being placed in the way of the Ganga Ram Hospital in Lahore.

55. Telegram to the Maharaja of Patiala¹

I am grateful for your offer of help which has been communicated to me. I have informed military authorities.

1. New Delhi, 20 September 1947. File No. 11 (15)-IA/47, p. 1/corr., External Affairs Deptt. N.A.I.

Reports and complaints are continually coming to us about bands of Sikhs from Patiala creating mischief on the border of the State in Simla and neighbourhood on road and trains from Simla to Kalka. In particular disturbances in Simla attributed chiefly to these bands from Patiala State. These occurrences creating serious situation and Patiala State authorities are being blamed for it. I would request you to take immediate steps to control and disarm these bands and help in maintaining security in the areas and places mentioned above.

Various reports about Sirhind Sharif also circulated.² Would be grateful for information about it.

2. On 19 September 1947, the Consul General for Afghanistan had expressed concern over reports of alleged occupation by Sikhs of the Muslim shrine in Sirhind and requested that it be restored to Muslims. On 4 October, Mian Iftikharuddin, Minister for Refugees, West Punjab, stated, after a visit to Ambala, Patiala and Nabha, that the Muslim shrine at Sirhind was safe.

56. Unauthorised Searches¹

It has been the policy of Government, repeatedly stated, that there should be no searches of people travelling unless there is some very special reason in an individual case. More specially objection has been taken that air passengers should not be searched. Some days ago we were informed that Sir Sultan Ahmed and Mr. Suhrawardy² arriving at Willingdon aerodrome were searched. A day or two ago Dr. Syud Hussain, who travelled by air from Calcutta, had this experience at Willingdon aerodrome. It appears that as soon as passengers alight, Muslim passengers are asked to separate themselves for the search. Both men and women are then searched thoroughly. On enquiry as to why this was done, it was stated that orders from higher authority have been issued.

I should like to know who issued these orders and when. I should further like to know why these searches have been continued in spite of orders of Government to the contrary.

1. Note to M.S. Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner and District Magistrate, and T.G. Sanjeevi, Inspector General of Police, Delhi, 20 September 1947.
File No. 7-43/47-O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. H.S. Suhrawardy.

This matter may have to be considered by the Emergency Committee and, therefore, a report should be made.

57. To Mehr Chand Khanna¹

New Delhi
21 September 1947

My dear Mehr Chand,

You have had a bad time during the last month or more; but in another sense we have had a very bad time also. We are not out of the wood yet and the problems that face us are terrific. However, I shall not trouble you with our problems except to point out that anything that we may do in India must be viewed in proper perspective of the big upheavals that we are facing. The Frontier Province problem must be viewed in this context. I imagine this is not done always and this is natural because one's own problem engrosses one's attention.

2. In existing circumstances our desire to help you in every way is limited by several factors as you well know. We can't do much for the Frontier Province. Badshah Khan repeatedly asked me how we could help. I tried to explain the situation to him. Since then much has happened which has made the situation even worse than it was then.

3. The present immediate problem appears to be to give such help as we can to the minorities there. What the exact position of these minorities is, I cannot say definitely. It is clear, however, that a considerable number of people belonging to the minority communities want to come away. We shall help them to do so. Whether all of them want to come away or not, I do not know.

4. I was told by Cunningham² and Abdul Qayyum in Lahore that there were in all about 45,000 Hindus and Sikhs in the N.W.F.P. at present.

1. J. N. Collection.

2. George Cunningham (1888-1964); joined I.C.S. 1911; Private Secretary to the Viceroy, 1926-31; Governor, North West Frontier Province, 1937-46 and 1947-48.

Of these about 15,000 were in camps and the others were chiefly in Peshawar and Bannu. They said that they intended evacuating those in camps. So far as the people of Bannu and Peshawar are concerned, they seemed to think that they might stay on. I rather doubt this myself. However, we shall undoubtedly try to bring away those who want to come away. We cannot do so immediately in any large numbers because our hands are full and the Frontier Province is farther away than other affected areas. Still I hope that some special trains will be arranged soon and the air services may function also. Meanwhile, the minorities should be given adequate protection there. This the Governor and Abdul Qayyum promised. But their promises do not go very far.

5. We have been trying to send a Deputy High Commissioner to Peshawar. But the Pakistan Government have not yet agreed to it. We are pursuing the matter with them. Meanwhile, they have agreed to our sending K. L. Panjabi for ten days or so to visit various places in the Province and report to us about conditions there. I hope that we shall be able to send him back after the report, because we want to keep close contacts with you and to know exactly what is happening. Panjabi should visit Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, D. I. Khan, and such other places as may be necessary. He will be able to send us daily messages by telegram.

6. I am told that you might be coming here tomorrow by the plane in which Panjabi is going. If so, well and good, and we can have a talk here. There is some mention also of Badshah Khan coming tomorrow. If this is fixed up, we shall welcome him here. I do not want Panjabi to make any special arrangements about Badshah Khan's coming here as this might lead people to think that we are using our Deputy High Commissioner for purposes other than those he is meant for. But, of course, if there is room in the plane tomorrow, Badshah Khan is welcome to come in it. I fear just at present we are so terribly engrossed in all-India, Delhi and Punjab problems that we have hardly time for any long talks. But, however busy we might be, we shall of course find time for Badshah Khan and you if either or both of you come here.

7. If Badshah Khan comes tomorrow, nothing more has to be done about it. But if any special arrangement has to be made, I think the proper course will be for me to wire to the Governor of the Frontier Province, through the Prime Minister of Pakistan, that Badshah Khan has been invited to attend our meeting here and requesting that facilities might be granted to him. This would be the proper formal approach. Otherwise, of course, Badshah Khan can always come whenever he can get accommodation in the planes we send. Governmentally if we take up the matter, we must approach the local Government through the Pakistan Government.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

8. Please tell Badshah Khan that he is welcome here now and always and that we can never forget the Frontier Province. But events have taken a strange turn which ties up our hands. We have seen enough of horror and tragedy during the last five weeks and the future is none too bright.

9. If you or Badshah Khan are coming here tomorrow or the day after, please try to let us know either by telegram or telephone. You can ask a Panjabi to inform us.

Yours sincerely
Jawaharlal Nehru

58. Record of Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

Lord Mountbatten felt that resettlement should be carried out in three phases.

- (a) Arrange to receive the refugees on arrival in India and direct them to various destinations.
- (b) Set up an organisation to assist refugees for first six months.
- (c) Formulate a long-term resettlement plan.


K. C. Neogy observed that an economic adviser, along with a committee of scientists and others, would enquire into the long-term aspect.

The Prime Minister gave his view that the long-term resettlement plan would be intimately associated with other economic planning that it was intended to carry out. Wider schemes would also soon have to be considered. There were a large number of middle-class refugees who had no wish to settle on the land. A deputation of these had made the suggestion to him that they might build a model town of their own, where they would become a self-sufficing community, near Delhi. So far as the immediate resettlement of non-Muslim refugees entering East Punjab from West Punjab was concerned, 50,000 had already been settled in. The process would be partly automatic and partly assisted. The number of people leaving East Punjab was, on the whole, larger than the number coming in. There should, therefore, be sufficient land available for them.

1. New Delhi, 22 September 1947, Extracts. Those present were Lord and Lady Mountbatten, Nehru, Neogy and Matthai. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archival Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.



ARRIVING AT THE RED FORT, DELHI, TO HOIST THE
NATIONAL FLAG, 16 AUGUST. 1947



SPEAKING FROM THE RAMPARTS OF THE RED FORT, DELHI,
16 AUGUST 1947

59. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Reference my telegram No. 110-PS dated 21st September regarding searches of evacuees in West Punjab. I have again received reports that searches of evacuees and their personal effects are being carried out systematically in Lahore and other places and our Deputy High Commissioner who has protested to West Punjab Government has received no reply. I hope you will take urgent steps to see that our joint decision not to carry out searches will be carried out in practice.²

1. New Delhi, 23 September 1947. File No. 7-43/47-O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Liaquat Ali replied that he had communicated the decision regarding searches to the Governments of West Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and North West Frontier Province.

60. Cable to Sri Prakasa¹

Your telegram No. 58 dated 22nd September.² At last conference with Pakistan Premier decided that: "The Governments are agreed that searches of refugees will not be made and personal effects will be allowed to be carried. This, however, is without prejudice to the right of each Government to prohibit the bulk transfer of merchandise". This agreement applied more especially to Sind which was mentioned. In particular it has been clearly stated by Sind Government that no women should be searched in any circumstances. We are communicating with Pakistan Premier on this subject. Suggest that you should also draw his attention to breach of agreement arrived at.

Please send daily report.

1. New Delhi, 23 September 1947. File No. 7-43/47-O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C. R., N.A.I.
2. Sri Prakasa informed Nehru that searches of evacuees, including women, were still continuing. He urged Nehru to "put greatest possible pressure to discontinue all searches on both sides."

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

Met Choithram³ today who tells me you have not yet received telephone or other facilities. Please let me know so that I might communicate with Pakistan Government.

3. Choithram P. Gidwani (1889-1957); president, Sind Provincial Congress Committee, 1920-47; arrested for participation in freedom struggle, 1922, 1930, 1932, 1940, 1942; member, Sind Legislative Assembly, 1937-39.

61. To Tej Bahadur Sapru¹

New Delhi

24 September 1947

My dear Tej Bahadurji,

Thank you for your letter of the 19th September.^a It is always a pleasure to hear from you. I am glad that you are a little better now and I must say that I am also glad that you have switched on to allopathic treatment.

We are taking steps to prepare a documented narrative of the situation as suggested by you.

It is very good of you to write as you have done. It heartens me greatly to have your good wishes and goodwill.

Please do not believe all the rumours that you hear. The situation is serious enough but rumour makes it much worse.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Sapru had suggested that the Government of India should prepare a documented narrative of the situation in the Punjab and Bengal to refute the allegations of Zafrullah Khan at the U.N. He also wrote of a rumour of a gun-powder plot by some Muslim Leaguers in Delhi.

62. Record of Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

...The Prime Minister said that many of these Muslim refugees in Gurgaon

1. New Delhi, 24 September 1947. Extracts. Those present were Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel, Matthai, Bhabha and Shanmukham Chetty. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.

The Prime Minister interjecting said that he absolutely saw this point of view and agreed with it.

Pandit Nehru also pointed out a complication, in that Pandit Kunzru was really attacking the whole of the present Government and not merely the British; and that it might be difficult to separate the two. I, however, urged that the British case was the more pressing and that it should be grappled with strength at this moment...

64. Record of Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

Mountbatten and Patel told Nehru that, from the psychological point of view, the Government measures for restoring communal harmony in Delhi had "misfired". Propaganda vans urging communal amity had been nearly mobbed.

The Prime Minister said that he fully agreed that this was by no means the right approach. The average official, he pointed out, had little idea of crowd psychology. He agreed to consider the possibility of nominating experts in this to assist the Delhi Emergency Committee...

The Prime Minister said that it appeared to him that none of the more important organisers of the recent trouble had been arrested.

Mr. Sanjeevi said that he wondered whether it had been an organised effort when the disturbances broke out.

The Prime Minister replied that he did not wonder about this at all, he was sure. The disturbances had been organised, taking advantage of the psychological state of affairs. People who were normally considered responsible, rather than the *goonda* type, had taken a large part in the organising. A number of notices and leaflets had been circulated in Delhi about a week before the disturbances broke out. This has been done by some organisation. So far, the problem had been tackled in a superficial way. He trusted that some of the organisers would soon be unearthed and arrested. Such action would improve the situation both materially and psychologically.

1. New Delhi, 26 September 1947. Extracts. Those present were Mountbatten, Nehru, Patel and Sanjeevi. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.

65. Toleration or Ruin¹

I appeal to you to stop this fratricidal war and work for peace. Toleration alone will lead India to peace and prosperity. I warn you that the manner in which this killing is going on will lead the country to nothing but ruin.

India, which upheld the torch of liberty, justice and fair play, and to which the Asian countries looked for guidance, has degraded herself in the eyes of the world by fratricidal killings. India was well known in the past for her policy of toleration and assimilation. This was her inherent strength. People of different ideologies could live here in peace.

Events in Punjab and Delhi in the last six weeks have shown that people have turned absolutely mad, flung all codes of morality to the winds and behaved like wild animals. This trouble started with the initiation of the two-nation theory followed by the Noakhali killings and other incidents which spread like wild fire in the country.

Delhi which has been the scene of horror and bloodshed does not deserve to be the capital of India. The seat of government should be free from disturbances. No government can tolerate lawlessness in the capital. There are representatives of foreign countries in Delhi and what happened here has affected world opinion.

The trouble in Delhi has given a setback to the work of evacuating refugees from West Punjab. This delay has meant the loss of many valuable lives.

The Government of India is preparing an inventory of the property of evacuees coming from Pakistan and refugees must register themselves with the Government. Both the Pakistan and Indian Governments have decided that forcible possession of property will not be treated as legal. If you do not want your houses and property to be taken by others in West Punjab, it is not fair of you to take illegal possession of others' property here. It is your duty to check looters from taking possession of movable property and if such people do not listen to the advice of their fellow beings, the law shall stop them from doing so. Lawlessness must be stopped at all costs.

During the last eighty years India has built her way to freedom. Though herself in bondage, she fought for the freedom and democracy of other countries. India had built up a great reputation at the last session of the U.N.O. when the question of South Africa was taken up, but now, when the question is again coming up before that august assembly of nations,

1. Speech at New Delhi, 27 September 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times* and *Indian News Chronicle*, 28 September 1947.

we are ashamed to face it.²

Retaliation by people for what has happened elsewhere is meaningless. Private retaliation will not be tolerated in any form. It is for the Government to take whatever action it thinks necessary.

Those who talk of establishing a Hindu nation by exterminating all Muslims in India are short-sighted people. If they talk in terms of Hindu and Muslim nations they have no place in the United Nations which stands for the equality of all and for justice for everyone.

2. In December 1946, the U.N. General Assembly at the instance of India passed a resolution recommending that the treatment of Indians in South Africa should be in conformity with international obligations and the U.N. Charter. As Smuts refused to take cognizance of the resolution, the dispute came up again in October 1947.

66. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
27 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Your letter of the 25th² about Iengar's letter to Randhawa asking for some information. You are perfectly right in saying that it is better for such requests to be made to the Ministry. Normally they are so made. I suppose it was to save unnecessary trouble that the direct request was made to the Deputy Commissioner.

I suggest that certain information be collected, if it has not already been collected, regarding the recent disturbances in Delhi. The more data we have the easier it is to deal with the situation. This data will probably be incomplete, but still it may help us.

The data required might be as follows :

- i. number of casualties :
 - a. deaths of non-Muslims by mob or individual action,
 - b. deaths of Muslims by mob or individual action,
 - c. deaths of non-Muslims by military or police action,
 - d. deaths of Muslims by military or police,

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 397-398.

2. Patel wrote that his Ministry was collecting information regarding houses and shops vacated by Muslims in Delhi and that H.V.R. Iengar, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, should have asked the Home Secretary for information before approaching the local or provincial government.

COMMUNAL RIOTS AND THE REFUGEE PROBLEM

- ii. total number of dead bodies disposed of by various authorities;
- iii. number of houses destroyed :
 - a. Muslim,
 - b. non-Muslim,
- iv. approximate estimate of damage to property;
- v. number of people who have evacuated from Delhi :
 - a. Muslim,
 - b. non-Muslim,
- vi. number of non-Muslim refugees in Delhi;
- vii. number of Muslim refugees in Delhi, other than evacuees from the city;
- viii. number of shops or houses looted in Delhi and New Delhi :
 - a. Muslim,
 - b. non-Muslim,
- ix. number of mosques and temples destroyed or partly destroyed in Delhi.

These are some heads under which data could be collected.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

67. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

We are informed from Peshawar that humiliating and harassing searches are still being conducted by police stations in case of evacuees by air and personal belongings are being confiscated. Chief Secretary, N.W.F.P. Government, justifies this on the ground that the agreement about searches applies to the Punjab and not to N.W.F.P. You will remember that agreement was extended at last meeting² to N.W.F.P., Baluchistan and Sind subject to proviso about bulk merchandise. Would request you to take immediate steps to ensure proper observance of agreement.

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1947. File No. 7-43/47-O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. This was held at Delhi on 19 September 1947.

68. Disturbances in Delhi¹

The Government is thinking of imposing collective fines in the city. Delhi must bear the cost of local disturbances, responsibility for which cannot be laid squarely on any one community. The inhabitants of any locality in which desecration of places of worship occurs will have to bear the loss.

People must work in *mohallas* for peace and improve conditions in the city. The life in the city cannot be organized on the basis of the military pickets and police escorts. People should themselves organize it and create a peaceful atmosphere.

My pride in the glory of India has suffered because of happenings in Delhi and I cannot face the world as I did before. Many shameful things have happened. All these happenings cannot have sprung up in a day after the transfer of power. They are the result of past happenings. Their seeds were sown much earlier.

Rehabilitation plans for refugees from West Punjab are being drawn up and these will be put into effect as soon as conditions become normal. The government is thinking of demanding compensation from the West Punjab Government for the loss suffered by refugees in West Punjab and is preparing an inventory of the property and business left there by the refugees.

1. Speech at Delhi, 28 September 1947. From *The Hindustan Times*, 29 September 1947.

69. The Responsibility of Delhi¹

I remind you that I am not speaking to you in my official capacity as Prime Minister of India. I am now speaking to you as Jawaharlal, who has worked and lived with you for many years.

1. Speech at Delhi, 29 September 1947. From *The Hindustan Times* and *The Times of India*, 30 September 1947.

It is imperative that disorders in India are stopped at once if our dreams of construction are not to end in smoke. When the floodgates of murder, loot and arson are opened, it becomes very difficult to close them again. People who have once tasted blood will not easily be put down. Reports from West Punjab show that Muslims have started looting Muslims, and, in East Punjab, non-Muslims have become a source of anxiety to non-Muslims.

There is in Delhi an old man who has been in every way the Father of the Nation. He has been our guide, philosopher and friend for many a year. On his direction and under his guidance the nation has marched on to freedom and independence.

What must he be thinking now? He must be saying that he had taught the country to fight the entire might of the British with the weapon of nonviolence. The struggle has ended and victory has been achieved, mainly through nonviolence. And now that he is at the tail end of his life, we have given him a present of bloodshed and destruction. This is how we have treated the architect of India's freedom!

Muslims played a noble part in India's fight for freedom. I have known and worked with Muslims like Dr. Ansari and Hakim Ajmal Khan, who did so much for India. During the past few years, however, the Muslim League has incessantly preached a gospel of hate.

The Congress has always refused to subscribe to the two-nation theory and has been supported by the people in this matter.

But, today, the people of India are doing the very thing for which they blamed the League.

Do you wish to accept the evil ways of the Muslim League by following its example set by its members in West Punjab. The Muslim League had spread the poison, but that does not mean that India, too, should repeat the very things for which she dislikes the League. That would not be retaliation but it would be merely copying the ways of the Muslim League.

If non-Muslims followed the example of the League, they will be playing into the League's hands and giving it the satisfaction of having been victorious in the battle against virtue. That will not be India's victory but her defeat.

I would condemn those who advocate that all Muslims should be expelled from Delhi. The great beauty of our country is that we have such a variety of cultures and religions.

The demand for making India a Hindu state is a virtual victory for the Muslim League, a victory compared with which achievement of Pakistan is of very little significance. You should not accept and follow the same principles that you have vehemently opposed in the past.

Great countries have always kept their doors open to healthy cultural influences. India was once a great country but then she lost her greatness.

Why did this happen? It happened because we closed our doors to the outside world and became narrow in our outlook.

It was Gandhiji who made Indians realise the folly of narrow-mindedness. All talk of Hindu raj is an aspect of this narrow-mindedness. Hinduism is strong enough to stand by itself without artificial ideological crutches.

Every citizen of India, whatever his religion, has the right to live in this country and call for protection from the State. The Muslims who really consider India as their own country and do not look to any outside agency for help are welcome to live in the country. The Government must and will give full protection to them.

I warn all those who do not intend to pledge their unquestionable loyalty to the Indian State that there is no room in India for them. They are advised to migrate wherever they like.

I had sometimes thought it would be a good thing to shift the capital. During the last few days Delhi has been like a city without any soul.

If Delhi loses its culture, which is its spirit, then it will cease to have any special claim to being retained as India's capital. The people of Delhi have some special responsibilities.

Historically, Delhi is the centre of many cultures and civilizations. Different streams of thought have flown into this city and given it an individuality of its own. Disorder in Delhi is of special consequence since the eyes of Asia and of the world are turned on it. The recent rioting has resulted a loss of lakhs of rupees to its people who have had to bear it. If compensation has to be paid to those who have suffered in the riots, that too must come from its citizens.

The government has tasks whose execution has been interrupted by the outbreak of violence in the country. India must ultimately be run on the system of social democracy. The goal is to provide equal opportunities to all. But this ideal can materialise only if there is peace in the country.

The consequences of rioting are much more serious than people imagine. A large number of men, women and children have been killed but many more might die of disease and privation resulting from the disorders in the country.

It is not that houses have been burnt and people murdered which is so serious, although that is bad enough; what is much more serious is that the disturbances affect the whole future of India. The hard-won independence of the country is in danger of being lost through mad actions. We must wash the stains of blood from our hands before taking up the tasks of reconstruction.

I have had seen eye-witness accounts which show that the behaviour of railway officials has in some cases been scandalous.

70. Record of Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

...The Prime Minister emphasised that he would have to be informed before this movement did start again, so that he could tell Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan.² He also pointed out that he had requested Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan not to send refugees trains from West Punjab unless he was satisfied concerning their safety.

The Prime Minister asked for news of a refugees train which was reported to have left the North West Frontier Province. Major-General Rees undertook to find out details of this.

The Prime Minister also undertook to discuss, at his next meeting with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, the movement by train of non-Muslim refugees from the area beyond Lyallpur and Jhelum. It was pointed out that movement on foot from these areas was out of the question because of the distances involved.

1. New Delhi, 29 September 1947. Extracts. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.
2. The Committee directed the Minister of Railways to inform Nehru as soon as a clear route for the running of refugee trains from Delhi to Lahore had been found and this movement could recommence so that Nehru could inform Liaquat Ali Khan and to report on his investigation of allegations against the East Punjab railway staff.

71. India Will not be a Hindu State¹

Ever since I assumed charge of my office, I have done nothing but tried to keep people from killing each other or visited refugee camps and hospitals. All the plans which I had drawn up for making India a prosperous and progressive country have had to be relegated to the background.

I am a representative of the people and am bound to vacate my office when called upon to do so by them. But I am also at liberty to give up my responsibility if the people of India cease to have any faith in the lead that I give. If they do not subscribe to my ideals and are not prepared to

1. Address to mill workers and labourers in Delhi, 30 September 1947. Based on reports from *Free Press Journal*, 1 October 1947 and *The Hindu*, 2 October 1947.

cooperate with me then I will have no choice but to resign from Prime Ministership and continue the fight for the establishment of a State where every citizen enjoys equal rights irrespective of his religion.

As long as I am at the helm of affairs India will not become a Hindu State.

The Indian National Congress always worked for the achievement of a socialist democracy where everyone would be given equality of opportunity. Just as it fought against the supremacy of one class, it will now oppose the supremacy of any one community. The very idea of a theocratic state is not only medieval but also stupid. In modern times the people may have their religion but not the State.

The Muslim League has done incalculable harm to India and the country would have got freedom long before if there had not been the obstacles placed in its way by the League. A large number of Muslims may have acted as traitors to the country and the punishment for all those who betray their motherland must be severe; but you must not lose sight of a large number of Hindus and Sikhs also who, in the past, have acted treacherously.

There were non-Muslims who had actively helped the British while they were suppressing the Indian patriots. What punishment would you suggest for them? The traitors are those who are disturbing the peace of the country and leading it to bankruptcy and ruin.

I am also aware of the acts of brutalities committed by the people in Pakistan with the active help of the authorities. I want to take effective measures against the Pakistan Government for having failed to protect the interests of the minorities but my hands are bound by similar things happening in my own country. On what basis then can I take action against the Pakistan Government? I would have liked the armies of India to march into Pakistan for the protection of the helpless, rather than see them occupied in quelling riots and guarding hospitals.

Remember the great lesson of nonviolence taught by the greatest man of the world and the Father of the Indian nation. One can either follow the lead given by Mahatma Gandhi or oppose it. There is no third way open. You cannot profess to be Mahatma Gandhi's followers and at the same time do things which are a virtual betrayal of his noble creed.

Workers in other countries have progressed because they have strong unions. The workers in India must remain united and form powerful trade unions. Riots like the ones that have taken place here do not help the workers in any way. They only undermine their morale and create disunity.

Already the workers are divided among themselves and have very little effective means of protecting and safeguarding their interests. If riots do not stop then they shall not be able to achieve their cherished goal of a government run by the common man and capitalists will remain supreme.

Besides, by every day which we spend away from our work we are making

the country poorer. The gigantic plans that we have for raising the standard of living of the people of India cannot be put into practice if the energies of the workers are spent in harmful pursuits.

India is getting a bad name in countries abroad. I have been constantly visiting foreign lands and keeping contact with their people, but I cannot do so now because India's name is dishonoured. I feel ill at ease even while talking to representatives of foreign nations who occasionally come to see me. After all that has happened in Delhi and in other places, how can I face them with confidence?

Your freedom is threatened today. If it is dear to you then work wholeheartedly for the maintenance of law and order in the country. Your Government will be worth nothing if it is incapable of protecting the life of a loyal citizen simply because he happens to profess one particular faith.

72. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

30 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

For the last four days I have been going into the city, addressing meetings, meeting groups of people, etc. The impression I have got is that while there is an apparent improvement and incidents are few, this improvement is only on the surface. It is a lull and preparations are going on for a fresh and organised attack. The few remaining Muslim shops or occupied houses in the city are rather a pretext for an attack on Government. Reports come to me from various sources to the effect that these preparations are proceeding. I hope the intelligence service is inquiring into this matter and that we shall not be caught unawares again. These reports have come to me entirely from Hindu sources, shopkeepers, etc. Many of these persons are themselves alarmed by the developments that are taking place.

The atmosphere of Delhi is being poisoned by the numerous news-sheets that continue to circulate. You must have seen all the articles which appeared in the *Hindu Outlook*² some time ago. There are other more or less similar articles appearing. I think strong and swift action should be taken against these papers.

I am convinced also that the imposition of heavy punitive fines on various *mohallas* of Delhi is necessary. Even the mention of this has produced a good effect.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 398-399.

2. The *Hindu Outlook*, a weekly organ of the Hindu Mahasabha started in 1936, was published from Delhi.

Information has reached me that in the Sikh States, notably Faridkot and Nabha, Hindus are being deliberately attacked and pushed out, more especially everyone who has been connected with Praja Mandal activities. Indeed, Hindus are beginning to leave these States.

There appears to be some kind of contact between subversive elements in Delhi with the rulers of some of the Sikh States as well as with Alwar and Bharatpur.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

73. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
30 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 28 September.² There is no question of my having issued any orders directly to the local authorities in Delhi. What happened was as follows.

2. During the early days of the Delhi disturbances I went about the city chiefly to see what was happening. On one or two occasions I visited the Town Hall and found the Military Headquarters situated there. I was told that the Chief Commissioner's and the Deputy Commissioner's offices were situated two miles away. The Police Headquarters were somewhere else. This struck me as a very odd arrangement and I suggested to the Chief Commissioner³ and Randhawa⁴ as well as to the military that it

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 295-299.

2. Patel expressed surprise that Nehru had issued certain orders direct to the local authorities in Delhi in the matter of recruitment of special police officers when the matter fell within his ministerial jurisdiction.

3. Khurshed Ahmad Khan (1897-1952); joined I.C.S. 1921; Magistrate and Collector in various districts of U.P., 1929-41; Commissioner, Ajmer-Merwara, 1941-44, and Jhansi division, 1944-47; Chief Commissioner, Delhi, 1947-48; Principal, Officers' Training School, Allahabad, 1950-52.

4. Mohinder Singh Randhawa (b. 1909); joined I.C.S. 1934; served in various capacities in the U.P. till 1945; Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, 1946-48; Commissioner, Ambala Division, 1951-53; Secretary to Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1955-60; Adviser, Planning Commission, 1961-64; Special Secretary, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, 1964-66; Chief Commissioner, Chandigarh, 1966-68; Vice-Chancellor, Punjab Agricultural University, 1968-76; author of several books on art, literature and horticulture.

seemed to me essential that temporary headquarters of both the civil and the military as well as the police should be in one place. They all agreed to it. There was some discussion. Randhawa suggested that the military should move to his office in Old Delhi. General Rajendra Singhji,⁵ who was with me, said that this would be very undesirable as this would cut them off from the Fort which was their base; also Randhawa's office was in the Civil Lines of Old Delhi which is rather out of the way. Ultimately there was an agreement that the next day all headquarters would be shifted to the Town Hall.

3. I suggested further that it was necessary to have as much non-official cooperation as possible and a room should be set aside for Congress workers and others working with them to be near at hand to be able to offer such assistance as they could to the civil authorities.

4. Further I suggested that it would be desirable to have a small emergency committee for Delhi to bring about coordination between the civil and the military and police and some non-officials. I envisaged a committee of about 7 or 9 persons (this was before the formation of the present Emergency Committee). I went to the Town Hall again the next day and discovered, to my surprise, that the joint offices had not been established there as agreed to. The next day the question of forming a Delhi Emergency Committee⁶ came up before the Cabinet Emergency Committee and it was decided to form it with Bhabha as chairman.

5. In the course of my visits to the Town Hall during the early days I discussed on many occasions with Randhawa and the Chief Commissioner the preventive action that should be taken. I felt that the instigators of the disturbances should be traced and arrested. Randhawa seemed to think that the whole affair had been a spontaneous one and he could not think of any person who could be called an organiser or instigator. This rather surprised me because it seemed pretty evident that there was plenty of organisation behind the thing. Also it was stated definitely by some Delhi people that they were well-known persons who had organised and encouraged these disturbances. I suggested to them that any names of suspected persons should be handed over to Randhawa. I believe this was done some time later. I further suggested to Randhawa that special police and magistrates might be appointed as was usually done in such circumstances.

5. (1899-1964); commissioned to Indian army, 1921; appointed commander of the Delhi area, August 1947; G.O.C.-in-Chief, Eastern Command, April 1948 and later of the Southern Command, 1948-53; Chief of Army Staff, 1953-55.

6. The Delhi Emergency Committee functioned from 9 September 1947 to 8 October 1948.

He agreed. I added that it would be desirable to consult the leading Congressmen in Delhi as to the names.⁷

6. The next day, I think, or the day after, when I went to the Town Hall, I was informed that among the names of the special magistrates and special police were some persons whose names had been included in the list of principal organisers of the disturbances.⁸ The Chief Commissioner himself complained of this to me and further said that although this was his responsibility, he had been completely ignored in drawing up the list. I was very much surprised at this and I told Randhawa that it was very odd that persons charged with doing mischief should be included in the list of special magistrates. I knew nothing about these persons, but I suggested that any person who was supposed to be guilty by a number of others was hardly suitable to be appointed as special magistrate or a member of the special police. I found that the method of choosing special constables and special magistrates had nothing to do with their reliability but was based on their educational qualifications. The choice apparently was made by some junior officers under Randhawa. I suggested to Randhawa that this was hardly a satisfactory way of drawing up lists when reliability was the most important qualification and he might revise the list from this point of view and also keep the Chief Commissioner in the picture as the responsibility was his also.⁹

7. I suppose this talk of mine was interpreted as my having given orders though there was no question of orders but certain obvious suggestions which were discussed. I did not say that special police officers should be recruited through the D.P.C.C. but that some noted Congressmen, who knew the people in Delhi, should be consulted.

8. After this incident, I did not visit the Town Hall for many days. I heard a number of complaints from Congress people that their services were not being utilised. But I did not intervene in any way.

7. On 12 October, Patel informed Nehru that, of 1,304 special police officers, 574 were nominees recommended by the Delhi Congress Committee. Besides, of the 49 special magistrates, 19 were Congress nominees. Others were, according to Randhawa, persons with some influence in various localities.

8. In the same letter Patel replied that, as far as he was aware, "no complaint of any special magistrate having taken a partisan attitude in the present disturbances has come to light."

9. Patel asserted Randhawa's impartiality and said the omissions of the local administration had to be viewed in the light of the unusual circumstances.

9. I have known Randhawa for a number of years when he was in the U.P. Ranjit Pandit knew him well and liked him. My own impression has been that he is a good officer. He has functioned well in Delhi during these past few months prior to these disturbances. It was because of this that I spoke to him and made certain suggestions. It seemed to me rather obvious. It surprised me that in spite of previous intimation no preventive action had been taken by way of arresting suspicious people. I have found out subsequently that intelligence reports indicated what was likely to happen and indeed even the persons and groups were named. But unfortunately nothing was done then and even later. After the riots had continued for some days no such step was taken. It is only now, I believe, that an effort is being made to round up some of the suspicious people.

10. The information that has reached me from many sources indicates that the trouble in Delhi was caused by certain well-organised bands, some Sikh and some Hindu. Probably most of the murders were committed by one or more organised and well-armed Sikh bands which had come here specially for the purpose and which subsequently visited Simla and Kalka and other places. The Hindu bands seemed to owe allegiance to the R.S.S. It seems to me clear that the R.S.S. have had a great deal to do with the present disturbances not only in Delhi but elsewhere. In Amritsar their activities have been very obvious.

11. While the connection of the R.S.S. with these disturbances is fairly well known, still noted members of the R.S.S. were appointed as special magistrates and special police officers. This seemed very odd to me. But after my first experience I did not interfere at all in this business though it seemed to me all wrong.

12. I believe the Delhi police have got sufficient information in their possession against the R.S.S. as well as the Sikh bands and that they have slowly begun to take action now. There appears to be a lacuna somewhere and the delay in taking action which should have been initiated long ago. Why this has happened I do not know. In other matters also, such as the suppression of highly undesirable periodicals and leaflets, nothing was done for weeks although the most objectionable articles and news items appeared. In regard to punitive fines also nothing was done although the Cabinet Emergency Committee discussed this matter on several occasions.

13. All this slackness and delay on the part of the local authorities at a time of grave crisis did not do credit to the authorities. I realise that the situation was too big for almost any person to handle satisfactorily and it came with some suddenness. Nevertheless, something could have been

done and this was not done.

14. It is a mystery to me why Randhawa, who had functioned so effectively previously, should have slackened at such a moment of crisis. From his talk it would appear that his sympathies lay in a certain direction and this perhaps prevented strong action. But I cannot be sure of this and would not like to come to a conclusion without further evidence.

15. As far as I can make out, we have had to face a very definite and well-organised attempt of certain Sikh and Hindu fascist elements to overturn the Government, or at least to break up its present character. It has been something much more than a communal disturbance. Many of these people have been brutal and callous in the extreme. They have functioned as pure terrorists. They could only do so, of course, with success in a favourable atmosphere so far as public opinion was concerned. They had that atmosphere. These gangs have not been broken up yet although something had been done to them, and they are still capable of great mischief. Last night's incidents when four Muslims in the Safdarjung Hospital were killed in their wards is a horrible reminder of the type of persons we have to deal with.¹⁰

16. I entirely agree with you that orders should be conveyed through proper authority. Any other course would lead to confusion in the administrative machinery.

17. I understand that there have been many instances of grave dereliction of duty among the special magistrates and special police officers. Many of the R.S.S. men, who have been appointed, have functioned improperly and an attempt is being made now to purge these people.

18. I am returning to you the papers you sent me.¹¹

Yours s'
Jawaharlal

10. On the night of 29 September 1947, armed men from neighbouring village, a ward in the Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi, and killed four and wounded patients. The District Magistrate took immediate punitive action and collective fine of ten thousand rupees on each of the two villages.
11. Patel thought that official acts should be judged in their proper context. officials were acting under most unusual circumstances, and the police effective.

MIGRATION AND REHABILITATION

1. Abide by Gandhian Principles¹

We have not collected here merely to pay homage to the frail person of Gandhiji, but to pledge to honour the ideals which Gandhiji holds dear and which have led India to freedom. These ideals have proved to be the true and infallible guides of the nation so far and they can be relied upon as the right principles in the future also.

Gandhiji's teachings and principles are of a fundamental nature and they do not outlive their utility simply because the situation is changed. I warn anti-social elements who are undoing the Mahatma's great work by indulging in mad acts of retaliation and lawlessness, and appeal to you to face facts, control passions and work honestly for the betterment of the country. The country has suffered incalculable harm at the hands of those who have been breaking the law and disturbing peace. That cannot be tolerated any more.

You must make up your minds as to which path you are going to follow, the one pointed out by Gandhiji or the other one on which you have, for the past many days, been led by the anti-social elements in the country. You cannot shout Mahatma Gandhi ki jai and pursue a policy of hatred towards your own brethren.

The question is whether Gandhiji's principles and ideals which have so far proved successful are worth maintaining or a new set of principles and ideals have to be found to replace them. A decision has to be taken immediately on this matter. There can be no question of letting things drift or even compromise.

If we have to fight against some external threat, we shall do so. People say that India stands in some danger from Pakistan. I admit Pakistan may be a source of some danger to us. But for that we have to augment our strength. I think India is strong enough to meet any such danger. But there is one internal danger from which we have to safeguard ourselves—the danger of disorder and discord in the country. If this danger persists, we shall not only have to face possible dangers from Pakistan but, perhaps, from other foreign powers as well. India has many enemies within its borders such as those responsible for the recent disorders in Delhi. Those who encourage communal riots are in every sense traitors and, are, therefore, dangerous to India. Those who favour the idea that all Muslims should leave India for Pakistan are motivated by narrow communal and sectarian ideals.

1. Speech at a meeting organised by the Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee to celebrate Mahatma Gandhi's birthday, 2 October 1947. From *The Hindustan Times*, 3 October 1947.

Some people accuse me of paying too much attention to international affairs. I may be wrong. But my reading of Indian history tells me that whenever India has turned inwards and broken its living contact with the outside world, it has always fallen and suffered an eclipse.

The riots in the Punjab and Delhi have harmed national interests in more than one way. People have suffered, but, perhaps more than that, the big plans of the Government for building India anew have received a serious setback. The Congress plans to lead India on to true democracy based on socialism. It has not driven out the British to hand over the country to anarchy. It wants to establish the rule of the common man with equal opportunities for all.

All these plans, all these dreams, have been interrupted and the hands of the clock put back by the spread of communal poison. India has every capacity for reconstruction and for increasing her wealth. It is our misfortune that we are not able to exploit our opportunities and remain engrossed in small, petty matters.

I strongly oppose the demand for making India a Hindu State. This is not only my personal view, but, it has the support of my Government and the entire Congress organisation. The demand for a Hindu State is not only stupid and medieval but also fascist in nature. Those who put forth such ideas will meet with the same fate as Hitler and Mussolini.

I and my Government will never agree to the demand for a Hindu raj. If you do not agree with us, you will have to find another set of people to govern you. We are against the very idea of a theocratic State.

2. Beware of the Wave of Fascism¹

The wave of fascism which is gripping India now is the direct outcome of hatred for the non-Muslims which the Muslim League preached among its followers for years. The League accepted the ideology of fascism from the Nazis of Germany. I recall how, immediately after my return from Europe in 1938, I found in the League a distinct influence of European dictators.² The ideas and methods of fascist organisation are now gaining popularity among the Hindus also and the demand for the establishment of a Hindu State is its clear manifestation.

1. Address to Congress workers and students in Delhi, 3 October 1947. From *The Hindu*, 5 October 1947.

2. See *Selected Works*, Vol. 9, pp. 283-285.

If Muslims prove traitors to this country, then India has every right to punish them, but it is not possible to force them to migrate to any other country. There are Hindus, too, who have acted treacherously towards India. To which country can they be asked to migrate? The demand for sending away all the Muslims from India and the lawlessness prevailing at present is proving a great help to reactionary elements who are gradually gaining a foothold in the social and political life of the people. This is a serious menace and it is the duty of every honest Congress worker to fight it.

At the United Nations, India protested against the order of the South African Government banning Indians from entering certain areas, but now our whole case will collapse if we in our own country put restrictions on loyal Muslims.

The Congressmen of today are frittering away their energies in petty squabbles and are not doing much by way of honest constructive work. The confidence which the Congress enjoys among the masses is the fruit of sacrifices of the past and it is being shaken by the way real work among them is being neglected by Congressmen. Public memory is short and you cannot depend upon the reserves of popularity for very long.

3. Collective Fines¹

I am of the opinion that, in such cases, in time of crisis, it is impossible not to punish the innocent. In every case in which a collective fine is imposed, innocent people suffer. I will prefer this to be so, if it resulted in less bloodshed and disorder. There must be evidence in every case—but in some a lesser quantity than in others.

It is of especial note that no fine has yet been imposed on the city of Delhi, where there is so much stronger a case than in villages. However, in this instance, the fact of having imposed a collective fine might help in tracing the guilty.

1. Remarks at a meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee, 3 October 1947. File No. 5/51/47-Poll, p. 5/n & 6/n., M.H.A.

4. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
4 October, 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have received a copy of a telegram sent to you by Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan from New York begging you to intercede with the East Punjab Government to provide safe transport for evacuation from Qadian. He refers to women and children only, presumably meaning that the men will stay.

2. So far as I know, conditions in Gurdaspur District, where Qadian is situated, are fairly steady and no particular incident has been reported recently. In fact the only recent report was about certain aggressive activities of the people of Qadian. In any event there should be no objection whatever to the evacuation of women or children or men from Qadian. Qadian is fairly near the border between East and West Punjab.

3. I should like to add that Sir Muhammad Zafrullah has been carrying on a campaign in America which is most unbecoming for a diplomat or a representative of Government. I have drawn Liaquat Ali Khan's attention to this. In today's paper there is a vicious attack by another member of the Pakistan Delegation in New York. We have instructed our Delegation not to say a word against Pakistan and to refuse to enter into any controversy. But it is a little difficult to maintain this correct attitude when attacks are being continually made.

4. Qadian, or rather the people living there, have had a bad record during the last six weeks. I drew Sir Muhammad Zafrullah's attention to this fact when he was here and when he sent telegrams on this subject. Since then other instances of misbehaviour have been reported.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

5. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
4 October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have your letter of the 3rd October² in which you give your programme of visit, to Simla and some other places. I am glad to learn that you will have a few days at Simla after your very strenuous time here. Mashobra should be very pleasant indeed in October.

2. I quite agree with you that the Emergency Committee³ meeting should take place once a week in future. If necessity arises for a special meeting, it can be held at short notice. In such a case it might be desirable to confine it to the committee members only.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 97 (13) G/47, p. 6, President's Secretariat.
2. Mountbatten wrote that he would visit Simla, Sanawar and Kasauli and spend the weekend at Mashobra.
3. The Cabinet Emergency Committee was appointed at a special meeting of the Cabinet held on 6 September 1947 to discuss the Punjab situation.

6. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I received following telegram² from our High Commissioner at Karachi.

I am sure you will agree that it is an intolerable position if joint agreement of two Dominions is nullified in this manner by provincial government. I shall be grateful if you will ensure that our agreement is implemented by all provincial governments in Pakistan.³

1. New Delhi, 4 October 1947. File No. 7-43/47-O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Not printed, Sri Prakasa informed Nehru on 3 October that the Prime Minister of Sind, criticizing the Pakistan Government's orders regarding searches, had approved searches of persons and baggage by the police.
3. Liaquat Ali Khan informed Nehru on 8 October that the Prime Minister of Sind had not said what had been attributed to him but only that "belongings of those suspected of contravening law are liable to search."

7. Cable to Saleh Harb Pacha¹

I have received your telegram dated 1st October.² While I deeply regret sufferings of Muslims in East Punjab and in Delhi, I wish you to know that these are the result of attacks upon non-Muslims, especially in West Punjab, which started last March. My colleagues and I are doing our utmost to secure cooperation of Government of Pakistan in localising disturbances and bringing them rapidly to an end.

2. Dominion of India most earnestly desires to live in peace and friendship with sister Dominion of Pakistan. In statement issued on 19th September, representatives of both Governments declared the very idea of war between them as abhorrent. Suggestion of war to which you refer is based on complete misunderstanding of our policy which, during our long struggle for India's freedom, was based on nonviolence and remains one of adjusting all international differences by peaceful means.

1. New Delhi, 4 October 1947. File No. R/3/1/174, I.O.L.R., London. Saleh Harb Pacha was President of General Young Men Moslems Association, Cairo, 4 October 1947.
2. He had expressed concern and resentment in Egypt over the reported massacre of Muslims in India and at the possibility of India declaring war on Pakistan.

8. Appeal to the Citizens of Delhi¹

The Government of India are being criticized in certain quarters for not adopting a strong line against Pakistan, but in fact they are not to blame. The Government can do nothing against another country if all their strength is required for maintaining internal peace. By indulging in private retaliation the people are merely preventing the Government from doing what they want them to do.

I appeal to the citizens of Delhi and the people of India to help the Government in the tremendous task of maintaining peace in the country so that the urgent tasks which await the administration in the Punjab may be tackled with speed and efficiency.

1. Speech at a public meeting, New Delhi, 4 October 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 5 October and *The Hindu*, 6 October 1947.

But for the recent disturbances in Delhi, the problems of evacuation and rehabilitation must have been much nearer solution. Those who have lost their lives in the Punjab are beyond our help but those who are still living shall have all our assistance, irrespective of what it costs the Government to render it.

The objective of reconstructing India on democratic lines has received a serious setback due to disorders in the country. The Congress had planned to change the economic structure in the country in the shortest possible time immediately after the attainment of independence. But the problem now is to retrieve the already bad position as quickly as possible.

The programme of the Congress, after acquiring power, was to banish poverty from the country. But the unparalleled situation with which the Government were faced immediately after August 15 has put all these plans into cold storage. The discord which followed the division of the country was not engineered by the Congress or its sympathizers. Its seeds were sown by the very people who had forced division on the country.

Whether we were right or wrong in accepting Pakistan is a debatable question. The Congress acted in all good faith. Now, the practical problem before us all is how best to help the ravaged Punjab and to add to the strength of India. This problem cannot be solved unless the people help the Government to maintain peace in the country.

Another point which the people must consider is that bigger problems like the evacuation of millions of people or of war with another power has to be tackled by the Government and not by the people individually. Retaliation by isolated individuals weakens rather than strengthens the hands of the Government. India can take a very firm stand with Pakistan if there is complete peace within her borders. As it is, disorders in India prevented the Government from calling Pakistan to account for the destruction of the lives and property of the non-Muslims in West Punjab.

India stands in grave danger of losing her hardwon independence. This danger does not come from Pakistan which is in no way strong enough to face an open showdown with India. It arises from our internal weaknesses. It is the people who are actually aiding the enemies of India. Their opposition to Pakistan is merely theoretical; in fact, these people are serving the purpose of Pakistan.

The fundamental question before India is whether we would like to establish a true democracy in the country or we should give in to those who indulge in acts of loot and rowdiness. All loyal elements in the country are for the setting up of a democratic government enjoying the full consent of the people. Disloyal elements have to be punished and expelled, no matter what their religion or calling in life. I must warn you to be on guard against the people who are spreading unrest in the country for personal gains.

In all my actions as the Prime Minister of free India, I shall continue to

be guided by the principles which guided the Congress in its fight for freedom and, if you do not approve of them any more, then you are at liberty to choose another person in my place.

There are also some chiefs of princely States who are planning to crush the Praja Mandals and are working for the establishment of a Hindu State. The only concern of the people now should be to strengthen the country. It is wrong of Socialists or Communists to sidetrack the country into other channels of activity.

With the attainment of freedom, a great opportunity has been afforded to us for promoting the economic development of the country. I have no doubt that with the cooperation of the people, we shall succeed in removing poverty and lead the country further ahead.

9. Rejection of a Hindu Raj¹

Friends, the lawlessness which prevails in the country today is serious enough to shake the foundations of even a well-established government; it is all the more serious, because it has been happening immediately after free India was born.

If the people continue to take the law in their own hands, the result will be absolute anarchy like the one that followed the fall of the Mughal empire. If you do not maintain peace, you will be denying the Government the chance to function properly. You must not lose sight of the grave dangers, both internal and external, that confront India. We can understand our enemies placing obstacles in our way, but unfortunately our friends are also creating difficulties for us.

This demand for a Hindu raj tends to show to the outside world that India is a narrow-minded country with strong leanings towards fascism. The conception of a theocratic state belongs to an unprogressive era in world history and is out of keeping with modern political ideas. The demand for a Hindu raj in India is a reaction to the efforts of the Muslim League to establish an Islamic State in Pakistan. The pity is that the very people who had opposed the two-nation theory are today following in the footsteps of its sponsors. They are accepting the League principles of encouraging violence, hatred and discord at every conceivable opportunity. My oppo-

1. Speech at a public meeting, Delhi, 6 October 1947. From *The Hindustan Times*, 7 October and *The Hindu*, 8 October 1947.

sition to the idea of a Hindu raj does not mean any hostility towards Hindu culture. India being predominantly a country of the Hindus, Hindu culture will naturally overshadow all other cultural shades in the country. But, I am strongly opposed to the medieval idea of establishing a theocratic state in India.

You must realise that the unalterable laws of nature will compel India to pay for what has already happened in the country. No people can escape the consequences of their actions. Whatever has happened in Pakistan and India during the last few months will have its repercussions. India cannot hope to escape the consequences of the misdeeds of her citizens. Why, the consequences are already there for everybody to see. The fair province of Punjab has been devastated and misery has been brought upon millions of people. India and Pakistan will have to suffer the consequences of what has happened in the form of disease and famine. And the consequences are already there in the Punjab.

If you recognize that what has happened in the Punjab, Delhi and elsewhere is bad, you should now make strenuous efforts to see that such things are not repeated in future. Those who blame the League for instigating, in fact launching, the vicious circle of communal violence are right. It was the League which had spread the poison of communalism. But the question is—did India add to her strength by retaliating in the way in which she did? The answer is in the negative. India by creating disturbances within her own borders has put her house in disorder instead of getting strong and ready to face any possible enemy.

Disorders in Delhi have prevented the Government from speeding up the work of evacuation in West Punjab. The riots have completely upset the programme of reconstruction which the Congress had planned to give effect to immediately after 15 August. The shock administered to the new Government immediately after its birth has put out of gear the administrative machinery considerably. A system—built up over a period of two hundred years of trial and error—came to an end on 15 August. It was a bad system meant to benefit a foreign power but it was nevertheless a system. Suddenly, the system was uprooted, and uprooted in a way which involved complications like the division of the country.

The economic difficulties of the country were a source of anxiety to all far-sighted people. India was in the grip of an economic crisis. A little jolt like that of the Bengal famine and the economic structure of the country would have toppled over. The fear of India being swept away by inflation was also there. Seeing these awful possibilities the Congress had accepted Pakistan so that in at least a large part of the country the constructive programme could be put into operation at once.

There is an urgent need for increasing the production which will result

in greater buying capacity of the common man and provision of the necessities and amenities of life. Ways and means for more equitable distribution can only be devised after a period of reasonably high production has been reached. The Government has planned 15 to 20 major schemes for producing electricity and power for industrialisation of the country. These schemes can transform the whole appearance of India within five to six years.

The events in the Punjab have caused the postponement of all plans of reconstruction. The morale of the people, already lowered by the last war, has lowered still further. And on the top of it, exploiters have become active and are fishing for profit in the troubled waters. The anti-social elements struggled to become independent, and terrorists looked forward to the repetition of conditions created during the last days of the Mughal empire.

We have to coolly decide now which way we are to go. We have to decide on the principles we have to follow, or whether we are to follow no principles at all. Gandhiji has taught us that good actions alone can lead to good results. We have to decide whether we are going to follow Gandhiji's principles or some other rules of public conduct.

10. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
6 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am writing to you about Delhi. Conditions here are certainly better but they are still far from normal. There is tension in many areas and all manner of rumours about future undesirable occurrences are afloat. Apart from this, there are so many acute problems in the country that difficulties may arise in other parts. If so, Delhi will be affected by them.

2. We have thus to be very careful about Delhi and not relax our vigilance.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 399-401.

3. I hope the Emergency Committee will continue in some form or other. Possibly the Emergency Committee is somewhat unwieldy; a smaller committee may be more effective. However, that is a small matter. I am anxious that some emergency organisation should continue; not only the committee but the central control arrangements that had been made. These arrangements have been much appreciated and, if they are wound up, there will be great disappointment.

4. An important matter to which a reference has previously been made is the proper functioning of our intelligence services in regard to Delhi. We have been let down in the past in this respect. If we are kept properly informed and take preventive action in time, our difficulties will be infinitely less. I am glad to know that something is being done in this respect.

5. Preventive action means not only the removal of trouble-makers but also the control of the irresponsible press. There are plenty of people in Delhi today who are bent on mischief and there are many newspapers, recently started, which are carrying on an astonishing campaign not only against Government but against all decency.

6. From all accounts attempts are being made to carry trouble to the United Provinces and elsewhere. The people who started this show in Delhi have spread out to other places though some remain here still.

7. Delhi is an important charge. It is worthwhile considering whether in view of the importance and delicacy of this charge responsibility should not be divided, that is to say, instead of one district magistrate, there might be three or four with Delhi and New Delhi divided in these areas. Each district magistrate would of course have his normal complement of staff, civilian police, etc.

8. The military should also continue to keep in touch with the civil authorities. Each district magistrate having a military liaison officer would be under the control of the Area Commandant.

9. The position of the Chief Commissioner of Delhi has been very peculiar. He has hardly functioned with any authority during the past few weeks. This seems to be bad from the point of view of work and discipline. It must demoralise the services somewhat. If the present Chief Commissioner is not considered wholly suited to the job, perhaps some other man might be appointed in his place. The point is that the Chief Commissioner should function and should not be there for show only.

10. The policy to be followed by the newly-appointed Custodian of Evacuee Property² has also to be clearly laid down as there appear to be varying opinions.

The ordinance was clear enough, I thought, and yet it has been interpreted in many ways. It is common knowledge that empty houses are being occupied not only by the refugees but by others who do so with the intention of profiteering. Indeed Punjab refugees have come to me to complain that these empty houses have been occupied by others who charge heavy rent for them and ask for big premia. One Punjabi Hindu woman came to me today bringing a case to my notice of this kind where a Delhi resident had occupied several houses and shops and was charging heavy premia apart from rent. She herself had offered Rs. 100 a month and Rs. 2,000 as premium, but he wanted more. This profiteering at the expense both of the original owner of the house and the Punjab refugee is scandalous and I hope that effective steps will be taken to put an end to it. Indeed something should be done to stop this unauthorised occupation and to punish those who have been trying to profiteer.

11. Another question of policy arises about Muslim refugees in the city. I imagine that of the 1,20,000 persons in the Purana Quila and Humayun Tomb, about half will go away to Pakistan. Where are the other half to go? According to our policy they will return to Delhi. To what parts of Delhi? Some parts of Delhi which the Muslims did not evacuate, like Ballimaran, Faiz Bazar, etc., are already full and there is not much room for additional people. Where else then are they to go to except to certain areas from which they were evacuated. These areas thus cannot be considered as reserved completely for non-Muslims. This matter will have to be carefully thought out so that wherever Muslims may live they should be in some kind of close proximity to each other in an area and not in isolated groups. In any event it is desirable that nothing should be permitted to be done now which comes in the way of future policy and rehabilitation of those who remain.

12. I am sending these suggestions to you so that you may consider them and, if you think proper, pass them on to the other authorities concerned.

I am sending a copy of this letter to Neogy and H. M. Patel and asking Patel to show it to C.H. Bhabha.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

11. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
7 October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

As you know, we have been trying our best to have meetings and conferences with representatives of the Pakistan Government. The conferences we held thus far have yielded some results. We have attached importance to maintaining these personal contacts at a high level. We have tried to bring together the Ministers and Governors of East and West Punjab. There were proposals for the exchange of information also between the two Provincial Governments.

The West Punjab Government has not cooperated to any appreciable extent in these attempts. For a considerable time the East Punjab Government sent them their situation reports, but the West Punjab Government did not send information from their side. The Governor of East Punjab² complained about this repeatedly and he has again been drawing our attention to the fact that he does not get any reply from the Governor of West Punjab.³

Recently we have put forward several proposals for some kind of joint functioning or joint consideration of problems by the East and West Punjab Governments. Mr. Neogy and Mr. Gopaldaswami Ayyangar discussed these proposals day before yesterday at the Lahore conference and came back disappointed, as none of them were accepted.⁴ It seems clear from their report that the main obstacle in their way was Governor Mudie. Some of the West Punjab Ministers would agree to the proposals or would initiate

1. File No. 32 (46)/48-PMS.

2. Chandulal Madhavlal Trivedi.

3. Sir Francis Mudie.

4. The Indian proposal that a coordinating body be established at ministerial level to deal with problems arising out of the situation in the Punjab was not accepted by Pakistan's representatives who maintained that meetings of ministers would be held as and when the need arose. The Pakistan representatives accepted the Indian proposal that persons sent by evacuees to move evacuee property from West Punjab could be given identification certificates by the Indian Deputy High Commissioner to facilitate their work. The Ministers also requested that those keen on migrating to Pakistan from Delhi should be included in the scheme of migrations of minority populations.

it, but Sir Francis Mudie would reject it. It seems to be the set policy pursued by Governor Mudie, and apparently accepted by the Provincial Government, that they should have as little to do as possible with the East Punjab Government, or even representatives of the Dominion of India. I have reason to believe that Governor Mudie dislikes not only my going to Lahore or anyone else representing our Government.

This makes it difficult for any of us to thrust ourselves on the East Punjab Government. Personally, I have no desire to go to Lahore if this is the kind of reception that awaits me there, but this is not a personal matter and it is something which is having unfortunate consequences. Obviously, our difficulties will be far greater if contacts between the East and West Punjab and the two Dominions begin to fade away. Those contacts have thus far been maintained because of the mutual desire of the Ministers on both sides, but Sir Francis Mudie's likes and dislikes and the general policy he has pursued, is now making it difficult to continue these contacts. It was no pleasure to me to go to Lahore to meet him, as his past record in India has been one which has made him publicly disliked by large numbers of people. That record has been a destructive record and one of creating friction and preventing any united functioning. What his objective may be it is difficult for me to say. He has now gathered round himself some other retired British civil service men from the U.P. and the Punjab who have also gained in the past a most unenviable reputation. All this does not help.

I do not know if you can do anything in the matter. I am writing to you chiefly because I felt that you should know how I feel about this and because in future my going to Lahore may be affected by the attitude that Sir Francis Mudie has taken up. Unfortunately, what Sir Francis Mudie says or does influences public opinion and, somehow or other in the present tense state of affairs, affects Indian reactions to British officials. Quite wrongly they judge from individuals.

About a year ago I wrote a number of letters to Lord Wavell about Sir Francis Mudie who was then functioning as Governor of Sind.⁵ I pointed out that Governor Mudie had been guilty of misbehaviour and that he had acted improperly in many matters. I described this then as a public scandal. Lord Wavell agreed with me that Governor Mudie had acted wrongly, but he did not judge him quite so harshly as I did, or take any action in the matter. Now Mudie is functioning in West Punjab at a critical moment in the history of India and it is a matter of deep concern to me

5. See *Selected Works*, Vol. 15, pp. 253-254 and Vol. I (Second Series), pp. 150-152, 155-156 and 161-163.

that he should be in a position to sabotage our efforts to settle our problems amicably. In the past, in my opinion and the opinion of many of my colleagues, he has done great injury for the cause of India and helped in sowing the seeds of disruption. The present is an even more dangerous time to experiment in this way.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

12. Record of Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

K. C. Neogy said that, at the conference on 5 October, Liaquat Ali Khan took exception to the "dumping" of Meos across the Pakistan border and according to Pakistan Government's understanding of the situation all members of minority community who wished to leave East and West Punjab, the Punjab States and the North West Frontier Province would be given facilities to do so but this arrangement should not be extended to include other places.

Vallabhbhai Patel saw no reason why Delhi should not also be included if N.W.F.P. was.

The Prime Minister asked what Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's view on the matter would be if he knew that Muslim refugees wished to leave Delhi. Neogy replied that he had asked Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan whether he would make a public announcement to the effect that Pakistan was not prepared to receive Muslims who wanted to go there, other than from East Punjab. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had parried to the effect that there would be time enough to consider this if the Indian Government declared their inability to protect Muslims.

1. New Delhi, 7 October 1947. Letters: Their present were Maulabhatti, Nehru, Patel and Neogy. Lord Mountbatten Papers, British Library Archives Trust, British Library, Kew, Richmond.

He added that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had also objected to the movement of Muslim refugees from the United Provinces. The Prime Minister pointed out that these refugees had originally come from East Punjab. So far as Delhi was concerned, the position of the Government of India was that all those Muslims who wished to go should be granted full facilities.

13. Telegram to Gopi Chand Bhargava¹

I have had a complaint that searches of evacuees² are going on in Simla and that some evacuees have been deprived of their blankets in Kalka. If this is correct, it is contrary to our agreement and must be stopped. Will you please see that suitable instructions are issued accordingly?

1. New Delhi, 8 October 1947. File No. 7-43/47, O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Bhargava, in his reply of 29 October, denied that this was being done systematically. But on one occasion six suspects were searched and found to be carrying a bomb.

14. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
9 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Dr. Zakir Husain came and saw me today and he asked me what was our policy in regard to Muslim evacuees. Of course, he knew generally that our policy was to send away those who wanted to go and to keep those who wished to stay. But this policy was being differently interpreted and implemented.

1. File No. 20 (3)/47-PMS.

There are at present three areas which used to be Muslim *mohallas* and which have now been completely evacuated or destroyed. These are : Karolbagh, Paharganj and Subzimandi. He asked me if Muslims, or some of them, were to go back to any of these three *mohallas* or not. If not, where else should they go to? A number, of course, could go to the existing Muslim *mohallas*, but these are crowded enough already. Still, they might absorb ten or fifteen thousand persons.

The present position is that there are about 1,20,000 Muslim evacuees in the camps. It may be taken that about half of these, comprising the more troublesome elements, and those who want to go, will be sent away to Pakistan. About 60,000 remain. Many of these are very well known artisans, goldsmiths, and hand-workers (*dastakars*) whose work was famous in Delhi and attracted people from afar. They used to live in Paharganj and as a group they were good people, opposed to the Muslim League generally, rather non-political, and on the whole, nationalist. They were much too busy with their work to indulge in politics and the rest. This Paharganj *mohalla* itself was established after the Mutiny and became the centre of these people. They do not want to go to Pakistan because they have been here for many generations, but they do not know what to do and they want to be told what their fate is.

I feel that it would be a pity to lose fine artisans and craftsmen, and Delhi would certainly make a bad bargain if it lost them. There appear to be two ways out: one is that a separate part of one of the three destroyed *mohallas* might be set apart for these people, the other is that a completely new *bustee* adjoining Delhi city might be established on cooperative lines where these fine hand-workers could move in and live a community life. This, of course, would take a little time, but not too much time. Meanwhile, many of them could be accommodated in the *mohallas* where Muslims still dwell.²

Anyway this is a matter which should be carefully investigated and precise lines of policy laid down. At present there is a great deal of confusion and what is likely to happen is that the good Muslims will leave Delhi and some of the bad ones will remain.

Then there is the question of quarantine. If it is possible, those who have been given cholera vaccine some time back and who live in the existing Muslim *mohallas* might be allowed to go back. They would be safe enough

2. Patel, in his reply dated 11 October, doubted the wisdom of creating Muslim pockets in or near Delhi "as likely to invite hatred of the neighbouring non-Muslim areas or villages." Agreeing that they should not lose good artisans and craftsmen, Patel wrote: "... there is reason to believe that quite a large number of them have already left with valuable raw materials, jewellery etc. . . Apparently they thought it was a good opportunity to escape with these valuables and establish business elsewhere."

there. This might mean that about ten thousand persons or more could gradually drift back to Delhi without any particular trouble. This would relieve the tension in the camps too and would help towards normality.

Dr. Zakir Husain further said that in Faiz Bazar, which is a Muslim locality, some of the police officers were creating a lot of trouble, especially two Sikh officers.³

I enclose a copy of a report that has been sent to me about a meeting addressed by Randhawa.⁴ I do not know how far this report is correct. But if it is correct, then, I think, this peace campaign business is all wrong. What Randhawa is reported to have said is also not very desirable, nor does it seem proper to me that these meetings were held just to boom up Randhawa. From the service point of view also this is bad.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

- 3 Patel in the same letter replied that Nehru's frequently expressed dissatisfaction with the police and Zakir Husain's vague allegations "add nothing further on which any action can be taken." He added that knowing well the present strength and quality of the police force "the only thing which we can do is to make the best of it."
4. Addressing a public meeting in Delhi on 8 October, M. S. Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, praised the sacrifices of the Punjabis for India, criticised those in Delhi who were jealous of the Punjabis who had built Delhi and even looked after its cleanliness, complained that some people in U.P. had developed ill feeling against the Punjabis, the only people with creative genius and initiative, and appealed for peace in Delhi.

15. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
9 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Dr. Zakir Husain mentioned to me that he had received information about the ill-treatment of Muslim prisoners in the jail here. According to report they are being manhandled, are beaten severely and are kept in solitary confinement. Most of these prisoners no doubt are a bad lot. But, nevertheless, in prison bad treatment has to be avoided.

1. File No. 20 (3)/47-PMS.

Many of these prisoners are the old Khaksars. I understand that Qureshi,² who is alleged to have shot Dr. Joshi, is also there. According to report, he has been badly beaten and his body is all swollen. Qureshi, of course, will be tried and, if he is found guilty, will rightly be punished.

I am told that among the Khaksar prisoners there is Allama Mashriqui's son Ashghar Inayatullah, aged eleven years. If this fact is correct, the boy need hardly be kept in prison. His sister is in the Jamia.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Abdul Ghani Qureshi; physician; member, Delhi Muslim League; Municipal Commissioner, Delhi; arrested on 18 September 1947 on the charge of murdering Dr. N. C. Joshi; found guilty and sentenced to death on 6 January 1948; sent to Pakistan in November 1948 in an exchange of prisoners between the two Dominions.

16. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
11 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am rather worried about developments in Delhi city. During the last weeks there has been a widespread acquisition of Muslim houses in the city, including Chandni Chowk. The appointment of a Custodian, instead of stopping this process, has actually accelerated it because people wanted to take possession before anything definite was done. I understand that this process is being helped by the subordinate staff, including the police. This will naturally create grave complications for any future settlement of the problem.

In Mussoorie and Dehra Dun the same process was going on accompanied by looting. The U.P. Government took stringent measures and stopped it completely and as a consequence all looting, etc., has also stopped.

I have a feeling that there is not enough co-ordination between the district authorities and their superiors, that is to say, the Government of India's policy is not given effect to by the district authorities. I drew your attention the other day to a speech by Randhawa. Apart from the speech,

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 404-405.

his general view appears to be not at all in conformity with the policy we have laid down and he is continually saying this to people. In his meetings he is accompanied by others who are well known for their opposition to our present policy.

It seems to me that much of the trouble is not due to the Delhi citizens, but rather to a certain official element which is bent on carrying out a policy not in conformity with ours. Where any attempt is being made to further our policy, it succeeds, such as in Narela recently where Choudhari Sher Jung² has brought about a very amicable arrangement among the people.

I suggest to you to consider that a change in officials in Delhi might be made. This would bring fresh minds to bear on these problems and there will be a greater chance of our solving them in conformity with our policy.

Very soon we are going to have the *Dussehra* celebrations. Round about this time also there is the *Bakr Id*. Every precaution should be taken to avoid any trouble then. There is no chance of the Muslims misbehaving then because they are thoroughly broken up and cowed down. There is a possibility of some further organised attacks being made upon them. I trust that this matter will be enquired into. From a number of sources, more or less independent of each other, I have learnt that the persons named below have been, and are, carrying on a very mischievous propaganda in Delhi city. I send these names to you for such action as you may think proper. The names are :

In Kishanganj	:	Dr. Bhagwan Das and Lala Hariram
In Ruiki Mandi	:	Moolchand Vaid
In Bara Hindu Rao	:	Manoharlal, Municipal Commissioner
In Faiz Bazar	:	Master Juglal

There is one other matter to which I drew your attention in my last letter. There are a number of people in Purana Quila or Humayun's Tomb camps who are residents of those *mohallas* in Delhi city where Muslims still dwell. They have every desire to go back, but they have been kept back because of quarantine. The sooner these people are allowed to go back to these *mohallas* the better. There is no question of security involved, as they go back to the *mohallas* inhabited by Muslims still. This will relieve tension in Purana Quila and help in solving the problem.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. (b. 1907); interned for long years for revolutionary activities; organised anti-communal squads to check riots in Delhi in 1947; author of several books in Urdu.

17. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please see your telegram No. 467 dated 8th October.² Searches of evacuees. North West Frontier Province Government in spite of repeated protests from Panjabi still claim that agreement regarding searches does not apply to their province. This information has been communicated to us by Panjabi on the 7th of October. We have also unimpeachable evidence that searches are still going on in West Punjab ostensibly for purpose of discovering unlicensed arms. Pakistan officer at border below Balloke had recently stated that there were orders to that effect.

You will recollect that at Lahore conference we specifically considered the possibility that if searches are abandoned unlicensed arms may be carried by evacuees. We both decided that that risk must be taken. In our joint communique.³ we specifically stated that searches should be abandoned irrespective of any controls or previous administrative orders to the contrary. In view of this your statement that the agreement does not contemplate any abrogation of law for the time being in force and your reference to the confiscation of unlicensed arms suggest that you are abandoning position taken up at the conference. If searches are to be made for purpose of confiscating unlicensed arms then the whole object of our agreement is frustrated.

I regret to see that in spite of your instructions searches are still being carried out and people are being deprived of their personal belongings. This is causing tremendous bitterness and increasing pressure on us to abandon an agreement which is not being implemented in Pakistan. We can only resist this pressure if we have the fullest cooperation from you.

1. New Delhi, 11 October 1947. File No. 7-43/47, O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Liaquat Ali Khan denied that provincial governments had issued orders contrary to the agreement between the two Dominions and asserted that the agreement could not contemplate any abrogation of law in force. Only persons suspected of contravening the law were being searched.
3. Issued on 14 September 1947.

18. To N. V. Gadgil¹

12 October 1947

My dear Gadgil,

Thank you for your "Summary of Activities" for the week ending 5th October. This summary rather oddly enough, contains an account of your investigation in Delhi city in regard to the reactions to my speeches. You gave expression to these views at our meeting the other day also. No doubt what you have said represents the feeling of some people. No doubt also what I said represents my feeling and my judgment of the situation. That judgment is not particularly affected by the opinion of the people you refer to. It is clear to me, as I have stated before, that there must be one clear policy pursued here. If there is any doubt about that policy even now, that doubt must be removed and those persons who believe in the policy laid down should carry on governmental work. Any other method is likely to lead to greater confusion in the public mind. We shall have to decide about this matter fairly early.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

19. India and Pakistan¹

I am not quite sure what I am supposed to say to you. I warn you that there is nothing of very special news value that I am going to tell you, unless accidentally and incidentally you manage to get something out of me. It was suggested to me yesterday to have a press conference and since I had not had one for a long time, I agreed. Perhaps it would be better if I say a few words and then some questions may be put to me and I shall try to answer them.

I am told that this conference is specially meant to deal with the Punjab situation. That means generally the situation that has arisen in northern India, the Punjab and connected issues. What is the present position there?

1. Interview to the press, Delhi, 12 October 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindu*, 13 October and *Indian Information*, 1 November 1947.

I think we can definitely say that we have turned the corner. That, of course, does not mean that our tasks ahead are easy because what happened in West and East Punjab, resulting in the uprooting of millions of people is a tremendous problem, and I greatly fear that with the coming winter those problems will be aggravated.

Obviously, we have to deal with this matter with considerable speed to avoid deaths and disaster through all manner of natural causes : winter, lack of food, exposure, epidemics and the like. Even now cholera exists in some camps, not to a very large extent, but there is danger of its spreading, and quite extraordinary precautions have been taken by the way of injecting everyone with cholera vaccine for preventing it from spreading. These are tremendous problems.

The first task is to look after these people, bring them over and put them first in temporary camps and then to settle them. To settle millions of people uprooted from their homes even in the least is a very big problem. Now the first thing is to realise the dimensions of that problem. When we talk about exchange of populations, let us remember that at the present moment the parts involved are West and East Punjab, the Frontier Province and, if you like, Baluchistan. This latter is a very small matter. This definitely has to be tackled as soon as possible. This business of exchange of populations was not exactly one of our seeking nor one that we encouraged; but owing to various occurrences it simply took place and naturally we had to adapt ourselves to it and make all provisions and give facilities for it. And so when we met some of the Ministers of the Pakistan Government it was decided to carry it out with as much mutual cooperation as possible in the Punjab, West and East. The Frontier Province was included in that, because the Frontier Province is completely cut off from India, and if there was an exchange in the Punjab it inevitably followed that the Frontier Province should be affected by it.

There are areas like Sind where the same principles do not apply. But we propose to give all facilities demanded of us to those who wish to come away and indeed we are giving them—railway or shipping. But it is to be treated on a different level from the Punjab problems. Two or three days ago there was a statement by the Pakistan Government,² in which reference, was made to a conference held in Lahore recently between our respective Ministers. In this statement something was said about the western districts of the U.P. and Delhi. Then, some kind of contradictions were issued by our Ministers who were present. So I should like to make it clear what our policy is in regard to these western districts of the U.P. and Delhi.

It is not our desire and it is not the wish of the U.P. Government to

The problem is so big and the time element so important that it is essential from the point of view of both India and Pakistan that there should be the closest cooperation between them in solving it. Any lack of cooperation on one side injures both States immediately, because it delays everything. If a convoy is held up, a convoy of two or three hundred thousand people, it probably means great loss of life through just starvation and disease. It means upsetting the whole arrangements, the whole set-up of exchange which has been closely worked out. So it is quite essential and that is why we have sought to cooperate with each other in this matter of exchange and to some extent we have succeeded but not always. It can only be carried out on the basis of each party doing its utmost in the matter of sending people in one direction and bringing people from the other.

Further, as regards law and order and security arrangements for the movement of these convoys, we know that there have been very unfortunate and bad accidents and attacks on these convoys in the past. But for many days now in East Punjab there has been almost complete freedom from these attacks. Petty incidents have occurred here and there but no serious incident. An accident occurred the other day of another type and that was a normal railway accident which we deplore and it was of a different nature.⁴

One of our refugees trains ran into a goods train. That is unfortunate and some small number of casualties took place. Anyway it had nothing to do with the other dangers that we have to contend against.

So the situation in East Punjab has improved very greatly during the last fortnight or so. I do not say that it is perfect, it is far from perfect, more especially in regard to the feeding and medical supplies to camps and convoys. We are improving these also, but the chief difficulty has been shortage of food all over and also medical supplies. I do feel, however, that things are improving at a fair pace. You know that the biggest camp for the Hindu and Sikh refugees coming over from the West Punjab has been established at Kurukshetra. Probably about 200,000 persons will be accommodated there. We have arrived at an arrangement with the East Punjab Government for the fullest cooperation between them and the Central Government for running this camp, and we hope to have the cooperation of the military authorities in that work too.

Then there is the very urgent problem of land settlement and reaping

4. On 10 October 1947, a special refugee train collided with a goods train near Karnal, killing four and injuring twenty five Muslims. Of the non-Muslims who were travelling unauthorisedly in the goods train, twenty eight were killed and forty eight injured.

the harvest and sowing the new crop.⁵ If we fail to do it, it will affect the future very greatly in regard to food production. This is being looked into by the East Punjab Government officers. I am afraid we are likely to lose a certain percentage of this crop anyhow, partly because of deliberate destruction and partly (or probably more so) because of accidental destruction, that is to say, cattle roaming about freely without anybody looking after them and they spoiling the crops. It will mean a loss of possibly 25 per cent of the crop which is a big figure, but we do hope to get the rest of it, although all the rest will not come into proper hands. And we hope to have proper sowing too soon after.

There are two other factors about this exchange business concerning property. You remember that an agreement was arrived at between the two Governments about the various educational, cultural and other public institutions.⁶ Lahore, as you know, is full of colleges, hospitals, schools and other cultural institutions and there are others, too, in East Punjab no doubt. We were rather perturbed about the future of these institutions and we have addressed the Pakistan Government urgently on this matter.

Then, there are factories on the other side as well as this, which also according to our agreement should not be interfered with by either party on either side. But there has been interference, a kind of forcible seizure of factories. This is more or less the position in the Punjab.

In Delhi, as I told you, it is not our desire to push out any permanent resident of Delhi who wishes to stay here. We would like him to stay here. Many people have gone from here, first of all a large number who were either themselves Pakistan Government employees or connected with it, and secondly, others, who have expressed a great desire to go. There are many still left who have expressed their desire to go. Those who remain will, we hope, stay in Delhi as they have stayed in the past.

There are at the present moment three or four parts of Delhi where many Muslims live and have lived throughout. There is no difficulty about them, and those who have come out of those *mohallas* may go back to them. Yet there are two or three parts of Delhi which have suffered greatly during these disturbances. There are predominantly Muslim *mohallas*. These have to be repaired and built up, and much has to be done to them.

5. Pending the final settlement of land allotment in East Punjab in 1950, a temporary settlement to harvest the standing *kharif* crop and to sow the *rabi* crop was reached in September-November 1947 on the basis of grouping of particular areas and villages. This assured quick distribution of land and enabled refugee cultivators to pool their resources.
6. At a meeting of the Joint Defence Council of India and Pakistan held at Lahore on 29 August 1947, the two Governments decided not to recognise illegal seizure of property and to appoint custodians of evaceue property.

Now, exactly what will be their future will have to be thought about. Whatever steps we may take in Delhi, they will naturally be such as to promote future peace and harmony in Delhi, and not lead to unnecessary conflict. We have to resettle Delhi residents who have come back to Delhi, preferably in their own localities. Where there is some difficulty about it, we will try and set them up in other localities which can be found out in co-operation with prominent people from the *mohallas* and others. But it should be clearly understood that our policy is to keep old Delhi residents in Delhi unless they want to go away. So much about these matters pertaining to your questions.

I am anxious to say one thing, if I may say so, to gentlemen of the press. We are, all of us, living at the present moment under great stress, not only stress of work, but emotional stress, because tragedies on a terrific scale have happened and are happening, and the evidence of that tragedy is always before us. We are all moved by that, and sometimes we get reports bad enough in themselves; the actuality is bad enough, but the reports have been more exaggerated.

Now, it would be wrong to suppress truth, but, if I may say so, it is equally wrong to give expression to exaggerated, unverified versions which excite people still more, and possibly lead to grave consequences. Sometimes even the expression of the truth may be such as may excite. As every journalist knows, the manner of giving expression to a piece of news makes all the difference to it. You may give a four-column headline or you can give the same item of news in another way.

I do think that all of us who wish to play a constructive part in the present unfortunate drama should realise that every word that we say or write has a certain consequence, and we must try, therefore, to act in a way to help in easing the situation rather than in making it worse. After all, some time or other, this business of transfer is going to end. We have to live peacefully in this country. We have got a bad enough legacy which will pursue us for a long time to come. Let us not add to that legacy of hatred, violence and retribution.

Those who are in responsible positions of authority have necessarily to do everything to protect their people, their country, their frontiers, and something that is very important, though intangible, that is the honour of the country and the people. But in doing that, it is a poor way of discharging their responsibility if they add to the stock of hatred and violence and retribution for the future. When we took charge of this Government less than two months ago, many of us had brave schemes in our minds of economic problems being solved through planning. Those were huge schemes of construction and attacking unemployment in this way. All those schemes got suddenly suspended in the air because of the situation that arose in the Punjab, and later to some extent in Delhi. Yet, essentially,



AT A REFUGEE CAMP, END OF 1947



WITH REFUGEES, 1947

those are the major problems of India, and unless we set about solving them, and that too fairly soon, there would be greater upsets all over the country.

I am anxious that our Government should begin dealing with those problems, not in a superficial way, not just scratching the surface, but really in a basic, fundamental way, and if we do not do so, I fear its consequences for our people will be bad. We see what is happening in many other countries.

In England they have a very grave economic crisis which is being met very bravely by the Government of the U.K. Our economic crisis is no simpler or easier, though it may not be quite so obvious to many persons, and unless we deal with it effectively and fairly rapidly, we may be caught up in all manner of difficulties which affect millions of people.

This Punjab business has affected us in many ways. It has reduced our production both of food and other commodities. We have lost, I do not know, how many billion hours of work. The people who would have produced are today for the moment not producing, not because of their own fault but because of circumstances, and yet the main problem of India, as has been said for many months in the past, is to increase production. The Punjab has hit us here. Delhi has hit us here. Wherever there is trouble, of course we are hit. Production goes down. Now if we are to pull through satisfactorily, we must push up production, increase production in every way, and I would like to make an appeal to labour specially, which is after all ultimately responsible for increasing production, that this is no time for anything else except accelerate the rate of production.

I think I can say with some justification that both our Provincial Governments and the Central Government are anxious to do everything for labour, raise their standards, and to give them a square deal in every possible way. Much of our labour legislation has helped labour not only to strengthen their unions, their cooperative activity, but, otherwise, too, it has improved their standards. Ultimately, those standards, however, depend, as everything else, on the pace of production in the country. We cannot distribute something which we have not produced. In our legislation, we have provided rather effective means of impartial adjudication over any labour dispute to avoid these conflicts, in the industrial sphere, which impede production. I think it is a very great gain for labour if they only take advantage of it and if they as well as the other party loyally abide by the results of arbitration or adjudication.

I would therefore earnestly appeal to labour as well as to the employers to avoid industrial disputes and to refer every matter which might lead to a dispute to arbitration or adjudication by a competent impartial authority and in any event not to do anything which lessens production. I know labour has got to go a long way before it finds its right place in India's economy. We want it to go rapidly there. But it is quite impossible in the present

context of events to change the whole structure of India, economic and otherwise, without upsetting everything, and that ultimately will mean that neither labour nor anybody else would have much left.

I might mention in this connection specially the case of Jamshedpur which, as you know, is the largest industrial unit in India and which produces the most vital goods for us. Now any reduction in production at Jamshedpur is of the greatest importance and it may mean a very great deal to the whole of India's economy. There has been plenty of labour unrest there recently and the situation is not good. I would again suggest both to the employers and labour there that if you have trouble, have recourse to arbitration or adjudication; do not try to coerce each other, and agree to abide by the decision of the adjudicators, because at the present moment, if any labour or employer group, thinking in narrow terms of self-interest, does something which is harmful to the community as a whole at a very critical moment in our history, that is doing a great illturn to the country and the country will judge these people harshly.

That is all I wish to say now. If you wish to put questions, I will answer them.

Question : Is the Government of India evacuating these people from the Punjab purely on humanitarian considerations or is it in pursuance of a definite policy?

Jawaharlal Nehru : I have pointed out that the Government of India had no policy with regard to exchange of population and there was no talk of it before August 15, although since March, from Rawalpindi and so on, about half a million people must have come through the frontiers of the Punjab to the U.P. and other places. We only accepted them because they came and there was no question of a general migration.

Later, in August, events took a sudden turn for the worse and vast numbers of people started moving out without any policy or orders but simply with a view to escaping from places and conditions which they found intolerable. Whatever the average middle-class urban person may do, the peasant does not leave his land unless he finds it impossible to stay there. Specially on the eve of the harvest he does not move and yet these people left their lands. It simply means that life became so intolerable and dangerous that they could not stay there.

Now, when these people in large masses started trekking, something had to be done. We accepted that position, and we had a discussion with the Pakistan authorities and decided that so far as the Punjab was concerned, we had to accept it. That does not mean that people who desired to stay on were going to be pushed out.

The other day, for instance, I read a report in the newspapers that about

20,000 people in Jhelum had declared that they are going to stay there. But I remember that when I was coming from Sheikhpura in the evening, I suddenly came across a few hundred people trekking along the road, among whom I recognised certain old friends and colleagues of mine. They came up and charged me with having deluded them. They were referring to a broadcast I had made ten days previously from All India Radio in which I had appealed to the people not to migrate but to stay on.⁶ They told me they had followed my advice and this was the consequence : their families were all dead and they were the sole representatives left. After that it became impossible for us to talk in terms of asking them to stay on in spite of those consequences and face greater dangers.

Q : What do you have to say about dual citizenship under which Hindus and Muslims can choose to become citizens of either State? The Congress has accepted that position because the President⁷ is a Hindu from Pakistan.

JN : There is no dual citizenship. It is not clear to whom a particular nationality applies yet. It is vague, and a sudden change has come. Gradually it will settle down, and Hindus and Muslims will be citizens of one State and Hindus and Muslims and Sikhs will be citizens of the other State. You mentioned the Congress President. As a matter of fact he left Sind about 40 years ago, though his family is there. There is, of course, also the Bihar Governor.⁸ I was given to understand before the partition that he had more or less shifted to the U.P. It is undecided about many people. You cannot have double citizenship; but because of this fluid character some people are here who want to be treated as such.

Q : If the question of nationality is not decided where is the question of loyalty?

JN : The question of nationality is decided for those who have decided. For instance, I know what my nationality is and you also know what yours is. But there are people for whom the question is not decided in their own minds, and we do not want to force a decision on them. A Hindu, for instance, may be in Karachi; I cannot tell him that he cannot become an Indian citizen; if he wants he can be one and we will accept him. But if you live here you owe loyalty to the State you live in.

Q : My question is that so much has been demanded of the Muslims here; what about the Hindus of Pakistan?

6.. See *ante*, pp. 53-57.

7. J.B. Kripalani.

8. Jairamdas Doulatram.

JN : It is exactly the same : those who remain there owe loyalty to that State. As for the Muslims, it is a question of where they will ultimately be. Every country has aliens in it. If an Englishman lives here, he lives in a friendly way, but his allegiance is to England. So an Indian citizen may live in Pakistan, but he owes allegiance to us and he is not a citizen of Pakistan.

Q : As far as migration is concerned, why not take up Mr. Jinnah's offer that exchange of populations be considered at governmental level? After all, exchange also involves exchange of property, means of production and of earning incomes and a regulated exchange might satisfy all affected.

JN : It is perfectly true that if the thing is to be done, it should be done properly on a governmental level without the loss of any property to anyone.⁹ But to think in terms of this being done on an all-India scale is a problem which, I think, inevitably reduces itself almost to an impossibility—apart from its undesirability. You take the census figures and the distribution of the population : it can take us half a generation. But what is likely to happen is that it will be done improperly because once this happens it will involve volcanic changes, it will upset the whole economy of India, a great deal of the production will cease, there will be starvation, there will be mass movements, there will be no railway system or any system whatever. Tens of millions of people will move and we will sink as a nation without any resources with a starving and a dying population.

Q : Would you consider exchange of populations on governmental level in a spirit of friendship and goodwill which would make an appeal to the people as it would achieve a smooth transfer of urban population though the rural population may not be affected at all?

JN : So far as the Punjab is concerned, we have tried and are trying to talk on that level. But unfortunately owing to other circumstances that has not been translated to lower levels. For instance, in our talks with the Pakistan Minister we decided about what I may call the sanctity of property, that the property of evacuees and refugees should be protected. More specially we decided about these big public institutions like banks, schools, colleges, factories, hospitals etc. We are still pursuing that, but all manner of difficulties have cropped up to which I referred. But the principle is laid down,

9. Jinnah, addressing a gathering of defence and civilian personnel at Karachi on 11 October 1947, stated that if "the ultimate solution of the minority problem is to be mass exchange of population, let it be taken up at governmental plane and not be left to be sorted out by bloodthirsty elements."

and we follow it wherever we can.

Q : You have said that as far as Delhi and the U.P. are concerned you would like the Muslims to stay on or to come back to their homes. But some of them are coming back with serious results : specially in Karol Bagh where they are killed as soon as they come back. Do you not think that in such circumstances it will be more humane to insist on their being sent to Pakistan instead of their getting killed here?

JN : I hope you followed what I said about Delhi. I said that those who are residents of Delhi and desire to stay here may stay. Their desire to stay here, of course, involves a feeling that they want to be citizens of India owing allegiance to India; otherwise they have no particular reason to stay on. If they have that desire it is up to the State to protect anyone who wants to be a citizen. If the State is weak and cannot afford that protection, it is a matter to be looked into and considered as to how to afford that protection. For instance, in Delhi, there are three or four *mohallas* where only Muslims live; and, obviously, the people who have gone from there can come back and there is no danger to them.

In regard to places like Karol Bagh or Pahargunj and other places, the difficulties pointed out are there and have to be considered. There is no point in doing something which adds to the present conflict. Whatever is done has to be done in peace and with amity and goodwill of the neighbours. It is no good making the neighbours fight each other. If there are to be separate places for them and new settlements, that has also to be considered. We have to face this problem in two ways, the problem of administration and the police and also the psychological feelings of the people. We have tried to approach this problem in both ways. We are trying to make the people understand to gain their goodwill to any arrangement which might be made. For eight to ten days I went about various parts of Delhi addressing the people. I imagine I must have addressed one quarter of the population of Delhi, and we hope to evolve solutions which are based on mutual understanding and not compulsion.

Q : Is there any basis for the charge that much of the present handling of the situation is due to the Congress still thinking in terms of an undivided India?

JN : I should say, briefly speaking, no. I never heard of this before. But never having heard of it before, I may give you my personal opinion as to the possibilities of the future.

It seems obvious to me that any decision about the future of India and Pakistan in regard to the relations with each other will have to be reached

by some kind of mutual agreement. It seems obvious to me also that after present passions have cooled—how long it will take I do not know—economic circumstances and various other stresses and strains will compel closer association between India and Pakistan.

Q : Have you visualized conditions in which it may be possible to fly the flags of the two States side by side occasionally in public, Sir, as in Calcutta?

JN : As a matter of fact flags of completely separate and independent countries are on occasion flown side by side. India may fly the flag of China as it does on occasion. The main point is that we are judging things too much under the strain of the present. The present passes and something else takes its place and other factors more important in the lives of nations play a greater part and I imagine that the time will come when some kind of a closer union—what that may be I cannot say—may come about not only between Pakistan and India, but between India and quite a number of countries of Asia. It may be that we may eventually evolve being some kind of separate States and yet evolve a common nationality. There are many ways out. These are world tendencies and trends. They are perhaps hidden by recent events in India.

Q : Do you think that the Pakistan Government may follow a different foreign policy?

JN : How can I answer for the Pakistan Government? It is quite possible they may follow a different foreign policy. What it will be I cannot say but in the ultimate analysis, economics plays a very important part and the economics of India and Pakistan will bring them together. It cannot be a static position. Either they come together or go further apart. And, I imagine, even if they go further apart for the present, the forces bringing them together will ultimately prevail.

Q : The last time you gave an official figure of casualties in the Punjab. Have you any figures now? The last time you said it was 15,000.

JN : The last time I gave you no official figures. I gave you the figures supplied to me by the military authorities. They said at that time the actual verified number of deaths was 15,000. But they themselves said it was likely to be three times that figure. I do not know what their figure is now. But I am quite convinced that that was a gross underestimate and that the figures are much larger. It is impossible for one to estimate whether it is 100,000 or far more.

Q : You have nothing more to say than that?

JN : No.

Q : You began by saying that you think you have turned the corner. Did that apply to conditions in Delhi and East Punjab or did it also cover the situation as you visualized in West Punjab?

JN : I should say that generally speaking it certainly applied to Delhi and East Punjab primarily, about which I know more. Of West Punjab I do not know so much. But even there, major incidents are fewer. Minor incidents are many. But I have an impression that the problem we are facing today is not that type of problem of facing major attacks and incidents, but rather minor incidents and terrible things of starvation, exposure of huge convoys of people dying of disease. That is more evident than the other type of sure protection from attacks by bands of armed people or mobs.

Q : May we know your views about the finds of these large amounts of arms and ammunition. Is it due to the conspiracy of some Government or are they for individual protection? I refer to the finds in such places like Delhi, Jabalpur and Kanpur.

JN : I do not think there is any evidence to suggest any conspiracy of any Government. To my knowledge I have no information, nor has it been suggested to me by any one yet. After the last war there were enormous dumps. I think the American Army is chiefly responsible for these dumps of arms and ammunition all over the place, and I do not think they were sufficiently guarded, and during the last 1½ years, what with this communal tension, there was a desire in the minds of many people of all communities to get some kind of firearms, and those people, often enough, in charge of the dumps, were not above parting with them for a price—usually a black market price. And plenty of these dumps gradually disappeared in this way and arms were distributed.

Also, large numbers of ex-servicemen—demobilised soldiers—must have brought some kind of arms that they possessed from the eastern front and elsewhere. In some cases there may have been some collections of arms for some nefarious purpose by groups of individuals. But I do not think there is any governmental activity behind it.

Q : Is it a fact that there has been some organized attempt by a political party or some combination of men to get arms and distribute them in an underhand way in various parts of the country?

JN : When you talk of a combination it is difficult for me to talk of any particular political party. But undoubtedly groups or combinations of men have functioned in that way for the collection of arms all over the place. This was particularly done in the Punjab and there were many sources of getting arms which were open to particular groups of men and they utilized them.

Q : Are you making any enquiry into this conspiracy?

JN : There was no conspiracy.

Q : Has any approach been made by the Government of Pakistan for the transfer of population to all other parts of India?

JN : None whatever.

Q : With partition, do you think that the ideology of the Congress will suit the new requirements?

JN : The ideology of the Congress is a free democratic State, aiming at, as far as possible, some kind of an equal, egalitarian society.

Q : I think what the gentleman meant was whether you believed in nonviolence and appeasement?

JN : No, no.

Q : How can people decide to stay on or not?

JN : The eastern districts of Bengal will not be affected by Congress ideology very much because they are outside the scope of the Indian Dominion. What you mean normally is citizenship rights. I have said they should be completely equal for everyone.

Q : Is there really any serious demand for a Hindu State?

JN : You as pressmen ought to know better than I do. But it may be a demand of some people. It is rather a vague ideology of certain persons who have probably not given much thought to the matter. I do not just understand what it means, because either it simply means a patent fact which is that India has a very great majority of Hindus and in a democratic State the majority has its way; or, it means a non-secular State, a communal State, which is a highly objectionable thing. That means that those who

are not members of that particular faith have some kind of a subordinate position. The fact that India has a large number of Hindus is obvious.

Q : Don't you think it is the natural idea of a theocratic State dominating Pakistan?

JN : Just as many other things have been natural reactions ! But the point is whether the things considered bad are to be accepted because they are natural reactions. We condemned the two-nation theory and, of course, this business of a Hindu State is just the two-nation theory exemplified.

Q : Is it a fact that there is no Muslim State as a Muslim State in the world?

JN : As a matter of fact, there is no Christian State as a Christian State. The only thing is a demand for a Jewish home. Arab opposition to that is not Muslim opposition. This Arab opposition consists of both Christian and Muslim Arabs, so that in the world today one does not talk in terms of a Muslim or a Hindu or a Christian State. Of course, vaguely, you may say that western Asia is Islamic. You may talk of Islamic countries of western Asia like Iraq or Iran but they are not all Islamic States in that sense.

Q : The people who talk in those terms merely say as Mr. Jinnah says. Mr. Jinnah has given the same definition of citizenship that you have given. He has also said that Pakistan is a democratic State and yet he calls Pakistan the greatest Muslim State in the world. What some people really mean when they talk of a Hindu State is not that it would be a theocratic State but that it would be the largest Hindu State in the world—a State having a majority of Hindu population.

JN : You may call it the largest or the smallest Hindu State for it is the only State.

Q : There is Nepal. I do not think they mean a Hindu State in the theocratic sense. They just react to Jinnah.

JN : I said that the whole ideology at the back of Pakistan for the past four, five or six years has been an ideology of an authoritarian theocratic State. In fact, you can find plenty of chapter and verse for that in the past and Mr. Jinnah in the past has expressly spoken against a democratic constitution as such. He did not believe in democracy.

Q : Did you say that Pakistan was a theocratic State or was not? I understood that it was not.

The policy I have indicated above has been followed thus far, but I understand that no formal orders to this effect have been issued by the Home Ministry, and the local authorities, therefore, have been functioning rather in the air. May I suggest that such orders might be sent to them to regularise their actions?³

Yours,
Jawaharlal

3. Patel replied that, though he was looking into the matter, his impression was that since the question related to the reservation of vacant houses for Muslims, it was for the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation to carry out Cabinet orders.

28. To Albert Mayer¹

New Delhi
3 March 1948

My dear Mayer,

Thank you for your letters of January 27 and February 25.² I have read with great interest, specially your account of the informal discussion that you had with a group of experts. I am looking forward to your return to India with your selected group. We are full of work and worry, but whatever happens we want to go ahead with this planning for development.

As you must know we have had to face a terrific problem owing to large-scale migrations of people in the Punjab and elsewhere. We have had to provide for about five million people who have been uprooted and displaced. About four million go to the lands, but one million town dwellers are a much more difficult proposition. Such a problem ought to offer an ideal opportunity for planning both town and rural. But it came upon us so suddenly and in such a magnitude that we were rather overwhelmed and all attempts at planning faded away to begin with. We are trying to plan now to some extent and building townships in developing industrial areas, etc. You would be of great help in these undertakings.

I have sent a copy of your last letter to the U.P. Premier.

Sincerely yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In these letters Albert Mayer had informed Nehru that he had had discussions with leading agricultural experts and that a group of people was being got together for the U.P. assignment.

29. To N.R. Malkani¹

New Delhi
15 March 1948

My dear Malkani,

I have your letter of the 10th March.

Surely it was not necessary for you to tell me of your long record of national service. Nor is there any question of the machine being stronger than man in the present instance. The only question is how to carry on the work of evacuation, etc., most effectively. It is obvious that this can only be done effectively with some measure of cooperation from the Sind Government. Unfortunately the Sind Government has taken strong exception to our appointing you as a Deputy High Commissioner and anything that we do through you is held up by them. It was because of this that I suggested to you that you should not deal with the Civil Government directly. It was also for this reason that we have suggested that you should not officially be the Evacuation Commissioner. We thought that this arrangement will speed up work and even facilitate your own activities, as then the Sind Government would have less reason to object. The question before us was not certainly of your being a subordinate to anyone. If other difficulties had not intervened, that is, the difficulty of your being a Sindhi, you might well have been the High Commissioner there. But it is your desire and ours to push the work ahead, and hence our proposal. In effect you will do all the important work and advise us about all matters relating to evacuation. I do hope you will appreciate that there was absolutely no desire on our part to do anything which might affect your prestige or opportunity to do national service.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

30. To B. C. Roy¹

New Delhi
March 22, 1948

My dear Bidhan,

News from East Bengal continues to be disturbing and some of our friends

1. Suroj Chakrabarty, *With Dr. B.C. Roy and Other Chief Ministers* (Calcutta, 1932), p. 106.

here are upset about it.² I can understand that. Nevertheless, I think that we should have some clear policy in mind and not be diverted from it by minor incidents.

East Bengal will continue to feel neglected and bypassed so long as the centre of gravity is in western Pakistan. That centre of gravity is bound to continue to remain in the West, and this will lead to eastern Pakistan drifting farther and farther away.

Western Pakistan, I think, is likely to continue, though I hope that in future our relations with it will grow closer and there may be some common subjects like defence.

It is for this reason, among others, that it is wrong to encourage any large-scale migration from East Bengal to the West. Indeed, if such a migration takes place, West Bengal and to some extent the Indian Union would be overwhelmed.

The problem, therefore, before us is how to keep up the spirits of Hindus in East Bengal and how to help them in so far as we can. If they come over to West Bengal, we must look after them. But it is no service to them to ask them or to encourage them to join the vast mass of refugees who can at best be poorly cared for.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

2. About 50 people including Fazlul Huq, ex-Premier of Bengal, were injured as a result of baton charges by the police in front of various government offices in Dhaka on demonstrators demanding declaration of Bengali by the Government as the official language of eastern Pakistan and one of the state languages of Pakistan.

31. To B. C. Roy¹

New Delhi
26 March 1948

My dear Bidhan,

I appreciated your difficulties in regard to the increasing number of refugees from eastern Pakistan.² I hope that with your new Board³ you will be able

1. File No. 29(42)-PS/48-PMS.
2. It was estimated that one million refugees had reached West Bengal from East Bengal by this time.
3. In March 1948, the Government of West Bengal set up a Relief and Rehabilitation Board to collaborate with the Rehabilitation and Development Board at the Centre.

to deal with this situation more satisfactorily. I realise that these refugees, or many of them, will have to be accommodated in other parts of India and that will be the special business of our Relief and Rehabilitation Board. But I am quite clear in my own mind that if you raise the question of Dalbhum and Manbhum or any other area⁴ which you wish to be tagged on to West Bengal, you will raise a hornet's nest which will come in the way not only of your refugee problem but also of your Mor Scheme.⁵ As a matter of fact, we are not likely to appoint a judge to consider the question of Kharsawan and Seraikella States.⁶ We have suggested to the Premiers of Orissa and Bihar to settle this among themselves. I would, therefore, strongly advise you not to raise this question of provincial redistribution. I am quite sure this will not lead to any satisfactory result and will only cause us trouble. The very object we are aiming at will be defeated. That object is to find areas for the rehabilitation of people from East Bengal. Let us by all means find such areas outside West Bengal wherever this is suitable.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. Manbhum and Dalbhum areas, which formed part of Bihar, were claimed by West Bengal on the basis of cultural, linguistic and geographical affinities. Finally under the Bihar and West Bengal (Transfer of Territories) Act, 1956, portions of Kishanganj subdivisions of Purnea district and portions of Gopalpur *thana* and Purulia subdivision of Manbhum district excluding the *thanas* of Chas and Chandil were transferred from Bihar to West Bengal.
5. The Mor Project, later known as Mayurakshi Project, envisaged construction of a dam on the river Mayurakshi, a 2000 KW generating power station and irrigation canals to irrigate six lakh acres of land mainly in Birbhum and partly in Murshidabad and Burdwan districts.
6. The two princely States were transferred to Bihar on 18 May 1948 following arbitration by the Ministry of States between Bihar and Orissa.

KASHMIR AT THE UNITED NATIONS

1. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi
2 January 1948

My dear Baldev Singh,

Thank you for your letter of the 1st January about Colonel Kaul going to U.S.A. in connection with our reference to the Security Council of the U.N.O.

I returned from Lucknow this afternoon. On hearing that Thimayya was here I sent for him this evening to find out what was happening on the East Punjab border. In the course of our conversation I mentioned that Kaul might be sent to the U.S.A. He said that he had been hoping to keep Kaul with him for the organisation of irregular forces and had mentioned this to you, but that you had told him that in accordance with my request you would like to send him to the U.S. I thought about this matter again and I felt that if Kaul can be utilised more effectively here then probably it will be better for him to stay on and do a good job of work. The U.N. Security Council business is rather vague and one does not quite know when a person will be required and for how long. We shall have to wait a little for developments. If it is necessary to send an officer we can perhaps choose someone else. In our present need of competent officers here it might be unwise to send a person abroad who can be of definite use here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

2. Reference to the United Nations¹

As is well known now, the Government of India has made a reference to the Security Council of the U.N.O. in regard to the invasion of Kashmir by persons coming from or through Pakistan.² About 50,000 raiders are inside

1. Statement at a press conference, New Delhi, 2 January 1948. *The Hindu* and *The Bombay Chronicle*, 3 January 1948.
2. On 1 January 1948, the Government of India, under Article 35 of the Charter of the United Nations, which entitles any member to bring before the Security Council any matter whose continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, asked the Council to take cognizance of the situation in Kashmir.

the Jammu and Kashmir territory and another 1,00,000 have gathered on the border and are being trained and armed for the invasion of Kashmir. This large force is using Pakistan as a base and receiving from Pakistan modern military equipment, training and guidance.

The Government desires to take the press and the public into full confidence in so far as it can, having regard to diplomatic decorum and propriety. It has waited thus far because it would have been proper for the Security Council to consider the matter first before any publicity was given to it, but in view of references³ being made to this subject by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and by others, it is desirable to state the facts briefly.

I have previously on several occasions placed before the country the facts relating to Kashmir ever since we sent our troops there on October 27, 1947. Our troops succeeded in saving the Valley of Kashmir and the city of Srinagar and drove back the enemy to Uri along the Jhelum Valley road.

Since then fighting has taken place on a large front along almost the entire border of the Kashmir State and Pakistan. Very large numbers of armed men, in battle formation and fully equipped with modern arms, have entered Kashmir State territory at many places, and still larger concentrations of these men have been made along the border on the Pakistan side.

These border areas of Pakistan have become the base of operations for these invaders and, from the security of these bases, large numbers come across and raid, burn and loot Kashmir State territory which is Indian Dominion territory.⁴

The Government of India would have been justified, in self-defence, to strike at these bases and thus put an end to the sources of supply of these invaders. It has, however, scrupulously avoided doing so, so as to limit the field of operations and in the hope that the Pakistan Government will cease aiding and abetting these invaders.

During the last two months, repeated requests have been made to the Pakistan Government to prevent the use of its territory for aggression

3. At a press conference in Karachi on 1 January 1948, Zafrullah Khan accused the Indian Government of inept handling of the communal trouble in the Punjab and of using force to secure the accession of Junagadh, Mangrol and other states. A similar campaign was said to be in process in Kashmir. He said that the Pakistan Government were yet to be informed officially about the reference of the Kashmir issue to the U.N. He charged the Indian Government with violating the financial settlement of December 1947 by refusing to transfer the cash balances and military stores to Pakistan.

4. This has now been confirmed by Pakistani sources.

on India. It has not only done so, but it is an established fact that these invaders, among whom are a large number of Pakistan nationals, have been helped in every way by the Pakistan Government.

They are allowed transit through Pakistan territory by motor transport and railway trains, supplied petrol, food and accommodation, and the arms they possess are manifestly the arms of the Pakistan Army. Pakistan Army personnel have also been captured by our troops in the operations in Kashmir.

Not only has the Pakistan Government not taken effective steps to prevent this invasion, but it has refused even to call upon the invaders to desist from their active aggression.

The Government of India cannot tolerate the use of a friendly and neighbouring country as a base for the invasion of Indian territory, but in its desire to avoid any action, unless it is compelled by circumstances to take it, it has decided to refer this matter to the Security Council of the United Nations.

On December 22, 1947, a formal request was made in writing to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In this letter, the acts of aggression of Pakistan and the forms of aid given by the Pakistan Government to the invaders were briefly stated and the Government of Pakistan was asked to call upon the Pakistan nationals to cease participating in the attack on the Jammu and Kashmir State and to deny to the invaders: (1) all access to and use of Pakistan territory for operations against the Kashmir State; (2) all military and other supplies; (3) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

The Government of India expressed its earnest desire again to live on terms of friendship with Pakistan and hoped that its request would be acceded to promptly and without reserve. It pointed out, however, that, failing such response, it would be compelled to take such action, with due regard to its rights and obligations as a member of the U.N.O., as it might consider necessary to protect its own interests and those of the Government and people of the Jammu and Kashmir State.

As no reply was received to this formal request, two reminders were sent.⁵ Ultimately, on December 30, a formal reference was made to the Security Council of the U.N.O. through the representative of the Government of India at the U.N.O. On December 31, a copy of this reference was sent by telegram to the Pakistan Government.

This reference stated the facts of the case and pointed out that they indisputably pointed to the following conclusions :

5. For Nehru's cables to Liaquat Ali Khan on 28 and 31 December 1947. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 4, pp. 397-398 and 420 respectively.

- (a) that the invaders are allowed transit across Pakistan territory;
- (b) that they are allowed to use Pakistan territory as a base of operations;
- (c) that they include Pakistan nationals;
- (d) that they draw much of their military equipment, transport and supplies (including petrol) from Pakistan; and
- (e) that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise helping them.

There was no source other than Pakistan from which such quantities of modern military equipment, training and guidance could have been obtained. The Government of India requested the Security Council, therefore, to ask the Government of Pakistan :

- (1) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating in or assisting the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (2) to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking any part in the fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State; and
- (3) to deny to the invaders: (a) access to and use of its territory for operations against Kashmir; (b) military and other supplies; (c) and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

The reference to the Security Council is thus limited to the matters mentioned above. There is an urgency about these matters, for the first step that must be taken is to put a stop to the fighting and this can only be done if the invaders withdraw. It must be remembered that all the fighting has taken place on Indian Union territory and it is the inherent right of the Government of India to drive back any invaders on its territory. Till the Kashmir State is free of the invaders, no other matter can be considered.

The Government of India deeply regrets that this serious crisis has arisen. It is not of its seeking, and it has been thrust upon it by invading armies from outside who have committed acts of barbarism against the inhabitants of the Kashmir State and destroyed and burnt a large number of villages and some towns. No government can tolerate such an invasion.

In its desire, however, to avoid any act which might lead to further complications, it has shown the greatest forbearance and made repeated appeals to the Pakistan government. Those appeals have been in vain and hence it decided to refer this particular question to the Security Council. It has naturally reserved to itself the freedom to take such action in self-defence as the situation may require.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in a recent press interview, has brought a large number of charges against the Government of India. I shall not go into these charges except to repudiate them utterly. What has happened during the past year is well known and we are prepared to stand the test of the closest scrutiny. Apparently all this variety of charges has been brought to cover up the Kashmir issue in a forest of other matters which have nothing to do with it.

It is completely untrue to say that the Government of India has tried to undo partition or to strangle Pakistan. The mere fact of our agreeing to what everybody recognized to be very generous financial terms is evidence of our desire to help Pakistan and to have friendly relations with it.

It is completely untrue that we have repudiated these financial agreements; we stand by them and shall honour them, but it is true that we have pointed out to Pakistan that we cannot make these payments at present when that money might be utilised for warlike operations against India.

The Kashmir issue stands by itself. If the methods of invasion of a friendly territory by a barbarous force are encouraged and submitted to, there is no future either for India or for Pakistan and, therefore, this has to be and will be resisted by us to the utmost, and the Kashmir State will have to be freed completely. Even from the narrowest viewpoint of self-interest, the Government of Pakistan should realize that the encouragement of such an invasion is perilous to its own future, because once the forces of unbridled violence are let loose, they endanger the whole security of any state.

It must be remembered that in Kashmir there is no communal issue as such. Large numbers of Kashmiris—Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, are fighting the invaders. It is a national issue for them to preserve their freedom, and we have gone there to support them. We have pledged our honour to them and we shall stand by our pledge.

I would appeal to the press for restraint in dealing with this issue at this critical stage and to avoid publishing unauthorized matter. We shall try to give full information to the press whenever it is possible. The publication of unauthorized stories is likely to do harm to the State and to the cause we represent.

Question : Is there any truth in Pakistan's complaint that India is violating the international boundary?

Jawaharlal Nehru : India has not yet attacked any area of raiders' concentration within Pakistan territory. The Pakistan Government has on many occasions protested that Indian aircraft flew over some parts of their territory and dropped bombs. Most of these complaints have been investigated and it was found that all of them were either untrue or grossly exaggerated. It is however possible that sometimes a bomb was dropped on the other side on account of an error of judgment. The Government of India has asked the Indian Army and Air Force to avoid stepping into Pakistan territory.

Q: What are your expectations from the Security Council?

JN: I hope the Security Council will take prompt action. The proposal

is a simple one and is not complicated. The Pakistan Foreign Minister's statement has become a vast enquiry into the past year's occurrences. It is clouding up and cloaking the whole Kashmir issue. Evidently the Pakistan Government does not fancy the consideration of the Kashmir issue as such. But the issue is a clear one. The Security Council can consider it swiftly and issue directions within weeks, not months.

Q: There is much talk of war in Pakistan. How do your countrymen react to it ?

JN: Of course, we wish to avoid war and I would say that if we are compelled to take some action against the invaders' bases, even that is not war, because we would be taking that action in self-defence when the Pakistan Government was unable to take that action. I certainly think that it is possible to avoid war. Anybody who tries to invade India will get a hot reception. The fact is that the fear complex on both sides is making people believe in rumours.

Q: Has the Government taken adequate precautions to meet any possible threat from the raiders on the East Punjab border?

JN: Anybody who tries to come into India that way will have a very hot welcome. But it seems to me that all these rumours result from a state of fear and panic in the public mind on both sides. This fear is a dangerous thing. It leads to panic and to all manner of suspicions and fantastic stories.

Q: What is your reaction to the report that Lord Mountbatten has threatened to resign.?

JN: It is fantastic nonsense. The report is no good evidence of the intelligence and reliability of the press, because it is just slightly over hundred per cent false. There has been no whisper of the Governor-General's resignation anywhere. Constitutionally the Governor-General naturally accepted the advice of his Ministers. At present the Governor-General functions in another capacity also—a very helpful capacity—as Chairman of the Defence Council.

Q: Has the Government of India sought the U.K. Government's advice in this matter ?

JN: There is no question of any advice being given but, naturally, in such an important matter, we kept the U.K. Government informed of the

steps we proposed to take and the steps we had taken. Not only did we inform the Prime Minister of the U.K. but we informed the various ambassadors here representing various other countries.

Q: Will it not be better for you to meet Mr. Jinnah to bring about a solution of the outstanding issues?

JN: The Ministers of the Government of India have been meeting the Pakistan Prime Minister and other ministers frequently. In the normal course there will be a meeting of the Joint Defence Council in a few days in Lahore. But you must remember that Mr. Jinnah is a constitutional Governor-General and is not expected to discuss these matters with anybody. .

Q: Has the Government of India repudiated the financial settlement between the two Dominions?

JN: The Government of India has not repudiated anything. We accept completely that decision arrived at by agreement just as we could have accepted a decision of the Arbitral Tribunal if the matter had gone to it. But having accepted that decision, the question arose of making these large payments. You can well appreciate that when we are charging the Pakistan Government with aiding and abetting an invasion of India, we can hardly make any large payments to carry on or to encourage these military operations and war against India. No state can do it. Normally, a state freezes the credits of the other party in such circumstances. We have not frozen anything in that sense. All that we said was that we accept this agreement but there must be an overall settlement and we shall honour it completely.

Frankly, the Government of India hoped that the fairly generous gesture on its part would help in solving the other difficulties, including the Kashmir problem. It did not and the consequence was, as had been pointed out to the Pakistan Government, in the present circumstances, it was just not possible for us to pour money into their coffers, which might very well be used against us. We are prepared to pay that money just as soon as circumstances permit, and we will pay it undoubtedly.

Q: What are your views on the Boundary Commission's Award?

JN: We accepted it in the legal sense because we had promised to accept it. I think the grossest injustice was done to India in the boundary award, more especially in several areas of Bengal, the Khulna District particularly, and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. It was our intention, having accepted the award legally, to raise these matters as between the two Dominions,

to come to some friendly arrangement and subsequently, if necessary, to raise it before some other court or to try for some kind of arbitration, international or other. Unfortunately we could not do that because of other occurrences, but we may do it still. But anyhow that would be a friendly approach to the problem, not by force.

Q: What are your views on developments in Ajmer and Junagadh?

JN: How can I say at what temperature Sir M. Zafrullah Khan's blood boils? What happened there two or three weeks ago is undoubtedly regrettable but the stories that have come in Pakistan newspapers about Ajmer are grossly exaggerated. The *Durgah* is perfectly safe. There were lootings and fifty or sixty people were killed in the rioting. A fairly considerable number of Muslims left Ajmer about that time. I will be going there tomorrow morning. I had intended to go a week ago but could not. I will try to induce people to remain there and ask those who had gone to come back.

The stories about Junagadh were also grossly exaggerated. There has been some looting and at one place two or three persons were killed on either side, but the situation was immediately brought under control. It was never really out of control and only some petty occurrences took place.

Q: Can you draw a parallel between Junagadh and Kashmir?

JN: There is no parallel between Junagadh and Kashmir.

3. The Kashmir Question at the Security Council¹

We have referred the Kashmir question to the Security Council because our intention is that whatever we do, we should do it in a civilized manner. The Government of India has positive proof of Pakistan being implicated in the Kashmir affair. The question of Kashmir is interconnected with other questions in India. It must be clearly understood that we undertook to defend Kashmir only on appeal for help from the Maharaja and the National Conference. However, before sending our troops we made it clear that ultimately the people of Kashmir alone would decide their future. We

1. Speech at Jaipur, 3 January 1948. Based on reports from *National Herald* and *The Statesman*, 5 January 1948.

also made the Maharaja hand over administrative authority to the popular leaders.

More than ninety per cent of the people of Kashmir are Muslims, and we have gone there to help them. They are with us and are fighting the Pakistan forces. This is a significant fact and an argument against certain happenings in India, particularly the attempt to drive out Muslims from various provinces and States.

Even the other States have been affected by the recent change in India. Smaller States of Orissa and Central Provinces have agreed to merge themselves with the neighbouring provinces and, except Hyderabad, all bigger States have acceded to India. The object of our entering into a one-year standstill agreement with Hyderabad was to avoid unnecessary conflict. We are not afraid of fighting, but we want to avoid it as far as we can. We want that Hyderabad should also join the Indian Union and a responsible government be set up there.

Great advance has been made in all States and constitutional reforms are being introduced in most of them. I hope Jaipur will give a lead to other States in this matter. I have little doubt about it.

Great changes have taken place in India recently. One chapter has closed and a new one has begun. On August 15 all eyes were set on the new-born free nation, but suddenly the catastrophe of communal disturbances gripped her and she lost much of her prestige abroad.

An indication of how our prestige has been lowered is our defeat at the U.N.O. on the question of Indians in South Africa.² Our enemies made capital of our difficulties; but the world again looked upon us with admiration when we successfully overcame the gigantic obstacles in our way.

I accepted the invitation to address you in order to meet you all and derive strength from the love and affection you show towards me. The high position given to me carries great responsibilities, and it will be difficult for me to shoulder them unless I have the affection and cooperation of the people. I, however, feel anxious about the growing communal bitterness among the younger generation. After all, we have done our duty and soon the younger generation will have to take over the responsibility from us. If young men go astray today the country's progress will be retarded.

I request you all to work for the peace and prosperity of our country. I want to take you into confidence. At times I wonder if we really are prepared for freedom. It is always easy to defeat the enemy from outside, and that we have done, but the real difficulty is in overcoming our own

2. The resolution moved by India on 20 November 1947 called on the Governments of India and South Africa to discuss at a Round Table Conference all pending matters and invited the Government of Pakistan to participate in the discussion. The resolution failed to obtain the requisite two-thirds majority.

weaknesses and shortcomings. Unless we conquer these we shall not strong enough to shoulder the responsibilities of freedom.

4. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Del
5 January 19

Dear Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,

Your letter of the 30th December was received in New Delhi on the 1 January.² I had gone to Lucknow for the day and did not therefore get until the 2nd. On the 3rd I had to visit Ajmer and yesterday, the 4th, was fully occupied with celebrations of Burma's independence and other business. This will explain the delay in my sending you a reply.

2. I do not think that any useful purpose will be served by my attempting to answer, at length, the counter-charges that you have laid against India in paragraph 18 of your letter.³ Pakistan's accusation that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was procured by conspiracy, fraud and force has been repeatedly made by you and was frequently denied and refuted by us. So far as the cases of Junagadh and Manavader are concerned, we maintain that there is no parallel between them and that of Kashmir.

3. Any impartial person familiar with the tragic happenings in the Punjab will recognise the complete baselessness of the suggestion that India organised the wholesale massacre of the Muslim population in any part of its territories. Massacres of non-Muslims began first in 1946 in Calcutta, and in March 1947 in the West Punjab. What happened in India against Muslims was by way of retaliation against the atrocities perpetrated on non-Muslims first in Calcutta, and, later, in territories which are now part

1. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, pp. 87-89.

2. Replying to Nehru's letter of 22 December 1947, Liaquat Ali had denied all charges of Pakistan aiding and abetting the raiders and accused India of conspiring with the Maharaja "in repudiation of the very principles" on which India had opposed Junagadh's accession to Pakistan.

3. These charges were that India never whole-heartedly agreed to the partition scheme and was out to destroy Pakistan which her leaders still regarded as part of India; that she stopped the transport of coal and rail transport to Pakistan, withheld Pakistan's share of funds and military stores, and killed Muslims in India; and that she occupied Junagadh, Manavader and other States in Kathiawar and fraudulently brought about the accession of Kashmir.

of Pakistan, e.g., Noakhali and the West Punjab. We have not only not encouraged, but openly and consistently condemned retaliation. We have also done everything in our power to protect Muslim minorities in India. We claim that we have done so more effectively than Pakistan.

4. I am not aware that there has been any stoppage of essential requirements, such as coal and rail transport, as a kind of sanction against Pakistan. Where delays have occurred these have been due entirely to other causes, e.g., shortage of wagons, or, in the disturbed areas of the Punjab, to dislocation of traffic owing to the disturbances.

5. There has been no deliberate withholding of Pakistan's share of funds and arms and equipment with intent to apply pressure on Pakistan. As I have already tried to explain to you, we stand by the financial agreement that was recently reached. Payment has been deferred because we cannot, while operations against Jammu and Kashmir State are being conducted from bases in Pakistan, with Pakistan's connivance and assistance, reasonably be expected to make available funds which might be used to intensify military operations against us.

6. The first two charges, viz., that India has never wholeheartedly accepted the partition scheme, and that India is out to destroy the State of Pakistan which her leaders persistently continue to regard as part of India itself, are completely devoid of foundation, and I must emphatically repudiate them. Had we not desired to accept the partition scheme, nothing would have been simpler for us than to refuse acceptance when the scheme was first put forth. India has no responsibility for the sequence of events which you regard as evidence of India's resolve to destroy the State of Pakistan. It is true that some of us have expressed the view that India and Pakistan must draw closer to each other. The facts of history and geography fully justify this conclusion. Two neighbouring States such as Pakistan and India can either be friends, or live in a state of veiled or of open hostility. No responsible Indian leader has ever thought that friendship between India and Pakistan, which is more desirable than mistrust or enmity, should be achieved by forcible compulsion of Pakistan into political union with India.

7. In conclusion I would add that while I fully share your hope that our approach to the United Nations Security Council will help to lay the foundation of friendlier relations between Pakistan and India, it is not possible for us to invite the intervention of the Council on all the matters

The Congress had fought for the establishment of Swaraj, in which equality was assured to all, irrespective of caste, creed, religion and sex. Before independence, power had been in the hands of a few British officials. The Congress made it clear that Swaraj did not mean concentration of power in the hands of a few individuals. Our ideal has been a socialist democracy. Swaraj does not mean that a handful of Indians should reach the highest positions in the State while the masses lived in poverty. We want Swaraj for the prosperity of the common man.

The Muslim League members of the old Cabinet created a deadlock at every step and made it impossible to run the administration of the country on smooth lines. The Congress eventually decided to allow the secession of those parts of India which wanted to do so and try to administer the rest of the country in accordance with its ideals. This was the only solution of the daily conflicts in the Cabinet which had held up all plans for the reconstruction of the country.

August 15 was celebrated all over the country with great enthusiasm. The glory of freedom that was visible in the eyes of the people in the huge gathering outside the Red Fort on August 16 had inspired hope in me that India could now march forward on the path of peace and prosperity. But that hope proved a dream. There were people who were bent upon fishing in troubled waters. Troubles started in the eastern districts of the Punjab and soon engulfed the entire population, with the result that the great province suffered irreparable loss. Events forced millions to leave their homes and convoys of refugees on foot are trudging their way across the Punjab border. This is unprecedented in history.

These riots happened at a time when the Government was a new-born baby. Even the new administrative machinery had not been completely set up in eastern Punjab. Seeds of hatred and distrust sown in the past and nourished by interested elements had resulted in complete disunity among Hindus and Muslims.

Communal disturbances expose the country to outside aggression and weaken its foundations. India fell in the past because of internal disorders. Mahatma Gandhi taught us how to make the nation strong. Resistance to the British Government was the way of becoming strong.

A few groups have been organised in the Punjab who have made it their profession to murder people. The destruction of so much life is not accidental but planned. It is an attempt by the reactionary elements to paralyse the whole administrative machinery and to usurp political power. This is not the democratic way of capturing political power with the vote of the people, but the fascist method of terrorising the people by show of arms. The Government has ruthlessly crushed them and will meet the danger with strength.

Riots in Delhi dislocated all arrangements for the evacuation of refugees

in the western Punjab with the result that a large number of refugees were stranded and killed.

China was torn by a civil war for the last 30 years, and all its progress held up. In the present riots nobody's life has remained unaffected. Industry and commerce are at a standstill in the Punjab. Unless this destruction is stopped all hopes of building a socialised industrial structure will be shattered.

My recent remarks about the readiness of the Government to resign if the people have no confidence in it² have been misinterpreted in certain quarters to mean that I am contemplating retirement. I have no desire to withdraw from the battlefield when the principles for which I have fought are in jeopardy. What I meant was that the Congress is wedded to a certain ideology. If the people do not support that ideology, I can resign from the post. If this Government cannot translate the wishes of the people, it should resign. The Government cannot work with the aid of military and police alone and people's cooperation is necessary for maintaining peace in the country.

The call for the establishment of a Hindu state is a reactionary slogan and will bang the door on all future progress. The Congress wants to establish a secular, democratic state in this country. Naturally, in such a state the predominant cultural outlook will be governed by the great majority of Hindus in the population. France, U.S.A. and other states have Christian majorities which govern the cultural outlook of these countries but these states cannot be called Christian states. Kemal Ataturk opposed all attempts to make Turkey an Islamic state. A theocratic state is synonymous with bigotry and narrow-mindedness. It is unfortunate that those who had opposed the principles of the Muslim League became disciples of the League communalists.

The question of citizenship in Pakistan and the Indian Union can not be taken up at present. Anybody who does not owe allegiance to the state in which he lives can only live there as an alien with no citizenship rights. If Muslims want to live in the Indian Union and owe full allegiance to the state they will be welcomed. Those who want to leave this country are free to go.

I am glad that the U.P. Government has made it clear that no person shall be driven out of the U.P. because he belongs to a particular community. If anybody is a traitor he should be dealt with suitably. Even among Hindus all are not patriots. I congratulate Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, the U.P. Premier, on his success in controlling the situation under such difficult conditions and appeal to you to assist the provincial government in maintaining peace.

2. See *ante*, pp. 107-108.

A strong, stable government in the Centre and similar governments in the provinces are essential for peace and prosperity, otherwise the alternative is anarchy. I appeal to the people to help the government in maintaining peace and law and order in the country.

34. Cable to Imam of London Mosque¹

Your² telegram dated 17th. Report that any army order was served on last pocket of Ahmadiyas to evacuate Qadian³ absolutely false. As High Commissioner has doubtless informed you already, orderly and peaceful evacuation of those who wanted to leave Qadian has been made and others are remaining under adequate military protection. As I have made it clear repeatedly, Indian Government have not had the slightest intention of putting any pressure on people to evacuate Qadian and in fact have made special efforts to provide security there. I much regret that grossly exaggerated and false reports about Qadian should be in circulation in overseas countries.

1. New Delhi, 20 October 1947. File No. 19(164)-IA/48. M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Mushiaq Ahmed Bajwa.
3. Qadian in East Punjab is the Indian headquarters of the Ahmadiyas, a Muslim reformist sect, founded in 1889 by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908). In Pakistan, the Ahmadiyas have been denounced as non-Muslims.

35. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
22 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,
You will remember that the question of mosques which had been destroyed in Delhi city came up on several occasions in the Emergency Committee. There and elsewhere we have stated that we were specially responsible for the protection of places of worship.

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. I am given to understand that a fairly large number of mosques have been either completely or partially destroyed in Delhi city. At some places Arya Samaj or Hindu Mahasabha flags have been put up on the destroyed mosques.

3. One particular case is specially deserving of notice. I am told that the Masjid Haji Ali Jan in Kucha Khan Chand near the Clock Tower has been converted into a temple. This mosque was rather a notable one with library attached. Maulana Azad was partly responsible for this library. The library has been looted.

4. It is obvious that this business of not only destroying a mosque but converting it into a temple is of the utmost significance and very grave consequences will follow from it, apart from our prestige suffering greatly.

5. I have not myself verified these facts about this particular Masjid, though I have seen several broken-down mosques. I think the matter deserves full inquiry and some stern action. First of all no one should be allowed to occupy a mosque. Secondly, the Government must undertake to rebuild it. Thirdly, I think some kind of punishment in the way of a punitive fine should be imposed on the *mohalla* or neighbourhood. This punitive fine might be in special relation to the destruction and desecration of the mosque and not for any other particular purpose.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

36. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 590 dated 18th October. Searches. I am grateful to you for having taken immediate steps with Sind Government for stopping searches of evacuees. I have since heard from our High Commissioner that this has resulted in considerable improvement in the situation in Karachi.

I regret, however, that the position shows no improvement in West Punjab and I continue to receive complaints every day of searches and

1. New Delhi, 22 October 1947. File No. 7-43/47, O.S.-V-(Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

detention of personal possessions of evacuees. I hope you will take strong action to have our agreement implemented in this province and also in North West Frontier Province.

In drawing your attention to individual cases my intention was partly to show that the agreement was being widely disregarded in the Pakistan provinces and partly to enable you to take drastic action in specific cases. Every specific allegation made by you has been investigated and I am satisfied that, so far as India is concerned, any complaint that agreement is not being observed is incorrect.²

2. In his cable of 28 October, Liaquat Ali Khan had alleged that while there had been no instances of violation in Pakistan of the agreement on searches, a non-Muslim escort of a refugee train carrying Muslims had searched passengers between Mannawala and Attari and taken away valuables on 18 October, and in Karnal district, Muslim refugees were not allowed to take with them clothes or personal belongings in cold weather.

37. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
24 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 23 October² about searches of Muslim passengers. Naturally where there is any definite suspicion, a search should be made. My information was, however, that all Muslim passengers were asked as they alighted from the plane to separate themselves for purposes of search. Their persons were not searched but all their luggage was thoroughly examined.

About a letter sent to the I.G.P. from my office,³ I do not see any kind of impropriety in information being asked for by them directly. Confusion might arise in issuing any orders and it would be improper for any orders to be issued without your knowledge. Many points of information are frequently necessary and they are asked for directly in order to save time.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 353.

2. Patel wrote that passengers leaving Delhi by air were not searched and incoming passengers on 23 October and luggages were searched only on definite suspicion that unlicensed firearms and ammunitions were being brought to Delhi.

3. In the same letter Patel wrote to Nehru : "I feel it is only right and proper that such matters should be brought to my notice in the first instance and should not be taken up direct with the officers serving under me."

In regard to the I.G. of Police, Delhi, this appears to be the natural course. As a matter of fact I have been seeing him from time to time also to find out what the position was.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

38. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 310-G dated 8th October. To our enquiry Governor East Punjab has reported "Allegation that refugees who arrived in Lahore from Jullundur on 8th October by train were searched and deprived of their belongings at Jullundur and not supplied with drinking water at Amritsar is on enquiries made from the Deputy Commissioner concerned found to be absolutely false."

1. New Delhi, 25 October 1947. File No. 7-43/47, O.S.-V (Pak), M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

39. To the Maharaja of Patiala¹

New Delhi
1 November 1947

Dear Maharaja Sahib,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th October.

I have myself been greatly exercised about the growing estrangement between Hindus and Sikhs. Many reports of this have come to me and I understand that a large number of Hindus have left or are leaving Amritsar and the neighbourhood.

Certainly I should like to do my utmost to prevent this happening, as I think it is bad for all concerned and more especially the Sikhs. Hindus are spread out all over India, Sikhs are more or less concentrated in certain parts. Any growth of estrangement would naturally tend to isolate the Sikhs from the rest of the country to their great disadvantage.

1. J. N. Collection.

Personally any unity movement should, in my opinion, not merely be confined to Hindus and Sikhs, but should include all Indian nationals of whatever creed. We can never build up a strong and stable nation if we encourage communal or separatist tendencies. Recently the demands made in certain quarters for a Sikh State, Jatisthan and Rajasthan have seemed to me quite astonishingly foolish and short-sighted. Therein lies disruption, weakness, disunity and conflict. Any unity movement, therefore, must come out openly and stoutly against such disruptive tendencies.

I have been pained to observe these and other tendencies at work among some of the States. The rulers of these States, notably in parts of Rajputana, have been behaving none too well. Apparently they are under the impression that the Indian Union Government is too busy with its troubles to pay attention to what is happening in their States; popular movements have been crushed and sectarian elements encouraged. This is not the path of wisdom and in the present tense atmosphere of India it may lead to big upheavals.

I trust that you will draw the attention of other rulers to the necessity of avoiding communalism and sectarianism in every form, also to the need for encouraging and cooperating with popular movements. Kashmir would have fallen even before our troops got there but for a popular movement which was essentially non-communal and which included large numbers of Muslims. It was this movement that kept the flag flying and faced the raiders till help came from India and our military reports tell us of the fine work that this popular movement in Kashmir has done and is doing in support of the military and law and order. The strength of the ruler today depends, more than ever, on the support and goodwill of his people.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

40. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
4 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You must have heard of the plight of the refugees in Karnal, Panipat, etc. I am greatly disturbed at the way the East Punjab Government is dealing with this matter. They cast the blame on us for everything although the

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 356-357.

Central Government is doing its utmost to help them and the refugees. This is a completely irresponsible way of functioning. Again the Sikhs or some of them are misbehaving very much in various places. The Home Department and the police in the East Punjab are dominated by the Sikh element. Unless something about this is done, the Hindus of the East Punjab will suffer very greatly as they are suffering now. I enclose a copy of a telegram I am sending to Dr. Gopichand Bhargava.

The condition of East Punjab refugees in Delhi is also very bad. Some of the small camps, like Wavell Canteen, are full to overflowing and the railway station is in a very bad way. While we should try to stop this influx, we cannot leave these people in their present state.

We have been anxious not to open a new camp but I really see no way out of the difficulty except by opening a refugee camp for Hindus and Sikhs. This need not be on a very big scale and no protection will be necessary for them as in the case of the Muslims. If we do not do this, these people, wandering about Delhi and squatting down at odd places, will do harm to themselves and to us.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

41. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 379-G dated 6th November.² I have received information that a non-Muslim mob attacked Muslim refugees at Panipat last Sunday. Police opened fire killing 15 Hindus and Sikhs and injuring a large number. 400 looters were arrested and large quantity of looted property recovered. Two police constables were killed by the Muslims and their rifles were removed of which one was subsequently returned. You will see from the above that civil authorities far from acting in collusion with looters took very energetic action.

1. New Delhi, 10 November 1947. File No. 13-14/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Suspecting collusion between police and civil authorities in harassment and looting of Muslims escorted by a military convoy of 14 trucks on 1 November 1947, Liaquat Ali Khan urged investigation and punishment of the guilty.

2. The situation was rapidly restored to normal after above incident by rigorous police and military patrolling.

42. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Following is text of telegram received from Prime Minister Assam. "While returning Assam from Jaipur with family consisting ladies, children by Assam Mail on 1st November League National Guards and Pathan Police at Parbatipur greatly harassed us. They searched belongings and demanded thousand rupees otherwise threatened us dire consequences. Had to pay thousand to save life and honour ladies. Kindly arrange protection Assamese citizens passing through Pakistan. Would request that action be taken with Pakistan Government."

I shall be grateful if complaint referred to can be investigated and steps taken to ensure that no harassment is caused to Indian nationals passing through eastern Pakistan.

1. New Delhi, 13 November 1947, Extracts. File No. 7-43/47, O.S.,-V, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

43. Record of Twenty Seventh Meeting of the Cabinet Emergency Committee¹

K. C. Neogy stated that a train has been laid on to take eight thousand Pakistan Government personnel and their families from Delhi the previous day, but this had to be cancelled because twenty thousand eight hundred other Muslim refugees reached the station first and prevented the right people from being loaded. Arrangements would now be made for another train but he stated that rakes which had gone to Pakistan had not been returned as quickly as anticipated.

1. New Delhi, 14, November 1947. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present were Mountbatten, Nehru, Amrit Kaur and Neogy.

The Prime Minister pointed out that many Muslims who had not previously desired to leave had now changed their minds. There appeared to be no end to the process of sending Muslim refugees by train from Delhi. The feeling of insecurity continued. This was mainly a psychological problem; and the present Committee was not the place to discuss this. . . .

44. The Fundamental Policy of the Congress¹

The All India Congress Committee welcomes the elimination of foreign rule in India and the establishment of a free and independent state and a government responsible to the people of the country. The achievement of freedom is the culmination of the long struggle of the Indian National Congress and outcome of the sufferings and tribulations of the Indian people. Freedom brings responsibility and new burdens and problems.

The freedom achieved was not the kind that the Congress had envisaged during its long history. It has been accompanied by secession of parts of the country and disasters of unparalleled magnitude. Hardly was free India born when grave crisis overtook it and events happened which have besmirched her fair name and brought death and destruction to vast numbers of innocent people in circumstances too tragic for words. There have been arson and loot and murder on a mass scale in West Punjab, N.W.F. Province, Baluchistan, East Punjab and adjoining areas. The Committee cannot find words strong enough to condemn these inhuman acts by whatever community perpetrated. It extends its sympathy to all those who have been the innocent victims of this colossal tragedy. At this moment of crisis, it is necessary that the Congress should again declare its faith and policy in clear terms and that the people as well as the Government should follow that policy unswervingly. Even though the Congress agreed to a division of the country in the hope, which has thus far proved vain, that thereby internal conflicts might cease, it has never accepted the theory that there are two or more nations in India. It has firmly believed in the whole of India as a nation bound together by indissoluble cultural and historical links which had been further strengthened in the course of the national struggle for

1. Resolution moved by Nehru at the A.I.C.C. meeting, New Delhi, 15 November 1947. A.I.C.C. Papers. File No. ED-7 (Part II) 1947-48, N.M.M.L.

freedom. It was on the basis of this faith that the Congress grew up as a national institution open to all Indians without reference to creed or religion. India is a land of many religions and many races and must remain so. Nevertheless, India has been and is a country with a fundamental unity and the aim of the Congress has been to develop this great country as a whole as a democratic, secular state where all citizens enjoy full rights and are equally entitled to the protection of the state, irrespective of the religion to which they belong. The Constituent Assembly has accepted this as the basic principle of the constitution. This lays on every Indian the obligation to honour it.

The Congress wants to assure the minorities in India that it will continue to protect, to the best of their ability, their citizen rights against aggression. The Central Government as well as the Provincial Governments must accordingly make every effort to create conditions wherein all minorities and all citizens have security and opportunity for progress. All citizens must also on their part not only share in the benefits of freedom but also shoulder the burdens and responsibility which accompany it, and must above all be loyal to India.

The All India Congress Committee calls upon all Congressmen and the people of India to adhere strictly to these well established principles of the Congress and not to allow themselves to be diverted into wrong channels by passion or prejudice or by the tragic events that have happened. Real good and progress of India have yet to be achieved and this can only be done by adhering to the ideals and policy of the Congress and discarding and opposing all false doctrines which have done so much mischief to India and her people.

45. Record of Lord Ismay's Interview with Nehru¹

Ismay had a two-hour talk with Nehru on 18th November but it was in the main concerned with the movement of refugees and the resolutions

1. Delhi, 18 November 1947. L/P & S/13/1845 B, I.O.L.R.

passed at the recent meetings of the All India Committee of the Congress;²

2. Nehru thought that movement of the whole 8 million refugees would be completed without disaster within a month at the most, while the impression which he gave about the recent Congress meetings was that Congress as a whole were now becoming less Mahasabhte in outlook and more really disposed towards a secular state. On Ismay saying that Kripalani's speech at these meetings included rather unfortunate passages³ and on his asking why Kripalani had tendered his resignation of the Presidentship,⁴ Nehru only replied that in any case his tenure of office was nearly up and that he was a Sindhi who could not bear the thought of his province being in Pakistan.

3. Ismay also tried to draw Nehru on the question of Kashmir and the danger of it becoming a running sore and landing India with a heavy permanent commitment, but Nehru was not disposed to discuss the subject. When Ismay rather pointedly asked when the next India Defence Committee meeting would be held, Nehru said that there was an important paper on the organisation of cadet corps which required early consideration. Similarly, when Ismay expressed the hope that Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan would shortly be meeting, and suggested Amritsar as a possible rendezvous as being easier than Delhi for the sick Liaquat to reach, Nehru made it clear that whereas a meeting was desirable in principle there was no real hurry. In fact, the impression left on Ismay was that Nehru thought things were going so well in Kashmir that the longer the discussion with Liaquat was deferred the stronger would be India's position. Ismay's own views are the direct contrary of this.

2. The A.I.C.C. meeting for three days, from 15 to 17 November 1947, passed resolutions regretting Kripalani's resignation from the presidentship of the Congress and placing on record its appreciation of his services; exhorting the princes to move with the times and to recognise "the voice of the people" as the 'supreme law'; supporting the effort to rescue and resettle refugees specially abducted women; appealing to organisations such as the Muslim National Guards to discontinue the raising of private armies, desiring that political parties be not divided on communal lines; disapproving of controls on foodstuffs and cloth; and appointing committees to define the aims of the Congress and to review its constitution in view of its new responsibilities.
3. In his presidential address on 15 November 1947 Kripalani said that "we should frankly tell the League-minded Muslims that though we, Congressmen and our Governments are determined to protect them, we can't do so merely on the strength of our police and army.... The safety of the Muslims must come from their Hindu neighbours who form a majority of population and from whom the majority in the ranks of the police and army must come. These will not be active in affording this protection unless they know that their co-religionists in Pakistan are getting a fair deal."
4. Kripalani resigned as Congress President on 15 November 1947 on the grounds that there was a lack of harmonious cooperation between himself, as the Congress President, and members of the Central Government, even though the latter formed a majority in the Congress Working Committee. Rajendra Prasad was unanimously elected to succeed Kripalani.

46. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

18 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have received information that preparations are being made for big-scale trouble about the time of the Garhmukteshwar fair which takes place in a few days' time. Garhmukteshwar is not far from Meerut in the U.P. People going there from Rohtak district would normally go Delhi.

2. My information is that it is proposed to take well-armed bands from Rohtak to Garhmukteshwar—arms to be taken in bullock carts—on the way to Garhmukteshwar villages in the U.P. roundabout Meerut to be looted, that is Muslim villages to be looted or Muslim parts of mixed villages, and Muslims killed—on the way to Garhmukteshwar or probably on the way back disturbances to be created in Delhi, Shahdara, Ghaziabad, Hapur and Meerut.

3. Most of the people who are likely to go are Jats who are being mobilized for this purpose in the villages between Delhi and Rohtak. The Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh and the old Hindu and Sikh members of the Unionist Party in Rohtak and of the Jat Mahasabha as well as some Arya Samajist leaders are working together for this purpose. It has been announced that women should not accompany these people from Rohtak. Some I. N. A. men and other ex-servicemen are likely to take part also. Jhajhar, which is not far from Delhi, is one of the centres of this plan.

4. How far this information is accurate I cannot say. But there is undoubtedly a considerable stir on the Rohtak side and wild rumours are afloat. It would be desirable to take full precautions against any such move. It might be worthwhile also to discourage people, specially in Rohtak and Gurgaon, from going to the Garhmukteshwar *mela*. Carts might be prevented from going through Delhi. I am told that it is proposed to start these *jathas* with carts from the Rohtak area on the 20th November. If any carts come with these *jathas*, they might be searched rigorously.

5. You will remember that there was trouble last year at the Garhmukteshwar *mela* and this was caused largely by Jats from Rohtak and Gurgaon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

47. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
21 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have your letter of the 21st enclosing a copy of the letter sent to Neogy.²

2. I have not seen Iengar's³ letter to which you refer. But probably it was based on a talk I had with him. Nobody likes compact Muslim or any such blocks in a city. The normal population of a city should be evenly divided. The problem, however, was not of having a compact Muslim block but of preventing trouble spreading to those two or three areas in Delhi city where Muslims still live in some numbers. Cases have been reported to me where houses vacated by Muslims in a predominantly Muslim *mohalla* were occupied by non-Muslims, usually Sikhs. Immediately, petty trouble arose there between the newcomers and the old residents and this tended to grow. The Muslims in that *mohalla* were threatened by the newcomers and in view of the prevailing atmosphere these Muslims were frightened and many of them left their houses and went to Humayun's Tomb.

3. As I understood our policy, it was to create conditions of security for those Muslims who wanted to live in Delhi as well as those who had left Delhi and might want to come back. We have so far failed to create that feeling to any appreciable extent, with the result that the population of Humayun's Tomb has increased. If this process continues there is little doubt that more and more resident Muslims of Delhi will be forced by circumstances to leave the city.

4. As you know, this matter was repeatedly discussed in the Emergency Committee meeting and the general direction given was that Muslims should be encouraged to remain in the areas they live in and nothing should be done to create any apprehension in their minds. The recent A.I.C.C. decisions went much further in this respect and even stated that Muslim houses which have been vacated under pressure of events should not be given to refugees.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 362-364.

2. Patel feared that the creation of compact Hindu or Muslim blocks in Delhi would perpetuate communal tension and that such a policy could have wider repercussions on problems of internal security. He suggested consideration of the matter in all its aspects.

3. H. V. R. Iengar.

In fact the whole policy laid down by the A.I.C.C. is to prevent a Muslim exodus and to keep the door open for Muslims to return to their original homes. How far it is possible to keep houses vacated by Muslims vacant in very large numbers is exceedingly doubtful, especially where the whole areas have been so vacated. The question then arises as to what we should do with empty houses in the few predominantly Muslim localities. It seems to be inevitable that if these houses are handed over to non-Muslims, there will be continuing trouble and the impression will grow that we want to drive out the remaining Muslims from the city. That would be a direct contradiction of what we have stated and of the policy laid down by the A.I.C.C.

5. As things are today it is an unfortunate fact that frightened people tend to leave and go for security and self-protection. Very few Muslims can find houses or any security in predominantly non-Muslim areas. I hope that some time later this difficulty will cease to operate and a mixed and balanced population will grow up. Meanwhile, we have to face the situation as it is and there seems to be no way out, if we have to adhere to our professions, than to avoid giving houses vacated by Muslims in the predominantly Muslim *mohalla* to non-Muslims.

6. There is also the question of some Muslims wanting to go back to Delhi city from some camp or wherever they might be. Where are they to go? Also there is a relatively minor question of some Congress Muslims who have been turned out of their homes elsewhere finding some place to live in. We have to find answers to these questions.

7. When I was informed that actually some Sikhs had taken possession of some houses in a Muslim *mohalla* and created trouble there and as a consequence neighbouring Muslims were leaving their houses, I told⁴ Iengar to mention to Kirpalani⁵ that this kind of thing must not be encouraged and that such Muslim houses should not be given over to others. I suppose that in pursuance of this that Iengar wrote his letter.

4. On 19 November, H.V.R. Iengar wrote to S. K. Kirpalani, Secretary, Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, that deputationists of Jamiat-ul-Ulema, Delhi, had urged that the houses vacated by migrant Muslims be given on rent to Muslims only so that compact Muslim blocks were formed. He added that Nehru desired such a policy directive to be issued.

5. S. K. Kirpalani (1899-1983); joined I.C.S., 1922; served in the Punjab, 1922-37; Joint Secretary, Department of Supply, 1941-42; Partition Officer, Punjab, 1947; Secretary, Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, August 1947-January 1948; High Commissioner to Canada, 1949-50.

8. I am told that there is trouble again in Bara Hindu Rao because of some similar development there. I feel that if we are serious about the policy we have laid down we must not only clearly state it but see that it is acted upon. Any half-hearted attempt to implement it would be unfortunate and would lead to confusion and failure.

9. If you feel that what I have stated above is not a correct policy for us, I shall gladly put up this matter before the Cabinet. Indeed it is desirable that the directions given by the A.I.C.C. should be considered by the Cabinet in their entirety, that is, in so far as they apply to the situation confronting us. I was in fact going to send copies of these resolutions to the provincial Prime Ministers as well as to some members of our Cabinet who are dealing with these matters.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

48. To C.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
21 November 1947

My dear Trivedi,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th November as well as the other letter sent previously with copies of messages sent by you. I am glad you gave the press conference.² I have sent a copy of your letter and the press cutting to Gopalswami Ayyangar.

2. Why does Punjab have so many F.C.s? Is it just to give a higher status and additional salary to a person?

3. I am getting complaints from Liaquat Ali about a contemplated invasion of West Punjab by armed Sikhs. I do not know what truth there is in this. But from speeches made by some Sikh leaders there is obviously some ground for this apprehension. I hope that your Government will be vigilant and will prevent the formation of private armies. As a matter of fact I feel that even distribution of arms to odd individuals on the border is unsafe and likely to cause trouble. Increase your home guards if you will and give them arms. They must be under your discipline. Distributing arms to people not in a disciplined force is bound to give you many headaches in future.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. On 14 November 1947, C. M. Trivedi said that law and order had been re-established in East Punjab and called for help for the rehabilitation work.

4. I understand that you are negotiating with West Punjab for a general amnesty in both East and West Punjab. I think this is a very good idea. Suhrawardy has been pressing me for it. Very special cases may perhaps be left out. Otherwise it seems rather absurd for a large number of petty offenders and killers are abroad. I am sure most of the Hindus and Sikhs in prison in West Punjab and most of the Muslims in East Punjab are not particularly guilty of anything. They have been the sufferers and it is no good persecuting them any further. They should be exchanged.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

49. A National Relief Fund¹

For some time past I have been receiving odd sums of money which were either earmarked for relief work or were to be spent at my discretion. I passed these on to other funds meant for relief purposes. Many of these amounts were sent to me as Prime Minister, some were sent personally. Later I decided to put them aside in a special account pending decision as to how this should be used.

2. Mr. J. R. D. Tata suggested to me that it might be desirable to open a Prime Minister's Relief Fund or a National Relief Fund, which would attract attention on a considerable scale, as there was a great desire to help the refugees from the Punjab and elsewhere.

3. The questions that arise are :

- (i) Should such an official or semi-official fund be started?
- (ii) Should it be a kind of general distress relief fund which could give help in many emergencies, or should it be confined to relief of refugees, i.e., to the present emergency, that has arisen in the Punjab and elsewhere. In any event of course the fund would at present be principally or almost entirely concerned with the present emergency.
- (iii) What should be the name of the fund?
- (iv) Who should be holding the fund and what should be the management of it? Should the trustees be appointed in their personal capacity or in their official capacity?

1. Note sent to Cabinet Ministers, 25 November 1947. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

4. I should like to consult my colleagues in regard to these matters before taking any step. I might mention that I have consulted Gandhiji and he is in favour of some such fund being started. He is also of opinion that the trustees should be appointed by virtue of their official position and not personally.

5. If some such fund is started, then it is desirable to do it on a big scale so as to attract public attention.

6. Having given some thought to this matter, I feel that it would be desirable to have some such fund. Money comes to the Prime Minister as such and it would be proper to send it to a special fund rather than to non-official funds. I think also that the fund should not be limited in scope, but might be used for any type of distress or emergency relief. But it is clear and it should be stated that the immediate use of the fund must necessarily be for relief of the refugees from the Punjab, North West Frontier, Sind, etc.

7. The name of the fund might be any one of the following:

- (i) National Relief Fund
- (ii) Prime Minister's Fund for Relief of Distress
- (iii) Prime Minister's National Relief Fund
- (iv) National Relief Fund for Refugees (This would rather limit the scope)
or
any like name.

8. The trustees of the fund should not be too many. Among them should be :

- (i) Prime Minister
- (ii) Deputy Prime Minister
- (iii) Finance Minister
- (iv) President of the Congress
- (v) Chief Justice of India
- (vi) A representative of the Tata trustees
- (vii) A representative of industry & commerce, to be chosen by the Chambers of Commerce.

One or two other names might be added of persons in their representative capacities. It is to be considered whether the Governor General should also be a trustee. Probably it would be desirable for him to be there.

9. Apart from the trustees there might be a managing committee which might include the Prime Ministers of the provinces and possibly one or two additional ministers of the Central Government.

10. These are some suggestions to be considered.

11. I might mention that the contributions I have been receiving during the last two or three weeks, without any appeal or attempt on my part, now amount to about one lakh of rupees. I have opened a temporary account in the bank where these moneys have been deposited.

50. Force no Solution¹

Two years ago, on this very day, I was at Nankana Sahib, the birth-place of Guru Nanak. These two years were marked with a succession of events of unparalleled importance and magnitude in history. The last four months comprise a period in which immense destruction was wrought in many parts of the country. Common men like us are swayed by passions of the times we live in but great men mould the era in which they are born and leave an indelible impress of their personality on it.

Lives of the great teach us that it is more proper to look at our own actions with a critical eye than hasten to blame others. A race or a civilization dies of its own internal weaknesses and not because of external aggression. There are many amongst us who sully the fair name of India by their thoughtless words and deeds.

I ask you to put yourselves in a world twenty years hence and then look back at the present from that distance and angle. That will afford us a better perspective and enable us to look at the present situation dispassionately. Just imagine what posterity will have to say about us. I have no doubt they will find us guilty of many unworthy acts. Whether it is an individual from Pakistan harming one of us or vice versa, it is an Indian injuring another Indian.

India cannot and will not remain divided. That is my conviction no matter how much I am personally criticised for having accepted partition. Non-acceptance might perhaps have proved to be a greater evil. Perhaps the present struggle might forge a stronger bond of unity between us.

The political division of India cannot change certain fundamental things which still are the same in both the Dominions. India and Pakistan shared a common heritage and history. They have common economic

1. Speech at a reception given by the Sikh Seva Dal, New Delhi, 28 November 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 29 November and *The Hindu*, 30 November 1947.

relations which though broken for the time being will have to be established again.

Anyone who is not carried away by momentary passions will easily realise that ultimately both the Dominions will unite into one country. The unity, I am confident, will be brought about not by force but by the march of events all over the world and consideration for mutual interests. The differences between India and Pakistan cannot be ironed out by the use of force and anybody who adopts this method will only succeed in creating greater complications and more difficulties in the way of a solution.

The relations between the two Dominions are strained at present, but that does not change the fact that we are neighbours and are so-placed that we cannot live in isolation from each other. There are only two courses open to us. Either we unite or go to war against each other. Even if there is war between the two, it cannot last for ever. After the war they will have to follow the other course of merging themselves into one united country.

It is possible for one country to invade another and occupy it by force, but that should not be mistaken for a union of the two countries. The set-up of things in the world at present is such that big problems cannot be solved by the use of force. If India is attacked, all possible force will certainly be employed to defend her and no quarter will be granted to the invader, but for solving Indo-Pakistan problems peaceful methods alone should be adopted or they are liable to become more serious and complicated.

The past two years in India have been full of unpleasant happenings. Dreadful things have taken place during the last four months. Much blood has been shed and suffering caused in this country, but that should not be permitted to warp our judgment. The people of India must think dispassionately and take stock of what they did and in what way it was different from what they should have done. The people who get carried away by their passions always come to a sad end. It is their duty to find out their own mistakes before pointing out mistakes committed by others. A nation really falls not due to attacks by her enemies but on account of the misdeeds of her own people.

Time has now come for everyone to make an honest and firm resolve not to say or write anything which is liable to create ill-feeling between the two Dominions. There are times when strongly-worded replies are called for, but we must learn to restrain ourselves as ultimately it is saner thinking alone that helps.

Guru Nanak, whose birthday we have gathered here to celebrate, has been a great apostle of unity among all sections of humanity and goodwill towards everyone. In the present state of distrust and bickerings, his teachings are of great value, and his message can bring about lasting peace.

I appeal to the Indian press to exercise restraint in their writings. I regret that of late they have done more harm than good to the country. They must

52. The Problem of Rehabilitation¹

The experts have spoken and others who have intimately been in touch with this problem have given us the benefit of their advice and criticisms. There has been some praise of the Government and plenty of criticism, and I think probably there is a great deal of truth in both. For my part I feel, not only for myself but speaking on behalf of the Government, a certain inadequacy in having to deal with this problem, because however efficient or however able or competent a Government might be the problem is so big that one is apt rather to quail before it. I do not know what in future might be said about the handling of this problem not only by this Government or by the East Punjab Government or by this House or by all our officials and others. But I do think that in that future history it will be said that the vast and colossal as this problem was, something which might shake the very foundations of Government and the social order, the people of India stood up to it bravely, tackled it, and, I hope, ultimately, solved it to the advantage of the nation, for, after all, no government, however good it may be, can tackle such a problem without a vast amount of public support. It is essentially a problem in which the cooperation of vast numbers of people is required. We have got into the habit, in past days or past periods, of thinking too much in terms of a Government doing this or not doing it, of blaming a Government for this or that. Now I do believe that the Government must shoulder their responsibility. My honourable friend Mr. Aney asked whether we want to make ourselves responsible for the rehabilitation of all these people fully or just temporarily. Well, if he wants an answer I should say that any Government of India should make itself responsible for the well-being of every Indian in this country, and not temporarily responsible but permanently responsible. But it is all very well for me to say that but I know that in this country vast numbers of people are starving or have no houses, are poverty-stricken and all that; but the point is that we as a Government and we as a House must realise that it is our responsibility that every Indian should have food to eat and a house to live in, and education and opportunities of progress. If that is so for everyone in the country, certainly it is so for these unhappy countrymen of ours who have suddenly found themselves lost in the storm that arose. We recognise that responsibility fully. How

1. Speech at the end of a discussion on a motion on relief and rehabilitation of refugees, moved by K. C. Neogy, Minister of Relief and Rehabilitation, 29 November 1947. Among others who spoke on the motion were Dewan Chaman Lal, Thakurdas Bhargava, Sucheta Kripalani, Ajit Prasad Jain and Mohanlal Saxena. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. II, 1947, pp. 917-922.

far we shall discharge it is a matter of our ability and strength, and the country's strength, and it is a little difficult for me to be definite and precise about it.

We have heard in today's debate a great many points raised on the practical aspect of the question; I should like to draw the attention of the House to certain other and psychological aspects, if I may say so. When any great catastrophe comes, a Government or a country tries to ameliorate the lot of the sufferers; they address themselves to their task with all their strength. The process of healing starts immediately after the catastrophe. Here we have been dealing with a very peculiar state of affairs; the catastrophe was a man-made catastrophe—not a natural phenomenon like an earthquake or a fire or some other calamity like that—and all the evils of man's passions followed it throughout and follow it still so that while we tried to heal, the process of destruction went on. On the one side, there was a process of building, on the other, of breaking up, actually, physically and even more so in men's hearts. All the time many of us thought in terms of helping certainly, but also in terms of hurting others, and when you mix up these two feelings the result is that the helping part suffers. You do not create that proper atmosphere of helping and rehabilitation and building up, when half your mind is turned to breaking down and hurting others.

There has often been talk of retaliation. In fact, all this sorry and terrible business that has happened in these three or four months everywhere, might be put in one word—"retaliation". Each person, each group, apparently thinks of retaliating so as to protect one's own interests. Now it passes my thinking and imagination how anybody can think that in the state of affairs that we have to face in India today, we can help any cause by widespread or small-scale retaliation. I have not a shadow of doubt that if, as soon as the catastrophe overwhelmed us, most people had thought in terms not of retaliation but of healing and stopping it, 75 or 80 or 90 per cent of this business would have been stopped. But we did not—I am not talking about this House of course; I am talking about the passions that were roused in this process. People thought that they would protect their interests or the interests of their dear ones by hitting out and hurting others and thus by this process of retaliation possibly bring pressure on the other party. Exactly the same feeling worked all over the place on both sides with the result that every act of retaliation brought further retaliation and the vicious circle went on.

And yet I find people talking in terms of retaliating; and yet I find newspapers and others blaming this Government for not adopting a retaliatory policy. I want to say quite clearly that so far as this Government is concerned it is not going to adopt the method of retaliation. Of course every Government has to protect the interests of its citizens, of those who look to it for help. We are going to protect them by every means; if they are attacked or if they are injured, it is our business to protect them in every way. But we

do not think—leaving out any higher plane of action—even in the narrower plane of expediency and self-interest that the way of protecting is not the way of retaliation and injuring others.

I do not know if Members of this House or others outside when they talk or think about these problems give much thought to any future picture of India that they may have before them. After all, unless we have some such picture what are we aiming at, what are we working for, and what kind of edifice are we constructing? It is important that we should do so because when we are dealing with millions of people who have lost everything and are trying to help them and rehabilitate them we must have some picture. I am not merely talking in terms of actual rehabilitation which is very important, but something even further than that. What exactly are we aiming at? We have seen a terrible operation—the cutting up of the living entity of India—and we have seen the still more terrible consequences of it. We may blame this or that individual—and no doubt many persons and groups have been terribly blameworthy—but something that has happened has been on such a cataclysmic scale that it passes human blame. It is in the nature, if I may say so, of some mighty tragedy of which the Greek dramatists have written, which comes and envelopes and overwhelms a nation and where human virtues and human failings somehow count for little. This is a big thing that has happened, so that mere blame does not help nor saying that it is a result of so-and-so's ill-will or action.

In tracing these events it is easy enough to know, and we all know, what are its major causes. Nevertheless the thing that has happened has been so big and so all round in its evil nature that it does little good to excuse oneself by blaming this or that person. Let us be quite clear about this: that whatever the origin, whatever the initial errors and crimes that may have been committed, what has happened on either side in the Punjab has been terrible in every sense of the word. And the most terrible part of it has been the psychological part—far worse than injury to property, injury to all manner of things, even injury to life. The terrible thing is how it has perverted man's minds and perverted the minds possibly of the younger generation that is growing up seeing these horrors.

Now, what is the kind of picture that we have in our minds? What are we building for? Are we building for conflicts, wars, destruction and the rest, to satisfy a feeling of vengeance which may be justified? Or are we building for some other type—building for peace and ordered progress? For my part, I have no doubt at all about this. Again, not from any high moral ground but from the narrowest ground of expediency and the national good and the individual good, if we try to lay stress on the destructive part, on the vengeful part, on the retaliatory part, we shall build nothing at all; we shall carry on this misery and this trouble till some time or other at last the nation turns to progressive and constructive endeavour.

Looking round, personally I see definitely signs of the healing process starting. Probably that is a more hopeful thing than all the work that this Government or anybody else might have done. That healing process has started—no doubt every process starts because of individuals working to that end—but probably it has started by the reaction to the shock of events, ultimately and gradually; as the passions of the moment have cooled, people have begun to think a little more deeply and realise the folly of much that has been done.

May I say one thing rather personal, if I may say it? It has been a terrible time for those who have to shoulder any responsibility. It has been, no doubt, a terrible time for any sensitive human being who lives in India. The name of India—and when I say 'India' I am not referring to the Dominion of India but this country of India which will remain India, whatever political divisions may take place—became mud because of what many Indians had done—and Indians still live in Pakistan and they continue to be Indians, whether they call themselves so or as Pakistanis. The curious position arose that those of our detractors and enemies who live abroad and who often have to manufacture all manner of stories and tales against us did not have to manufacture anything. All that they had to do was to quote one person against another. All that they had to say was what certain persons in Pakistan wrote about India and what certain persons in India wrote about Pakistan. Now, we need not balance that. I am merely saying that, what appeared in foreign countries, just quotations from what Indians said against each other. Now, it may be, and I believe it is, that when such things occur, there is a measure of right on one side, more right and perhaps a measure of less evil, and more evil on the other. I need not tell the House what my opinion on this subject is, as to where more right lies or more evil. But the point is that so far as the outside world is concerned, it is there—this mud-slinging, these acts, these horrible acts. What could they think of India then? We may have been interested in clearing our honour as against Pakistan and the Pakistan people no doubt wanted to show that they were not evil-doers, but the fact remained that whatever the right or wrong, the reputation of whole of India suffered and it became a dreadfully difficult thing to clear that reputation. Blood had flown and many millions of people had shed tears in this country. It was not easy to wipe ourselves clear of that blood till at last we approached the question, not in the way we had been approaching it, but in a spirit of healing, and not in a spirit of revengeful retaliation or of recrimination, although recrimination may have been justified. Retaliation does not help. That is the first point which I venture to place before the House regarding the spirit in which we should deal with this problem.

The second point—and it is also related to the first one—is that in these days when we lived fevered lives—speaking personally—I do not think I

could have carried this burden at all but for one fact, and that fact was the magic presence of our great leader, Mahatma Gandhi. I have not a shadow of doubt in my mind that just as he performed a miracle in Bengal, so also he performed his miracle here. The obvious miracle may not have occurred here, but nonetheless there was the miracle of his presence which affected the situation tremendously. I would beg of you, therefore, to consider this problem in this context in regard to the future of India.

Now, coming to the problem directly, I would mention two essential facts of it which I consider most important. We have to look after the refugees, do this and that for millions of people, but whenever there is a huge problem, one inevitably has to give certain priorities. Talking about everything, trying to do everything, means sometimes that you do nothing at all. What are the obvious priorities in this problem? I say the obvious priority is that the youth, the students, young boys and girls should be saved, because after all the future of India depends upon them. All honour and respect to the older generation who are suffering, but the first priority must go to the youth who should be saved not only from the point of view of life, but saved from the point of view of broader things. They must be educated, they must be looked after and they must be made proper citizens of India. I think, if I may, even as a Member of the Government criticise our own government, that we have not paid sufficient attention to this aspect of the problem. We have, of course, generally speaking, but I think far more attention should have been given to this aspect. We should concentrate our attention, even though evil may befall others, as in a war or some other calamity, to the saving of these children—boys and girls and students—and provide for their education and their future. That, of course, is also a big problem, but it must be tackled because the whole future of India depends upon them.

The second, though it is not second really, it is at least as important, is the saving of our womenfolk who have been abducted, and when I say that, let me repeat again, this is not a one-sided problem. Women have been abducted in both the Punjabs and elsewhere. Women have been abducted by the thousands, not a few cases. Nobody knows the exact figures, but if you know the estimated figures, both for West Punjab and East Punjab, you will be staggered at the number. Therefore, one of the highest priorities should be given for the relief of these women. Of course, attempts have been made and thousands have been rescued, but tens of thousands still remain. Now this work cannot be done easily without full cooperation of the two Governments in the Punjab. It cannot be done otherwise. You can take an army and march in, and you may conquer and defeat the enemy, but you do not rescue anybody thereby. Therefore, we have to approach this problem from the point of view of cooperating with each other and, naturally, all parties are concerned in that cooperation, and in a certain measure we have achieved that cooperation, but not enough yet. I hope that within the

next few days a more efficient organisation will grow up in cooperation with both Governments for the rescue of these abducted women. These two aspects I place specially before the House for consideration.

One thing more. We want to render all possible help to these people who have suffered. Members of the House have pointed out that if you can spread out the families in all the 700,000 odd villages of India, you can absorb them. That is very interesting, this mechanical calculation, but I do not think it takes us any distance. One way of looking at it would have been, which, I think has not been considered in that way obviously, is to tackle this question of temporary shelter for people. What did they do in war-time in various countries where they had to deal with vast numbers of refugees? They were in the military fashion spread out to various families; each family had to take one or two members. The burden was distributed just like armies are distributed in that way. No particular attempt has been made to think of that problem that way. Take the East Punjab. It has suffered greatly, but they have their millions of people living there. Why should not each family in the East Punjab accommodate one other or one, two or three persons? Accommodate a million or two million persons. Let the Government help them if necessary. Let them help them by money or by food or whatever it is, but immediately millions should be accommodated or be helped to spread out and then you may think about permanent arrangements. Unfortunately to some extent our social conditions do not fit in with this kind of thing. People do not like these difficulties to arise. They can accept somebody and not somebody else. You cannot do it at the same time as they did in Europe during the war. It is a matter worth pursuing. Your problem of temporary accommodation becomes less, not only lesser if you spread out these people, these vast camps that have grown up need not have grown up. Secondly, there is this business of large numbers of refugees going into the rest of India. Now the rest of India ought to do everything in its power to help them; that is true. Apart from vague statements and heroics, let us examine the problem from the merits. If you look at the East Punjab population—I won't go into all these figures—the post-migration population of the East Punjab is likely to be one million and a half less than prior to the migrations. For various reasons, whatever the population was, there were more Muslims going out and less Hindus and Sikhs coming in, and further about 6,00,000 Hindus and Sikhs from the West Punjab have spread about over the rest of India, and unfortunately large numbers of people have died and so on and so forth. The result is that at the very least the population of the East Punjab after these migrations will be one million and a half less than it was before; it may be more or less. Now, therefore, if that is so, then the question of large numbers of refugees from the Punjab not finding room in the East Punjab does not obviously arise. The question arises in another way. Punjab used to be in a sense the most prosperous

province of India from the middle class point of view, from the peasant proprietors point of view. In the West Punjab, the average holding was, let us say 20 or 25 acres of very good land—they have not got that in the East Punjab, neither good land nor the big holding. They are providing with I believe ten acres, not so good land and there is complaint : “We cannot do with 10 acres.” When friends suggest that land should be given in the United Provinces or in the C.P. or Bengal, or wherever it may be, certainly if land is available it should be given, it has to be remembered that the average holding of the United Provinces is $2\frac{1}{2}$ acres. So it comes to this; that in order to provide two persons with a room you put people in a room where there are already ten persons. You are putting two more in it. We cannot be vicariously generous; we cannot put a greater burden on the poverty-stricken people of any place merely because you want to be generous. Let us be generous; but not obviously because apart from everything else this is going to give rise, as it is giving rise, to grave discontent in various ways and an unfortunate tendency to dislike these refugees coming there. We do not want that to happen; this kind of thing sows seeds of bitterness for the future. Therefore, the problem has to be examined in all its aspects in this way and the burden has certainly to be spread out, the financial burden and the burden in many other ways is, of course, being borne by the whole of India today and it will be borne. But this business of taking land where there is no land and giving the land to somebody is not a proper way of giving relief. So far as the question arises, I see no difficulty. I think the land in the Punjab including, of course, the States in the Punjab is enough. The problem will arise in regard to the urban dwellers and I think we should try to absorb them and help them in every way in other parts of India also. In fact cities can be built in East Punjab and will be built which will absorb them, so that the problem, if analysed, is not so big or difficult of solution. People seem to think that somehow the East Punjab is a tiny little place where people have not got room to stay. Therefore they should spread out all over the place. The East Punjab from any Indian standard is not only enough but bigger from the point of view of the population of India to absorb those who come. But from another point of view, the Indian and the urban point of view, it is not big enough to absorb it. It is perfectly true at the same time because it has been shaken up—the big cities cannot absorb the population in a few villages in the East Punjab. That is a big problem and we must at any rate act promptly and we shall be able to solve it by not only building cities in the East Punjab, but by taking them to cities in the rest of India having colonies, suburban areas, etc. As a matter of fact the Punjabis fortunately are a very enterprising people, more so than, if I may say so, the people in most parts of India. The province owes its prosperity to them and, with the help that they are obviously going to get from the State, I have no doubt they will make good far more rapidly than

probably any other people in India might have done. So, big as the problem is, I do think that there is nothing in it which should really frighten us. But if I may come back to what I began with and say that if we tackle this problem in a spirit of retaliation, we get into trouble. Here in the city of Delhi there are lakhs of people who are refugees and all the time we are having trouble in the housing and there is a continuous pressure on Muslim houses where Muslims still dwell here to push them out. Now from any point of view, Governmental or other, it is highly improper to think that residents of Delhi, because they are Muslims, should be pushed out. It is unbecoming to put up with it. It is unbecoming for the Delhi Administration. No nation, no government, no country can carry on if it follows that kind of policy. If a national requires protection he must be given that protection, whether he is a Hindu or a Muslim or anybody. Now it is true that there is pressure of refugees coming in and difficulties arise which in some cases are insoluble unfortunately. We must be clear about it, and the Administration must be quite clear about it, that you do not solve the difficulty by creating another difficulty. That is not the way of solving the difficulty. May I finally say that in regard to some of these problems, as Members will no doubt know, the All India Congress Committee met some days back. They gave thought to that and they passed certain resolutions. Some of those resolutions may be termed unrealistic in part, may be, nevertheless they wanted to emphasize that outlook and I want to say that we as a Government entirely adhere to that policy and will try to follow it.

53. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
30 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of 30 November. I hasten to reply to you in regard to the incident of the house in Bazar Sitaram² of which I spoke to you. When I heard the complaint, I passed it on to the Inspector-General of Police³ and left it at that. He took some action after inquiry. I had made no further inquiry into the matter. I did not want any steps to be taken in the nature of punishment merely because I drew attention to this matter. It is possible that I had had only one side of the story. Whatever is done should

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 406.

2. See *ante*, item 51.

3. T. G. Sanjeevi.

be on the basis of facts found out after due inquiry. I mention this specially as the police officer in question came to me today and complained that a wrong version had been told me. I said to him that I had referred the matter to the Inspector-General and I had no doubt that he would deal with it after full inquiry and properly. I had no time to enter into the details of the matter and I did not want anyone penalised unjustly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

54. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have also been informed that 3,000 abducted Hindu women have been brought to Gujrat from the Bhimbar area and they are being sold like cattle at Rs. 150 each. I am asking an officer on the staff of the Deputy High Commissioner at Lahore to go personally to make enquiries in Gujrat district and I hope you will ask West Punjab Government to give him all facilities.

1. New Delhi, 1 December 1947. Extracts published in *Indian Information* (Delhi). 1 April 1948. Full version not available.

55. British Assistance in Transport of Refugees¹

The operations on which B.O.A.C. have been engaged for some time on behalf of the Government of India for the transport of refugees across the borders of India and Pakistan conclude today.² I am happy to learn from my Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation that these operations have been conducted smoothly and efficiently and to the entire satisfaction of that Ministry. I would like to convey my appreciation to all the B.O.A.C.

1. Message to H. G. Brackley, commanding B.O.A.C. evacuation aircraft in India. From *The Statesman*, 2 December 1947.
2. The B.O.A.C. undertook 1,962 flights from 15 September to 7 December 1947 to evacuate 28,000 persons from Pakistan to India and 18,000 persons to Pakistan from India, most of whom were Government employees.

officers and men concerned in this work.

The task which they have just concluded arose out of a very unhappy chapter in the history of India. That chapter is closing and we shall soon be embarking on constructive endeavour. I am quite sure that in this constructive task there is much scope for friendly cooperation between India and the U.K.

56. To K.C. Neogy¹

New Delhi
3 December 1947

My dear Neogy,

Your office has to deal with large numbers of refugees and I have often suggested to you that you should have a competent staff just to interview refugees and give them some mental relief, if nothing more. Most of your refugees are naturally Hindu or Sikh but in Delhi specially and partly from the neighbouring districts, many Muslims also go to your office. I think it would be highly desirable if you engaged some Muslim in your office temporarily, at least to deal with these Muslim evacuees, who would be able to approach them in a more friendly way than a non-Muslim.

This suggestion has been made to me by Maulana Azad and I entirely agree with it. I suggest that in appointing some such officer, you might consult Maulana Azad who would probably be able to suggest a suitable name.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 385.

57. To Gopi Chand Bhargava¹

New Delhi
3rd December, 1947

My dear Gopichandji,

Thank you for your letter of November 26th. In this letter you ask me to

1. Pyarelal Papers, N. M. M. L.

suggest a suitable officer for your Volunteer Corps. I do not know what you mean by a National Volunteer Corps. Is this a kind of Home Guard under official auspices, or is it something semi-official? Obviously, it should be completely under government's control. I have no doubt that the Defence Deptt. will provide you with a suitable officer.

I am afraid that the influx of refugees to Kurukshetra, Panipat etc. has not been checked at all with very grave consequences. The stories we get from these places are most distressing and Lady Mountbatten who has recently gone there is considerably upset. The first thing to do is to stop any further influx; the second thing is to remove many of those who are there. It is of the highest importance, in view of the general political situation, for us not to push out any large numbers of Muslims from Panipat, Karnal, Gurgaon, etc. This has a bad reaction all over India, in the world at large, and in Kashmir particularly. I hope, therefore, that the strictest orders will be issued on this subject to all subordinate officials.

The foot convoys from Gurgaon have fared very badly and created a very unfortunate impression on all those who have seen them. It is time that we stopped them and sent anybody who wanted to go by train.

You will remember that I spoke to you about the Deputy Commissioner, Ambala,² when I last met you and asked you to send him to us in the External Affairs Ministry. He was chosen long ago by our Ministry for the Foreign Service and he was considered a particularly suitable officer for it. At that time you said that there were charges against him and that you would not like him to go away immediately. This matter has become rather complicated. All the reports that we have received about Grewal, the Deputy Commissioner, except what you said, have been very much in his favour and the impression we gathered was that he was a very competent officer trying to carry out the policy that had been laid down by Government. Normally speaking, it is for your government to judge of the competence of an officer serving under you. In this particular matter, however, larger issues of policy have arisen and the Governor General is involved in them. He is under the impression that your government is taking action against Grewal because of certain answers that Grewal gave direct to the Governor General's questions. If that is so, then any action taken against him is a discourtesy to the Governor General. He feels this very strongly and he has asked us to convey his opinion to you. I understand that Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar tried hard to get in touch with you and

2. Balbir Singh Grewal (b. 1912); joined I.C.S. 1936, served in the Punjab in several capacities; Joint Secretary, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1953-54. Financial Commissioner, 1959 and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Government of Punjab, 1959-62; Secretary, Excise and Rehabilitation Departments, 1962-65.

having failed in this got in touch with the Governor of East Punjab and conveyed to him this message.

The position now is this; if you have any charges against him there should be an enquiry not only in regard to those particular charges but also in regard to the whole administration of Ambala Distt; if Grewal is found guilty of malpractices he should suffer for it, otherwise he should be exonerated and others who are guilty should suffer. No action should be taken against Grewal without such an enquiry.

Alternatively, you can transfer Grewal to External Affairs Ministry and we shall absorb him in our Foreign Service. You will appreciate that this matter has ceased to concern an individual only and has larger implications. Unfortunately the East Punjab Government has not got too good a reputation and it would be advantageous, both from the point of view of the Government and of the officer concerned, to have a full enquiry. Should you, however, think that this is not desirable, then the only other way out is for him to be sent to the Centre. No one wants to thrust him on your Government against their wishes but any seeming punishment of him would be unfair without that enquiry. It was for this reason that Gopalaswami suggested that the matter of his transfer be postponed pending further talks with you.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. In his reply dated 6 December 1947 Bhargava wrote that Grewal had told Lady Mountbatten on her visit to Ambala on 1 December, that as he had "conveyed some information to Their Excellencies it was taken as a complaint against the ministers and therefore he was being transferred from Ambala."

58. Telegram to Gopichand Bhargava¹

You will remember that we have repeatedly drawn your attention to situation in Kurukshetra camp and in Panipat, Gurgaon, etc. Mahatma Gandhi has been specially interested in these places and has personally visited some of them. We have requested you to stop inflow of refugees to

1. New Delhi, 8 December 1947. J. N. Collection.

Kurukshetra and to southern districts of East Punjab. But this inflow continued and Kurukshetra has over three lakhs now. In Panipat and Gurgaon Gandhiji gave assurances that remaining Muslims would not be sent away against their will. Nevertheless conditions were created there by large influx of Hindu-Sikh refugees which made it difficult for any Muslims to stay. Our workers state that local authorities do not know which policy to follow. They are prepared and capable of keeping those Muslims who wish to stay but have received no clear directions from your Government. This specially applies to Gurgaon. Would request you to send specific instructions to your officers in Gurgaon and nearby districts to make every effort to keep remaining Muslims in their homes. This not only urgently desirable for larger reasons of policy but also necessary so that we may not break faith with them after our solemn assurances.

“

59. To Gopichand Bhargava¹

New Delhi

11th December 1947

My dear Gopichandji,

I have received your letter of the 7th December.² Thank you for writing to me at length about Grewal. I wish you had told me all this previously. I knew nothing about it and neither did the Governor General. The facts you state are serious enough and certainly I would not like to come in your way in regard to any action that you might like to take. I am sure the Governor General would not like to interfere in any way. Normally, of course, the Governor General cannot and should not interfere but somehow he felt that his own honour was involved in this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Pyarelal Papers, N. M. M. L.

2. In his letter of 7 December 1947 Bhargava had charged Grewal with insubordination and indiscipline and had said that Grewal had used insulting language for the ministers and was responsible for the “disgraceful and deplorable” condition of the refugee camp at Ambala.

60. Universities and Nation Building¹

Your Excellency, Ladies and Gentlemen,

I have come back after a long while to my home town of Allahabad to which I have almost become a stranger. During these past 15 months I have lived in New Delhi, next door to Old Delhi city. What do these two cities convey to us, what pictures and thoughts do they bring to our minds? When I think of them, the long vista of India's history stretches out before me, not so much the succession of kings and emperors but rather that of the inner life of a nation, its cultural activities in many fields, its spiritual adventures and its voyages in the realms of thought and action. The life of a nation, and more specially of a nation like India, is lived principally in the villages. Nevertheless, it is the cities that represent the highest cultural achievements of the age, as they also do sometimes the most unpleasant aspects of human life. So these cities remind me of the cultural growth of India, of that inner strength and balance which come from long ages of civilization and culture. We have been very proud of this inheritance of ours in India, and rightly so. And yet, where do we stand today?

It is well that we put this question to ourselves in this ancient city of Allahabad, in this seat of learning. The universities have much to teach in the modern world and their scope of activity ever enlarges. I am myself a devotee of science and believe that the world will ultimately be saved, if it is to be saved, by the methods and approach of science. But whatever path of learning we may pursue, and however profitable it might seem to us, there is a certain basis and foundation without which the house of learning is built on shifting sands. It is for a university to realise and to lay stress on this essential basis and foundation, these standards of thought and action, which make an individual and a nation.

Above all, this is necessary today, during this extremely rapid phase of transition, when old values have almost left us and we have adopted no new ones. Freedom came to us, our long sought freedom, and it came with a minimum of violence. But immediately after, we had to wade through oceans of blood and tears. Worse than the blood and tears was the shame and disgrace that accompanied them. Where were our values and standards then, where was our old culture, our humanism and spirituality and all that India has stood for in the past? Suddenly, darkness descended upon this land and madness seized the people. Fear and hatred blinded our minds and all the restraints which civilization imposes were swept away.

1. Address at the convocation on the occasion of the diamond jubilee of the Allahabad University, 13 December 1947. The text was provided to us by the Allahabad University.

Horror piled on horror and a sudden emptiness seized us at the brute savagery of human beings. The light seemed all to go but, not all, for a few still flickered in the raging tempest. We sorrowed for the dead and the dying and for those whose suffering was greater than that of death. We sorrowed even more for India, our common Mother for whose freedom we had laboured these long years.

The lights seemed to go out. But one bright flame continued to burn and shed its light on the surrounding gloom. And looking at the pure flame, strength and hope returned to us and we felt that whatever momentary disaster might overwhelm our people, there was the spirit of India, strong and unsullied, rising above the turmoil of the present and not caring for the petty exigencies of the day. How many of you realise what it has meant to India to have the presence of Mahatma Gandhi during these months? We all know of his magnificent services to India and to freedom during the past half century and more. But no service could have been greater than what he has performed during the past four months when, in a dissolving world, he has been like a rock of purpose and a lighthouse of truth, and his firm low voice has risen above the clamours of the multitude, pointing out the path of rightful endeavour.

And because of this bright flame we could not lose faith in India and her people. And yet the surrounding gloom was in itself a menace. Why should we relapse into this gloom when the sun of freedom had arisen? It is necessary for all of us, and more especially for young men and young women in the universities, to pause and think for a while on these basic matters, for, the future of India is taking shape in this present, and the future is going to be what millions of young men and women want it to be. There is today a narrowness and intolerance and insensitiveness and lack of awareness which rather frighten me. We have recently passed through a great world war. That war has not brought peace and freedom, but it should teach us many lessons. It brought the downfall of what had been called fascism and Nazism. Both of these creeds were narrow and overbearing and based on hatred and violence. I watched their growth in their respective countries as well as elsewhere. They brought a certain prestige to their people for a while, but they also killed the spirit and destroyed all values and standards of thought and behaviour. They ended by ruining the nations they sought to exalt.

I see something very similar to that flourishing in India today. It talks in the name of nationalism, sometimes of religion and culture and yet it is the very opposite of nationalism, of true morality and of real culture. If there was any doubt of this, the past few months have shown us the real picture. For some years we have had to contend against this policy of hatred and violence and narrow communalism on the part of a section of the community. Now that section has succeeded in forming a state carved out

of certain parts of India. Muslim communalism, which had been such a danger and obstruction to Indian freedom, now calls itself a state. It has ceased to be a living force in India proper today, because its strength is concentrated in other parts. But it has resulted in degrading other sections of the community who seek to copy it and sometimes even to improve upon it.

We have now to face this reaction in India and the cry is raised for a communal state, even though the words used may be different. And not only the communal state is demanded but in all fields of political and cultural activity the same narrowing and strangling demand is put forward.

If we look back at India's long history, we find that our forefathers made wonderful progress whenever they looked out at the world with clear and fearless eyes and kept the windows of their minds open to give and to receive. And, in later periods when they grew narrow in outlook and shrunk from outside influences, India suffered a setback politically and culturally. What a magnificent inheritance we have got, though we have abused it often enough. India has been and is a vital nation, in spite of all the misery and suffering she has experienced. That vitality in the realm of constructive and creative effort, spread to many parts of the Asian world and elsewhere and brought splendid conquests in its train. These conquests were not so much of the sword as of the mind and the heart, which bring healing and which endure when the men of the sword and their work are forgotten. But that very vitality if not rightly and creatively directed, may turn inward and destroy and degrade.

Even during the brief span of our lives we have seen these two forces at play in India and the world at large—the force of constructive and creative effort and the force of destruction. Which will triumph in the end? And on which side do we stand? That is a vital question for each one of us and more especially for those from whom the leaders of the nation will be drawn and on whom the burden of tomorrow will fall.

We dare not sit on the fence and refuse to face the issue. We dare not allow our minds to be filled with passion and hatred when clear thought and effective action are necessary.

What kind of India are we working for? And what kind of world? Are hatred and violence and fear and communalism and narrow provincialism to mould our future? Surely not, if there has been any truth in us and in our professions. Here in this city of Allahabad, dear to me not only because of my close association with it but also because of its part in India's history, my boyhood and youth were spent in dreaming dreams and seeing visions of India's future. Was there any real substance in those dreams or were they merely the fancies of a fevered brain? Some small part of these dreams has come true but not in the manner I had imagined and so much still remains. Instead of a feeling of triumph at the achievement, there is an emptiness and distress at the sorrow that surrounds us and we have to wipe

the tears from a million eyes.

A university stands for humanism, for tolerance, for reason, for progress, for the adventure of ideas and for the search of truth. It stands for the onward march of the human race towards even higher objectives. If universities discharge their duty adequately, then it is well with the nation and the people. But if the temple of learning itself becomes a home of narrow bigotry and petty objectives, how, then, will a nation prosper or a people grow in stature?

A vast responsibility, therefore, rests on our universities and educational institutions and those, who guide their destinies, have to keep their lights burning and must not stray from the right path even when passion convulses the multitude and blinds many among those whose duty it is to set an example to others. We are not going to reach our goal through crookedness or flirting with evil in the hope that it may lead to good. The right end can never be fully achieved through wrong means.

Let us be clear about our national objective. We aim at a strong, free and democratic India, where every citizen has an equal place and full opportunity of growth and service, where present day inequalities in wealth and status have ceased to be, where our vital impulses are directed to creative and cooperative endeavour. In such an India communalism, separatism, isolationism, untouchability, bigotry and exploitation of man by man have no place, and, while religion is free, it is not allowed to interfere with the political and economic aspects of a nation's life. If that is so, then all this business of Hindu and Muslim and Christian and Sikh must cease so far as our political life is concerned, and we must build a united but composite nation where both individual and national freedoms are secure.

We have passed through grievous trials. We have survived them, but at a terrible cost; and the legacy they have left in tortured minds and stunted souls will pursue us for a long time. Our trials are not over. Let us prepare ourselves for them in the spirit of free and disciplined men and women—stout of heart and purpose—who will not stray from the right path or forget our ideals and objectives. We have to start this work of healing and we have to build and create. The wounded body and spirit of India call upon all of us to dedicate ourselves to this great task. May we be worthy of the task and of India.

61. The Battle Against Poverty¹

The battle of our political freedom is fought and won. But another battle,

1. Speech at Allahabad, 14 December 1947. From *National Herald*, 16 December 1947.

no less important than what we have won, still faces us. It is a battle with no outside enemy, though we have to remain constantly prepared for any eventuality like that—it is a battle with our own selves.

What we have now to fight against is the cancer of communal feelings in our hearts and the problems of poverty and unemployment. To achieve this success in this fight, we have to build ourselves up through proper organisation of our resources and strength. We have to fight social evils to make our country great and prosperous.

This battle can be fought not by armies or generals but by the people as a whole. Leaders can guide the people but it is for the entire nation to achieve victory in this battle through its collective effort.

I recall the sorrowful events which occurred at several places in India after August 15 when people lost themselves in communal frenzy and committed acts which were a matter of shame to any civilised nation. This cast a gloom all over the country and many big problems in the social, economic and cultural spheres had to wait as there arose many other vital problems in the wake of these sorrowful happenings. The problem of refugees, the problem of giving help and rehabilitating millions of people uprooted from their hearths and homes, sprang up before us. It has not been an easy problem; the entire energy of the Government is directed towards it.

The wealth of a nation is its people—not gold and silver. Refugees are as much our wealth. It is, therefore, incumbent on us to help those who have suffered. To help them is no doubt a big task. The number runs into millions. But we are doing this work as it must be done.

These sorrowful acts embittered communal feelings all the more. Our removing poverty and unemployment and bringing equal rights to high and low and thus raising the standard of the country could not be fulfilled until this communal bitterness which rages in our minds is removed.

The way shown by Mahatma Gandhi which even during these sorrowful days has remained unsullied is the right way, and if we want to achieve greatness for our country, we should follow that way, unite ourselves and work together hand-in-hand.

The Congress stands for the equality of all, irrespective of caste, creed or religion. It wants every Indian to have equal economic, social and political rights. I condemn communal organisations which check the growth and prosperity of a nation and call upon you to bury communal feelings and not imitate what is happening in Pakistan. We have to raise our country to new heights of greatness and prosperity, and we must, therefore, work and live together with equal rights for all and devote our attention to nation-building tasks. The two-nation theory, started by the Muslim League in the country, has already done its mischief. As a consequence, the country got divided, and if people still think on communal and sectional lines, they will further break up the country and weaken it. We have to ask ourselves whether

we want our country to be broken up into pieces or to build it into a strong, prosperous and powerful nation.

In Kashmir, there is no doubt that the military and the air force did a lot to drive out the raiders, but it was the people of Kashmir, both Hindus and Muslims, who saved the state. The people of Kashmir valley who are 90 per cent Muslims had understood that the ideals of the Congress and the Indian Government were just, and it is these credentials which have brought the Kashmir State into the Indian Dominion.

The whole of Asia is looking to India for leadership, and any wrong step at this stage will irreparably damage our cause. We have to guarantee full rights to all, irrespective of the community we may belong to. Even though the country has been divided, we are not prepared to deviate from this principle. I have no doubt that if we stand on right and true principles, Pakistan and the Indian Union will not remain separate states for long. The two must unite some day.

62. Looking Ahead¹

This little talk that I am giving now so suddenly arranged is the speech that I intended delivering at the public meeting today; but that speech could not be delivered owing to unforeseen happenings—chiefly because there was such a mighty crowd, a great multitude representing the great part of the population of Calcutta, that it overwhelmed all the arrangements. So I must apologise to you for this unfortunate occurrence, and yet I do not know that it was unfortunate. Personally, I do not feel it so, because I shall carry back with me impressions and memories unforgettable from my brief visit to Calcutta today.

I have come to Calcutta after one full year of my last visit. It has been a year full of grievous trials, full perhaps of mistakes on our part, full also of trials faced and overcome, and I came here today hoping to give some kind of an account of my stewardship to the people of Calcutta. I could not do so at this meeting, but whether I spoke or not, whether the people of Calcutta said much or not, excepting the cries of greetings, nevertheless, I thought that even in our silence we exchanged much with each other. I thought that many of the questions that I had in my mind had partly been answered by you.

I suppose I must have seen at least a million of the inhabitants of Calcutta today. I cannot remember to have seen such a multitude in the past. I have

1. Broadcast from Calcutta, 15 December 1947. Based on reports from *Hindusthan Standard*, 16 December and *The Hindu*, 17 December 1947.

seen great crowds many times in various parts of India and I wondered what all these signified. During this year that I carried heavy burdens, grave doubts have crept in my mind whether I was right, whether it was with the approval of our people. I was sitting in Delhi as the Prime Minister of India not because of any appointment but because of my faith that I represented the will of the Indian people and I was there by the grace of the Indian people.

The people of Calcutta, at any rate, have today demonstrated to me that I have their love and affection in full measure, and that has emboldened and strengthened me to face all the trials to come.

Fortunately, Bengal and Calcutta have been spared much that has happened in the northern part of India and we must congratulate the people of Calcutta and West Bengal. We, sitting in Delhi, near the border of the Punjab, had to face terrible happenings. We have overcome and put down many subversive elements. The danger is not yet passed. But what is in store for us we are strong enough to face.

I came to Calcutta to see you, and if I may say so, for you to see me, because we must have intimate contact with each other. We must understand each other and we must have faith in each other. I want to tell you that during these months of heavy burdens two or three things gave me strength. These were: faith in the Indian people, in the future of India and the great presence of Mahatma Gandhi with us. During these months, many indulged in acts of madness, madness born of fear, and fear is a terrible thing. You will remember the lesson that Mahatma Gandhi has taught us for the last 25 years or more. He has asked us to shed fear and then all would be well. To the extent we shed fear, all was well. Now suddenly we find fear, fear not so much of external enemies, but fear of ourselves, and fear of our neighbour. It is time we shed that fear and behave as fine men should behave. We are an independent nation and we are on the threshold of a great era.

We must behave like men, behave like the people of an independent nation; we have got to build up India not only as an independent nation but as a great nation. Therefore, we should shed fear.

I am told that the people in East Bengal, many of our comrades who are suffering from serious disabilities, wish to come over to West Bengal. But, I would beg of them not to do so. We must face all troubles and disorders. We shall have to work hard to make India great.

Recently, in Calcutta, there has been trouble over what is called the Security Bill. I do not wish to say much about this or its clauses. But one thing which I want to tell you is that such bills and measures have been introduced in most of the provinces of India without any opposition because there is great danger to the State and the people, and when the State is threatened, all liberty and freedom disappear. We cannot talk in terms of normal days and normal civil liberties without thinking too much of the risks involved. Therefore, I would beg of you not to behave in a manner which shows lack of discipline.

Why should we indulge then in this kind of action which was, perhaps, proper when a foreign government ruled over us and we had no democratic procedure which could enable us to change it? If we want to make changes, we must do it democratically and constitutionally.

One thing I cannot forget, a young cadet was recently killed. He belonged to the ambulance organisation with which I am connected.²

Before I finish my talk, I again say that I can never forget the wonderful welcome the people of Calcutta gave me and I will carry these memories for many years to come. *Jai Hind*.

2. On 10 December 1947, Sisir Kumar Mondal lost his life, while on duty, as a result of police firing on demonstrators who were protesting in front of the State Assembly against the West Bengal Security Bill. Nehru was the chief patron of the Relief Welfare Ambulance Corps.

63. Law and Liberty in India¹

For a long time past I have been desirous of coming to Calcutta and visit various other parts of India but the stress of events has prevented me from doing so. It was therefore a peculiar pleasure to come here even for a short visit. It is essential that those who occupy positions of authority in Government should keep in touch with the people and render to them from time to time an account of their stewardship.

The great city of Calcutta continues and must continue whatever else might happen as the great nerve-centre of India, politically and culturally. What Calcutta thinks or does has a powerful effect on the rest of India and so I attach considerable importance to this brief visit of mine to Calcutta.

I am sorry that the public meeting could not be addressed by me and yet I am not so sorry after all. Sometimes a message can be conveyed more eloquently without speaking. The magnificent welcome that the people of Calcutta have given me today all the way from Dum Dum airfield to the city and later at the *maidan* meeting is itself an evidence of the abounding love and affection which the people of Calcutta have showered upon me. Looking at them and sensing those strong bonds that tie us I feel overwhelmed

1. Statement at press conference, Calcutta, 15 December 1947. From *Hindusthan Standard*, - 16 December 1947.

and I had some difficulty in expressing myself even if conditions had allowed me to do so. It is seldom even my experience to see such a mighty gathering, a gathering essentially of friends and comrades. I am grateful to them for their faith and confidence in me even though I may have done little to deserve it.

I come to Calcutta after a year of vital happenings of historical events in India. These events have been good and they have been bad and they have shaken us up very greatly. Those in responsible positions have carried a grievous burden. They could only carry it because of their faith in India and the Indian people. If they felt at any time that the Indian people had lost confidence in them, they would have no further reason to stay in those places. I am sure that during the fateful days we have done much that we should not have done, but what has saved us, I think, is our intense desire to serve India and her people. It will be for history to judge how far we have succeeded and how far we failed.

Few governments have ever had to face at the very inception of their career the grave crisis that confronted us from August onward. It took the form of communal conflicts involving brutal massacre of people. But behind them there was something even deeper and the subversive elements in the population tried to attack the very structure of Government.

A year ago, Bengal and the city of Calcutta were full of trouble and the future here seemed dark but by a seeming miracle Calcutta and Bengal saved themselves. And I must offer my congratulations and homage to the people of this city and of Bengal for the wonderful way in which they faced difficult situations and kept their head. Trouble shifted elsewhere and the Punjab became a scene of carnage. All this is past history now though the consequences of it must pursue us for a long time.

The question before us is what we are to do now and what of the future. We must first of all extricate ourselves from this vicious circle of communal retaliation and ill-will. That does not mean we should be complacently watching everything that happens. We have to be very watchful and strong to protect our interests wherever they are threatened. But if we are to be, as I am sure we must be, really a great nation, we shall have to think in big terms and not allow ourselves to be diverted by the passions of the moment. I suppose that most people whether in India or Pakistan have thought furiously during the past few months about the unfortunate and unnatural event that has brought such evil consequences in its train. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that we must accept what has been done fully and without reservation because that is the only way of remedy, part at least, of the evil that has happened.

I have little doubt in my mind that India and Pakistan will some time or other come closer to each other because nothing can overcome the basic urges—historical, cultural and economic—that tend to bring them nearer to each other. That must be a friendly development and any attempt to force the

pace may well lead to opposite results. On my part I believe it is inevitable that in the years to come India will be closely associated with many neighbouring countries in the East and the West. If we keep this in view then we must not take any steps now which come in the way of this consummation.

It is because of this that the All India Congress Committee at its last meeting passed a resolution on this matter.² It was a resolution not lightly passed but passed after fullest thought. It is because of this that I would earnestly urge the people in East Bengal to stay where they are and not be influenced by the difficulties and fears of the moment. We cannot build a nation out of fear and indeed we cannot even save ourselves through fear. We must, therefore, face all our difficulties squarely without retreating from them and try to find a way of escape.

Even though Pakistan is a separate and independent country—and we must treat it so—I find it a little difficult to think of it as alien to India and of its people as anything but Indians.

Our policy, during these many years, has been to fight communalism. We have not wholly succeeded as is evident by mere establishment of Pakistan. Should we now vary our policy because of this event? I am quite sure, we must not do so whatever Pakistan might do. We have bigger objectives and bigger stakes to play for and we cannot endanger them because of some present passions and prejudices. India can only be a great nation as a composite, non-communal, democratic state. We must function in accordance with this objective and not think in terms of narrower objectives. Even from the practical point of view, in its limited sense, any other course of action means continuing trouble and delay in settling down and tackling our great economic problems.

We have fortunately come to a settlement with Pakistan about many controversial matters. One major issue remains and that is a difficult and a vital one, i.e. Kashmir. The Government of India has made clear its position in regard to Kashmir and to that it holds and everything that has happened subsequently has justified that position. There have been references recently in the foreign press to a possible division of the Kashmir State. We are entirely opposed to this and we do not think that this is either desirable or will solve any problem.

While a part of northern India has suffered from terrible upheavals, Bengal has kept more or less calm and unruffled. Recently, however, there has been

2. The A.I.C.C. at its meeting in Delhi on 15 to 17 November 1947 disapproved of large-scale migrations of populations which caused widespread misery and suffering to millions and did violence to the Congress ideal of a secular democratic framework. It desired such migrations to be discouraged and conditions created in both India and Pakistan for minorities to live in peace and security.

a slight disturbance in Calcutta over the Security Bill.³ It is not for me to express an opinion about this particular Bill or the incidents that have occurred. I do not know enough about them and it is not proper for the Central Government to interfere. But I should like to place some considerations which have been before us during the last few months and which have led to enactments of similar measures in many provinces of India.

We stand by civil liberty, but there are times when it becomes fantastic to talk about civil liberty. When a State is in danger there is no liberty or freedom left for anyone. Could we discuss civil liberty in West or East Punjab during the past three months? Any Government worthy of its name had to meet the menace that arose in the Punjab with all its might. It could not stand and talk about civil liberty when people were being killed by the thousand and women were being abducted also by the thousand. And so, in the larger interests of the State and the people, various steps had to be taken and various ordinances and enactments made. Not only in East Punjab but in Delhi, United Provinces, Bombay and Bihar, Security Bills of the type were passed by popular representatives in various assemblies. To my knowledge there was hardly an opposition to them because people realised their necessity. Indeed, people have criticised us for not introducing martial law in some parts of the country at the height of the trouble.

I believe the West Bengal Security Bill is, if anything, milder than some other security bills. While fortunately West Bengal has kept remarkably calm, it would be folly for any government to become complacent and not to take measures to prevent trouble. West Bengal today is one of the frontier provinces of India and West Bengal undoubtedly still contains many elements which might create trouble. So, on general grounds, I feel that the West Bengal Government was justified in taking some such measures. Indeed, I understand, the Bill is more or less continuation of an existing ordinance.⁴ If the people object to it they have the right to do so and to express their resentment in normal ways. But in a democratic system of government it is utterly wrong for any group of dissenting individuals to obstruct the work of the legislature and to treat a popular government as if it were a foreign government which cannot be influenced by popular opinion.

It seems to me people have not sufficiently realised yet, and especially our enthusiastic young men, that a certain basic change has taken place in the Government of the country and the methods that have been employed

3. The West Bengal Security Bill passed by the State Legislature on 15 January 1948 provided for detention of persons without trial for a period not exceeding three months. The State Government was to place before the Calcutta High Court the grounds of detention. The detenus had no right to appeal and the court could recommend the release or further detention for a maximum period of nine months.
4. The ordinance had been in force since 15 August 1947.

previously with some justification have no place or justification in the new order of things.

We are a very old country, but we are also a very new State which has had to face terrible trials. We have fortunately overcome many of them and dangers still threaten us and we can only face them in a disciplined and united way. Any lack of discipline, any attempt at disruption is a great disservice to the State and the people. What we want above everything is cohesion and discipline, not imposed from above but self-determined. Only thus can democracy function or this democracy cracks up giving place to dictatorship. We must learn to function now as free men and women function with their self-imposed discipline.

I hope that I shall have an opportunity to come to Calcutta and Bengal again before long because for a variety of reasons the Government of India attaches the greatest importance to the peace and well-being of the people of West Bengal, may I say, of those who are in East Bengal also. Because we do not talk about it so much in Parliament it should not be thought that we ignore the problems of Bengal. They are vital to the country and I can assure that Bengal is going to play an important part in the future development of independent India.

Question: What do you feel about the intense dissatisfaction in Bengal about the Award of the Boundary Commission?

Jawaharlal Nehru: There is, no doubt, dissatisfaction against the Boundary Commission's award in Bengal. We had accepted that award as we had bound ourselves to do so. But we do think readjustment is desirable. The only way to proceed about it is by the two Governments of India and Pakistan considering the matter together. During the last few months both these Governments have not only been occupied with vital issues but also the psychological atmosphere was not suited for any such talks. I hope it may be possible when some of the other major problems have been settled to consider this matter also.

Q: Recently, a report appeared in a London newspaper that you may visit London in the middle of January next. Is this true?

JN: I have been invited by Prime Minister Attlee and I told him I would gladly go when it was possible for me to do so. The matter rests there. I have at present no intention of going to London. Neither do I think it would be possible for me to go in the middle of January.

Q: When is the new Constitution of India likely to be passed by the Constituent Assembly?

JN: I expect that by the end of June next the Constituent Assembly, which is reassembling in April, would be able to pass the Constitution of free India. I hope that elections under the new Constitution will be held at the beginning of 1949.

Q: Do you have anything to say about India remaining within or opting out of the British Commonwealth of Nations?

JN: The Constituent Assembly has decided in favour of India being a Republic. What relationship that Republic will have with other countries or the British Commonwealth of Nations is a matter for decision by the Constituent Assembly. Or it may be a matter of discussion between the two Governments.

64. Advice to Bengal Congressmen¹

About the West Bengal Security Bill, the Congress party must appeal to the good sense of the public and convince them of the need for such a Bill at this hour. I would also suggest the formation of a sub-committee by the party to consult legal and public opinion and make any changes in the Bill which may be found necessary, as no public opinion can be flouted by a popular government.

1. Address to members of West Bengal Congress Assembly Party, 16 December 1947. From *The Hindu*, 18 December 1947.

65. Faith in a Cause¹

I am a little frightened of you, men and women of Calcutta. I have known how to face peril and danger but how am I to face the overwhelming affection that you have shown me? Tears come to my eyes and a lump rises

1. Message to people at Dum Dum airport, Calcutta, 16 December 1947. Based on reports from *Hindusthan Standard*, 17 December and *The Hindu*, 18 December 1947.

in my throat when I think of this, and how unworthy I am to receive this magnificent treasure. But I know this is not for me personally but for the great cause we all stand for. So now forget me, but remember this cause, and turn all your great faith and energy towards the building of free and democratic India. I have heard a million throats cry *Jai Hind*. Let this come true. Cast aside fear and narrow communalism and labour for unity and peace and progress. *Jai Hind*.

66. The Necessity of National Reconstruction¹

Let us end our strife and entrench ourselves against external and internal dangers so that we may concentrate our energy and endeavour on our schemes of national reconstruction to make India prosperous and powerful. This is a big task before us which involves further happiness and well-being of 30 crores of people. The wealth of the country should not go to the pockets exclusively of a few, but should be equitably distributed among the people. Poverty, ignorance and unemployment have to go with our new national and economic set-up. Efforts towards national reconstruction should not be obstructed by narrow-mindedness, indiscipline and the fascist tendency of certain communal elements as this will be a national loss. When our form of government is democratic and it is open to any party to take charge of the reins of administration and policy, they should follow the proper course and not indulge in activities which disintegrate our strength and divert our constructive effort into destructive and disruptive channels. Let us see our future in its proper perspective and make India strong and prosperous so that it may have a place of honour in the comity of nations.

The last one and a half years have been a period of storm and stress for us all. But we had the love, the confidence and the strength of the people to sustain us. Otherwise it would not have been possible for us to shoulder the responsibilities of the State. In Calcutta lakhs of people had assembled and here, too, a mammoth crowd came to greet and encourage me. Never before had I seen such huge gatherings at public meetings barring of course at Kumbh Mela at Prayag. It became impossible to address such mammoth gatherings.

1. Speech at Kanpur, 16 December 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 17 December and *The Hindu*, 18 December 1947.

We completed one stage of our nation's journey on August 15 after sixty years of patient suffering and sacrifice. We celebrated the event with rejoicings. But while on one side there was joy, on the other, dreadful tidal waves swept the country. The Punjab and some other adjoining provinces witnessed unheard of destruction and death which did immense damage to the country and lowered its image in the estimation of the civilised world. It will be a futile exercise to enquire as to who began the communal violence. The hands of all of us are stained with blood. We, however, faced the situation and brought it under control.

We have, however, to look ahead. Swaraj is not an end in itself but a means of accomplishing good for the benefit of the people. We have done very little for the benefit of the people during the last one year. The problems caused by the partition took our time. We have to settle them finally and divert our whole-hearted attention and endeavour to schemes which will benefit our people. We have to march ahead. We have to launch a new struggle against our poverty, ignorance and unemployment which have to be ended with supreme endeavour. Let us not worry about past events, but look to our future. There were conflicts and clashes and some provinces separated from us. We have been lowered in the eyes of the world. But those who picked up quarrels have gone to Pakistan and we have got to end strifes and establish a people's government in which everybody will have equal rights.

There are some who still raise communal slogans and talk of establishing Hindu raj in India. I wonder why they have raised this cry when Hindus are in such a large number and the form of government is democratic. If we follow this path of sheer communalism, then nobody will respect us in this world. When we import religion into politics then that signalizes the end of politics. India is now in the international field. Whatever we do, we should do it with wisdom and care. Narrow-mindedness will deal a death-blow to our recently hard-earned freedom.

A few vested interests who do not want the people to be independent are behind these outbursts of communalism. They inflamed communal passion for their own benefit. Although our country is old, our Government is a new-born babe. The recent holocaust has shaken the country. A new State takes time to establish and organise itself. Our country has to be made strong so that it may withstand all those internal and external forces which weaken us. We have to end all indiscipline and hooliganism among us. We can benefit by our freedom only when there is discipline among us. Prior to August 15, our struggle was of a different nature and was directed against a foreign government but now with the setting up of our own government, it is different. The people should realise this difference. The army and police are now theirs and people's attitude and behaviour towards them should change. The old walls which had separated our army and police from us are

now fast falling asunder. When people have a right to change their government, what do they gain then by picking up quarrel with their own government? The army and police should also change their attitude and should realise that this independent country is theirs and they have to serve the people.

Not only India and Pakistan but all the neighbouring Asian countries will soon come closer and live in peace and harmony.

67. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

16 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I returned from Calcutta *via* Cawnpore this evening, reaching Delhi at about 8 p.m. Soon after I went to see Bapu and he told me about the recent occurrences in Ajmer.² Later I had a visit from Balkrishna Kaul³ and Mukut Behari Lal⁴ who gave me further details. I have been very much distressed by these accounts and more specially by what is said to have been the attitude of the Ajmer authorities and police. Some weeks ago Balkrishna Kaul sent me a copy of a letter which he had addressed to you. In this letter he had drawn attention to certain past occurrences and to the probability of a repetition of them. This repetition has now taken place and apparently the local authorities, who had been warned previously, took no adequate steps to prevent this.

Apart from the local effects of what has happened there are two even more important aspects which are disturbing. One is the recrudescence of this kind of thing on a biggish scale which, if not firmly dealt with, may produce reactions elsewhere. The other is the fact that Ajmer with its Dargah⁵ is a very famous place, well-known outside India, and anything that happens

1. File No. 28(3)/47-PMS.

2. On 14 November, communal rioting began in Ajmer. Muslim shops were looted followed by arson and stabbings.

3. (b. 1903); a leading Congressman of Ajmer; arrested several times during the freedom movement; Finance Minister, Rajasthan Government, 1962-67; member, Rajya Sabha, 1968-71.

4. Mukut Behari Lal Bhargava (1903-1980); a leading advocate of Ajmer; joined Congress and the All India States Peoples' Conference, 1928; member of Lok Sabha, 1952-1967.

5. The Dargah Khwaja Sahib, the tomb of the Sufi saint, Muin-ud-din Chishti, who came to India from Ghor in the twelfth century, is a traditional place of pilgrimage.

there has considerable publicity in India and the outside world. Our reputation is likely to suffer because of this.

I have no doubt that you have taken steps to put an end to this trouble and to call to account those who may be responsible for it. I shall be grateful if I could be informed of the steps taken. The matter might be mentioned also at the next Cabinet meeting.

I was thinking of going to Jaipur on the 19th. In view of what has happened in Ajmer I think I should go there instead of or in addition to the Jaipur visit.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

68. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
23 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a letter² received from Pyarelal on behalf of Bapu. I met Bapu also this morning and he suggested that an early meeting might be arranged as has been proposed. I told him that I was perfectly agreeable to this and would refer the matter to you so that you could suit your convenience. Could you kindly fix some time for this and inform Bapu and me? Bapu would then send word to Maulana Sayeed³ and others.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 409.
2. The letter reported that Maulana Sayeed and a few other Maulanas of Delhi complained of the desperate condition in which the local Muslims found themselves. They suggested a meeting with Nehru, Azad and Patel in Mahatma Gandhi's presence.
3. Ahmed Sayeed (1888-1959); Khilafat leader of Delhi; founder-secretary, *Ulema-i-Hind*; arrested several times during the freedom movement.

69. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
24 December 1947

My dear Maulana,

I understand that we are meeting at Bapu's place this afternoon at 5.30—that is Sardar Patel, you and I as well as certain Muslim representatives of Delhi.

I have your letter about publicity being given to the Cabinet decision. I am sorry proper publicity has not yet been given and I am enquiring into the matter. I am told however by Kirpalani of the Relief & Rehabilitation Ministry that he has informed various people concerned and when he went with Zahid Hussain as well as the Pakistan M.E.O.² representative here to the camp at Humayun's Tomb and asked the people there from Delhi to return to their houses or to other houses in Delhi city, they refused point blank to return and they said on no account would they go back to Delhi city.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N. M. M. L.

2. The Military Evacuation Organisation was set up on 8 September 1947 to superintend the movement of non-Muslim refugees from West Punjab and Muslim refugees from East Punjab. It kept in touch with the Pakistan authorities.

70. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
29 December 1947

My dear Pantji,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th about Sinha, the Judge.

I had hoped to be in Lucknow for a day or two this week, but I have had to cancel this visit. The situation relating to Kashmir is a serious one and we are taking some steps which may have far-reaching consequences. I do not want to be away from Delhi during these days. I am sorry for this as I would like to have seen you and discussed some matters with you.

You told me that you were going to take action against the R.S.S. When is this going to happen? I think the sooner something is done the better.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

71. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Position of non-Muslims desiring to leave Sind is reported to be becoming exceedingly difficult. About twelve thousand Sikhs held up in various pockets in Sind are unable to go about their normal business and are facing destitution. Numbers forcibly converted to Islam. It is essential that arrangements should be made to move them by special trains under escort to Karachi for evacuation by sea. Movement of intending evacuees from Hyderabad Sind already restricted by local executive orders appears to have been completely suspended. It is essential in the view of this Government that non-Muslims intending to leave Hyderabad should be permitted to do so by scheduled trains. Recent troubled conditions in that area and consequent apprehension of danger to non-Muslim life and property have increased tendency of non-Muslims to migrate into the Indian Union. We would urge arrangements for a special train to be run daily from Hyderabad to Marwar Junction for some time either till all intending evacuees have been moved or conditions of law and order make it possible for non-Muslims to continue to live in these areas without reasonable apprehension of danger.

1. New Delhi, 30 December 1947. File No. 51-6/48, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

72. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

In spite of repeated protests by our representative at Peshawar, provincial authorities have refused to allow non-Muslim evacuees leaving the province to take away licensed arms with them. This is contrary to inter-Dominion agreement on the subject.² It is essential that agreement entered into by the Dominion Governments should be scrupulously carried out by the Provincial Government. Will you please issue instructions to all local authorities to allow non-Muslim evacuees to take away licensed arms when leaving Pakistan.

1. New Delhi, 30 December 1947. File No. 7-43/47, O.S.-V., M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. At the inter-Dominion Conference in Lahore on 3 September 1947, the two Governments agreed to permit evacuees to carry licensed arms.

STRAINED RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN

1. Communications in Strategic Areas¹

The Prime Minister mentioned that the question of telephonic and telegraphic communications between India and Pakistan on the Jodhpur-Sind border required to be considered. Karachi was the central exchange for that area, and as in the case of East Punjab, where Lahore was the communications centre, arrangements must be made for direct connection with the centre of Indian territory including the territories of States acceding to India. It might be necessary to have this question examined on other frontiers too, and a committee might have to be appointed. A note was being prepared in the Ministry of External Affairs on the subject and he would place it before the Government for consideration at a later date.² The Minister for Communications might, in the meantime, have the matter examined from the technical angle in so far as Karachi was concerned.

1. Remarks at a Cabinet meeting, 27 August 1947. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. The note dated 4 September 1947 stated that the borders of the States of Bikaner, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur with Pakistan needed immediate attention from the standpoint of security and communications and suggested the setting up of a committee to consider this issue and connected problems.

2. Terence Shone's Note on Talk with Nehru¹

As Prime Minister had not summoned me by 5 p.m. yesterday, I felt it would be as well to ask if he could spare me even a few minutes. I wished, if possible, to obtain his preliminary reactions and at the same time to do anything I could to soothe the feelings which Lord Ismay and I were sure the communication I had made to him must arouse.

2. It would have been helpful if I had been authorised to convey some

¹ Delhi, 21 September 1947. This report was sent to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations on 22 September 1947. L/PJ/7/15828, I.O.L.R.

Sir Terence Allen Shone (1894-1965); British diplomat; High Commissioner for Great Britain in India, 1946-48; also served in Lisbon, Oslo, Washington, Berne and Belgrade.

personal message to Pandit Nehru—if only an expression of H.M.G.'s sympathy with the Government of India in their difficulties and an assurance that H. M. Government would be glad, if desired, to circulate the views of the Government of India to Dominion Prime Ministers.

3. Pandit Nehru was friendly as usual, but Sir Girija Bajpai (who was present for part of the conversation which only lasted for some 10 to 15 minutes as the Prime Minister had another engagement) left me in no doubt that he was extremely angry. Pandit Nehru made no complaint to me against H. M. Government, but he was no less astonished than myself that the representative of H. M. G. in India had not been consulted before the Pakistan Government's telegrams had been circulated to the Dominion Prime Ministers.² He remarked that their correspondence with H. M. G. had started on the 10th September and said he simply could not understand how such a telegram as that of September 18th could have been sent by the Prime Minister of Pakistan at the very moment when he was coming to Delhi to discuss the situation. (He did not say that he suspected the finger of Mr. Jinnah, but I should be surprised if he did not.) I have no doubt that he is furious with the Pakistan Government.

4. Pandit Nehru said I would doubtless have seen the press report of the meeting with the Pakistan Ministers in Delhi.³ I replied that I had already telegraphed it to you. Pandit Nehru gave me a secret statement of the conclusions reached at the meeting with the Pakistan Ministers, and said he would be asking me to transmit this to H. M. Government with the Government of India's conversations on the communication I had made to him. He thought he might be able to let me have these today. He indicated that he would wish these in turn to be circulated to Dominion Prime Ministers, but if so, he will no doubt suggest it in his reply to me. I expect he will make use of the Australian⁴ and Canadian⁵ High Commissioners to communicate with those Dominions.

2. Pakistan had communicated to other Dominions, through the British Government, asking for help to resolve the communal problem. In fact before this communication was sent, the Government of India had already addressed the Pakistan Government suggesting bi-weekly joint meetings between the East and West Punjab Governments. There was no reply.

3. At a meeting in Delhi on 19 and 20 September 1947, the two Governments, rejecting the concept of conflict, agreed to work for peace and security in their areas, ensure speedy and safe transfer of refugees and prevent dissemination of false and inflammatory news.

4. Sir Iven Mackey.

5. John D. Kearney.

5. Sir G. Bajpai remarked that the United States Ambassador and the Canadian High Commissioner had both expressed sympathy for the Government of India in their difficulties and had indicated that they felt the Government of India were doing all in their power to overcome them. I said that I had been sending reports to London on the situation in India which were as objective and accurate as I could make them; and Pandit Nehru and Sir G. Bajpai would have seen what the Prime Minister had said, as regards the Government of India in his telegram of September 15th to the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

6. Pandit Nehru said he was seeing the Governor General at 7 p.m. when no doubt this whole matter would be discussed.

7. Pandit Nehru also referred to a suggestion which had been made (presumably by the Pakistan Ministers) that some neutral observers, possibly from U.N.O., might be invited to consider and report on the situation. He said that he had not taken to this suggestion; if the observers were to come from U.N.O., what branch of that organisation should be requested to provide them? Security Council? If they came from countries like Denmark, Czechoslovakia etc., it would take time to get them here and much time for them to produce a report. It would be difficult if not impossible for any observers from outside to investigate particular incidents; they would not know the language and much of their investigation would have to be done through interpreters; while they were busy with one incident, others would be happening elsewhere...

If anything of the kind were required Pandit Nehru indicated his preference for two qualified and fair-minded representatives of India and Pakistan respectively, e.g. judges. He dropped a remark which intimated that he did not think it would be fair or advisable to ask any Britisher to undertake such a task.

Pandit Nehru gave me together with the secret statement, referred to in paragraph 4 above, an *aide-memoire* which he had prepared for his talks with Liaquat Ali Khan.⁶ I am telegraphing the statement to you only to show the measure of agreement reached on various matters before this spanner, as I still fear it may prove to be, was thrown into works from Karachi. The *aide-memoire* is of interest as showing the feelings and the attitude of the Government of India.

6. See *ante*, pp. 85-92.

3. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

The High Commissioner of the United Kingdom has handed over to me copies of messages which have passed between you and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. I have read these messages with considerable amazement. Your telegrams to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom contain a one-sided and exaggerated account of what has happened with which we cannot agree. But what has surprised me even more is the fact that you made no mention of this correspondence to any of us in Delhi on the occasion of last meeting. Your last telegram to the U. K. Prime Minister is dated 18th. You met me on the 19th and 20th and made no reference whatever to these messages. Further, the decisions we arrived at on the 19th were opposed in spirit and letter to the request you have made to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. I do not wish to discuss this matter any further at this stage, but I must point out to you that the whole purpose of representatives of the two Dominions meeting together and frankly discussing the situation and coming to conclusions is frustrated when other activities are carried on without our knowledge. This can only lead to lack of faith and confidence and to the inference that no real value is attached to our conferences and decisions.

It seems to me that the only effective way to deal with this important situation that has arisen is for the Governments to have open and frank dealings with each other and cooperate in restoring peace and order. This has indeed been the policy declared repeatedly. Any outside intervention may actually be harmful because we would look to others for relief and not to ourselves. No outsider can solve our problems which are mainly psychological at present.

It is in this context that we have given our earnest consideration to your proposal about observers from U.N.O. being invited to India. It is not clear what the functions of these observers will be and it is obvious that it will take some considerable time before they can even function. It is quite possible that such a move may lead to greater difficulties being created in the way of the psychological understanding of the situation. We are anxious and eager to have impartial investigation whenever necessary. But such investigation should be entrusted to Indians whose impartiality cannot be doubted. Both Governments may nominate Indians who are neither Hindu nor Muslim nor Sikh, or both can nominate judicial officers who can tour together and report on various incidents. Such a procedure will not introduce any further complications, such as reference to foreign authorities or individuals might do.

1. New Delhi, 23 September 1947. J.N. Collection.

4. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
23 September 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have just received your letter of the 23rd September. I telephoned immediately to the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs, Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, to find out if any complaints had been received by him. He knew nothing about them. He had in fact met the Pakistan High Commissioner fairly recently on several occasions. Nothing to my knowledge or to the knowledge of the Secretary-General has been said about a car. Normally all we can do about a car is to ask one of the dealers to treat a particular case as a matter of high priority. It is very difficult to get a Buick and I doubt if any are available at all in Delhi. On one occasion, some days ago, the High Commissioner asked for facilities to get petrol for several cars. Arrangements for this were made immediately.

2. We realised that conditions were difficult for the High Commissioner and his staff and tried to help him in such ways as we could. We appointed a special liaison officer for the Pakistan High Commissioner's office who was available the whole day. I have not been informed of any special complaints made.

3. As regards sweepers, that is one of our biggest headaches in Delhi. But if we had known that the High Commissioner wanted sweepers, we would have immediately contacted some authority in Delhi who would have helped him.

4. I shall, of course, inquire into the various matters mentioned in your letter and try to help the High Commission in every way that we can. I felt, however, that I should send you this immediate reply to inform you that so far as we are concerned, hardly any complaints have reached us during the last many days.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

5. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

Your High Commissioner delivered to me last Sunday copies of the communications that have originated between you and Prime Minister of Pakistan. Beginning with latter's telegram to you dated 10th September 1947 and, ending with your telegram dated 20th September. I have handed to Sir Terence Shone for transmission to you by telegram (A) the text of an *aide-memoire* which I handed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan on 19th September which gives our appreciation of recent tragic events² and (B) an agreed statement of the agreement as reached at a conference which some of my colleagues and I had with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan and his Finance Minister on the same date. The Pakistan Prime Minister's account of happenings is so one-sided that I feel compelled to take steps to point out that the murder, arson, looting and offences against women of which he complains were begun in the Punjab by Muslims last March in Malaga and have continued practically without intermission though with varying intensity in West Punjab ever since. They are the result of two-nation theory and its concomitant doctrine of hate which Muslim League has been sedulously preaching for years.

In his telegram of September 16th, Prime Minister of Pakistan has asserted that Government of India are apparently unwilling or powerless to restore order. In his telegram of 18th he has stated "promises made, assurances given by Indian Government have not been translated into directions or schemes." Best answer to these charges is provided by prominent Muslims. On September 18th, day on which Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's secret telegram was despatched, Mr. Khaliqazzaman, one of the influential members of Working Committee of Muslim League, said : "It is not correct to say that Government of India are responsible for what has happened in spite of them and their efforts. It should be realised by Muslims of Pakistan that the whole prestige of Congress Government as well as Congress organisation is involved in present struggle to restore peace in the country and Congress Ministries at the Centre and in the Provinces are striving hard to shoulder it."

On 19th the acting High Commissioner for Pakistan in New Delhi said : "The first thing that I wish to make clear is that no representative of Pakistan desires in any way directly or indirectly to question any measures that the Government of India considers desirable for restoring law and order. All Muslims believe that Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and Mr. Neogy, in

1. New Delhi, 24 September 1947. L/PJ/7/15828, I.O.L.R.

2. See *ante*, pp. 85-95.

fact, all members of the Government, are genuinely anxious that existing panic should disappear; also that refugee camps are properly looked after."

2. In para 5 of your telegram to Prime Minister of Pakistan dated the 15th September, you have said : "Nothing can help so much as continued contact, frank discussion and cooperation between the two governments, and encouraged by their conduct, similar attitude among their people." That this has been both our policy and practice ever since the present troubles began. On our side, we have honestly and consistently endeavoured to act according to this policy. You can well understand, therefore, my surprise, not unmixed with resentment, that, even during our last meeting which took place on the 20th, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan should not even have mentioned to me privately and personally the fact that he had been in communication with you and had suggested a conference with Commonwealth representatives. I confess the procedure adopted by him has been most extraordinary and, so far as I am aware, is without precedent in the history of Commonwealth relations. Both in our public utterances, and in our private discussions with Pakistan Ministers, my colleagues and I have observed candour, forbearance and restraint. It is not my purpose to make suggestions on anyone. You must draw your own inferences from secrecy observed by Prime Minister of Pakistan regarding his correspondence with you.

3. In his telegram of September 10th the Prime Minister of Pakistan urged that the Government of United Kingdom, along with other members of Commonwealth, should immediately consider effective ways and means of saving the gravest situation in India which presents a serious threat not only to peace of this great sub-continent but that of whole world. As you will observe from agreed statement of conclusions reached by our conference with Prime Minister of Pakistan and his Finance Minister on 19th "any conception of a war between Pakistan and India is abhorrent, not merely on moral ground but for the reason that any such conflict would spell ruin to both of them". We are convinced of the truth of this declaration and determined to adhere to it. If Government of Pakistan are similarly disposed, there should be no question of a war between the two Dominions. It follows that there should be no need to convene a conference of Commonwealth Ministers to discuss a contingency which, we are both determined, shall not arise.

4: Such a conference could therefore only consider ways and means of dealing with present situation, which is not one of war between two Dominions but of communal strife, over which appeals to reason and action of forces of law and order, at least in Dominion of India, are rapidly asserting themselves. In reference to East Punjab and in Delhi, the situation, though still difficult in parts, has materially improved. In the other provinces of the Dominion of India, the Provincial Governments

have, throughout the disturbances, managed to maintain law and order; they have both the will and, I believe, the means to continue to do so. Our major anxiety now is for the safety of non-Muslim evacuees from West Punjab and certain other parts of Pakistan who have not yet been able to move into safety of our borders. This is a problem of protection and transportation which only the two Dominion Governments can solve by the fullest cooperation at all levels. The resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees who have moved from one Dominion into the other is a problem to be handled by each Government separately. We have created a special Ministry for this purpose and, although, considering the very large numbers involved, our task will not be easy. This is not a responsibility the discharge of which need involve a threat to either Dominion.

5. Both of the problems are involved and their magnitude is such that no outside intervention, however well meant, could provide an effective solution. Physical measures, including the use of force to suppress disorder, however important, cannot be sufficient to quell an upheaval which is fundamentally psychological. On both sides of the border, the mind of the mass in it has been stirred and inflamed by gruesome deeds but, even more, by spirit of revenge which such deeds have aroused. Only leaders of communities, in both Dominions, can restore tranquillity among the vast majority of their followers by appeals to goodwill and by practice of forbearance and restraint. At this stage, any discussion of the situation on a multinational plane outside India will only serve to revive controversy and to rekindle passions. For these reasons, and not from any desire to reject consultation or cooperation with the other Commonwealth Governments, I find myself unable to agree to the idea of convening a special conference with Commonwealth Governments to review or to deal with the present situation in India.

6. In the early stages of the disturbances, we were so completely occupied in dealing with a situation at once grave and fluid that it was not possible to keep representatives of friendly powers in Delhi informed of developments from day to day. But for over ten days now, military spokesmen have been holding conferences, to which heads of missions in Delhi have a standing invitation and which, at their own request, have now been reduced to two a week. For the information of the Commonwealth Governments, I shall now arrange that, hereafter, all official reports that we receive from our representatives in Pakistan and from our own officials in India should be communicated to the United Kingdom, the Canadian, and the Australian High Commissioners. This will enable the Governments of these countries to maintain an up-to-date picture of events in the disturbed areas. New Zealand and South Africa have no representatives in Delhi, but I shall be happy if you or Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations will keep them informed also.

7. Since you have communicated to Prime Ministers of the Dominions the text of the correspondence that has passed between you and the Prime Minister of Pakistan, I would request text of my message to you, and of other papers referred to in paragraph one of this message, should also be telegraphed to them and, of course, to the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

8. This and my immediately preceding telegram will be sent to Karachi by air mail on the 24th.

6. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

Your telegram number GA-46 dated 26th September. Mahatma Gandhi has explained his reference to war² as follows : He is wedded to nonviolence for all time and can never advocate war. In a state run by him there would be no police and no military. But he was not running the Government of India. He had merely pointed out the various possibilities. India and Pakistan should settle their differences by consultation and, failing that, should agree to arbitration. But if one party persisted in wrong-doing and would accept neither of the two ways, the only way left open was that of war. Gandhiji's statement was thus an appeal for peace and cooperation on basis of acknowledging wrong-doing and correcting it. Otherwise possibility of drifting to war which he abhorred.

2. In a separate telegram I am giving you a broad picture of the present situation.³ In a joint statement issued on behalf of Pakistan Government and some of my colleagues on 19th September it was stated : "Any conception of a war between Pakistan and India is abhorrent not merely on moral grounds, but for the reason that any such conflict would spell ruin to both of them." This is still our view.

1. New Delhi, 28 September 1947. File No. 7-46/47-O.S.-V, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. Mahatma Gandhi said on 17 September 1947: "I hate the very idea of war, But there would be no alternative to war in the absence of mutual settlement or decision by an arbitrator."

3. Not available.

I suggest that you make no comment on Mahatma Gandhi's statement to American press unless you consider this to be necessary to explain his true position. If Pakistan delegation should attack Mahatmaji and/or us, you can reply on basis of this telegram and of the appreciation of the present situation which is being telegraphed to you separately.

3. Suggest that in view of existing conditions your delegation's relations with Pakistan delegation should be courteous but strictly formal.

7. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to your telegram dated 28 September. I shall not comment upon it in detail, but would limit myself to two points :

(i) In paragraph 4 you say that a conference of representatives of the U.K. and of the Dominions, including India and Pakistan, might help to devise ways and means of securing peace between India and Pakistan. Since in our joint statement of 20 September we have both agreed that the very idea of war between the two Dominion Governments is abhorrent morally and likely to prove ruinous to both, I do not see how the question of a breach of peace rises as between the two Governments. The problem which we have to face is mainly psychological and can hardly be dealt with by people, who, however well-intentioned, can, in the very nature of things, exercise little influence on mass opinion whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh. It is a problem essentially to be dealt with by leaders and representatives of the two Dominions. India and Pakistan alone can solve and to that end bend all their energies. Your suggestion that the conference should devise ways and means of dealing with the present disturbances involves a considerable delay. A conference of the kind that you envisage will take some time to convene and our other efforts might thereby be halted or weakened meanwhile. The restoration of order and normal relations between the communities in both Dominions is a problem of such urgency that its solution can brook no delay.

(ii) In paragraph 7 you suggest that the conference which you propose

1. New Delhi, 30 September 1947. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 496-497.

should also consider the question of the appointment of an impartial commission and its personnel. This is a new suggestion and I am unable to understand what the functions of the commission would be. Such commissions in the past have taken inordinate time and ended without producing any results.

8. Terence Shone's Interview with Nehru¹

I

The High Commissioner for the United Kingdom came to see me tonight and spent nearly an hour with me. As usual he functioned as a diplomat and talked round and round the subject. Actually what he said was not much.

2. First of all he conveyed the British Prime Minister's appreciation of our difficulties and how we were handling them. He then mentioned the various proposals made on behalf of the Pakistan Government for foreign observers and commissions to come to India. He casually mentioned that the Australian Government had sent a reply to the request of Pakistan sent through the U.K. Government. He wasn't quite sure as to what this reply was, but seemed to think that it was an exhortation to all concerned to live amicably.

3. It was evident that the U.K. Government thought that something should be done though they were not quite clear as to what this should be. The idea of U.N.O. being approached was not greatly favoured (probably the fear is that Russia may come into the picture if U.N.O. is approached). It was pointed out that U.N.O. functions slowly and no results are achieved. The Palestine Commission was referred to.²

4. Having disposed of U.N.O., the High Commissioner discussed the possibility of some representatives of the Commonwealth coming to India,

1. 30 September 1947. Two accounts of the interview are printed here. The first is Nehru's account collected from J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L. The second is an account by Terence Shone, extracted from L/PJ/7/15828, I.O.L.R.

2. The United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was established on 15 May 1947 "to ascertain the issues relevant to the problem of Palestine" and submit its report to the Secretary-General not later than 1 September 1947.

it was not quite clear in what capacity or for what purpose. He was trying to find out what my reactions were. He said ultimately that any kind of a conference would be unsuitable but perhaps some Commonwealth observers might come and their presence might have soothing effect. This proposal was further limited and tied on to our own previous proposal about impartial Indian observers being nominated by Indian and Pakistan Governments. To these Indian observers, it was suggested, a few Commonwealth observers might be added. The High Commissioner was in a hurry to communicate this to me as I am going to meet Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan tomorrow and the subject might be discussed there.

5. I pointed out that we did not wish to hide anything but it was not clear to me what any outside observers could do in the present state of affairs. I repeated the usual arguments and said that there was even a possibility of such a mission from abroad being misunderstood and perhaps even influencing the situation in a wrong direction. The main problem for us could be divided up into two parts :

- (1) The police and military problem of dealing with the actual malefactors.
- (2) The psychological problem of influencing mass opinion.

Foreign observers did not fit in with either of these aspects and they might adversely affect the second and more vital approach which could only come from Indians. Anything that induced Indians to look outside might well lead to some kind of continuation of the present insecurity.

6. Though we talked at some length there was not much else of importance that we said to each other. The matter was left rather vague. The High Commissioner assured me of the friendly desire of the U.K. Government to be helpful. He hinted that perhaps I could let him know later what my reactions were, later meaning, I think, after I had met Liaquat Ali Khan.

II

2. ...Our conversation, which was frank on both sides and friendly throughout, ranged over a considerable field and lasted a good hour. In the course of it I reverted at intervals to the suggestion that one or more representatives of three Dominions might usefully participate with chosen representatives of India and Pakistan in some form of commission or investigating body. Pandit Nehru said that as he understood the suggestions of the Government of Pakistan, there were two suggestions, one for a Commonwealth Conference, the other for some sort of Commonwealth Commission to observe or investigate the situation. I had the strong impression from all he said that neither idea appealed to him; in particular he was very doubtful whether a commission could do useful work either

by enquiring into the whole field of dispute between the two new Dominions (which must take a long time and might well serve to embitter rather than smoothen relations) or by investigating particular incidents (for much the same reasons as those given in my telegram No. 870).

3. I put it to the Prime Minister that the Indian and Pakistan judges on the Boundary Commission³ had not found it possible to contribute much to a solution of that problem and that the participation of these impartial elements might help. He did not dissent as regards the judges on the Boundary Commission; but he made no bones about suggesting that a chairman from another Dominion of any commission appointed to look into the present situation might soon find himself in a position like that of Sir Cyril Radcliffe. This was said without bitterness, but rather with the feeling that no good would accrue to anyone if that were to happen. It was clear too that however difficult the task of a commission composed of Indian and Pakistan judges might be in the present situation, Pandit Nehru felt there was more chance of their accomplishing useful work than they had on the Boundary Commission.

4. When I suggested that the participation of impartial elements might have a stabilising effect on the situation, the Prime Minister was sceptical. Indeed he left me in no doubt that the participation of outsiders would be embarrassing to his Government because it was likely to rouse the extreme nationalists (Mahasabha, R.S.S. and so forth) who would resent anything that savoured of outside interference. He used the term fascist more than once to describe these and other middle-class opponents of the Government; but he did not dissent when I suggested that the Communists would also be likely to exploit any situation embarrassing to the Government.

5. In general, it was clear from his trend of thought and his remarks that he considered that the two Dominions must somehow manage to settle their differences without interventions from outside. He gave me the impression that he still believed this could be done given goodwill on both sides. He told me the Prime Minister of Pakistan was coming to Delhi again today and he maintained that discussion and cooperation were still possible on a high level, though there were often failures, because of communal infection and lack of efficiency in administration lower down, on both sides,

3. The Punjab Boundary Commission consisted of Sir Cyril Radcliffe, Justices Mehr Chand Mahajan and Teja Singh of India and Justices Mohammad Munir and Din Mohammad of Pakistan. The Indian and Pakistani judges gave decisions on expected lines.

to implement agreed decisions. The Government of India were doing all they could to overcome these difficulties.

6. The Prime Minister spoke more than once of the "core" of vicious elements which were at work here and which the Government of India were doing all in their power to unearth and deal with. (A report on this is going by telegram today.) He also referred to the intensive efforts which he and others were making by appeals to large audiences to induce a better feeling between Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims. (My telegram No. 863 paragraph 3(2) and my telegram No. 887 paragraph 6.) He believed this campaign, exhausting as it was, was having a real effect, but this could not be instantaneous, and he admitted that however successful these efforts might be, they would not influence the "core" which must somehow be eradicated. In all this, again, it was clear that he felt that Indians, who best understood the crowd psychology of their fellow countrymen, were more likely to overcome the present difficulties by themselves without outside intervention.

7. I put it to Pandit Nehru that Mr. Jinnah might make some hasty move, such as an appeal to U.N.O., just, as H.M.G. had feared that he might fire off his telegrams to all the Dominion Governments *en clair*; if this were to happen it could surely be of no advantage to anyone. The result on all previous showings was only likely to be a prolonged wrangle, ending in the same recommendation that the two parties should get together again and find some solution of their difficulties. I asked whether it might not be good policy to put forward some suggestion which might go at all events some way to meet Mr. Jinnah's desire for impartial collaboration from outside? I fear the Prime Minister, while agreeing that reference to U.N.O. was unlikely to benefit anyone, remained unconvinced that intervention by one or more members of the Commonwealth would do good rather than harm. I had the impression that he felt there was nothing to be gained, either by India or the Commonwealth, by adopting a suggestion which was unlikely to be fruitful, in order to avoid an appeal by Mr. Jinnah which he was ready to meet.

8. I suggested to the Prime Minister that he might think over the suggestion I had put to him. Perhaps the meeting which he was to have with the Prime Minister of Pakistan tomorrow might afford an opportunity for discussing it. In any case, I should be glad to have some account of the meeting, if he could give it to me, and of his reactions to the suggestion I had made to him when he had a little more time to consider it. But I am not at all hopeful that he will buy it, despite all efforts to sell it to him....

9. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
2 October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have received your letter of the 30th September as well as a copy of Sir Patrick Spens's letter of the 27th September.

It seems to me that Sir Patrick Spens has taken an unnecessarily gloomy view of facilities available in Delhi for the meeting of the Arbitral Tribunal.² I have little doubt in my mind that adequate facilities for the meeting of the Tribunal as well as for the residence and working of the staff will be available here. Indeed, even now there are satisfactory arrangements for the residence of the Muslim staff in a particular building and mess. Within a few days conditions will have further improved.

The questions that are going to be considered by the Tribunal are important, but they are not such as to excite public passion.³ I do not know whether the Tribunal will meet in public or private. I personally imagine that it would be better for them to meet in private sessions. In any event, there appears to me no reason to think that there is likely to be obstruction to the proper presentation of the case on behalf of Pakistan or to the giving of evidence, where this is necessary.

From many points of view Delhi is a more suitable venue than any other, because most of the records and papers are available here and any possible reference by the Tribunal can easily be answered. It would also take much less time to start functioning here than to have to make new arrangements elsewhere.

I entirely agree that Mr. Mohammad Ismail should have such Muslim staff as he desires and that the officestaff should also contain Muslims as the Tribunal wishes. There will be no difficulty about their accommodation or working conditions. I do not, however, understand the desirability of introducing the principle of parity everywhere, including the members of the staff, as between Hindus and Muslims. Surely there are others in India who are neither Hindus nor Muslims. Apart from Hindu and Muslim members in the staff there may be Sikhs, Anglo-Indians, Indian Christians, Jews or any others who are competent for the work entrusted to them.

1. File No. 1446/35/GG/43, President's Secretariat.
2. An Arbitral Tribunal under Patrick Spens, who was the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, was set up on 12 August 1947 to settle questions on which India and Pakistan might not be able to reach agreement. Justice Kania and Mohammad Ismail were appointed to represent India and Pakistan.
3. The issues were division of military stores, allocation of cash balances to Pakistan and the ratio in which the excess of liabilities over assets was to be shared between the two Dominions.

These members of the staff will not, of course, consider any questions of principle, but will do the routine work and they should be chosen from the point of view of their competence, keeping in mind that there is a fair proportion of various communities. This proportion need not bear any particular relation to members.

The suggestion that the permanent office of the Tribunal should be located in Bombay does not seem to me a very feasible one, as there are greater difficulties in Bombay than almost anywhere else in regard to housing accommodation. We have been trying to get houses for some of our foreign consuls without success. The Bombay Government have very recently asked us for a special ordinance to enable them to requisition certain types of houses. This matter is being considered by the Home Ministry. Thus, any attempt to establish our office in Bombay is likely to be held up for lack of accommodation, apart from possibly other reasons also. Further, Bombay is not exactly a haven of rest and quiet. It is relatively quiet and the Government has functioned efficiently there. Nevertheless, it is a possible storm centre. If, therefore, it was considered necessary for the Arbitral Tribunal to function in some other place than Delhi, I imagine that Poona would be a better place. It would be easier to get housing accommodation there and make other arrangements. I understand that the Bombay Government is going to move out of Poona in two or three weeks' time.

As I have stated above, I feel that there is no obvious necessity for the headquarters of the Tribunal to be taken away from Delhi which is in many ways the most convenient place. If, however, the Pakistan Government is anxious to change the venue then we do not wish to resist their demand and we would suggest Poona, but the suggestion should come from the Pakistan Government. Sir Patrick Spens can be assured that everything will be done in Delhi to meet his wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

10. Lord Ismay's Note on Interview with Nehru¹

The following are the salient features of a very long talk that I had with Pandit Nehru this morning.

1. 3 October 1947. R/3/1/174, I.O.L.R.

1. *Pakistan's representation to H.M.G. in the U.K. and other Dominions*

Pandit Nehru was inclined to think that since the story had partially leaked, it might be as well if Mr. Attlee published the whole series of telegrams. If Mr. Attlee agreed to this, he might think it right to make the suggestion to the Governments of India and Pakistan, with copies to the other Dominions, and propose the time for simultaneous release.

2. *Observers*

Mr. Nehru said that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had suggested that the Governments of India and Pakistan should ask U.N.O. or the other Dominions to send observers to watch events in the East and West Punjab.² He himself (Mr. Nehru) had not definitely rejected this proposal, but thought there was little or no advantage in it. It would take a long time for U.N.O. to collect representatives, and when they arrived, there would be all sorts of difficulties, such as ignorance of the language and of the country; and, at the end of it all, of what precise use would they be? It was true that they could visit refugee camps and columns of refugees, but they would not be able to check up on isolated incidents. Thus, although there might be an impression that they were a sort of impartial tribunal, they could not in fact function as such. The same sort of objections applied to observers from the Dominions.

A possible line of approach that had occurred to him (Mr. Nehru) was to have Indian observers, other than Hindu, Sikh or Muslim. It should not be difficult for each Dominion to select, say, half a dozen men of standing, e.g., with High Court experience, and to set them to work in pairs. He had put this proposal to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, who had not rejected it, but had suggested that there might be a British observer with each pair. Mr. Nehru doubted the wisdom of this. It was too reminiscent of what had happened in the Boundary Commission, when Hindu and Muslim judges had disagreed and Sir Cyril Radcliffe had had to give the casting vote.

In conclusion, Mr. Nehru made a very interesting point. He said that, in point of fact, he and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan seldom had any difficulty in reaching agreement as to what should be done to meet any particular problem that arose; but their difficulty lay in getting their decisions implemented. This difficulty would clearly apply to any conclusions that might be reached by observers from U.N.O. or elsewhere.

2. In reply to Pakistan's threat to approach the U.N.O. for setting up an enquiry commission, the Government of India expressed their willingness to accept the appointment of a body of impartial Indian and Pakistani observers, selected by both the Dominions jointly. They would tour and station themselves in the disturbed areas of the West and East Punjab.

3. *Character of the present troubles*

Mr. Nehru gave me a long and most interesting exposition of his views about the present troubles. To the world, the issues seemed to be exclusively communal, but in point of fact there was a definite political objective behind them. He went on to explain that the Congress movement was not unlike the labour movement in England, i.e. they were quite prepared to noncooperate or to go on strike, but they were totally opposed to violence. The Muslim movement was a direct contrast. They believed in direct action and violence and the Muslim National Guard was in effect a fascist militia. Now there were certain Hindu organisations which did not agree with the Congress policy, e.g. the Hindu Mahasabha, the R.S.S., there were also the Sikhs.

The Hindu Mahasabha had declared the 15th August as a day of mourning. The R.S.S. was composed largely of the lower middle class not unlike the Nazi movement. Their aim was an exclusively Hindu state; and they were fascist in outlook. They had not, before the present troubles, ever embarked on violence.

The Sikhs as a whole were quite ready to listen to Master Tara Singh when he incited them to violence, but not so when he tried to call them off. There were, in particular, two groups of terrorists; the first, about 2,000 to 3,000 strong, were well armed and well organised; the second, not so well armed, and not so well organised. Both had recently got completely out of hand and the only hope of calling them off was through their supreme religious authorities.

The troubles which started on 15th August had played into the hands of both the Hindu organisations mentioned above and of the Sikhs; and they had made hay while the sun shone. The troubles in Delhi, for example, had been started by the Sikh organisation joining hands with the R.S.S. and getting the police in their pockets. Had the intelligence system been effective, the movement might have been nipped in the bud, as had a similar movement in the U.P. in early August; but, as it was, things had got completely out of hand.

Mr. Nehru went on to talk about various States. He did not doubt that H.H. of Patiala wished to get complete supremacy of Sikhistan. The Muslims there had been killed in very large numbers. H.H. of Faridkot was a thoroughly bad man. He had expelled all the Muslims from his State and had confiscated their land and made it into Crown property. H.H. of Bharatpur, the only Jat State, and H.H. of Alwar had either killed all the Meos in their States or just turned them adrift. Both of them were engaged in crushing all organisations within their States. Alwar was a paranoiac.

4. *Junagadh*

Mr. Nehru said that although Junagadh was legally entitled to accede to Pakistan, the Government of India were not prepared to accept this acce-

ssion, owing to the geographical complications caused by the fact that the other Kathiawar States and Junagadh were inextricably interlaced.³ Thus there were Junagadh islands in Indian territory and Indian islands in Junagadh territory. In addition there was the complication of Mongrol and Babariawad, both of whom the Nawab of Junagadh claimed to be his feudatories.⁴ The Government of India, after consulting legal opinion, did not accept this claim. Junagadh had put troops into both these States, and the other Kathiawar States had thereupon demanded the protection to which they were entitled from the Government of India.

He (Mr. Nehru) had had a long talk with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan about this. They had both expressed their determination to settle the matter amicably. Mr. Nehru had suggested that the Junagadh troops should forthwith evacuate Mongrol and Babariawad, and Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had said that he would consider doing so. Mr. Nehru added that the Government of India proposed to send troops to Porbandar to assure the neighbouring States of their safety. It had originally been their intention to announce the despatch of these troops to Pakistan and to the world at large, but on further consideration he (Mr. Nehru) had decided that, as a first step, he would send a telegram to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan reminding him of their conversation and asking him to expedite the withdrawal of Junagadh troops from Mongrol and Babariawad.

3. When in August 1947 the Nawab of Junagadh proclaimed the accession of his State to Pakistan, the Government of India suggested a referendum. The administration of the State was taken over by the Government of India on 9 November in response to a request from the Nawab and his Dewan. The referendum on 24 February 1948 resulted in an overwhelming majority in favour of accession to India.
4. In a referendum held on 18 February 1948 in Mongrol and Babariawad the vast majority favoured accession to India.

11. To H.J. Kania¹

New Delhi
3 October 1947

My dear Mr. Kania,

I have received your letter of 30 September and have shown it to Sardar

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. IV, pp. 208-209.

Patel.² Both of us appreciate what you have written and we have given considerable thought to it, both from the public point of view as well as the private.

2. This question had arisen to some extent even when you were asked to join the Arbitral Tribunal. Since then the fresh development has been the criticisms of Mr. Jinnah and his colleagues of the awards of the Partition Tribunal.³ Those awards, as you know, are essentially one-man awards, that is, Radcliffe's. The criticism is thus of Radcliffe, though of course it includes in its scope others also.

3. We do not think that Mr. Jinnah's or anybody else's criticisms of the awards of the Partition Tribunal should make any difference to our previous decision regarding your joining the Arbitral Tribunal. Apart from the difficulties which would result from any change in the personnel of the Tribunal being made now, and these would be considerable and would delay matters greatly, any withdrawal of your name would be an improper surrender to the tactics of the Pakistan Government. This would encourage them still further.

4. We do not think that your functioning in the Arbitral Tribunal in any way comes in your way as Chief Justice of India. It is true that some of the matters that might be considered might have a political bearing, but even that political bearing will be as between one State and another. You represent the Dominion of India, not in a partisan way but as a judge of high standing trying to do justice.

5. Sardar Patel and I, therefore, feel that you should continue in this Tribunal and not worry yourself about what might be said later by Mr. Jinnah or his Ministers.

With all good wishes to you,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Kania had feared that, in view of the criticisms by Pakistani leaders about the Partition Tribunal's award, his association with the Arbitral Tribunal might draw the office of Chief Justice of India into controversy.

3. In a broadcast on 31 August 1947 from Lahore, Jinnah condemned the award as "unjust, incomprehensible and even perverse."

12. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
8 October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,
Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee has sent me a copy of a letter he has addressed to you about the stores which are under the control of the Supreme Commander's Headquarters. He has suggested the appointment of a small committee to consider this matter.

I think some such course would be desirable. As you know, this matter has been raised repeatedly and some feeling has been aroused and it would be to the interest of all parties concerned for the facts to be known by them.

The Supreme Commander is in a sense trustee for all these stores which have to be divided up in a certain proportion between India and Pakistan. What that exact proportion is has yet to be settled by the Arbitral Tribunal, but within certain limits it is admitted that a certain proportion must go to India and a certain much smaller proportion must go to Pakistan. These two admitted proportions do not exhaust the total supply and some is left over for determination by the Tribunal. Apart from the portion that is left over for decision, the rest can be disposed of immediately or as soon as practicable.

It would help greatly if the representatives of the parties concerned, and so far as we are concerned, the representatives of the Government of India, were given a complete list of these stores, or were allowed full access to these lists so that we might know what the present position is. We should also like to know how these stores had been disposed of during the past two months or so. In future, every such disposal might be placed before the committee that has been suggested so that they may be kept informed of what is being done.

Stores must consist of not only arms and ammunition but innumerable other kinds of articles, including machinery, tractors, etc. Some of these are of considerable value. Much else may not be of great value. It is particularly important that the valuable machinery should not be disposed of in any way without full reference to the parties concerned. I mention this as there are reports to the effect that a good deal of this machinery has already been disposed of, or is in process of being sent away, without our knowledge. Some, it is said, is being sent overseas, where I do not know. If full reports were sent of all these transactions to the committee we could remain in constant touch with developments.

I would suggest that till this is done, no further steps should be taken in regard to sending any valuable articles anywhere. The fact that certain

1. File No. 32 (46)/48-PM (Vol. I), No. 37-A, PMS.

articles have been sent to Hyderabad State only recently requires investigation. Also, we should particularly like to know if anything out of disposals has been, or is being, sent overseas.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. Cable to P.J. Noel-Baker¹

A little over three weeks ago, we asked American Ambassador² in New Delhi to request his Government to place ten four-engined transport military planes at our disposal to help in evacuating non-Muslim refugees from disturbed areas in Pakistan. We considered this supplementing of our transport facilities, including planes chartered by us from B.O.A.C., to be necessary to complete evacuation before onset of cold weather. Intention was that American planes, like others at our disposal, should, on outward journey from bases in India to Pakistan, carry Muslim refugees.

2. On 12th October, American Ambassador informed us that his Government would be willing to accede to our request if Pakistan Government would also support it. I immediately telegraphed to Pakistan Prime Minister purpose of our *demarche* and asked him that, if he agreed with our proposal, he might inform American representative³ in his Dominion direct. Our information is that Pakistan Government has agreed, subject to adjustment of technical details.

3. No answer has yet reached us from Washington, and we understand from most reliable sources that a senior officer of your Ministry has raised objections to our proposals on following grounds :

- (1) That it might be objected to by Pakistan as favouring India;
- (2) That dollar expenditure involved would embarrass H.M.G. in the U.K.;
- (3) That landing facilities available in areas concerned would militate against full use being made of planes.

1. New Delhi, 27 October 1947. President's Secretariat File No. 20/32/GG/47, pp. 2-3.

2. Henry F. Grady.

3. Paul Humiston Alling (1896-1949); joined U.S. foreign service 1924; Ambassador to Pakistan, September 1947-January 1949.

4. (1) in preceding paragraph is answered by paragraph 2 of this telegram. (2) does not arise since we have been told that U.S. Government would not require any cash payment for use of planes. Our financial responsibility would be limited to supply of petrol and maintenance of crews and would largely be in non-dollar currency. As regards (3), we had taken the obvious precaution, before approaching the American Ambassador, of making sure that suitable bases would be available for the use of these planes.

5. I need not tell you that India is a sovereign Dominion and, therefore, free to take decisions regarding its own affairs without interference from outside. We are still confronted with a problem of unprecedented magnitude in respect of refugees awaiting evacuation. Every day's delay in removing them from areas where they are exposed to inclemency of increasing cold and other dangers impedes the prompt discharge of one of our most pressing responsibilities. Our solicitude is not confined to non-Muslims wishing to come from Pakistan to India but includes Muslims desirous of proceeding from India to Pakistan. We cannot but regard the objections said to have been made on behalf of your Ministry⁴ as a source of grave embarrassment. We have renewed our request to the American Ambassador for an early decision by his Government and I would request you to help us by making sure that no obstacles are put in our way by anyone acting on behalf of the U.K. Government.

4. In his reply of 29 October 1947, Noel-Baker welcomed India's request for provision of American military planes for transporting refugees but agreed with American stipulation that Pakistan should also be associated. The High Commissioner of Britain had only expressed his country's embarrassment on the ground of need to save dollars, if India had to make payment in dollars for hiring American aircraft.

14. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have received information from more than one source that Muslim League National Guards in East Bengal are carrying on propaganda that Tripura State belongs to eastern Pakistan. Pamphlets inciting Muslims to conquer

1. New Delhi, 4 November 1947. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. V, p 426.

Tripura and annex it to East Bengal are in circulation in eastern Pakistan and preparations are being made to invade Tripura.²

Tripura acceded to the Indian Dominion before 15 August. Any activities in Pakistan territory intended to support the forcible annexation of Tripura into eastern Pakistan are clearly an hostile act against the Dominion of India. I request that you will discourage such activities and see that no act of aggression is committed on Tripura.

2. In October 1947, at public meetings convened by the Muslim League at Comilla, demands were made for the accession of Tripura to Pakistan. Similar propaganda was carried on in the Feni sub-division.

15. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
4 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You are no doubt aware of the reports that there is trouble brewing on the borders of Tripura (Agartala) State. It is said that the Muslim National Guards from East Bengal, Tripura district, have started an agitation against accession of Tripura to the Indian Union and they may well have raids. Tripura State is very feeble and the Raj family itself is divided.² If any trouble occurs there, we have no means of reaching it except by Assam.

Yesterday I sent a telegram to the Pakistan Government warning them about this matter.³ I have also informed the Assam Government.

I hope that you will deal directly with the Tripura State authorities.⁴

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 5, pp. 426-427.

2. On the death of the ruler of Tripura, Bir Bikram Kishore Dev Varman, on 17 May 1947, his minor son ascended the throne. A Council of Regency was formed with Maharani Kanchan Prabha Devi as President and the late ruler's brother, Brajendra Kishore, as Vice-President. The latter, as a former chief minister, was suspected of receiving encouragement from Pakistan to stake his claim to the throne.

3. See preceding item.

4. Patel said in reply that postal and communication links between Tripura and outside were being improved; Assam Rifles were being posted in the State; the Maharani and the Dewan were coming to Delhi for consultations on other matters, and Sir Akbar Hydari was being appointed the Agent to deal with Tripura.

Evidently the present Dewan is not much good and a better and stronger man is needed.⁵ Dr. P.C. Ghosh has also written to me on this subject and drawn urgent attention to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

5. S. V. Mukerji, appointed by the Maharaja before his death, was unpopular and fled in November to Shillong. He was replaced by the Government of India by A.B. Chatterji of the Indian Civil Service.

16. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I understand that West Punjab Government has passed an order requiring owners and managers of safe deposit vaults to resume work by 20th November failing which that Government will take possession of the vaults. I shall be grateful for urgent information as to whether this report is correct. If it is, I must lodge the strongest possible protest against the order of the West Punjab Government. Conditions in Lahore and other towns where safe deposit vaults are located are so insecure for non-Muslims that the managers and their staff will be incurring grave personal risk in attempting to resume work by 20th November. Moreover, I am reliably informed that number of Muslim depositors is less than 5%. The Managing Director of one of the safe deposit companies went to Lahore some time ago and tried to open the vault but was prevented from doing so. If in these circumstances West Punjab Government take possession of the vaults, that would mean expropriation of property worth an immense amount of money.

Our Minister for Refugees has telegraphed to you suggesting an inter-Dominion Conference on various matters on the 11th of this month. I understand that no reply has yet been received by him. I hope it will be possible for this conference to be held soon and the subject of safe deposit vaults may be included in the agenda. Pending such discussion, I would ask that the order said to have been issued by the West Punjab Government should be withdrawn.

I shall be grateful for a very urgent reply.

1. New Delhi, 8 November 1947. File No. 7-38/47-O.S.-V., M.E.A., N.A.I.

17. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to my telegram No. 311 of November 8 about safe deposit vaults to which I have not received a reply.² The matter is causing the gravest anxiety to a very large number of depositors who are in India and I trust that you will accept the suggestion to postpone any action in regard to these vaults until the matter has been discussed at the next Inter-Dominion Conference.

2. If you must insist on opening these vaults after the next three or four days I would ask that the vaults be opened in the presence of our Deputy High Commissioner and other officers accompanying him. Depositors now resident in Pakistan may open their lockers, but lockers belonging to persons now resident in India should not be touched. As soon as business of residents in Pakistan has been completed the vaults must be put under double lock, the key of one lock being retained by a representative of the West Punjab Government and the key of the other lock being retained by the Deputy High Commissioner or an officer nominated by him for the purpose. We will be prepared to make available as many officers as may be necessary so that one of our officers will be present at each safe deposit vault to operate the double lock and afford access to persons resident in Pakistan during specified hours. I suggest that this arrangement is absolutely essential until the matter is discussed further at the next Inter-Dominion Conference. I would emphasise that persons resident in Pakistan should be afforded access to lockers only after complete identification and with reference to entries made in safe deposit vault registers. You will appreciate that if the foregoing drill is not observed there is grave danger to the security of property belonging to depositors now resident in India and the Government of India would take a most serious view of any such situation.

3. I shall be grateful for an urgent reply to this telegram.

1. New Delhi, 15 November 1947. File No. 7-38/47-O.S.-V, M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. See preceding item.

18. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
15 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Your letter of the 14th about the sacred books of the Sikhs in the West Punjab.² Some days ago I telegraphed to the Pakistan Government and the West Punjab Government about these books. I do not think any reply has come. This matter might well be taken up at our next meeting with the Pakistan Ministers.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 360.
2. Patel wished the question of sacred books and shrines of the Sikhs in West Punjab to be discussed with Liaquat Ali Khan at their next meeting.

19. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 833 dated 13th November regarding jute export duty.² I had already gone into whole question very carefully with my colleagues. Under present arrangements, which cover period from the 15th August 1947 to 31st March 1948, each of the Dominions is entitled as a sovereign state to the taxes which it levies and collects in its own territories. It would scarcely be fair to question equity of this arrangement by isolating particular sources of revenue, such as jute export duty or central excise duty,

1. New Delhi, 19 November 1947. File No. 9-5/47-O.S.-V, M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. While disputing West Bengal's claim to any share of the export duty on raw jute as she did not produce even half of the raw jute required by her mills, Liaquat Ali said that he was prepared to arrive at an agreement on the sharing of the duty between the two countries. But he claimed that the Indian Government's refusal to allow any portion of the duties collected in India from going to Pakistan hindered all efforts at cooperation and had obliged her Government to impose an export duty on jute leaving East Bengal by land or sea.

in regard to which Pakistan may feel that it had any special claims. A matter such as this will have to be considered comprehensively over whole field of import, export and central excise duties in relation to common economic and fiscal policies and absence of any customs or trade barriers, or, in other words, in light of a customs and excise union. Pakistan members of Expert Committees connected with partition were definitely opposed to any forms of customs and excise union after 1st April 1948. Nevertheless as a result of the recent discussions between representatives of the two Dominions, Government of India made it quite clear in *aide-memoire* sent to your High Commissioner on the 30th October that they were prepared to initiate discussions at once, should Pakistan Government desire a reasonably long-term settlement between two Dominions in respect of :

- (a) Freedom of trade and commerce between the two Dominions *inter se*, covering in particular question of trade and customs barriers;
- (b) Uniformity of policy, legislation and taxation in respect of customs and central excises;
- (c) Division of customs and central excises of both Dominions on an equitable basis; and
- (d) As far as possible, general agreement on other relevant matters of mutual interest in the economic sphere.

We also made it clear that Government of India would be quite prepared to give effect to any such settlement with effect from the 15th of August 1947 in order to deal with claim of the Pakistan Government in respect of export duty on jute and excise duties. You will therefore see that far from rejecting request of the Pakistan Government, we have done our level best to find satisfactory solution of the whole problem. An *ad hoc* demand under an individual head without comprehensive examination of all connected matters can scarcely be considered reasonable, as you suggest. I am therefore considerably surprised at your doubts regarding our intentions in regard to customs union and economic collaboration. Our offer communicated through *aide-memoire* to your High Commissioner is still open, and is the only known way of securing really equitable and scientific solution. I would therefore ask you to take steps for initiation of immediate discussions. Meanwhile my Government have noticed that your Government have already levied an export duty on Pakistan jute coming into India and issued necessary notifications. I feel my Government is bound to take parallel measures and will do so without prejudice to any settlement which may be reached as the result of our correspondence.

20. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi
23 November 1947

Your telegram dated 18th November regarding opening safe deposit vaults in Lahore in which you pointed out that West Punjab Government had promised full protection to these vaults and the workers to the satisfaction of the Managers of the vaults.² I have now received report from our Deputy High Commissioner that when vaults were opened a large and unruly crowd of Muslims gathered before premises, shouted provocative slogans and insisted that valuables in vaults should not be allowed to be removed. Local authorities were unable to control crowd and Managers had to stop functioning. I understand also that District Magistrate has issued an order prohibiting removal by any person of any article deposited or lying in safe deposit vaults of any bank without his previous permission in writing. In view of this and of danger of attack from Muslim mobs the vaults have stopped functioning. In view of assurances of West Punjab Government, I can only express surprise at this development. I am sure you will agree that the position is an impossible one and I shall be glad to be informed what further steps you propose to take.

1. New Delhi, 23 November 1947. File No. 7-38/47-O.S.-V, M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. Liaquat Ali Khan informed Nehru that a decision to open the vaults had been taken after promising full protection to the workers and vaults.

21. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

You will have received telegram from Prime Minister of Pakistan, addressed to you in reply to your telegram of 22nd November regarding Kashmir. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan also sent me a copy of it. We entirely disagree with its tone and contents. But as I learnt that he would be coming to Delhi to attend meeting of Joint Defence Council.² I decided not to controvert what he had said to you, because I was anxious that as friendly an atmosphere as possible should be created for talks between him and his colleagues and us.

1. New Delhi, 29 November 1947. File No. KS-2/47-K, M.H.A., N.A.I.
2. Held on 26 and 27 November 1947.

2. You will be glad to know that, during the last few days, a number of difficult issues between the two Dominions have been discussed with candour and cordiality and agreement on some important ones has been reached. This is of happy augury for the amicable settlement of other outstanding questions. I intend to go to Lahore to attend a meeting³ of the Joint Defence Council about the 6th December and hope that discussions there will be continued in the friendly atmosphere which has been so helpful in our talks in New Delhi.

3. I am telegraphing this to you because I feel sure that you would be glad to know of the improvement in atmosphere and outlook which has come over the situation during the last few days and which I sincerely hope will be maintained.

3. The Joint Defence Council met at Lahore on 8 December 1947.

22. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

2. Your telegram No. QF (3)/47-PR dated 6th December regarding desecration of Muslim shrines and places of worship in Delhi province.² Orders have been issued for clearing all mosques of trespassers and for restoring them to their original condition. Detailed reply has been sent to your High Commissioner here. There is little foundation for the grave allegations regarding conditions of several mosques and *dargahs*. On the whole damage is insignificant. In particular Dargah Hazrat Nizamuddin Auliya,³ Dargah Hazrat Qutub-ud-Din Bakht Chishti and adjoining mosque and Dargah Hazrat Chiragh⁴ are absolutely intact. Dargah Hazrat Syed Hasan Rasul Numa⁵ is also intact except for some damage to railings round some graves.

1. New Delhi, 11 December 1947. File No. 5/27/47-Poll-KW, M.H.A., N.A.I.

2. Liaquat Ali Khan had requested Nehru to take special measures to safeguard Muslim holy places and shrines in Delhi following reports of their desecration.

3. Nizamuddin Aulia (1236-1325) was fourth in the line of the famous Chishtī saints.

4. Shaikh Nasiruddin Mahmud Roshan Chiragh-i-Delhi, the last of the great Chishtī saints of Delhi, was the chief disciple and successor of Nizamuddin Auliya. He was a contemporary of Muhammad Tughlaq. He died in 1356.

5. Hazrat Sayyid Hasan Rasul Numa was a descendant of Sayyid Usman of Narnaul. He died in 1691.

Damage to Dargah Hazrat Baqi Billah⁶ is also very insignificant. Information regarding tomb of Hazrat Khwaja Qutubuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki⁷ at Mehrauli has been called for.

3. I understand East Punjab Government have also decided to protect all Muslim religious places. I have, however, received reports that a number of temples and Gurdwaras have been demolished in West Punjab and on several of them Muslim League flags are flying. I shall be glad to be assured that you are also taking action under the Inter-Dominion Agreement to restore all such temples and Gurdwaras to their original condition.⁸

6. Khwaja Baqi Billah was a native of Kabul who arrived at Delhi during the reign of Akbar and died in 1603. He was a member of the Nakshbandi fraternity of holy men.
7. This *dargah* is one of the oldest shrines in Delhi. Khwaja Qutubuddin Bakhtiyar Kaki, born in Persia, came to India with the early conquerors and became a disciple and spiritual successor of Khwaja Muinuddin Chishti of Ajmer. He was a contemporary of Iltutmish and died in 1236.
8. At the Inter-Dominion Conference in Lahore on 3 and 4 September, the two Governments agreed to protect religious places within their territories and to ensure the restoration of such places which had been destroyed or desecrated.

23. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
23 December 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have your letter of the 23rd December. I am very sorry for the statement which appeared in this morning's press about the implementation of the recent agreement.² But I must confess that I was not very surprised to see it as for many days past, in fact since the meeting of the Assembly, there had been odd comments of this kind in the press. It did not strike me that any special information had been conveyed to the press on this subject. Indeed there was no possibility of doing so, even if one had intended it after our meeting with Liaquat Ali Khan. I did not mention it to anybody after that meeting; even my colleagues and I am sure Gopalaswami could never have done so. Today the only person I have spoken to about this has been Gandhiji.

1. J. N. Collection.

2. It was stated in the newspapers that the implementation of the agreement arrived at between the two Dominions about the divisions of assets and liabilities and the immediate payment of Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan would depend on a satisfactory solution of the Kashmir affairs.

Though I regret it greatly that such statements should appear in the press, I think that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan is somewhat unfair to think that any of us are guilty of disclosure. The matter is being talked about for days and days and it was easy for a journalist to refer to it in the manner it had been done. There is no question of a decision arrived at not being implemented. The only implementation is that there should be no disclosure. But in this particular matter, as I have said, there has been much public speculation.

The only way to get the press to play is, as you suggest, give them off-the-record guidance. As you have sent a copy of your letter to the Minister for Information, I am sending him a copy of this letter also. I am sure he will take such steps as may be considered necessary.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

24. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your letter dated 23rd December regarding payment of Pakistan share of cash balances on basis of Inter-Dominion Financial Agreements. As I have already informed you verbally the Government of India stand fully by these agreements and will implement them. The sole question at issue is the actual time of payment. There is and can be no question of repudiation of agreements. The decision on the financial issue was only one of several major points of controversy between the two Dominion Governments and it was clearly stated on several occasions that an overall settlement based upon agreements on all these points should be arrived at and they should be implemented simultaneously. This was stressed in a note given to you on the 26th November, at the meeting the Partition Council took its decision on the financial issue. It was repeated on subsequent occasions and a public statement of it was made by Sardar Patel in the Constituent Assembly.

1. New Delhi, 30 December 1947. Ministry of States, File No. K. S. 3744, M H A

On the major issue of Kashmir all our attempts to reach a settlement have so far failed because Pakistan has continued in spite of our request not to assist aggression on Indian Dominion territory. On the 22nd December I handed to you a letter on this subject. The situation is becoming graver every day and in these circumstances we feel justified in postponing payment for the present. I repeat once again that our intention is merely to suspend implementation and not repudiate agreements.²

2. On 12 December while presenting the details of the financial settlement between the two Dominions, Patel hoped "the new State of Pakistan and their government will regard this settlement as a gesture of our friendliness and goodwill. The successful implementation... depends on the continuation of the spirit of accommodation and conciliation on both sides...."

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

27 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am writing to you about Kashmir. I met Mahajan² before he went there and had a talk with him. I felt that his approach³ might not be wholly successful.

2. It is obvious to me from the many reports I have received that the situation there is a dangerous and deteriorating one.⁴ The Muslim League in the Punjab and the N.W.F.P. are making preparations to enter Kashmir in considerable numbers. The approach of winter is going to cut off Kashmir from the rest of India. The only normal route then is *via* the Jhelum Valley. The Jammu route can hardly be used during winter and air traffic is also suspended. Therefore it is important that something should be done before these winter conditions set in. This means practically by the end of October or, at the latest, the beginning of November. Indeed, air traffic will be difficult even before that.

3. I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of the coming winter.

4. Whether this strategy succeeds or not depends upon the forces opposed to it. I rather doubt if the Maharaja and his State forces can meet the situation by themselves and without some popular help. They will be isolated from the rest of India, and if their own people go against them, it will be very difficult to meet the situation. Obviously the only major group that can side with them is the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership. If by any chance that is hostile or even passive, then the Maharaja and his government become isolated and the Pakistani people will have a relatively free field.

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. (1889-1967); Judge, Lahore High Court, 1943; Member, R.I.N. Mutiny Enquiry Commission, 1946, and Punjab Boundary Commission, 1947; Judge, East Punjab High Court, 1947; Prime Minister, Jammu and Kashmir State, 1947-48; Constitutional Advisor to Maharaja of Bikaner, 1948; Judge, Federal Court, 1948-53; Chief Justice, Supreme Court, 1954.

3. On 27 October, Mahajan had met Nehru and Patel and emphasised the need for "immediate military aid on any terms" and said that "the town of Srinagar must be saved at any cost from looting and destruction."

4. To coerce Kashmir into seceding to Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan cut off the supply of essential commodities, including petrol, salt and sugar, to the State. Simultaneously, raids took place across the border between 3 September and 20 October.

5. It becomes important, therefore, that the Maharaja should make friends with the National Conference so that there might be this popular support against Pakistan. Indeed, it seems to me that there is no other course open to the Maharaja but this : to release Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference leaders,⁵ to make a friendly approach to them, seek their co-operation and make them feel that this is really meant, and then to declare adhesion to the Indian Union. Once the State accedes to India, it will become very difficult for Pakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union. If, however, there is delay in this accession, then Pakistan will go ahead without much fear of consequences, specially when the winter isolates Kashmir.

6. It seems to me urgently necessary, therefore, that the accession to the Indian Union should take place early. It is equally clear to me that this can only take place with some measure of success after there is peace between the Maharaja and the National Conference and they cooperate together to meet the situation. This is not an easy task; but it can be done chiefly because Abdullah is very anxious to keep out of Pakistan and relies upon us a great deal for advice. At the same time he cannot carry his people with him unless he has something definite to place before them. What this can be in the circumstances I cannot define precisely at the present moment. But the main thing is that the Maharaja should try to gain the goodwill and cooperation of Abdullah. This is the belief also of various minorities in Kashmir who have no other support to lean upon. I do not think it is possible for the Maharaja to function for long if no major section of the population supports him. It would be a tragedy if the National Conference remains passive owing to frustration and lack of opportunity.

7. Nobody can guarantee what will happen in this complicated situation. But the course I have suggested seems to me the wisest one and the most likely to produce results. But it is important that there should be no delay. The time element cannot be forgotten and delay itself may cut us off completely from Kashmir owing to the approach of winter.

8. I tried to explain much of this to Mahajan. But I fear he only partly appreciated what I said. I do not know what advice you gave to him. Your advice will naturally go a long way either with the Maharaja or with Mahajan.

9. At the present moment Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues are still in

5. Sheikh Abdullah was sentenced in May 1946 to nine years' imprisonment for having led the 'Quit Kashmir' campaign against the Maharaja. He was released on 29 September 1947.

prison. It seems to me very injurious to future developments. Unfortunately the Maharaja cannot make up his mind easily.

10. I hope you will be able to take some action in this matter to force the pace and to turn events in the right direction. We have definitely a great asset in the National Conference, provided it is properly handled. It would be a pity to lose this. Sheikh Abdullah has repeatedly given assurances of wishing to cooperate and of being opposed to Pakistan; also to abide by my advice.

11. I would again add that time is of the essence of the business and things must be done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible with the cooperation of Sheikh Abdullah.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

New Delhi
30 September 1947

My dear Sheikh Saheb,
I was delighted to know yesterday that you had at last come out of prison. But what a world it is which we have to face now !

2. We have had a difficult enough time during the past year and more; but the last six weeks have just been a series of horrors. It is difficult to believe that such things can happen anywhere, least of all in our own country. People have gone mad and I do not know when sanity will return.² Here in Delhi there is some improvement and a change in the atmosphere.

3. The more I have watched these occurrences, the more I am convinced that they are something much more than communal. They bear a striking resemblance to Nazi and fascist methods and the people behind them have been typical. It is the same kind of class, the same technique of murder and violence and hatred. We are passing through a severe crisis which in essence is political although it may bear a communal aspect.

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. The reference is to the communal riots in September 1947.

4. Long ago I wrote to Begum Abdullah suggesting that as soon as you were released, you and she should come to Delhi. That invitation holds. Not only does it hold, but I would urge you to come here fairly soon. Of course I realise that you have returned home after a long period and I cannot ask you to come immediately. I want you to rest a little, to meet your colleagues, to judge the situation in Kashmir, and when you have formed an idea of the present position there, then to come here. Gandhiji has also expressed a desire to see you. You are the best judge of how soon to come.

5. I hope that when you come, you will bring your wife with you. She has worked wonderfully during your absence and has extorted our admiration. When you come here I hope you will be my guest.

6. I shall not write to you about Kashmir affairs because you are on the spot and there are many people who will inform you. Undoubtedly the position in Kashmir is difficult just as it is difficult everywhere. One has to be careful now not to lose sight of the wood for the trees. Our old slogans do not always work as I know to my cost in Delhi. The very persons who shout *Inquilab Zindabad* are trying to stab our new-won liberty. That freedom itself is in danger not from outside, but from inside. But when the inside weakens, outside elements come into play. I have no doubt that we shall survive and overcome these evil forces. But all this has been a tragedy and a travail of the spirit.

7. Kachru³ is taking this letter. I should like him to come back fairly soon as he is doing useful work here. But you can keep him as long as you desire. With all good wishes to you and Begum Saheba,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Dwarkanath Kachru.

3. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
5 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a copy of a note on Patiala which Amrit Kaur has sent me.² She received it from Gyan Chand, who is a reliable worker living in Patiala territory near Simla.

I enclose also a brief statement by Dewan Shiv Saran Lal, who has been Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan in the Frontier.³ He is on leave and is in Delhi at present. He is a very straight and reliable man and knows the Frontier thoroughly. What he says must be based on knowledge. I am going to see him tomorrow to discuss the matter with him.

Shiv Saran Lal's statement demonstrates the immediate danger to Kashmir State. What we can do about it, I do not know. Anyhow, we should think about it jointly and devise some plan. I think you should also inform the Maharaja of Kashmir. The Maharaja has some knowledge of it already. These further details might help him to get a true view of the situation.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. I, p. 50.

2. The note described the atrocities committed against Muslims and stray cases of looting, assault and murder of Hindus in the area. Conversions of Muslims to Sikhism alone was permitted. In matters of jobs and business contracts and facilities, Sikhs were said to be favoured, and the rehabilitation of only Sikh agriculturist refugees was announced.

3. The statement referred to a scheme to send armed tribals from Pakistan to the Pakistan-Kashmir border; some of them had already moved towards the area in transport provided by the Pakistan Government. Arms confiscated from non-Muslims had been supplied to these tribals. The Wali of Swat had been promised Kashmir, and the States of Dir, Swat and Chitral were preparing for attacking Kashmir from the northwest. Intense propaganda was being done in the northwest.

4. Replying on 11 October, Patel said that the information given by Shiv Saran Lal was already known to the Kashmir authorities. He had also held a discussion with Shiv Saran Lal and felt that the latter held "some queer views about retaliation on this side. If educated and responsible persons from amongst the people who have come here from the Frontier and West Punjab hold such views you can imagine what an average refugee must be feeling."

4. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

New Delhi
10 October 1947

My dear Sheikh Saheb,

As Kachru is going back, I am sending this note with him. But really one cannot write much about a complicated situation in a letter. Fate has so willed it that every conceivable problem should encompass us at one and the same time. We have, therefore, always to keep this entire picture in view and try to look at it in proper perspective.

2. We have shouted *Inquilab Zindabad* frequently enough. Well, *Inquilab* has come but not in the manner we had wanted it to come. It has come with a bang and a shaking and it is going ultimately to change much in India. I think that our whole economic structure is going to be affected by the changes that are taking place.

3. We have had to face here in India a reactionary and fascist upsurge. The Muslim League was essentially reactionary, authoritarian and fascist in conception and it functioned in that way. The tragedy has been that this has affected large numbers of other people in India, chiefly belonging to the lower middle class, and they too have functioned in true fascist style. They have had the support of some States who wanted to profit by the occasion.

4. Just at the moment, when we were politically free from British imperialism and before we had even started functioning, we had to face this onslaught from within. Normally this would not have amounted to much; but people's passions have been roused greatly during the past few months by events in various parts of India and madness was let loose. I could not have imagined in my wildest dreams that human beings in India or elsewhere could possibly function as many people have functioned in West Punjab, East Punjab, etc. A great deal of the trouble has been due to regular terrorist groups who have grown up during the last few months.

5. The result of all this has been, apart from the terrible human tragedy and the shame and humiliation accompanying it, a vast upheaval on both sides of the Punjab. Innumerable people have been uprooted and are marching from one side to another. The Punjab is a ruined province. Not only has it ruined itself but it has poisoned a great part of India. It will take time for us to get rid of this poison.

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

6. We agreed to the partition of India after having pointed out on many occasions the dangers inherent in it. Yet even we never realised the extent of these dangers which are so evident today. We agreed because we felt that India's political and social life was being undermined and poisoned by continuous inner conflict and we wanted to put an end to this so that people may consider the questions facing us dispassionately. Our calculations were evidently wrong as events have proved. Yet oddly enough on the 15th August and after there were such tremendous popular rejoicings all over the country that we felt that we had done rightly. But the poison was there and it came out and spread with amazing rapidity.

7. Now enormous problems face us. As for Pakistan, it is in an infinitely worse position and I doubt very much if it can survive at all. Financially it will be completely bankrupt. It has no trained personnel, and the burdens it carries are such that it can hardly survive. These burdens grow. In spite of our difficulties in India, our resources are considerable, and a very great part of India is functioning more or less normally. Hardly any part of Pakistan is normal and western Pakistan, of which Punjab is the heart, is staggering under the blows it has received by recent occurrences.

8. All of us sit on the edge of a precipice and dangers surround us. But there is this difference: I think we in India have a firm hold and can keep ourselves going and overcome these dangers. Pakistan has no such hold and no strength or resources. It is relying even today on British officers, both military and civil, and it will do so more and more in the future. In India we hope to eliminate the British officer element fairly soon.

9. The situation in Junagadh is delicate.² In Hyderabad it is full of dangerous possibilities.³ In the Punjab and elsewhere we have on the

2. See *post* Section 5 on Junagadh. A Provisional Government of Junagadh was set up in Bombay; the Nawab fled the country, the State Council began to have second thoughts about its accession to Pakistan, and on 8 November the Dewan appealed to India to take over the administration of the country before it collapsed in chaos. The invitation was accepted with alacrity.

3. By 21 October, India managed to extend the Standstill Agreement by one year, during which time it was hoped that some wider agreement might be arrived at. When Chhatari and Monckton returned to Hyderabad to obtain the Nizam's ratification of the agreement, news had reached there that Kashmir had acceded to India. Muslim mobs demonstrated outside Chhatari's house demanding that Hyderabad should make no concessions to India, and the Ittehad threatened 'Direct Action' against the Nizam, if he should give in to India. Under this pressure, he refused to ratify the Agreement and announced that he did not contemplate acceding to India. Chhatari and Monckton again offered their resignations and this time they were accepted. A new negotiating committee including representative of the Ittehad was appointed. See also *post*, Section 6.

whole turned the corner. Our chief enemy in the next few months is going to be disease and epidemics, also lack of sufficient food. I fear large numbers will die through disease, exhaustion and inadequate food. Many of those who survive will be undermined in health and stunted in growth.

10. This is the India we are inheriting from British rule. Perhaps it is the consequence of long continued policy in this country. But it does little good blaming others when we have not come up to the mark and failed to discharge our responsibilities. We have to suffer for our own errors.

11. It is not much good crying over spilt milk and it is not with this intention that I am writing this to you. But we must understand clearly what has happened, why it has happened, and what the forces are behind all this. This letter is not meant to go into this question deeply, but rather to give you the background of events in India. It is in this background that we have to consider Kashmir. I have little doubt in my mind that we shall succeed in getting a good grip of the situation in India. But it will be some time before we can get rid of the aftereffects of what has happened. The past will pursue us and interfere with our activities.

12. Kashmir is, of course, of vital significance to this picture of India. What happens in Kashmir will affect the rest of India. For us, therefore, Kashmir has a double significance. For me Kashmir's future is of the most intimate personal significance. On no account do I want Kashmir to become a kind of colony of foreign interests. I fear Pakistan is likely to become that if it survives at all. It may well be that the Pakistan people look upon Kashmir as a country which can yield them profit. This can be done, I suppose, by allowing foreign vested interests to exploit Kashmir directly for a substantial consideration.

13. What should be done in Kashmir, it is for you to determine. I have impressed upon all the advisers of the Maharaja who have seen me that the only hope for Kashmir and for him is for him to gain your confidence completely and to follow your advice. Every other path leads to disaster. I think he understands the position, but he cannot get rid of the habit of a life-time and he is slow in taking decisions. I understand that owing to the absence of Batra,⁴ he went on postponing meeting you.⁵ I hope he will meet you

4. R. L. Batra; at this time Deputy Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir.

5. In his letter of 6 October, Abdullah had said that "beyond sending me vague messages, the Maharaja had taken no concrete step so far". Even his meeting with the Maharaja scheduled for 6 October had suddenly been postponed.

soon and that you will be able to understand each other somewhat. The process may be a little slow to begin with. But it should be encouraged.

14. We are sending large quantities of petrol to Kashmir by air and road. We are taking steps to make the Pathankot-Jammu route easily motorable and are building a bridge also over the river there.⁶ There are other ways too in which we are helping and will help. But essentially the question is how far the present Kashmir administration can gain your goodwill and the goodwill of the National Conference. That goodwill cannot be gained by empty gestures but by some solid approach and achievement.

15. I have written at greater length than I intended. I hope that before long I shall have the pleasure of meeting you and Begum Saheba here. We can talk at greater length then.

16. Kachru is at your disposal. Keep him as long as you like.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. The Jammu-Pathankot road was opened on 7 July 1948.

5. To M.C. Mahajan¹

20 October 1947

My dear Dr. Mahajan,

I am in receipt of your letter of the 18th October.

I am aware of the difficulties Kashmir has had recently, more especially in regard to the attitude adopted by Pakistan towards it. When you were here last we discussed this matter also. I assured you then that we have the friendliest feelings towards Kashmir and its people and that we would gladly help to the best of our ability in providing Kashmir with the commodities it specially needs. We would like to do so for humanitarian reasons as well as because of our deep interest in the future of the people of Jammu and Kashmir State. Our self-interest also demands this. We are strongly of the opinion that no coercion should be exercised on Kashmir State and its people and that they should be allowed to function in their own way and to make such decisions as they think fit and proper. In the furtherance of this policy we shall direct our efforts.

1. Printed in *Heir Apparent—An Autobiography* by Karan Singh (New Delhi, 1982), pp. 53-54.

You will appreciate that there are some difficulties at present in establishing proper communications between India and Kashmir. We hope that these difficulties will be overcome soon by our joint efforts. In regard to sending necessary commodities to Kashmir, we should like to know what exactly you require. You are aware that the situation in India in regard to commodities is also a serious one and many important articles are rationed because of short supply. It is not easy for us to spare them. Nevertheless, we shall try our utmost to send you anything that you particularly need. I understand that salt and kerosene oil are specially needed by your people. Could you kindly let me have some idea of what you require urgently?

Regarding other forms of assistance, you have our goodwill but you will appreciate that these will depend on circumstances. I suggest to you that there should be close contact between Kashmir State authorities and our Government so as to ensure cooperation in matters of common concern.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To M.C. Mahajan¹

New Delhi
21 October 1947

My dear Dr. Mahajan,

I have written² to you separately in answer to your letter. We are making arrangements to send salt and some other necessities to Kashmir very soon and to bring back from Kashmir some of the special articles that Kashmir produces for sale in India.

2. I am writing to you this second letter, however, to repeat what I have already told you. You will no doubt realise that the future of Kashmir is of the most urgent importance to us. For me it is both a personal and public matter. It would be a tragedy, so far as I am concerned, if Kashmir went to Pakistan. That, I am sure, would ruin it for a considerable time.

3. Pakistan are terribly anxious to get Kashmir and I can well understand their anxiety. They are already a tottering state. They look to Kashmir for a means of recovering. They intend to raise capital in America on the

1. J. N. Collection.

2. See the preceding item.

strength of Kashmir by giving special privileges, leases etc. for development there to Americans. All their present policy is to get help from America. I do not think that even the accession of Kashmir will give much stability to Pakistan. But it will certainly mean the overrunning of Kashmir by adventurers and others. No Kashmiri can welcome this prospect.

4. Because of this urgent need of Pakistan to get Kashmir's accession to them, they are straining every nerve to that end. Everything else also, like the Junagadh affair,³ is an accessory to this end. I am given to understand that the top-ranking leaders of Pakistan are continually approaching the Kashmir National Conference leaders and making every kind of promise to them.⁴ They apologise to them for their past behaviour and promise them something approaching independence if only they will agree to Kashmir acceding to Pakistan. They are even prepared to give the right of secession. You can understand how such offers might create an impression on some people's minds. Fortunately, however, Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues are bitter against Pakistan and want to keep away from them at all costs.

5. At the same time they are in a quandary. At any time, and more particularly at the present juncture, it is impossible for them to rouse their own people unless they can get them to defend their own freedom. Once they have the sensation of freedom they will also have the necessary urge to defend it. Otherwise at most they will be passive spectators of tragedy.

6. It is clear that the only proper solution of the Kashmir problem today lies in the fullest cooperation between the Maharaja and the people of Kashmir as represented by the National Conference. That cooperation can only come when the people feel that they are more or less running the show.

7. That is why I suggested to you the urgency of taking some step like the formation of a provisional government. Sheikh Abdullah, who is obviously the most popular person in Kashmir, might be asked to form such a

3. Junagadh, the premier princely state in the Kathiawar region, was bounded almost entirely by other Indian states except the southern side which touched the Arabian Sea. The Nawab of Junagadh acceded to Pakistan on 15 August 1947 although the vast majority of the population favoured union with India. On 8 November, the Dewan of Junagadh asked for help from India to maintain law and order. On 9 November, India informed Pakistan of the Dewan's request for aid and taking over of the administration. On 11 November, Pakistan accused India of staging a coup in Junagadh and called Indian action a violation of Pakistan's territory.
4. The Private Secretary to Jinnah had been in Kashmir for months promoting an atmosphere of communal frenzy against India. Communal-minded persons and Muslim priests were incited and asked to request the Maharaja to seek accession of the State to Pakistan.

government. In law there need be no major change and the Maharaja's powers would, therefore, continue. But in practice the burden would fall on the new interim government. There should also be an announcement of fresh elections in the near future to the Assembly. The date need not be fixed just yet. This will prove to the people that the State authorities mean business.

8. Although we have not specifically said that there should be a plebiscite or referendum in Kashmir, we have accepted a policy in regard to States which necessarily leads to a referendum where there is a dispute. We cannot, therefore, object to it. The best way is to have an ordinary election to the State Assembly at a suitable time. Long before this there should be a new interim government in power. Only then will a change come over the Kashmir scene and the people will develop some enthusiasm.

9. In view of all the circumstances I feel it will probably be undesirable to make any declaration of adhesion to the Indian Union at this stage. This should come later when a popular interim government is functioning. I need not tell you about the urgency of the situation and the dangers inherent in it.

10. May I suggest to you to get the landing ground for aeroplanes prepared for winter use? This is important so that rapid communications might be kept up.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

A grave situation has developed in the State of Kashmir. Large numbers of Afridis and other tribesmen from the Frontiers have invaded State territory, occupied several towns and massacred large numbers of non-Muslims.² According to our information, tribesmen have been equipped with motor transport and also with automatic weapons and have passed through Pakistan territory. Latest news is that the invaders are proceeding up the Jhelum valley road towards the valley of Kashmir.

1. New Delhi, 25 October 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir* (published by Government of India), pp. 45-46.
2. Many Afridis, Mahsuds, Wazirs, Swathis and soldiers of the Pakistan Army 'on leave' entered Kashmir on the night of 22 October 1947 and burnt the town of Muzaffarabad. The invaders then overran Uri and captured Mahura, the electric power station fifty miles from Srinagar, thereby plunging the city in darkness.

2. We have received urgent appeal for assistance from the Kashmir Government. We would be disposed to give favourable consideration to such request from any friendly State. Kashmir's northern frontiers, as you are aware, run in common with those of three countries, Afghanistan, the U.S.S.R. and China. Security of Kashmir, which must depend upon its internal tranquillity and existence of stable government, is vital to security of India, especially since part of southern boundary of Kashmir and that of India are common. Helping Kashmir, therefore, is an obligation of national interest to India. We are giving urgent consideration to the question as to what assistance we can give to the State to defend itself.³

3. I should like to make it clear that question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view which we have repeatedly made public is that the question of accession in any disputed territory of State must be decided in accordance with wishes of the people and we adhere to this view. It is quite clear, however, that no free expression of the will of the people of Kashmir is possible if external aggression succeeds in imperilling the integrity of its territory.

4. I have thought it desirable to inform you of the situation because of its threat of international complications.

3. On 25 October 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir appealed to the Government of India for military assistance. V.P. Menon flew to Srinagar to discuss the constitutional problem. He returned to Delhi the next day and pointed out the necessity of saving the state from the raiders who had reached upto Baramulla. Mountbatten insisted that Indian troops could only enter Kashmir if it acceded to India. Menon flew to Jammu where the Maharaja had come and secured his signature to the Instrument of Accession. The first batch of Indian troops under Lt. Col. Rai flew into Kashmir on 27 October.

8. To M.C. Mahajan¹

New Delhi
26 October 1947

My dear Dr. Mahajan,

I gave you a hurried note² today just before you left. I have not even got a copy of it. I have therefore drafted a slightly fuller note³ and I am between this and the previous note.

1. J. N. Collection.
2. Penciled note about the pronouncement for the formation of an interim government in Kashmir which included Sheikh Abdullah as a member.
3. See the next item.

I think it is important for Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to go to Srinagar immediately as the situation there requires urgent handling and his presence will be helpful. I am suggesting to him therefore to go straight to Srinagar tomorrow morning. He will come to Jammu whenever the Maharaja so desires.

We have decided to send more troops to Srinagar tomorrow as at first intended. Probably we shall be able to send 700 by air tomorrow. I am quite sure that our troops will render a good account of themselves. Apart from other officers we are sending one of our senior and experienced officers, namely Brigadier Hiralal Atal⁴ to accompany the troops. He knows Kashmir and his presence ought to be of great help.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. (1905-1985); commissioned into the Indian Army, 1925; Liaison Officer of the Government of India in Kashmir, 1947; Adjutant-General, 1949-52; G.O.C., 21 Corps Armoured Division, 1953; retired 1953; Ambassador to Ethiopia, 1953-55; Chief Commissioner, Tripura, 1955-57.

8a. The Decision to Accept Accession of Kashmir¹

The Defence Committee of the Cabinet of the Government of India considered the situation in Kashmir and the request made by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir State for help against the raiders who had entered their territory and caused great loss. The suggestion that the Kashmir State should accede to the Indian Union was also considered. The Committee came to the following conclusions, which were subsequently confirmed by the Cabinet :

- (1) In view of the request made by the Kashmir Government for help against raiders who have entered their territory, the Government of India have decided to give such help. In furtherance of this decision they are sending troops by air tomorrow morning to Srinagar. They intend reinforcing these troops by air as well as by the land route *via* Jammu, as the defence of Kashmir has become their responsibility now and they intend to discharge it to the best of their ability.

1. Note to M.C. Mahajan, 26 October 1947. J.N. Collection.

- (2) His Highness the Maharaja, in accordance with his wishes and the wishes of a large number of his people, will agree to Jammu and Kashmir State acceding to the Indian Union. The Government of India will accept this accession provisionally subject to their declared policy that such matters should be finalised in accordance with the will of the people. Any reference to the people can only take place when law and order have been fully established.
- (3) H. H. the Maharaja will invite Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to form an Interim Government after the Mysore pattern.

9. To M.C. Mahajan¹

New Delhi

27 October 1947

My dear Dr. Mahajan,

Thank you for your letter. I am glad indeed that the Maharaja Saheb signed the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement, also that he has invited Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim government.² I am sure this is a wise decision which will do good to Kashmir and to India. I hope that this decision will be given effect to in a spirit of the fullest trust and cooperation.

2. I am writing to His Highness separately and as, no doubt, you will see that letter, I shall not repeat it here.³

3. We have decided for the present to issue to the press only the letter of the Maharaja to the Governor General and the Governor General's reply. Those two state the facts clearly and briefly. Tomorrow your statement will be issued. No further information has been given to the press at present. We shall decide about this from day to day.

4. I am sending my secretary, Dwarkanath Kachru, to Srinagar with these letters. He will remain there for some days and return when he can. It is my own wish to visit Srinagar for a day. But just at present it is impossible for me to leave Delhi. As soon as I can manage it, I shall go there.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Collection.

2. Sheikh Abdullah was sworn in as the Prime Minister of the Interim Government of Kashmir on 31 October 1947.

3. See the next item.

10. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
27 October 1947

Dear Maharaja Saheb,

Shri V.P. Menon returned from Jammu this evening and informed me of the talks there. He gave me the Instrument of Accession and the Standstill Agreement which you had signed, and I saw also your letter to the Governor General of India. Allow me to congratulate you on the wise decisions that you have taken. I earnestly hope that they will lead not only to the effective protection of the Kashmir State in the present, but also to the freedom and well-being of Kashmir and India as a whole.

2. I am sending you separately the Governor General's reply to your letter. As you know, we sent Indian Army troops by air to Srinagar today. The decision to send them was made yesterday afternoon. Our resources in aircraft are limited. Nevertheless we strained every nerve and got all the available planes and sent a considerable body of men to Srinagar today. I must express my great satisfaction at the manner in which this difficult piece of organizational work was done at this end. It involved working hard, nearly the whole night. Soon after arrival in Srinagar the troops proceeded on the Baramula Road and came in contact with the enemy raiders and held them at Baramula. To have been transported from Delhi to Srinagar and to be in action within a few hours has been a remarkable achievement.

3. Tomorrow morning we shall send more troops by air and we propose to continue sending reinforcements by air and road. By road we would like to send them to Jammu, but we are not quite clear about the state of the road and I suggest that every effort might be made to put this road in proper conditions within the next two or three days. This road is going to be the chief life-line for our troops and for supplies. It is essential and urgent, therefore, that the road be in good condition and the river that has to be crossed should be bridged. Naturally there is no time for any permanent arrangements. Something should be done temporarily to make the road and the river passable.

4. I trust that there are enough motor vehicles in Jammu to take our troops and supplies to Srinagar from Jammu whenever necessary. Motor transport should also be made available to our troops in Srinagar. It is impossible to send it there. We shall try, of course, to send petrol.

5. It is our intention to use some aeroplanes in the valley. For this

1. J. N. Collection.

it is necessary to have some kind of aviation petrol depot in Srinagar. We shall try to send the aviation petrol there.

6. I am sorry we have been unable to send relief to the pockets of Kashmir State troops which have been isolated in Jammu Province. We felt that we must use every aircraft available for transport of troops to Srinagar. Tomorrow also we want to use every plane for troop transport. Day after tomorrow we shall endeavour to send food supplies to these isolated pockets in Jammu province.

7. The arrival of our troops in Srinagar undoubtedly saved the situation at the very last moment. Probably a day or two's delay would have been fatal. But the task is still very difficult and we have to put all our strength and energy into it. We propose to do so.

8. The way the people of Kashmir, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, are facing the situation and preparing to defend their country is most heartening. I trust that in this defence we shall give a demonstration to all India and to the world how we can function unitedly and in a non-communal way in Kashmir. In this way this terrible crisis in Kashmir may well lead to a healing of the deep wound which India has suffered in recent months.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

11. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

New Delhi
27 October 1947

My dear Sheikh Saheb,

V. P. Menon came back from Jammu this evening bringing the agreement for accession as well as the Standstill Agreement duly signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir. He also brought a letter from the Maharaja addressed to the Governor-General. I am enclosing a copy of this letter as well as a copy of Lord Mountbatten's reply.

2. We are issuing both these letters to the press tonight. No other statement is being issued at present. These two letters give a brief account of the present position and we thought we shouldn't add to it just now. That

1. J. N. Collection.

position is that Kashmir has formally acceded to the Indian Union and that the Maharaja is going to invite you to form an interim government after the Mysore pattern. In the emergency before us we cannot meticulously be careful about details or strict legal position. Till the raiders are driven out of Kashmir you or anyone else will have little chance of doing anything else except meet this menace.

3. You need not trouble to sit down and study carefully the Mysore arrangement. Generally speaking it means that you form the Government including the present Prime Minister, Mahajan, who retains his title. Presumably you will be called the Chief Minister. All this is a little confusing in nomenclature and the functions might also be a little confusing to begin with. In theory Mahajan will be just one member of the Ministry with no special powers to override the others. The Maharaja will in law retain all his powers, but in practice he should abide by the advice of his Ministry like a constitutional head. There are some matters which the Maharaja has stated he reserves for the present. We need not argue about these matters now.

4. I do not know what the next step of the Maharaja will be. If he wants to see you and you can spare the time to visit him, you might do so and present the names of your Ministry. If, however, you cannot leave Srinagar, then you should postpone your visit for the present. The defence of Srinagar and the valley is the first consideration. In any event the Maharaja should formally appoint you Chief Minister with power to act. You will function specially in the valley as you are there. When your Ministry is complete you will naturally meet all together and lay down general policy to be pursued. This too should be largely confined to defence at present, other matters to be left over till the immediate peril is passed.

5. The immediate need is, however, defence. It is clear that our troops have arrived there in the nick of time. One more day's delay might have been fatal. If they could have gone two or three days earlier, it would have been much better. However, we must be thankful for having got there just in time. I must say that the whole operation has been a remarkably fine achievement. We decided yesterday afternoon to send these troops by air this morning. Our resources are limited in planes. We mobilised them in the course of the evening and the night, and the troops went off early in the morning and some in the afternoon today. By the afternoon they were in action. This is a smart piece of work which shows very good organisation. Tomorrow morning more troops will be flying over. This process will be continued the day after.

6. We are meeting in Defence Committee tomorrow to think out the

future and layplans for it. We have taken up the defence of Kashmir and this is the first priority for us, and we shall discharge it to the utmost of our ability. We have at the same time to think of all the other consequences of the action we have taken and to prepare for them. I need not tell you that nearly all our time and energy are being spent over this matter now.

7. Apart from the troops we are sending to Srinagar we intend sending a brigade to Jammu. But we are not quite clear yet about the state of the road from Pathankot. These troops in Jammu can be sent on to Srinagar at short notice.

8. I think it is urgently necessary for something to be done about the two bridges at Kohala and near Muzaffargarh. Our air experts tell us they cannot bomb them from the air. We are examining the position still further. It seems, however, that the only thing to be done is to try to dynamite them from the ground. You can consult Hiralal Atal about it and try to make some arrangement for this if it is possible.

9. Now that Kashmir has definitely acceded to India, Pakistan troops as such cannot enter Kashmir without provoking war. I rather doubt that they will enter. But one must be prepared for every development. My information is that the Pakistan Government was waiting for the fall of Srinagar to recognize the Provisional Government formally and to move in troops into Jammu. All this programme has been upset by our action today.

10. We are sending more and more rifles, sten guns, etc., for arming the civil population. In this matter you will please consult Hiralal Atal and the Battalion Commander. You should choose able-bodied young men, Muslim, Hindu, etc., to be armed in this way and form them in a kind of home guard. The duty of these persons should be to guard Srinagar and other towns in the valley, also the airport. Our troops will thus be relieved for offensive operations. I hope you will impress upon all our people to act in a strictly disciplined way during this emergency. No looseness or weakness should be tolerated; nor should any destructive elements be allowed much scope.

11. The statement which you gave to Kachru has been sent to the press and will appear tomorrow².

2. Sheikh Abdullah said that Kashmir was in dire peril and the first duty of every Kashmiri was to defend his motherland against intruders. He also demanded full responsible government for Kashmir.

12. I have sent long accounts of developments in Kashmir to our Ambassadors and representatives abroad in London, Washington, New York, Moscow and Nanking. I propose to keep them fully informed as this is a matter of world concern. It is just conceivable that the question might be raised in the United Nations General Assembly. We have to be ready for that.

13. I am sending Rs. 5,000/- with Kachru. I shall send another 5,000/- in two or three days with someone else. I do not want to send larger sums at one time. Presumably there will be no lack of funds for governmental purposes. This money is for non-governmental purposes.

14. Kachru can remain there or come away as you desire. If he is useful to you, keep him, or send him back for a few days. He will be there as my secretary, that is this will be his official capacity in liaison with your Government. You can use him as such.

15. We have taken on a tough job. But I am dead sure that we shall pull through. Ever since the decision was taken yesterday, and I heard today that our troops had reached Srinagar, I have felt much lighter in heart. We have taken the plunge and we shall swim across to the other shore. This business is of vital importance, of course, to Kashmir. But it affects equally vitally all States in India and indeed the whole of India. It has become a test of our future.

16. I am getting frequent reports from our military in Srinagar. Please remember that you can send wireless messages to me from the aerodrome.

17. I am summoning back Colonel Kaul³ from Washington. He is one of our best officers and he will be of great use here. Please give my regards to Begum Abdullah and my greetings to Bakshi and other friends. The eyes of the whole of India are on Kashmir at present and as for us our hearts are there also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Lieut.-General Brij Mohan Kaul (1912-1972): Military Attache, Indian embassy, Washington, 1947; Military Advisor, Indian delegation, Lake Success, in Kashmir case, 1948; Director of Organisation, Army Headquarters, 1952-53; Chief of Staff to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, 1953-54; Chief of General Staff, Army Headquarters, 1961.

12. To Hiralal Atal¹

New Delhi
27 October 1947

My dear Hiralal,

I have received your message and I have also been receiving scripts from our military headquarters in Srinagar. It seems to me that our troops arrived in Srinagar in the very nick of time. Possibly a day's delay might have been fatal. We must be thankful for this after so many mistakes have been made previously. I must say that the whole operation of sending these troops today, their disembarking at Srinagar and getting into action was a fine piece of work, for which I should like to congratulate all concerned. We decided yesterday afternoon to send our troops by air. Our resources in aircraft are strictly limited, and yet we managed to fly these troops across and immediately after they were in action. That is good going.

With this fortunate beginning I have no doubt in my mind about the future. I realise fully that we have taken on a tough job full of risks and danger and that we have to deal with a clever and unscrupulous opponent. But we have taken the plunge and we shall carry on.

Soon after I got your message I saw Air Commodore Mukerjee² and General Bucher. Bucher promised his best to send your requirements. General Lockhart³ also came to see me and I have pressed upon him the need for speed. We cannot possibly afford to leave our troops in Srinagar without full support and reinforcements. I cannot definitely tell you what reinforcements are being sent except that a full load will go across tomorrow and possibly the day after. We are considering this early tomorrow morning in Defence Committee.

You will realise no doubt that the step we have taken in Kashmir is bound to have far-reaching repercussions and we have to keep that in mind and prepare for it. Indeed we cannot wait for events to happen now or allow ourselves to be caught unprepared. I have asked the Heads of our Services to prepare a full appreciation of possible developments and what we can

1. Printed in Maj. Gen. H. Atal's *Nehru's Emissary to Kashmir, October 1947*, (New Delhi, 1972), pp. 54-60.
2. Air Marshal Subroto Mukerjee (1911-1960); commissioned into Air Force, 1942; first Indian to command an Air Force station at Kohat, August 1943; Director of Training at Air Headquarters, 1946; appointed Deputy Chief of Air Staff, 1951; Chief of Air Force, 1954-60.
3. General Sir Rob Lockhart (1893-1981); Acting Governor, N.W.F.P., January-August 1947; Commander-in-Chief, Indian Army, August-December, 1947; retired 1948;

do about them. I have separately asked the Defence Minister to get plans and appreciations from some senior Indian officers of the three Services. This will be kept secret by us.

We hope to send some planes for strafing from the air in the Valley. Unfortunately our air resources are limited. I am afraid we cannot do much beyond Baramula and up the Jhelum Valley Road as the valley there is narrow. But this is a matter for our air people to decide. Our chief difficulty is to have aviation petrol in Srinagar before we can function from there. This we shall try to arrange.

What about the two bridges at Kohala and over the Kishanganga near Muzaffarabad ? Mukerjee tells me that it is next to impossible to bomb them from the air with the aircraft at our disposal. We must therefore rule this out. At the same time we must make an attempt to destroy these bridges. I am sure you can arrange with Sheikh Abdullah a small party with necessary equipment to endeavour to do this. It is a very risky job, but worth doing. The destruction of these two bridges would change the entire situation.

I am told that the programme of the raiders was to celebrate Id day at Srinagar. Further that after the fall of Srinagar the Pakistan Government would have recognised the Provisional Government and taken formal possession of Kashmir. A brigade was being concentrated for a move towards Jammu also. An intercepted message from Pakistan Army says that the whole area round Chakwal near Pindi should be cleared of non-Muslims within five days from today. What this means I do not quite know except that some mischief was afoot and arrangements were being made for it.

Kashmir has now formally acceded to the Indian Union and we have accepted that accession. This makes a big difference in the constitutional position and if Pakistan Army goes into Kashmir State anywhere it means war. I rather doubt if they will do this; but they may well go on encouraging irregulars to enter Kashmir. The possibility of war is however bound to be a damper on them, as this would mean their having to protect their whole West Punjab border. In any event we must be perfectly prepared for all consequences.

The Maharaja of Kashmir has also agreed to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim government. The present Prime Minister will also be a member of that Government. But all the others will be nominated by Sheikh Abdullah who really would be in charge. How this will work out in detail I do not know nor do I very much care. We cannot enter into nice legal details at this stage. The point is that Sheikh Abdullah will have the authority to represent the Kashmir Government. He will naturally exercise this authority primarily now in the Valley itself for the defence of the State although that authority extends to the whole of the State.

We shall be sending you more arms for distribution to the civil population. In this matter you will take the advice of Sheikh Abdullah both because he is going to be the Chief Minister and as head of the National Conference. Chosen young men, Muslim, Hindu and Sikh, should be given rifles and if possible given some simple training. We must do all this on a non-communal basis inviting everyone to joining in defence but taking care of one major factor—to trust none who might give trouble. Thus the Muslim League and the Muslim Conference people must be excluded. So also I think the R. S. S. people, although in the present emergency they can hardly misbehave. These armed volunteers can well undertake the defence of, and the duty of keeping order in Srinagar and other towns in the Valley. They could also look after the airport. This would leave our troops for more active work.

I do not know how long you propose to stay there. I would suggest that you stay on as long as your presence is necessary. You may, if you like, come over for a brief consultation and then go back. For the first few days you must remain there to study things.

I am asking for the return immediately of Bijji Kaul from Washington.

This trouble in Kashmir has been thrust upon us and yet it may well be the saving of us in many ways. It may go a long way in settling our problem with Pakistan as well as the Indian States. It may and I hope it will change the entire communal atmosphere in India. The fact that Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs are cooperating for the defence of Kashmir will tone up our whole system. The fact also that in the main Muslims are engaged in this defence and are fighting raiders and Pakistanis will also be of great significance all over India and abroad. So you are not merely dealing with the problem of the defence of Kashmir, big enough as though it is, but even greater problem in which the future of India is involved.

Kanhaiyalal⁴ gave me your note this morning. That was just like you. Subsequently Mukerjee spoke to me about the incident.⁵ So also did Bucher. It is clear that the British Brigadier misbehaved and he had no business to be offensive to you. He will no doubt be dealt with suitably and in any

4. Kanhaiyalal Atal (1913-1949); commissioned into Indian Army, 1934; served in Second World War in Eritrean Campaign; Brigadier, 1948-49; awarded Maha Vir Chakra (posthumously), 1951.
5. Major-General Atal had been appointed Liaison Officer of the Government of India in Kashmir State. Before he left for Kashmir he had been directed by Nehru that the plane he was in, and others that followed, should circle Srinagar as this would indicate that help for Srinagar's defence was forthcoming. When Atal approached Brigadier Mellsop at the Palam airport to acquaint him with Nehru's directives, the latter answered rudely and made disparaging remarks about the Prime Minister. Air Commodore Mukerjee was present at the time of this incident. Atal had written a note on this incident to Nehru asking to be relieved of this assignment after he had fulfilled his mission and be permitted to retire from service.

event he is a passing bird. But is it fair of you to offer your resignation at a critical moment because a Britisher is offensive and disagreeable. Surely this is an odd conclusion to arrive at. Nerves are frayed in the early hours of the morning after hard work during the night and not too much importance should be attached to sudden displays of temper. Anyway, this matter will be dealt with suitably. But I must ask you not to become too tragic at every provocation. That leads to loss of nervous energy when we require all our strength and clarity of mind. So don't bother about this incident and carry on with the very important work you are doing.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

13. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

I hasten to thank you for your message about the situation in Kashmir which was delivered to me this morning by your Deputy High Commissioner.²

2. For some time past we have had reports of infiltration of armed raiders in the western parts of Jammu Province. These raiders had done a great deal of damage in that area and taken possession of part of the territory. Three days ago we heard of a major raid from the Frontier Province *via* Abbottabad Road to Kashmir. Some 2,000 or more fully-armed and well-equipped men came in motor transport, crossed over to Kashmir territory near Muzaffarabad, sacked that town killing many people and proceeded along the Jhelum valley road towards Srinagar. Intermediate towns and villages were sabotaged and burned and many people killed. These raids were stopped by Kashmir State troops near Uri for some time but they got round them and burnt the power-house near Uri which supplies electricity to the whole of Kashmir. Position yesterday morning was that these raids had been held by troops numbering nearly 200 and part of the civil population which had armed at Baramula where the valley begins. Beyond Baramula there was no major obstruction up to Srinagar which is 35 miles

1. New Delhi, 28 October 1947. L/P & S/13/1868, I.O.L.R.

2. Attlee urged Nehru to refrain from armed intervention in Kashmir as it would only aggravate the problem and lead to "an open military conflict" between the two countries. He felt that the international aspect was not "so serious as to warrant taking such grave risks...." He added he had requested the Pakistan Government to "do their utmost" to prevent armed persons from entering Kashmir.

away. There was immediate danger of these raids reaching Srinagar and destroying and sabotaging that capital city and massacring large numbers of people both Hindus and Muslims.

3. Kashmir State troops were spread out all over the State, and most of them were deployed along western border of Jammu Province, and have split up into small isolated groups. Most of State officials had left the threatened area, and civil administration was not functioning. Order was maintained however in the valley by volunteers of National Conference. Progress of invaders had been marked by murder, arson and loot. All that stood between Srinagar and fate which had overtaken places en route followed by raiders was determination of people of Srinagar, Muslims and non-Muslims and practically without arms, to defend themselves. Srinagar also had a large increase in population from Hindu and Sikh refugees from West Punjab and there was little doubt that these would be massacred if raiders reached them.

4. The Maharaja appealed urgently to us for help.* He further suggested accession to Indian Union. The appeal for help also came to us from largest popular organisation in Kashmir, the National Conference, which consists chiefly of Muslims, but also of Hindus and others. This Conference, under leadership of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, declared that they would fight to death and protect their beautiful city and country at whatever cost. Thus we were approached not only officially by State authorities, but also on behalf of people of State.

5. Our own interests in future Kashmir could not be ignored. I have already drawn your attention to this. In case the raiders reached and sacked Srinagar this would have had very far-reaching consequences over communal situation all over India.

6. We decided at first not to send any troops to Kashmir, but to supply arms for which demand had come to us some time ago. But later developments made it clear that, unless we send troops immediately, complete disaster would overtake Kashmir with terrible consequences all over India. Immediate action was necessary to avoid this and save Kashmir.

We therefore elected to send troops to Kashmir, and early this morning one battalion of Indian troops was flown to Srinagar, and has landed there.

3. On 26 October 1947, the Maharaja of Kashmir sought accession and the following day Mountbatten replied to the Maharaja accepting the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India. He informed the Maharaja that no sooner had law and order been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader than the question of the State's accession should be settled by a plebiscite.

Reinforcements by air are going to follow. The sole object of these troops is to defend Srinagar, and to push out raiders who have no right whatsoever to be on Kashmir territory.

7. We took fully into account possible repercussions of our action in India and elsewhere. We decided that, in any event, the repercussions of our not taking action would be infinitely greater and more harmful. All these raiders have come into Kashmir territory, whether in Kashmir proper or in Jammu, across Pakistan territory. They are fully armed and equipped, and they have come in a large number of motor trucks. It is impossible to imagine that this move and arming and supply of trucks could have taken place without knowledge and assistance of Pakistan authorities. Nevertheless the Pakistan Government have officially disclaimed all responsibility for assisting in the invasion. According to their own statements this is an armed raid of irresponsible elements into a state which is friendly to us. It should be to their interest as well as ours to stop this raiding, which can only result in utter ruin for Kashmir. We would have welcomed their cooperation in this attempt. But situation was so urgent and critical that we could not wait further. Their actions during these few weeks have not led us to believe that they are averse to this raid. It seemed to us that, while keeping themselves aloof, they wanted to force their will through these raids on Kashmir State and people. This was resented by Maharaja and his people who fortunately for Kashmir are functioning together, both Muslims and Hindus, for defence of their country.

9. Our attitude and policy have been, as I have stated to you, that in case of any disputed State territory, the problem of accession should be decided amicably and in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned. We had no desire to force any State into accession and, even when Kashmir's Maharaja asked for accession, we hesitated and told him of our policy. Ultimately when this demand was insistently made on us and was supported by responsible popular element in Kashmir we replied that in the peculiar circumstances we were prepared to accept such accession, but it was to be clearly understood that final decision could only be taken in accordance with the wishes of the people, to be ascertained as soon as law and order were established.

10. We are satisfied that large majority of Muslim population of Kashmir as well as, of course, all non-Muslim population are full of indignation at this raid, and are determined to combat it; further that they want us to help them in this. In this critical state of affairs failure on our part to help would have been fatal, and we decided to send aid as rapidly as possible. It is impossible for us to look on when armed raiders come and destroy and upset the Government there. We are determined to prevent this at all costs.

Not only our honour and self-interest, but also a consideration of communal situation, left us no other course.

11. Our military intervention is purely defensive in aim and scope, in no way affecting any future decision about accession that might be taken by the people of Kashmir ultimately. Meanwhile we cannot desert the Ruler and people of a friendly State who are in peril.

12. We are always ready to discuss any issue in dispute with representatives of Pakistan. We have laid down the principle that accession of every State, whether Junagadh or Kashmir or Hyderabad, should depend on ascertained wishes of the people concerned. This is eminently fair and just and that is why an agreement should not be arrived at on that basis. It should be to the interest of Pakistan Government to join us in our efforts to clear Kashmir of the invaders. Early we trust the task (*sic*). If this is not accomplished, other questions do not arise and only rapid deterioration of homicidal situation will take place. There is no reason why Pakistan should take exception to action we have taken though we realise that they may not approve of it. We had no choice in this matter. We are prepared however to explore all avenues of friendly settlement.

13. I am glad that you have asked the Pakistan Government to do their utmost to prevent the incursion into Kashmir of armed persons from outside. In this task we can both cooperate. It is easy for them to stop this incursion, for the raiders pass through their territory and find equipment there.

14. Since the foregoing paragraphs of this telegram were dictated, fresh developments have occurred. These I am communicating in my immediately succeeding telegram No. 408.

14. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have communicated to you text of telegram I sent to Prime Minister, United Kingdom, regarding Kashmir situation.² I have also sent you text of corres-

1. New Delhi, 28 October 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, p. 48. This was repeated to C.R. Attlee on the same day.
2. See *ante*, item 7.

PRIME MINISTER.
INDIA.

Secret

New Delhi
7.11.47

My dear Dwarka Nath,

Your letter of today's date.

I am fully conscious of the political difficulties that have arisen between Shri. Sahas and the Maharaja. In fact that is why I sent Braj Lal Mishra and he wrote I gave him reply to these difficulties. I spoke at length to Batra last night and made him read the note also.

We are all agreed here that the Maharaja's attitude has been bad and is bound to lead to trouble. The attempt to evacuate machines from Jaipur was an amazingly stupid thing to do. Yesterday I sent an express telegram to him but I suppose I was too late. I have again repeated this warning today.

FIRST PAGE OF LETTER TO DWARKANATH KACHRU, 7 NOVEMBER 1947

pondence between Governor-General, India, and Maharaja Kashmir, regarding accession of Kashmir State to Indian Union. I have sent a further message to Prime Minister, U.K., informing him of imminent peril to Srinagar and Kashmir from raiders and of action we have taken to give protection to people there.³

I want to invite your Government's cooperation in stopping these raiders entering Kashmir territory from Pakistan. These raids have already resulted in large-scale deaths and destruction and if they are not stopped immediately they will lead to ruin of Kashmir. The consequences of success of such irresponsible raiders anywhere will be far-reaching all over India. Therefore in interest of both Pakistan and India such raids must be stopped. As raiders come across Pakistan territory it should be possible to stop them there.

I wish to assure you that action Government of India has taken has been forced upon them by circumstances and imminent and grave danger to Srinagar. They have no desire to intervene in the affairs of Kashmir State after raiders have been driven away and law and order established.

In regard to accession also it has been made clear that this is subject to reference to people of State and their decision. Government of India have no desire to impose any decision and will abide by people's wishes. But these cannot be ascertained till peace and law and order prevail. Protection of Kashmir from armed raids thus becomes first objective and in this we trust we shall have your cooperation.

3. See the preceding item.

15. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I would welcome an early opportunity of meeting you and discussing various problems that have arisen, more specially developments in Kashmir about which I have informed you. I earnestly hope that there will be cooperation between Pakistan and India in stopping raids and putting down disorder and then leaving choice about future to people of Kashmir. I am glad to learn that you are likely to visit Delhi for Joint Defence Council meeting soon...

1. New Delhi, 28 October 1947. Extracts. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*.

15a. Formation of Home Guards¹

In the *Sitrep* about Kashmir there is a reference to the desirability of arming the personnel of the National Conference. Brigadier Atal and O/C 1 Sikh have recommended this. It is obvious that it is urgently necessary to form some kind of Home Guard there which should be armed. It is also clear from the reports that the only persons who can do it are the leaders of the National Conference. In terms of the settlement with the Maharaja of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah is to be in charge as Chief Minister and will form the Ministry. What steps have been taken so far in this matter is not clear. But in any event this is going to be done very soon. Meanwhile, Sheikh Abdullah should be treated as such by our troops as there is no other authority there. We are communicating both to the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah on this subject. Meanwhile, in order to avoid delay, instructions might be sent to Brigadier Atal and O/C 1 Sikh that they should cooperate with Sheikh Abdullah in arming persons selected by Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues to form a Home Guard. The sooner this is done the better.

1. Note to Chief of the General Staff, 29 October 1947. J.N. Collection.

16. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
30 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,
Information has reached me that R.S.S. volunteers have been organised in East Punjab to be sent to Jammu for a campaign against the Muslims. It is stated that 500 were sent *via* Pathankot some days ago in special trucks. Further that a Special Recruiting Officer has been appointed by the Kashmir Government to go to Gurdaspur District and Kangra to recruit Sikhs, Dogras, etc. This officer is especially in touch with the R.S.S.

1. J.N. Collection.

to say all that I wished to say. But I think I have said enough to explain to you the delicate position that faces us and to inform you of the answer we have sent to the Afghan Government. I wanted you to have this background of information so that you could prepare yourself for and judge subsequent developments; also so that you might be able to give the correct lead to your people. We have to be careful lest in our dissatisfaction with any policy of the British Government we might do something which is injurious to India as a whole and to the Frontier Province especially. We would then be out of the frying pan into the fire.

15. I wish I could meet you and discuss all these matters with you. But I fear that is not possible now or in the near future. If, however, there is any important matter that you wish to refer to me, I hope you will send a letter by messenger.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

10. On Propaganda by Afghanistan¹

The Hon'ble Member for External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations said that about a month ago the press and the radio in Afghanistan had started a campaign giving prominence to Afghanistan's interests in the North West Frontier and the claim was made that Pathans were Afghans rather than Indians and they should have the utmost freedom to decide their own future and should not be debarred, as the proposed referendum would appear to do, from deciding either to form a separate free State or to rejoin their motherland, viz. Afghanistan. These claims had later been taken up on an official level with H.M.G. and the Government of India. The Government of India had refuted this irredentist claim of Afghanistan to the area lying between the Durand line and the Indus river, and had pointed out that the issue regarding an independent Pathan State was a matter entirely for the Government of India and the Afghan

1. Remarks at a Cabinet meeting on 4 July 1947. *The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, Vol. 11, p. 878.

Government had no locus-standi. H.M.G.'s Minister at Kabul² had mentioned the possibility that the Afghan Government's object might be to divert public attention in Afghanistan from the internal economic situation which was precarious.

2. Giles Frederick Squire (1894-1959); joined Indian Civil Service 1920; Minister to Afghanistan, 1943-48; Ambassador to Afghanistan, 1948-49.

11. To Khan Sahib¹

New Delhi

5th July 1947

My dear Khan,

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd July which you sent in answer to mine. I fully appreciate what you say. I only wish we could help you in your present difficulties. We have difficulties enough here from all quarters, but I realise that for the moment your difficulties are greater than ours. We are anxiously waiting for news of what happens in the Frontier Province during the next few days. Rest assured that our thoughts are with you and such help as we can give is always at your disposal.

As I suggested previously in my letter, if there is any important communication, I hope you will send it to me by messenger.

Please convey my regards to Badshah Khan and your other colleagues.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

12. The States and the Three Central Subjects¹

1. I informed Sir Walter that Pandit Nehru had informed me at his interview yesterday that the Congress Party were prepared to accept any Indian State as a full member of the Dominion of India if they would adhere for the three Central subjects (Defence, External Affairs and Communications) which were laid down in the Cabinet Mission plan of May 16. He had pointed out to me that all States had declared their willingness to accept these three subjects and that, provided the difficulty

1. This account of Nehru's interview with Mountbatten on 7 July 1947 is in Mountbatten's note on his interview with Walter Monckton dated 8 July 1947. *The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, Vol. 12, pp. 11-12.

of the partition of India could be accepted, he saw no reason why they should not join on those terms. I said that I had instructed the Political Department to put this on the agenda for the meeting of the 25th July.

2. I told Sir Walter that Pandit Nehru had agreed that I should conduct negotiations in the first instance and subsequently the States Department; and that I had arranged to keep him personally informed and thought that in that case he would not find it necessary to attend the meetings himself.

13. Mountbatten's Note on Interview with Nehru¹

1. I told him that Sir Olaf Caroe had written asking whether Pandit Nehru would agree that Mahbub Ali² should be shown a copy of Mr. Justice Clarke's³ finding, and would further agree that he might be given a copy to keep with his own records. Nehru was very generous about it and said that he had already given personal publicity to this finding and was only too glad that Mahbub should have it.

2. I discussed with him the question of an increase in the strength of the Assam Rifles, and he reminded me that this matter had been raised in Cabinet and the decision had been to send the whole file to the Finance Member where it now was.

3. I mentioned to him the request of the Catholic Bishop of Lucknow⁴ to be allowed to bring in a number of Italian priests. He said that two

1. 8 July 1947. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Paragraphs 1 and 4 are printed in *The Transfer of Power 1942-7*, Vol. 12, pp. 6-7.

2. Mahbub Ali, the Political Agent in Malakand, was exonerated of misconduct in failing to prevent an attack by the tribesmen on Nehru and his party on his visit to the North West Frontier Province in October 1946.

3. Reginald Clarke; practised at the Rangoon Bar, 1924-41; served in the army in Burma and India, 1942-44; Judge, Madras High Court, 1944-48; Judge of Clerkenwell, Middlesex, 1955-66.

4. Sydney Alfred Bill.

or three months ago he had been approached by (or on behalf of) the Bishop, and that he had given instructions for the E.A. Department to forward the request to the Home Department saying that so far as they were concerned it could be approved.

4. Nehru complained about Sir C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar's gratuitously insulting remarks about India having established diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.⁵ I told him it was my intention to invite Sir C.P. to come and see me in the near future to try and persuade him to join the Dominion of India on the basis of the three subjects of Defence, External Affairs and Communications, which Pandit Nehru had told me at yesterday's interview that the Congress Party were now prepared to accept as a basis of relationship between the Dominion of India and such States. I said I would certainly take up this question with Sir C.P. then. Pandit Nehru said that the basic difficulty with Sir C.P. was that he had a very inflated opinion of his own importance, was always taking offence unless he was played up to, and seemed to want to get into the news gratuitously. I promised to try and get hold of Sir C.P. as soon as I could without making it a matter of urgency.

5. On 6 July 1947, C.P. Ramaswami Aiyar declared "...Travancore cannot be found to join a dominion whose leaders have at this critical juncture in world history established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Republic."

asked us to go to discuss Kashmir. He also wanted us to get the Maharaja and Mahajan to be present. I informed him through Mountbatten that I saw no reason at all why the Maharaja or Mahajan should be present. If there were to be any talks they should be on Dominion level. If any particular matter relating to Kashmir was to be discussed then you have to be present. Personally I think that neither you nor Mahajan should go to him.

This evening I saw Pakistan's statement on Kashmir.² I was so annoyed with this that I have cancelled my visit to Lahore. I propose not to discuss Kashmir with Jinnah or the Pakistan Ministers after this statement. I am quite clear in my own mind that we must go ahead with our policy firmly and without faltering and make Jinnah realise that there is going to be no weakness or parleys. The only thing I am prepared to discuss, and that too under suitable circumstances, is the kind of plebiscite or election or referendum we might have in Kashmir after all the troubles have subsided. This will naturally take time. After giving much thought to it I feel that the proper course would be then to invite the United Nations Organisation to supervise the referendum. In one of your speeches you referred to a referendum being held under the joint auspices of India and Pakistan. I think any such arrangement is bound to lead to trouble and conflict and this should be avoided. Nor can we have the British Government or British officers to supervise. The only course left is to ask the United Nations which have some practice in this in Europe.

I want to come to Srinagar very much for a day or at least for a few hours. I shall try to do so in the course of next week if possible. Meanwhile, more power to your elbow and all my good wishes to my friends and comrades.

Begum Abdullah and family are leaving by plane early tomorrow morning for Indore.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The statement of 30 October 1947 asserted that Kashmir's accession, based on "fraud and violence", could not be recognised by Pakistan. It also alleged that the Kashmir Government had ignored or rejected all efforts of the Pakistan Government to hold discussions with them and claimed to have conclusive proof of provocation of the Pathan raid by attacks on Muslims in Jammu and Poonch by the Kashmir State troops.

19. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram dated 30th October.² I have repeatedly expressed to you my sentiments regarding the cycle of retaliation which has plunged West and East Punjab in tragedy. Both in public and private I have condemned atrocities irrespective of community of the perpetrators, Sikh, Hindu or Muslim. If Hindus and Sikhs have killed or driven out Muslims in any part of Kashmir, I condemn their action without reserve. I find it impossible, however, to accept either your version of the causes and course of attack on Kashmir or the baseless suggestion that we have sent troops to Kashmir on pretext of 'accession'. We are perfectly willing to have all events investigated during last 15 months to find out what have been basic causes and on whom blame rests. What has happened in Kashmir stands apart and must be judged as such, more specially in view of imminent danger of widespread disaster which Kashmir valley has had to face, which would have the most far-reaching consequences in regard to relations between India and Pakistan.

2. The Government of India entirely agree that no raids from one territory on another should take place and they must be stopped by all means at our disposal. It is patent that they have had nothing to do even remotely with occurrences in or near Kashmir State till they sent their troops to Srinagar on 27th October. Before accession, Kashmir was not our responsibility even though we were greatly interested in its future. We were not consulted by the Kashmir Government about any steps they may have taken or any correspondence with you. Our knowledge of what occurred then was derived largely from statements appearing in the press. From these statements it appears that the Kashmir Government's account is materially different from what you have given and according to them many raids have taken place from West Punjab into Jammu Province. As a matter of fact today a considerable part of Jammu Province has been occupied by raiders from West Punjab. These raiders are provided, according to reports, with the most modern weapons including flame-throwers. In these circumstances it is curious to state that aggression was from Kashmir State.

1. New Delhi, 31 October 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, pp. 49-50.
2. Liaquat Ali Khan had repeated the charge that the tribal invasion had been provoked by attacks on Muslims in Jammu and Poonch by mobs led by the State forces. Kashmir's accession to India had only worsened the situation. He also alleged that the Kashmir Government had all along been in "close touch" with the Indian Government while repeatedly refusing Pakistan's "offers of friendly discussions". As such Kashmir's request for Indian troops appeared to him planned and "formed quite independently" of the raid on 22 October 1947.

3. No impartial person could regard the military operations which for some weeks have been in progress against Kashmir as other than well-organised, well-planned and the result of most careful preparation. These operations certainly did not start on 22nd October. What started on the 22nd October was raid from North West Frontier Province. Its timing, mobility and speed are more suggestive of a concerted link between this operation and the operation which has been in progress on Kashmir's western borders than of a sudden tribal eruption inspired by communal happenings in the Punjab. In addition to this we have reliable information that regular Pakistan troops in large numbers were concentrated near the Kashmir border at Kohala as well as on the Jammu border and that they were prepared to enter Kashmir in the wake of the raiders.

4. You say that all along the Kashmir Government has been in close touch with us. You also say that Kashmir's plan of asking for Indian troops was formed quite independently of the recent raids. Indeed, you even suggest that the request for Indian troops was inspired by us. I repudiate both the statements of alleged fact and the insinuation. Until the Pathan raid started we had no request from Kashmir State for military aid and the question was never considered by us. Some weeks ago we were told by the Kashmir Government that essential supplies had been stopped by the Pakistan Government and we were requested to send some of these essential supplies. A request was also made for arms which was referred, in common with requests from other States, to our States and Defence Ministries. This was sanctioned but as a matter of fact no arms were sent to them at all as this matter was not considered very urgent. It was at 11 p.m. on the 24th October that an urgent and specific request was made to us for the first time for troops to be sent. We considered this on the 25th in our Defence Committee and again on the 26th morning. In view of the imminent peril to the Valley and the possibility of large-scale massacres, a decision was arrived at regarding accession and to send airborne troops the next day, the 27th October. You will appreciate that it would have been easy for us to send these troops earlier if we had intended doing so and thus stop the raiders at an early stage of their career along the Jhelum Valley road. Both military and other competent opinion has criticised us for being dilatory. At no time did we consider the question of sending troops for Kashmir previous to the 25th October. The earlier visits of the Kashmir officials were concerned with supplies and no question of giving military help arose.

5. Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us at the request of the Maharaja's Government and the most numerous representative popular organisation in the State which is predominantly Muslim. Even then it was accepted on the condition that as soon as the invader has been driven

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

from Kashmir soil, and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession. It is open to them to accede to either Dominion then. Had we desired a pretext either for Kashmir's accession or for sending our troops there we should not have waited to accomplish our purpose until half of the valley of Kashmir and parts of Jammu Province had been given to fire and sword and Srinagar itself was in peril of capture by the raiders with all its horrors.

6. I have no doubt that you realise that the raiders from the Frontier Province or along the Murree road come from Pakistan territory and it is the easiest thing in the world to stop them at the two bridges which connect Pakistan territory to Kashmir. They were not so prevented and their equipment and arms including artillery and automatic weapons bear witness to every help being given to them. We are credibly informed that regular officers of the Pakistan Army are advising the raiders. Even now it should be easy for your Government to stop the passage of these raiders or their supplies to Kashmir territory completely.

7. Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision about the future of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world. You lay on us responsibility for what is happening. I should have thought that this could more appropriately and fairly be placed on those who have been attacking and invading Kashmir. To accuse us of provocation and aggression when all that we have done is to go to the rescue of a people threatened with loss of life, property and honour, is a singular perversion of truth and reason. It gives me no pleasure to write to you in this strain. I am convinced that if Pakistan and India are to live in peace, leaders on both sides must have trust in one another and act with understanding and restraint. Mutual distrust and recrimination can only lead to consequences which would be to the advantage of neither India nor Pakistan. I have done everything possible to think and act in this spirit. It was not possible for us to refuse the request of the Kashmir Government to help them prevent raiding bands from committing massacre, arson and loot and ruining Kashmir. I should have thought that it was equally to your advantage to prevent this and hence my appeal to you to stop these raiders at the source.

8. I have no knowledge of the raid you refer to in Jammu in your last paragraph.³ I am inquiring about it. We shall certainly do our utmost to

3. Liaquat Ali Khan had referred to a raid on a village in West Punjab by a well-armed mob from Kashmir.

India in our approach to the Nepalese Government, and we were now desirous of coming to an agreement with the Indian authorities without further delay.

4. Viscount Montgomery made it clear that he did not wish the matter to be decided by the Indian Cabinet if that presented difficulty; he would be satisfied if he could obtain a satisfactory assurance from Pandit Nehru. He pressed Pandit Nehru to give this assurance before he left Delhi, in order that he might be able to inform the Prime Minister.

5. Pandit Nehru, whose attitude became rather more forthcoming towards the end of the conversation, said he must consult some of his colleagues. Viscount Montgomery urged Pandit Nehru to do this without delay and said he would be glad to call on Pandit Nehru at any time or place convenient to him tomorrow, to hear his answer.

6. I told Pandit Nehru that Viscount Montgomery was lunching with me tomorrow and that I hoped he would come too and would be able to give us an answer by then. Pandit Nehru accepted the invitation but did not promise a reply by then.

7. Viscount Montgomery then raised the question of British troops in India. Was it correct that Pandit Nehru wished them to be withdrawn on the transfer of power, on 15th August? Pandit Nehru replied in the affirmative. Viscount Montgomery said that after the transfer of power, British troops would be in India merely as sojourners; it would not be possible to withdraw them all at once; the plan he had been working on was for complete withdrawal by June, 1948, but he wished to get the British troops out as soon as possible and the plan could be speeded up to make withdrawal complete by the end of February, 1948. Pandit Nehru agreed. Viscount Montgomery said it was important for him to know whether there was any likelihood of the Government of the Indian Union changing their minds and asking for British troops to remain. Pandit Nehru said "we shall not ask you to stay".

8. It was pointed out to Pandit Nehru that the forthcoming withdrawal of British troops was an additional reason for reaching an early agreement about the employment of Gurkhas.

9. The conversation then turned to the arrangements for the division of the Indian army, in regard to which Pandit Nehru's ideas seemed to be rather nebulous and impractical.

10. Before we took our leave, there was some general talk about conditions in India with particular reference to the division of the country. Viscount Montgomery congratulated Pandit Nehru on the fact that the Indian leaders had reached agreement. Pandit Nehru spoke of the great amount of work to be done in connexion with the division of India, and of the relative poverty of Pakistan, industrially, as compared with the Indian Union. But Pakistan would possess many of the most productive food-growing areas, which showed how necessary it was for the two parts of India to have good relations. He also alluded to the French and Portuguese colonies in India which, he said, would inevitably come into the Indian Union sooner or later. He spoke of M. Baron's² "strange" proposal that France should continue to exercise some sort of cultural control in the French colonies; and he said that the Portuguese title to Goa derived from a Papal Bull. The Government of India had made an approach to the Vatican on this through the Catholic Primate in India. The Vatican, it appeared, were more concerned with the maintenance of their religious institutions throughout India than with the question of Goa itself.

II

Field Marshal Montgomery came to see me yesterday, accompanied by the U.K. High Commissioner Sir Terence Shone. He told me that as head of the British army he was arranging for the complete withdrawal of British troops from India. He intended beginning this process on the 15th August. He wanted to do so as rapidly as possible, but there were shipping and other difficulties which would delay the process. In any event, he said that the end of February 1948 was the final date for the withdrawal of the last soldier of the British army from India.

2. He asked me if I was agreeable to this withdrawal. I said I was entirely agreeable to the withdrawal as soon as possible. I could not fix any definite date, as this would depend on various facilities. A few weeks this way or that way would not matter, but I hoped that the withdrawal would be speedy and complete.

3. He asked me if there was any chance of our changing our minds later and asking some British troops to be left in India. If this happened it would upset his programme. I told him that there was not the least chance of this happening and we wanted British troops in India to be taken away completely.

2. Governor of the French territories in India.

4. He then spoke to me about the British proposal about taking Gurkha troops in the British army. This, of course, had been discussed previously with Major General Lyne, who came here some months back. It had been before the Cabinet on two or three occasions and it was in this connection that Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai and Brigadier Rudra had visited Kathmandu, on behalf of the Government of India.

5. The position was that the Government of India had agreed to the inclusion of Gurkha battalions—probably eight in number—in the Indian army, on the express understanding that they would be officered by Indian officers or possibly Gurkha officers. This had been agreed to on behalf of the Nepalese Government informally.

6. As regards the employment of Gurkha troops in the British army, no decision had so far been reached, though some light had been thrown on the attitude of the Nepalese Government by the visit of Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai and Brigadier Rudra to Nepal.

7. Field Marshal Montgomery pointed out that the British Government were very anxious for a decision in principle of this matter and their plans were hung up because of this. Also, in view of the division of the Indian army which was now taking place, it might be difficult to tackle this question at a later stage when facilities for doing so might not be forthcoming. Therefore, a quick decision by us was necessary. That decision need be only of the principle involved and not of any details. He did not want any formal decision either of the Cabinet. He is satisfied if I could give the assurance and he would communicate it to his Prime Minister and go ahead with the proposal. This meant that some representatives of the British War Office would visit India in the near future and discuss the matter more fully with representatives of the Government of India or our Defence Department. Later the two could go to Kathmandu for final discussions and decisions.

8. I told the Field Marshal that while we were anxious to meet the wishes of H.M.G., there were considerable difficulties in our way and many questions of principle were involved. I could not possibly, therefore, give him any answer at that stage committing our Government. Indeed, it was impossible for me to commit the future Dominion Government of India as that has not been formed. This did not seem to worry the Field Marshal and he said that my own assurance was quite enough for him. Ultimately, I said that I would consider the matter further, consult some of my colleagues and give him our reactions the next day, that is today.

9. Having consulted a number of my colleagues this morning, I met the Field Marshal this afternoon. Sir Terence Shone was also present. I told him that Gurkha troops especially, and, to some extent the whole Indian army, had become unpopular because of their use for imperial purposes by the British Government in the past. A year ago Gurkha troops came into conflict with Indonesians and there was much resentment in Indonesia against Gurkhas.³ Anything that we might do and which might lead to a continuation of the old tradition of employment of Gurkha troops for imperial purposes would be subject to adverse comment in India. While the present was no doubt different from the past and the future was likely to be still more different, it was the past that had produced the present psychological approach of our people. They would judge every action by their past and any hang-over from the past would be objected to. It would be looked upon as a continuation of the old imperialist method of holding down colonial territories. It might also appear as a continuation of the imperialist link with India. We were entirely opposed to any such thing, and would object strongly to the use of any troops, much more Gurkha troops, against any people struggling for their freedom. "What were the Gurkha troops required for?" I asked.

10. The Field Marshal said that they were required as a reserve for emergencies and to carry out the British commitments in the Far East. These troops were not to be used locally and certainly not against any people's movement for freedom. They were not to be used at all in fact, unless war came. Malaya was a suitable place for them to be stationed; otherwise, they had nothing to do with Malaya. He told me how Gurkhas had been misjudged in Indonesia, as they really helped in keeping the peace and preventing grave developments. So also in Syria, Sir Terence Shone added, where the Gurkhas became very popular with the people.

11. I said that we could not come in the way of any arrangement between the U.K. and Nepal, as Nepal was an independent country; but, owing to the geographical situation of Nepal, surrounded as it was by India, certain facilities were required of us. What were these facilities? He said, in the main, they required transit facilities, not for troops as such, but for individuals or groups of Gurkhas travelling as civilians across India. There might also be some facilities for transfer of moneys from the Gurkha soldiers to their country. Apart from this, practically

3. On 29 September 1945, Indian troops, including the Gurkhas, had landed in Indonesia to suppress the nationalist movement at Surabaya and there had been fierce fighting between the Gurkhas and the Indonesians.

The position is that well-armed and well-equipped raiders in large numbers provided with motor transport, automatic weapons, artillery and even flame-throwers entered Kashmir territory from a large number of points through Pakistan territory. They are under highly competent leadership. At first they entered Jammu Province and gradually drove the state troops back over a wide area which they hold today. We did not intervene. Then this major and well planned raid took place along Jhelum valley road which these raiders had taken to the accompaniment of massacre, arson and loot to the very gates of Srinagar. It is hardly possible to say that tribal people can possess modern weapons or motor transport or leadership unless these are provided to them by others. All raiders in Jhelum valley had to cross one or two bridges and it was exceedingly easy for Pakistan authorities to stop them at these bridges if not earlier. We are reliably informed that large numbers of regular Pakistan troops were concentrated near border at Kohala as also on Jammu border. We have had no information of all this from Pakistan Government. This appears to us to be not only an unfriendly act towards Kashmir but towards the Government of India also which was intensely interested in future of Kashmir. Submission to such raids means the end of all organised government with disastrous consequences all over India and Pakistan.

It seems to be clear that first step that must be taken by all parties concerned is to drive back raiders from Kashmir and establish peace and order there. We have undertaken to do this and we have invited Pakistan Government to help in this endeavour. We have stated also that we shall withdraw our troops as soon as order is established and leave people of Kashmir to decide their future. That future may be accession to either Dominion. We have succeeded in inducing Maharaja of Kashmir to agree to this. I can think of no fairer and more just settlement of this problem. We are prepared to discuss with Pakistan the question of how to ascertain the will of the people. There are at present electoral rolls for election to State Assembly. In any event any reference to the people can only be made after peace and order have been established in State. At present moment the invaders from Pakistan territories are threatening the lives of large numbers of people there and whole structure of State. It must be remembered that main opposition to this invasion comes from Muslims of State.

It is not clear to me what is meant by your suggestion that we should keep the Pakistan Government informed of any measure that we may take to assist in restoration of order in Kashmir.³ We have informed them that we have sent troops and that business of these troops is to protect the Valley

3. Atlee had suggested this as he felt that "it would be of advantage in promoting cooperation" between the two countries and "prevent the spread of exaggerated rumours..."

from invaders. I do not understand what other information we can give them. The supply of information cannot be a one-sided affair nor is such supply possible in a situation when momentary decisions have to be taken for military reasons. Kashmir has been brought to this pass by raiders coming from Pakistan territory without any information to us or attempt to stop them.

I appreciate your difficulty in making any comments on action which my Government has taken. We do not wish to add to your difficulties. We have taken this action with a full sense of responsibility because no other course was open to us as a Government and as Indians. Subsequent events have convinced us of rightness of this action. I would suggest that developments be judged by test of time and not only of expediency.

I am communicating this message to you through our High Commissioner in London and shall be grateful if you will arrange to supply him copies of your previous telegrams to me.

22. To Tej Bahadur Sapru¹

New Delhi
1 November 1947

My dear Tej Bahadurji,

I have your telegram.

2. I need not tell you how terribly concerned all of us have been over Kashmir developments. It has been touch-and-go there and we intervened at the very last possible moment. One day's delay would have meant the sack of Srinagar.

3. The Pakistan Government have made out that it is a conspiracy between us and the Maharaja. As a matter of fact there was no talk of our sending military help till the 25th night. It was obvious that military intervention was not only a difficult matter owing to geography, but might lead to all manner of dangerous consequences including war. We gave the most careful thought to this and finally decided on the afternoon of the 26th October to send help by air. On the 27th morning our troops began to go by air and there has been a continuous stream of them going since then. We have commandeered almost all the aircraft in India. Nearly all the air services have stopped.

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

4. I must say that both our military headquarters and the air services have done a magnificent job. To arrange to send troops by air within a few hours of decision involved hard work all night and a great deal of organisation. Our people have come up to the mark. So have our air crew, both military and civil. But for this, we would have failed to save Srinagar.

5. In Kashmir itself the departure of the Maharaja and Mahajan resulted in a complete collapse of the administration. Nearly all officials went away. There was practically no State army left and no police was functioning. Meanwhile, the raiders had reached Baramulla and Srinagar was in imminent danger of being captured by them. Those raiders are very well equipped with modern arms and have competent leadership. At this juncture Sheikh Abdullah's National Conference took charge of the situation and kept order in the city and prevented panic. All our military, who had gone there, pay a tremendous tribute to the National Conference and Sheikh Abdullah. Indeed it was not possible for our military to land there or function at all but for this.

6. After two or three anxious days I can say now with some confidence that Srinagar is safe. Soon I hope we shall take the offensive and drive out the raiders from the valley. It will be more difficult to deal with them in the higher mountains specially with the winter coming. We have undertaken a big job and we shall go through it.

7. The Pakistan Government have issued a bundle of lies and malice in their statement. They never expected us to function so rapidly and effectively and so they imagine that we must have been preparing for a long time. The arrangement was on their part to send their own regular army into Srinagar as soon as the raiders captured the city and proclaimed accession to Pakistan. Jinnah was then to have made a triumphant entry. All this battle plan has been completely upset and naturally there is anger and frustration. Kashmir is being held by us today not only because of our army but because of the cooperation our army is getting from the Kashmiris, both Hindu and Muslim. It is the non-Kashmiris there and the refugees who have been panicky and troublesome.

8. You can well imagine that it would have been unbearable agony for me to remain a silent witness to the sack and ruin of Kashmir. I felt we must intervene not only for the sake of Kashmir, but also for India or else the disgrace of this would cling to us. Fortunately we acted just in time. There are many difficulties ahead and the situation all over India is tense. But we have got stout heart and we shall face and overcome these obstacles.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal Nehru

22a. To Dalip Singh¹

New Delhi
1 November 1947

Dear Dalip Singh,

I enclose a letter for the Maharaja. Bajpai who was here dictated it. I suppose it will do. No other credentials are necessary nor is it usual to give credentials when dealing with States.

2. You will represent the Government of India as a whole but your dealings will be in the main with the States Department. The Foreign Department is also interested in Kashmir as this is a frontier area and our foreign relations may be affected by developments there. You will please therefore send your normal reports to the States Department with copy to Foreign.

3. Anything dealing separately with foreign relations or the frontier should be sent to Foreign direct.

4. It is a little difficult to define your functions. The situation itself in Kashmir is a very fluid one and you have to adapt yourself to it. You have to guard the interests of the Government of India and help the Government of Kashmir State in every way with your advice. Kashmir having acceded to the Union all matters, other than internal matters, should be dealt with by the Government of India. Therefore, the Kashmir State should not deal with Pakistan directly. Any approach by Pakistan should be referred to the Government of India.

5. The internal government of the State is governed at present very largely by the military situation. This again brings the Government of India into the picture. Not only is Defence a central subject after the accession but as a matter of fact this defence is being conducted by our troops. Therefore in reality the Government of India is functioning in several capacities in Kashmir State.

6. You should get such information as you can about the border regions of Kashmir and keep us informed about them. These will be chiefly through the Kashmir Government but possibly other sources may also be available to you. You should also try to keep in touch with information or rumour about what may be taking place on the other side of the frontier, that is, in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union and China. We realise that you have no particular means of doing so and not much can be expected. Nevertheless information may reach you and this may prove helpful to us, even though it might be unconfirmed. Rumours are plentiful and are usually unfounded.

Nevertheless a rumour may have importance as indicating the state of public opinion which believes in that rumour.

6A. Our main objective in the Kashmir State at present is to rid it of the invader and to establish peace, law and order. When this is done some kind of plebiscite or referendum of the people will have to be arranged, in order to decide the question of accession and the future of Kashmir. The defence of Kashmir has a military and civil aspect. Indeed all military undertakings depend to a large extent on the civil background and the morale of the population. In Kashmir particularly today it is most important that there should be full cooperation between the civil government and the military as well as between the population and both the government and the military. In order to ensure this a popular government has been established under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership. It is essential that there should be no friction, between the Maharaja and the Prime Minister on the one side and Sheikh Abdullah who is the head of the administration. You should try to help in every way the smooth working of this many-headed machine.

7. So far as the population is concerned it is predominantly Muslim and any defence therefore must depend upon the goodwill of a large number of Muslim Kashmiris. Any communal trouble in the State between Muslim and Hindu or Sikh will affect adversely military operations and defence. This fact must always be kept in mind and brought to the notice of the Maharaja and Mr. Mahajan, the Prime Minister. Kashmir Valley has fortunately been free from communal trouble and hence the remarkable spectacle of Srinagar functioning normally even when the enemy is a few miles away. Jammu Province unfortunately has had plenty of communal trouble and it is stated that the Muslims there have fared badly. What part the Maharaja's troops took in this I do not know. But it is fairly certain that the local Hindus and Sikhs pushed out the Muslims and killed many of them. This kind of thing must be vigorously stopped. It is not good enough for the Maharaja's Government to say that there have been raids from Pakistan and that this is the reaction to them. Whatever Pakistan may do it is fatal for any anti-Muslim move to be countenanced by the State.

8. There have undoubtedly been raids from Pakistan and a very large number of irregulars have taken possession of a part of Poonch and the Mirpur area. There can be no doubt that Pakistan has encouraged these raids. There is also some proof that Pakistan troops have entered Kashmir territory. Indeed a disabled tank has been found in the Poonch area and this could only have come from the Pakistan Army. These raids will have to be dealt with in a military way by our troops. Any attempt by the people to have counter raids will be injurious to us and to our policy. This must be made perfectly clear to the State authorities as well as all others concerned.

9. Among those who are likely to be aggressive in communal matters are the Dogra Rajputs, the Akali Sikhs and the R.S.S. people. All these should be approached privately and informed of the situation. If they misbehave still the Maharaja should be asked to deal with them firmly.

10. Our troops should have friendly relations with the people. We are indeed arming a kind of Home Guard which is being raised from the people, mostly from the volunteers of the National Conference. In this matter Sheikh Abdullah's guidance must be taken.

11. While you have to spend most of your time in Jammu you should visit Srinagar from time to time and keep in touch with Sheikh Abdullah and find out what his difficulties are. He is bound to have these difficulties and perhaps you might be able to help him in solving them.

12. It would be desirable for you to keep in touch with our troops in Jammu and Srinagar and see that they have the right spirit and do not think of this adventure in any communal way.

13. It must be remembered that the Jammu-Srinagar Road *via* Banihal Pass is of the utmost importance and must be protected at all costs. After some weeks the question of keeping it clear from the snow will have to be faced. We shall try to arrange for snow-ploughs or bulldozers, but meanwhile, the Kashmir Government should think in terms of keeping it clear even by manual labour.

14. It should be the duty of the Kashmir Government to provide food supplies to our troops. Probably it will be necessary to send part of them at least from Jammu to Srinagar.

15. Winter clothing and blankets will be needed not only by our regular troops but by the Home Guards that we are raising. Every effort should be made to get these manufactured in Kashmir. Electric power having failed we shall have to fall back on handspun and handwoven stuff. Efforts should be made to organise production on these lines immediately. This will be good for the people also as it would keep them busy and they will be able to earn something.

16. Dwarkanath Kachru, one of my Private Secretaries, will be in Kashmir for some time. I am asking him to keep in touch with you and to keep you informed of developments and trends.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

23. To Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed¹

New Delhi
2nd November 1947

My Dear Bakshi,

I have followed from this distance with admiration the brave defence of Srinagar. Not merely the military defence but the civil arrangements for which the National Conference has been chiefly responsible. I have had so many accounts of the outstanding part you have taken in this brave adventure, and I have felt cheered to find that my friends and comrades should have risen to the occasion so bravely. Congratulations !

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

24. Fraud and Violence in Kashmir¹

Friends and Comrades,

I want to speak to you tonight about Kashmir, not about the beauty of that famous valley, but about the horror which it has had to face recently. We have passed through very critical days and the burden of taking vital and far-reaching decisions has fallen upon us. We have taken those decisions and I want to tell you about them.

Our neighbouring Government, using language which is not the language of governments or even of responsible people, has accused the Government of India of fraud and violence in regard to the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union. I cannot emulate that language nor have I any desire to do so, for I speak for a responsible government and a responsible people. I agree that there has been fraud and violence in Kashmir, but the question is—who is responsible for it ? Already considerable parts of the Jammu and Kashmir State have been over run by raiders from outside, well-armed and well-equipped, and they have sacked and looted the towns and villages and put many of the inhabitants to the sword. Frightfulness

1. Broadcast from Delhi, 2 November 1947. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L.

Zakir Hussain

9.10.47

1. Policy of rehabilitation of Muslims in various.

are especially to Khandayh, Patayanj & Salmund -

Artisans - goldsmiths - jewellers - and the
in Patayanj - good people - natives -
Dakshin K. to Pakistan. but do not know what to do.

✓ Possibility of new basis for these Muslims & Co-operative
clubs etc.

If few chairs really from about 6000 (about
over 12000) would like to remain - Many of these can
go back to their villages where Muslims already
present. Others of only 10000 or more might remain.

≡ Quarantine.

Handsome being given to them.

? - possibly - separate basis?

They do not fit in - Feb, June & July, and
to be into them in some months
meaning crime - Feb & Ramon Pothos.

2. Fair

(Quarantine others who were killed.)

Khandayh - Allameh Khandayh on 11 Dec 47
also in prison? - Afghan Khandayh -
His sister in Jamin married to Khandayh.

3. Police - in Fair Bazar - Khandayh,

& side of his creating trouble - Khandayh not back
(Khandayh)
x. Dakshin - 14 Feb 47

NOTE OF A DISCUSSION WITH ZAKIR HUSAIN, 9 OCTOBER 1947

suddenly descended upon this lovely and peaceful country and the beautiful city of Srinagar was on the verge of destruction.

I want to say at once that every step that we have taken in regard to Kashmir has been taken after the fullest thought and consideration of the consequences and I am convinced that what we have done was the right thing. Not to have taken those steps would have been a betrayal of a trust and cowardly submission to the law of the sword with its accompaniment of arson, rapine and slaughter.

For some weeks past we had received reports of infiltration of raiding bands into the State territory of Jammu Province. Also of a concentration of armed men near the border of Kashmir with the North West Frontier Province. We were naturally concerned about this not only because of our close ties with Kashmir and her people but also because Kashmir is a frontier territory adjoining great nations and therefore we were bound to take interest in developments there. But we were anxious not to interfere and we took no step whatever to intervene even though a part of Jammu Province was overrun by these raiders.

It has been stated that there were raids from the Jammu side across the Pakistan border and that there was communal trouble in Jammu and Muslims were killed and driven away. In the past we have not hesitated to condemn evil whoever might have committed it, whether Hindu or Sikh or Muslim; and so if Hindus or Sikhs or any functionaries of the State misbehaved in Jammu Province certainly we condemn them and regret their deeds.

But I have before me a detailed list of 95 villages in the Jammu Province which have been destroyed by the raiders from Pakistan. Bhimbar, a considerable town, has also been sacked and destroyed. Other towns are besieged and a considerable part of Poonch and Mirpur areas is in possession of the raiders. Does this indicate that aggression took place from the Kashmir side into West Punjab or does it not show that there has been continuous and organized aggression from West Punjab into Kashmir State? These raiders possess the latest type of modern arms. It is reported they have used flame-throwers and a disabled tank has been discovered with them.

About this time we were asked by the Kashmir State to provide them with arms. We took no urgent steps about it and although sanction was given by our States and Defence Ministries, actually no arms were sent.

On the night of the 24th October I learnt of another raid, this time from the Abbottabad-Mansehra road which enters Kashmir near Muzaffarabad. We were told that armed and well-equipped persons in over one hundred lorries had broken in, had sacked Muzaffarabad and killed many persons there including the District Magistrate, and were proceeding along the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar. The State forces were spread out in small numbers all over the State and they could not stop this armed and

well-organized raid. The civil population, Hindu and Muslim, fled before the raiders.

It was on the 24th night that for the first time a request was made to us on behalf of the Kashmir State for accession and military help. On the 25th morning we considered this in the Defence Committee, but no decision was taken about sending troops, in view of the obvious difficulties of the undertaking. On the 26th morning we again considered this matter. The situation was even more critical then. The raiders had sacked several towns and had destroyed the great power house at Mahura which supplies electricity to the whole of Kashmir. They were on the point of entering the valley. The fate of Srinagar and the whole of Kashmir hung in the balance.

We received urgent messages for aid not only from the Maharaja's Government, but from representatives of the people, notably that great leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, the President of the National Conference. Both the Kashmir Government and the National Conference pressed us to accept the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union. We decided to accept this accession and to send troops by air but we made a condition that the accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. We were anxious not to finalise anything in a moment of crisis and without the fullest opportunity to the people of Kashmir to have their say. It was for them ultimately to decide.

And here let me make it clear that it has been our policy all along that where there is a dispute about the accession of a state to either Dominion, the decision must be made by the people of that State. It was in accordance with this policy that we added a proviso to the Instrument of Accession of Kashmir.

We decided to send troops on the afternoon of 26th October. Srinagar was in peril and the situation was urgent and critical. Our staff worked hard that day and night and at daybreak on the 27th our troops went by air. They were small in numbers to begin with, but immediately on arrival they rushed into action to stop the invader. Their gallant commander, a brave officer of our army, was killed the next day.²

Since then troops and equipment have been flown over daily and I should like to express my high appreciation and the appreciation of my Government for the fine work which our staff have done as well as the pilots and the air crews who have thrown themselves into this adventure with heart and soul. The airlines have cooperated with us fully and to them also I am grateful. Our young men have shown how they can rise to the occasion in a moment of crisis to serve their country.

2. Lieutenant-Colonel Dewan Ranjit Rai was killed in action on the outskirts of Baramulla on 27 October.

Srinagar was in peril and the invader was almost on its door step. There was no administration left there, no troops, no police. Light and power had failed and there was a vast number of refugees there and yet Srinagar functioned without obvious panic and shops were opened and people went about the streets. To what was this miracle due? Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues of the National Conference and their unarmed volunteers, Muslim and Hindu and Sikh, took charge of the situation, kept order and prevented panic. It was a wonderful piece of work that they did at a moment when the nerves of most people might have failed them. They did so because of the strength of their organisation, but even more so because they were determined to protect their country from the ruthless invader who was destroying their country and trying to compel them by terrorism to join Pakistan. Whatever the future may hold, the people of the Valley of Kashmir have exhibited during these past few days remarkable courage, capacity for organization and unity.

It would be well if this lesson was understood by the whole of India which has been poisoned by communal strife. Under the inspiration of a great leader, Sheikh Abdullah, the people of the Valley, Muslim and Hindu and Sikh, were together for the defence of their common country against the invader. Our troops could have done little without this popular support and cooperation.

The Maharaja of Kashmir deserves to be congratulated on his decision to make Sheikh Abdullah the head of the administration at this critical juncture. That was a wise step which other rulers might well follow, making their people trustees and defenders of freedom.

It must be remembered, therefore, that the struggle in Kashmir is a struggle of the people of Kashmir under popular leadership against the invader. Our troops are there to help in this struggle and as soon as Kashmir is free from the invader our troops will have no further necessity to remain there and the fate of Kashmir will be left in the hands of the people of Kashmir.

We have passed through days of peril not only for Kashmir but for the whole of India. That peril is less now but it is by no means over and many dangers confront us. We have to be very vigilant and well prepared for whatever may happen. The first step in this preparation is to put an end completely to every manner of communal strife in India and to stand up as a united nation to face every danger which might threaten our freedom. External danger can only be faced effectively when there is internal peace and order and an organised nation.

We talk about the invaders and raiders in Kashmir and yet these men are fully armed and well trained and have competent leadership. All of these have come across and from Pakistan territory. We have a right to ask the Pakistan Government how and why these people could come across the Frontier Province or West Punjab and how they have been armed so

effectively. Is this not a violation of international law and an unfriendly act towards a neighbour country? Is the Pakistan Government too weak to prevent armies marching across its territory to invade another country, or is it willing that this should happen? There is no third alternative.

We have asked the Pakistan Government repeatedly to stop these raiders from coming and to withdraw those who have come. It should be easy for them to stop them for the roads into Kashmir are very few and have to pass over bridges. We on our part have no intention of using our troops in Kashmir when danger of invasion is passed.

We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it. We are prepared when peace and law and order have been established to have a referendum held under international auspices like the United Nations. We want it to be a fair and just reference to the people and we shall accept their verdict. I can imagine no fairer and juster offer.

Meanwhile we have given our word to the people of Kashmir to protect them against the invader and we shall keep our pledge.

25. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

3 November 1947

My dear Sheikh Sahab,

I have received your letter of the 2nd November today.

2. First of all about Kanwar Dalip Singh. He has been sent to Jammu entirely at my instance. He belongs to our External Affairs Department and has recently been appointed our Constitutional Adviser in regard to treaties and foreign affairs. As soon as Kashmir's accession was decided upon my Department suggested his name to me as liaison between the Government of India and the Kashmir Government. I accepted this in part and referred the matter to the States Department. My acceptance was due to the fact that I have high opinion of Dalip Singh's ability and because I thought that somebody should be near the Maharaja and Mahajan to keep them on the right track. I was anxious that nothing should go wrong at that end as far as possible. Dalip Singh seems to me specially

1. J. N. Collection.

suited for this and I explained to him the situation very fully. I wanted to speak to you about it and was under the impression that I had done so. But evidently I forgot to do so when you came here last. I instructed him to meet you as soon as possible. But I was more anxious for him to be in Jammu near the Maharaja to advise him than to be with you. I suppose he will see you soon.

3. On the Srinagar side I had arranged for Hiralal Atal to be present and to endeavour to bring about coordination between the military and the civil. Dwarkanath Kachru will of course be there to help you in any way you desire.

4. I have felt strongly that the new set-up in Kashmir should work as smoothly as possible during these early days. I knew that you would try your utmost to do this; but Jammu side troubled me. Hence my detailed instructions to Dalip Singh and Hiralal Atal. As you yourself pointed out many things are likely to happen in the present set-up which rather overlap or even to some extent are self-contradictory. The only thing to do is to avoid getting entangled in petty matters and to concentrate on the major issue that is defence and to hurl back the invader. No rules or regulations can solve difficulties of this kind. Only tact and goodwill can do so. It is perfectly clear as you say that the supreme task is this of defence. Further that it is urgently necessary that this pure defence should be turned into an offensive and the valley should be cleared. As soon as the Valley is cleared of the invader the task becomes easier and we can deploy our forces differently.

5. As I understand it the position now is this. Srinagar is safe from any frontal attack but individuals infiltrate in the neighbouring villages and create trouble. This should be guarded against, but the main task is to break the backbone of the invasion. I hope that this will be undertaken very soon. If you capture Baramulla and close up the exit to the valley you can easily deal with any of the raiders left in the valley and you can at the same time battle any others who may seek to come in. I am impressing this upon our military.

6. I can easily understand that you will have to face certain amount of cataclysm in the administration. That is unfortunately a legacy which we inherit from any other government and it is undoubtedly worse in States. You have adopted the right policy in not shaking up the existing administration too much; but obviously changes will have to be made gradually. I notice from the papers that you have appointed a number of people as heads of departments. It is a good choice and I congratulate you upon it.

7. Now as to the other matters you have referred to. As regards some kind of a proclamation in praise of the Dogra soldiers, I have not seen this nor the changes you have suggested. I suppose it is natural for the Maharaja to praise the Dogra soldiers. The changes which you say in your letter you have suggested appear to me to be desirable; but I cannot say anything without seeing the text. This is relatively a small matter.

8. About Bakshi Tek Chand² I knew nothing about this. He is a very able lawyer and if he has been advising the Maharaja during the past few months you can hardly object to his being paid for it. That period is over and it is for the Maharaja to judge what his arrangement was.

9. I would not have personally thought it the right thing to appoint Tek Chand as Kashmir Durbar representative with the Indian Union. Obviously it would be better to have a Kashmiri. As a matter of fact such an appointment has practically no real value as we are in direct touch with you as well as the Maharaja and a person sitting here can do very little. You are perfectly right in saying that you must be careful in drawing upon the country's revenues more specially at the present critical moment. As for constitution-making this is no time for it. There is other more important work to be done. Ultimately the constitution will have to be drawn up and certainly B. N. Rau, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and others will help in this process.

10. While I agree with you about the appointment of Bakshi Tek Chand I suggest that in the present circumstances you need not raise any final objection to it. You can tell the Maharaja that first of all the drafting of a constitution might well be postponed for the present; secondly that it would be advisable to have a Kashmiri as the State's representative with the Indian Union. You have no objection to Bakshi Tek Chand but you think that a Kashmiri would naturally be a more suitable representative. If however the Maharaja wants to have Bakshi Tek Chand as a kind of personal representative here temporarily you do not wish to raise an objection to it although you feel that at present heavy expenditures on such appointments seem to you to be unnecessary and likely to create a wrong impression in the public mind.

11. The purport of all this is that having stated your views fully and frankly you should still not come in the way finally of the Maharaja appointing Tek Chand. But if he does so you should tell him that you would like a Kashmiri to represent the views of the government also.

2. Bakshi Tek Chand, a retired judge of the Punjab High Court, was appointed on 21 October 1947 by the Maharaja of Kashmir to draft the constitution of the State.

12. As most appointments are going to be made by you, it does not seem worthwhile or desirable to object to one or two appointments made directly by the Maharaja even though these might be unnecessary and expensive.

13. Mahajan came to see me this evening. I did not discuss any of the matters mentioned in your letter with him as he did not raise those issues. But I have impressed upon him again that governmental work must be carried on at your instance and under your guidance and that the fullest cooperation should be given to you. He said he completely agreed.

14. I hope the formation of your Home Guard is proceeding apace. This is most important. However big the army which we may send the ultimate burden for normal defence must fall on your Home Guard. I have specially suggested to your military to give some training to your volunteers for this purpose.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

26. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 373-G dated the 2nd November. Aircraft flying from India to Kashmir do not have to cross Pakistan territory and we are not aware that they are doing so. However, we have issued instructions to pilots not to do so. It is possible, however, an aircraft in distress may have to fly over Pakistan territory to reach nearest landing ground or land in Pakistan landing ground itself. In such cases, we trust you will, according to international usage, allow them to do so.

The request contained in your telegram is consistent only with an attitude of strict neutrality on the part of Pakistan Government in the matter of Kashmir. We would be interested to learn what steps the Pakistan Government have taken against the violation of Kashmir State territory by raiders who pass through Pakistan territory and what action they are taking to prevent a continuance of that violation. The Government of India cannot believe it is the intention of the Government of Pakistan to agree to accord tribesmen facilities which they expressly deny to the sister Dominion.

Further telegram will be sent to you in regard to the concluding paragraph of your telegram.

1. New Delhi, 3 November 1947. File No. KS-247-K, M.H.A.

27. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please refer to paragraph 3 of your telegram No. 373-G dated 2nd November. We have instructed Indian aircraft proceeding to West Punjab and N.W.F.P. to make first landing at Lahore. We take it that bans on proceeding direct to points in West Punjab and N.W.F.P. are not intended to apply to B.O.A.C. and British registered aircraft which are used solely for evacuation of refugees both Muslim and non-Muslim. Landings at Lahore on both outward and inward flights by these aircraft will seriously affect evacuation programme. Alternatively suggest that clearance certificate be given by Pakistan representative at Palam.

1. New Delhi, 3 November 1947. File No. KS-2/47-K, M.H.A.

28. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have received no reply yet from you to my telegram, dated 31st October, regarding Kashmir.²

Reference to last paragraph of your telegram, dated 30th October, I have enquired from Prime Minister, Kashmir, about alleged raid.³ His reply sent after investigation is that there was no raid from Kashmir side into West Punjab, but there was a raid from West Punjab side into Jammu Province. This was resisted by villagers and State troops and two Gurkha soldiers were killed in Kashmir territory. Apparently their bodies were dragged away by the invaders into West Punjab.

1. New Delhi, 3 November 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, p. 55.
2. See *ante*, item 19.
3. Liaquat Ali Khan had charged that "well armed mobs" from Kashmir landed in a village in West Punjab.

I am informed that in Jammu Province situation is well in hand except in areas under the occupation of raiders who are continuing their depredations. Kashmir Government is protecting Muslims in Jammu and the border would be quite safe but for raids from West Punjab.

I have repeatedly requested you to stop raiders from entering Kashmir territory from Pakistan both in Jammu Province and along the Jhelum valley road. Our information is that these raiders are being helped by high Pakistan officials. Indeed Prime Minister of North West Frontier Province has openly declared that these raiders should be helped.⁴ We have definite information of senior officials of the Frontier Province giving every assistance to these raiders. We put it to you that this is not only against your own declaration but also is a breach of international law. We trust that you will take immediate steps not only to stop further raiders from coming into Kashmir State territory, but order withdrawal of all those who are already in Kashmir State.

We are anxious to restore peaceful conditions in Kashmir and we invite your cooperation again to this end. This can only be done after the withdrawal of the raiders who have inflicted tremendous damage in the State territory. As soon as raiders are withdrawn there would be no necessity for our keeping our troops there.

I wish to draw your attention to the broadcast on Kashmir which I made last evening.⁵ I have stated our Government's policy and made it clear that we have no desire to impose our will on Kashmir but to leave final decision to the people of Kashmir. I further stated that we have agreed to an impartial international agency like the United Nations supervising any referendum. This principle we are prepared to apply to any State where there is a dispute about accession. If these principles are accepted by your Government there should be no difficulty in giving effect to them.

4. Speaking at Peshawar on 29 October 1947, Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan said that the entry of Indian troops into Kashmir constituted a challenge not only "to Pakistan, but to the entire Muslim world." He appealed "to every Muslim in Pakistan to get ready" to meet this challenge.
5. See *ante*, item 24.

29. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Please see my immediately preceding telegram No. 270 of today. I have since received information that a fighter aircraft of the Pakistan Air Force most probably a Tempest flew over the Kashmir valley a couple of days or so ago. This is contrary to international regulations and I must request that such incursions into Indian Dominion territory by the Pakistan Air Force will not be repeated. These incursions are particularly dangerous when conducted over an operational area.

1. New Delhi, 3 November 1947, File No, KS-2/47-K, M.H.A

30. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Kashmir. Continuation my telegram, dated 3rd November.² Further reports state that raids continue to be made from the Pakistan side into Jammu Province. On first November following villages within five miles of the border were sacked and burnt, Colon Chak, Palango, Shibo Chak, Bahadurpur, Swankha, Abtal, Raika, and Majua. It is stated that armoured cars and three-inch mortars were used by the raiders. On second November there was raid on Hiranagar across the border from West Punjab. I have already informed you of the sack and burning of Bhimbar town.³ Further particulars of this have reached us. Raiders came in military formation and were well-equipped with automatic weapons and mortars. They had also armoured cars. After the destruction of the town there was large-scale massacre of men, women and children. According to report a thousand persons were killed and over hundred women were kidnapped. The town was looted and many lorry loads of loot were taken away to West Punjab.

1. New Delhi, 4 November 1947, *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, p. 56.
2. See the preceding item.
3. On 20-21 October 1947.

31. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Governor-General, India, has told me of his conversation with you in Lahore³ and I am happy that you will be fit enough to come to Delhi for the Joint Defence Council meeting on Saturday. That will give us an opportunity of personal discussion which is desirable. I hope you will be quite well soon.

1. New Delhi, 4 November 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*.
2. At this meeting on 1 November Liaquat Ali repeated the old allegations that the Maharaja had categorically refused any form of negotiations with Pakistan and that the tribal raids had been provoked by the massacre of Muslims in Mirpur and Poonch areas and across the border of Jammu. On Mountbatten's asking if the tribes could have come "from beyond Peshawar in motor transport" without the Pakistan Government's knowledge, Liaquat Ali "did not deny knowledge of the movement", but argued that had his Government interfered, it "would have precipitated trouble with the rest of the tribes on the frontier". Mountbatten on his part affirmed the Indian Government's sincerity in "their offer of a plebiscite."

32. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Governor-General of India has passed on to me your message asking for safe conduct for two Red Cross ambulances to evacuate inmates of convent at Baramula.¹ Government of India are prepared to give safe conduct. Please telegraph in advance details of movements of the two ambulances to enable us to issue instructions to Army and Air Force authorities at Srinagar.

1. New Delhi, 4 November 1947. File No. KS-2/47. K, M.H.A.
2. On 27 October 1947, a gang of tribesmen attacked St. Joseph's Convent at Baramula in Kashmir, killing several European nuns.

33. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 375-G of 3rd November. Our information is that no bombs have been used by aircraft at Kohala. In any event, we have issued instructions that nothing should be done in Pakistan territory.

I would point out to you, however, that Kohala bridge and Pakistan territory adjoining it are used by irresponsible raiders to enter Kashmir State territory and commit acts of aggression and violence. It is for your Government to stop this use of your territory by raiders of Kashmir. Our Government is responsible for protection of Kashmir State and we must take necessary measures to drive out raiders and prevent their entry into Kashmir.

1. New Delhi, 4 November 1947. File No. KS-2/47-K, M.H.A.

33a. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

4 November 1947

My dear Sheikh Saheb,

I have your letter of the 3rd November together with a note from your Accountant General. We shall consider this note carefully and let you know what we can do in the matter.

2. Kachru has written to me about Diwan Shivcharan Lal. I think you are right in not appointing him to any post at present. I really do not want you to appoint him to a formal post but rather to give him some precise work to do. I realise that any appointment at present would be unwise. You can use him as you like and find out how good he is in that work. Anyway you are the best judge of what to do with him. If for the moment you can think of nothing special for him then ask him simply to help you in getting intelligence about the enemy.

3. We have had a report from Sardar Patel and Baldev Singh about their visit to Kashmir. After their return today we held an emergent meeting of the Defence Committee and we have taken certain steps to which effect is going to be given immediately. I feel that there has been a certain easy

1. J.N. Collection.

optimism and complacency on our side. This is always bad. Our commander there, who took charge two three days ago, also appears to be a rather nervous person or at any rate not used to the peculiar conditions prevailing in the Valley at the present moment. From tomorrow there will be a new overall commander, Major General Kalwant Singh. He is able and strong and just the man for taking the offensive in action. What we want is the offensive and not too much defence. Our orders to him are to take Baramula at any cost and very soon and I am sure that he will do it. Once Baramula has been taken we shall bottle up the road there and then deal with any raiders left in the Valley. Having cleared up the Valley completely we shall proceed along the Jhelum Valley Road to Kohala and clear that up. It is possible that a number of raiders might take refuge in the mountains. They can easily be dealt with specially in the cold season which is already beginning.

4. I have little doubt about this programme and we shall see developments in accordance with it. I only regret that there has been two or three days delay in giving effect to it. This has resulted in infiltration in villages and elsewhere of these raiders and consequent trouble. There is nothing new about this. Every army has to face this kind of thing and should be prepared for it.

5. We are told that the army found it difficult to distinguish between friends and foes and thus foes crept into the villages and gave trouble. This is absurd. We are dealing with a military situation and there can or should be no looseness about our action. There must be a strict curfew order and anyone found outside during curfew hours must be liable to be shot, friend or foe, unless he has a permit. The military must have a free hand.

6. All your workers or Home Guards should not only have permits but clear distinguishing marks. Those marks are not enough by themselves because the enemy can use them to delude us.

7. I was told that you did not like the idea of your Government ordering curfew and that you preferred the military taking charge for the purpose. I do not know if you have been correctly reported, as I do not understand this. Military can take charge if it is so desired by the civil government. But it is far better for the civil government to order curfew and ask the military to enforce it. In doing so they should consult the military about the hours and times of curfew. This is normally the business of the civil government. On the whole I think it would be unfortunate for the military to be in complete charge of the city. That would indicate that an outside army was functioning against the wishes of the people and the civil government.

8. We must concentrate on immediate action during the next three days. I do not want to give more than three days for the capture of Baramula. All other activities must be subordinated to this. Demands come to us for more and more troops. Well, more troops are being sent and will be sent. But I do not like the spirit of not taking action till more troops come. I think you will notice a change in tactics in our army from tomorrow and this will be a change for the better and a change involving offensive action.

9. The refugee problem must also be dealt with. It does not matter if refugees are not sent away for a day or two. They must not be allowed to clutter up the airfield and strict system of permits should be instituted for those who have to or must leave.

10. Kachru writes to me something about your thinking that we should deliver an ultimatum to Pakistan and declare war at the end of it. We know well that all this Kashmir raid has been completely organised by Pakistan. Their responsibility is obvious. But take it from me that any declaration of war by us would be very injurious to Kashmir and to a lesser extent to India. War would mean first of all our not giving any help at all to Kashmir and in fact possibly withdrawing some of our forces for use elsewhere. We would ultimately win the war of course but Kashmir would, meanwhile, be ruined. It is to our great advantage to concentrate on Kashmir at the present moment and then consider the situation. We are going to concentrate and hit out there. Rest assured of them.

11. I am very anxious that the military and your Government should have close contacts and should understand one another. I have explained this to General Kalwant Singh and I think he has understood it. Unfortunately in moments like this there are occasions when some suspicions arise of each other. This is very harmful. We have to be aware and careful and there may be traitors anywhere; but it is quite essential that you and our Commanding Officer should be in close contact.

12. We are taking the most urgent steps to send reinforcements. I imagine that a number of armoured cars have already arrived in Srinagar *via* Jammu.

13. This letter is being taken by General Kalwant Singh. I would request you to keep the contents of this letter secret. In war nothing is more important than secrecy, sometimes even from one's colleagues. Our people are in the habit of loose talk.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Sheikh Abdullah replied on 5 November 1947 that "an all-out effort must be made to rush more troops and supplies to the valley" for the defence of Kashmir. He complained of "misbehaviour" of troops with the local population, interference of Mahajan in the administration and of the R.S.S. trouble in the Jammu Province.

33b. To Dwarkanath Kachru¹

4 November 1947

My dear Dwarkanath,
I have your letter of the 4th November.

2. There is no difficulty about Shiv Saran Lal. I quite appreciate Sheikh Saheb's position in this matter. For the present he need not appoint him for any post at all. He can use him as an adviser to someone and as one doing intelligence work quietly without any fuss.

3. We have had an emergency meeting of the Defence Committee tonight and we have come to many conclusions to which immediate effect is going to be given. General Kalwant Singh, who is taking this letter, has been charged with these new instructions. I think we shall see quick action soon. Reinforcements are also being sent.

4. Please remember that in a situation like the one at present in Srinagar loose talk must be avoided nor should the military position or the number of our forces or the action we might take be discussed with anyone, even colleagues. This is an essential precaution. We are apt to indulge in loose talk without thinking of the consequences. There is also the danger of people beginning to suspect one another of disclosure. I understand that a lorry-load of arms belonging to our army was intercepted and looted by the enemy. Immediately suspicion arose as to who could have sent the information to the enemy. It is therefore absolutely essential not to do anything which might lead to suspicion. It is also necessary that only trusted persons should be used for any important or secret work.

5. Your suggestion about our sending an ultimatum to Pakistan about war is, I am sure, completely wrong at the present moment. It might well have very bad consequences in many ways. Kashmir of course can hardly be defended properly by us if war started because we would be busy with our other fronts and even apart from the Pakistan Army, frontier raiders would pour into Kashmir. It is far easier for us to deal with Kashmir at the present moment when our entanglements are limited.

6. Sardar Patel and Sardar Baldev Singh have given us a full account of the position in Srinagar. We have taken effective steps after hearing them. General Kalwant Singh who is going to take command is one of our good leaders known for his strength and ability.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

7. The people who infiltrate are troublesome and mischievous but it should be easy to take steps against them. The main thing, however, is to drive back the principal body of the raiders up to Baramula and beyond and this is going to be done soon.

8. Sheikh Saheb wrote to me that he did not want me to come to Srinagar just yet. I have therefore given up the idea of going there for the present. But if he feels that I should come he should let me know and I shall go there as early as possible.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. In his letter dated 9 November 1947 (not printed) Nehru informed Dwarkanath Kachru of his intention of holding talks with Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues and Gen. Kalwant Singh during his visit to Srinagar on 11 November.

34. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
6 November 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 5th November.² I have shown it to General Bucher and he is having a note prepared on the subject. We shall communicate this note to the U.K. High Commissioner.

We have been taking steps to keep some of the Ambassadors informed of developments in Kashmir. There is nothing to hide so far as we are concerned.

It is desirable to give some information to the British press. I think the best course for us would be to ask our High Commissioner in London to deal with the press there. We have sent him information about Kashmir and we shall add to it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32 (46)48-PM, Vol. I, PMS.

2. Mountbatten suggested that the British Government be "told of the considerable strength that has already been built up by the Indian Government in the Kashmir area" in order to allay the misgivings of the British Government and public.

35. Danger from All Sides¹

Some weeks ago I addressed a number of public meetings in Delhi. That practice was later on suspended as new and complicated problems cropped up. I have a great desire that the practice should be continued as I think it will enable me to know you well.

Ever since we assumed office, we have been so much engrossed in office work that it became difficult for us to tell you what we felt about the problems that confronted us. The recent happenings in different parts of India, in the Punjab, Kashmir and Hyderabad, are closely linked to each other. The way things have been shaping during the last two months, it is evident that India is faced with grave dangers from all sides. Unless we are well prepared to meet them, our freedom may prove short-lived.


Some time back India had to tackle the problem of Junagadh, Mangrol and Babariawad, and while she was employing her energies to solve this, the question of Kashmir arose. Kashmir was a much more serious issue and it had become quite clear that Junagadh was used merely to divert the attention of the Government of India and to hide the preparations for this attack on Kashmir. The Government have reasons to believe that preparations for this attack were being made for the past many months.

On 25th October we received information that Kashmir was in danger. The danger was so great that we decided to send troops by air to protect the State. On 27th our troops had reached there and to a great extent checked the advance of the invaders.

Kashmir was invaded by people from the tribal areas and other parts of Pakistan. The invading armies possessed modern weapons and were directed by officers of the Pakistan Army. We, however, succeeded in flying in our troops for the defence of Kashmir and prevented the fall of Srinagar. Kashmir is strategically important. It is situated on the border of two great countries, China and Russia, and the Indian Government did not like its collapsing before marauders. But that was not the only or even the main reason for our trying to defend Kashmir. We have pledged to defend it because the call for help came from the patriotic people of that State and their great leader, Sheikh Abdullah.

The recent events in Kashmir have an important lesson for us. If you leave out Jammu, 95 per cent of the people of the State are Muslims, and only five per cent are Hindus and Sikhs. There is an important political organization in the State called the Jammu-Kashmir National Conference.

1. Speech at Delhi, 6 November 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, *The Statesman* and *The Hindu*, 7 November 1947.



CHINA

State of Jammu and Kashmir

TIBET

R. Shyok


JAMMU AND KASHMIR

R. Indus

I N D I A

JAL PRADESH

Manali●



It is a non-communal body and looks at problems from a national angle. The way the people of Kashmir faced the situation under the guidance of the National Conference is a lesson for the people of India.

The National Conference had, for seventeen years, fought valiantly for their freedom. They had also fought the reactionary elements in the State like the Muslim Conference, the handmaid of the Muslim League. When their freedom struggle was about to bear fruit, the National Conference found their home and independence threatened by invaders from Pakistan and they had no option but to ask the Government of India to come to their rescue. India has taken upon herself the task of defending Kashmir and she will not rest till the entire area is cleared of all the intruders.

I must pay my tribute to the work done by the volunteers of the National Conference. Without their help it would not have been possible for the Indian Army to do anything. The raiders were only a few miles from Srinagar and the people had heard stories of what they had done to the villages and towns they had captured; yet they did not give way to panic and disorder. For four days there was no government there; there were no troops nor police. The people of Kashmir, however, rose to the occasion. They gauged the seriousness of the situation and decided that after carrying on a struggle against the rule of the Maharaja, they must not surrender to an invading army without giving a proper fight and they have achieved success in their work. Though the formation of the Azad Provisional Government in Kashmir was announced from Pakistan, the people of Kashmir were not taken in by such propaganda. They could not mistake the invading armies for fighters for their freedom.

Imagine what you would have done if the enemy was at the gates of Delhi. It is a miracle that at such a critical time all the shops in Srinagar were open and people carried on their work as usual. The people were worried, no doubt, but they were not panicky. The credit for creating this atmosphere goes to the volunteers—Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs—of the National Conference. Unarmed, they guarded the city and prevented people from becoming panicky.

Had there been a communal war between Hindus and Muslims at this time, Kashmir would not have survived. But for the help that the people of Kashmir gave us—they are mostly Muslims—we could not have done anything at all. I assure you India will not rest till the whole of Kashmir is cleared of the raiders.

If anyone thinks that the war in Kashmir is between Muslims on one side and the Hindus and the Sikhs on the other, he is sadly mistaken. The tribal raiders are indiscriminately killing Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs in Kashmir. The incidents in Kashmir have therefore a great lesson for people swayed by communal passions. In Kashmir people of all communities are fighting against the foreign aggressor because they know that their beautiful land will otherwise be destroyed by the raiders. They stand

united in their determination to defend their country. One slogan which has knit them together and given them strength is that of 'Hindu-Muslim-Sikh Unity'.

We are faced with critical times. We should be prepared to meet all eventualities and should not weaken ourselves by internecine warfare. We should not do anything which will add to our country's troubles and problems and create any more trouble in India.

The Frontier Premier asserts that they are doing everything to stop the tribal raiders from entering Kashmir. But it is wrong to state that they cannot stop them. How is it possible that people can walk through Pakistan without the knowledge of their Government? It only means that either Pakistan is very weak or that these raiders are encouraged to attack Kashmir. Whatever may be the fact, this invasion has been highly improper. The Frontier Premier's attempt to explain the presence of the raiders in Kashmir will not deceive the world. The recent wild and unfounded allegations made by some leaders of Pakistan will also not convince anyone. They fear the likely consequences of their present policy. They have not yet given up their old habit of abusing others.

People often ask us why we do not reply to them in their language. Abusing others is not a sign of strength. It is only a sign of fear and backwardness. A strong government should be sober in its utterances. It is not the time to apportion blame as to who was responsible for this calamity.

In the Punjab 30 to 40 lakhs of people have been uprooted from their ancestral homes. There were disturbances on a large scale in Delhi. These unhappy happenings retard the progress of the country. We should not be guided by mere sentiment but should critically examine who are our friends and who are our enemies. The religion of an individual should not be the ground to brand him as our enemy. In our struggle for freedom many of our best fighters belonged to diverse faiths. If you read the history of the Congress, you will find that its great leaders belonged to different faiths—Hinduism, Islam, Christianity and Sikhism. It is wrong to think that the people of only one particular faith love their country. It is dangerous to think that people of one particular faith are the only loyal subjects of a country.

We should now cry halt to this madness. The uprooting of the millions of people in the Punjab, N.W.F.P. and Baluchistan must now cease. Otherwise, the entire country will get ruined. We will not be able to tide over the critical times that lie ahead of us. I do not know what the leaders of Pakistan propose to do in the future. But from the way things are shaping, it is clear that the whole of India should be prepared and that we should not waste our time in internal quarrels. We must be ready to meet the critical times ahead.

While we will not force people to stay, we will do everything to protect

those who would like to remain in India. To uproot people for the crimes of their co-religionists elsewhere would be wrong.

It is not correct to say that similar things are being done in Pakistan. Why should we degrade ourselves by behaving like the people of Pakistan ? It is a pity that the first page of the history of free India would be a record of killings and other such deeds.

To protect the country against our enemies is the biggest task that faces us. We have to build strong foundations of our national life. There is no country in the world today which bases its nationality on religion. Only the people of backward countries think that religion and nationality are interchangeable.

How can it be done ? The two essential requisites are that we should maintain internal peace and step up production of essential commodities. There is shortage of food, cloth, railway trains and many other essential things. The riots in the Punjab and elsewhere have retarded our progress. They have also lowered our reputation.

There is no doubt that Hindu culture will have its influence in India. But to demand a Hindu state is wrong. It is a negation of the principle for which we have fought. It is against all the canons of modern politics. We have to ensure equal rights to all the people whether they are Hindus, Muslims or Sikhs.

If we say that Muslims in India are our enemies, shall we not invite the enmity of all the Muslim countries of the world ? It would result in creating an iron wall all around us. We must, therefore, create such an atmosphere that everyone may feel safe.

35a, To Dwarkanath Kachru¹

New Delhi

7 November 1947

My dear Dwarkanath,

Your letter of today's date. I am fully conscious of the political difficulties that have arisen between Sheikh Saheb and the Maharaja. In fact that is why I sent Brajlal Nehru and the note I gave him refers to their difficulties. I spoke at length to Batra last night and made him read that note also.

We are all agreed here that the Maharaja's attitude has been bad and is bound to lead to trouble. The attempt to evacuate Muslims from Jammu was an amazingly stupid thing to do. Yesterday I sent an express wireless against this but I suppose I was too late. I have again repeated this warning today.

Hiralal Atal is being sent to Jammu tomorrow morning and I have explained the situation fully to him. He appreciates it. He will see the Maharaja, Mahajan, Paranjpe² and others. Afterwards he intends going on to Srinagar. If he cannot go there tomorrow he will reach Srinagar on the 9th morning.

As the Maharaja is so much in the wrong, I should like Sheikh Saheb to be absolutely correct in his approach. Let him not take any hasty step or forgo a reference to the Maharaja where it is necessary or desirable. Even in fully constitutional governments those semi-formal references are made in regard to certain matters; especially in regard to Jammu these references should be made.

I am quite clear that the Maharaja is played out and has no understanding of the situation. Nevertheless in the present legal context he can create difficulties. These should be avoided.

I have informed the Maharaja that the agreement he has made with the Government of India must be fully honoured and implemented. Otherwise a perilous situation will result.

One thing must be remembered. We must not talk about or suggest a separation of Kashmir State into Kashmir and Jammu. This is dangerous.

I am quite sure that you must remain with Sheikh Saheb. Difficulties are cropping up continually and your presence will be helpful.

We have accepted the Mysore pattern for Kashmir. Reddy³ and others from Mysore are here and I have met them. I shall get full particulars from them. In this pattern the Ruler becomes a constitutional head.

We have had news that there has been a military success this afternoon and the enemy are on the run towards Pattan.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Brig. Y.S. Paranjpe; he was asked to rescue the Muslim refugees in Jammu Province.
3. K.C. Reddy.

36. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

1. Your telegram, dated the 6th November, about Kashmir was received today.²

1. New Delhi, 8 November 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, pp. 61-62.
2. Liaquat Ali repeated his charges that Muslims were being massacred in Jammu with the active help of the Kashmir police and army, who were also organising raids into West Punjab.

2. I regret that I have to disagree completely with your account of what has happened or is happening in Jammu and Kashmir State. We have received and are receiving full information from our own representatives in both Jammu and Srinagar and this convinces us that your information is wholly wrong.

3. I regret also the tone and the contents of your broadcast of the 4th November regarding Kashmir which indicated no desire to find a method for a settlement. It was merely an indictment which has no relation to the fact.³

4. In the last paragraph of your telegram you say that Lord Mountbatten promised to let you know the views of the Indian Government to the proposals discussed between the two Governors-General but that you have heard no more about them. On this point there seems to have been a misunderstanding.

5. Lord Mountbatten on his return from Lahore gave me full account of his talk with Mr. Jinnah and in particular of the two important suggestions which had been discussed namely.

One : The withdrawal of Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen from Kashmir, and

Two : The holding of a plebiscite at the earliest possible date.

6. As regards the first proposal Lord Mountbatten told me that Mr. Jinnah desired that withdrawal of the Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen should be made simultaneously, but that he (Lord Mountbatten) had pointed out that it was clearly impossible for the Indian troops to withdraw from Kashmir valley until the raiders had left Kashmir soil and law and order had been restored in Kashmir. Lord Mountbatten had also made it quite clear to Mr. Jinnah that the Government of India had no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than was necessary.

7. As regards the second point Lord Mountbatten reported that Mr. Jinnah had expressed the view that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities. To meet this point Lord Mountbatten

3. In his broadcast, Liaquat Ali stressed the "immoral and illegal" ownership of Kashmir. He claimed that the people of Kashmir were fighting "not only for their freedom, but also for their very existence. They had been caught in the meshes of a widespread plan for their extermination." He also alleged that the Indian Government were propping up Dogra rule and that Kashmir's accession was a fraud perpetrated on the people by the Maharaja with the help of the Indian Government.

had suggested that it should be conducted under the auspices of the U.N.O. Mr. Jinnah had put forward a counter-proposal that two Governors-General should be given plenary powers to settle the matter. Lord Mountbatten had pointed out that it would be constitutionally improper for him to undertake this duty.

8. On the very day that I had this talk with Lord Mountbatten, I made a broadcast in which the views of the Government of India on both these proposals were stated plainly and I sincerely followed it up with telegram to you indicating that they might form the basis of discussion at our next talks.⁴

9. It is thus clear beyond any shadow of doubt that we did in fact put forward definite proposals as a basis for discussion between us as soon as possible after Lord Mountbatten's return from Lahore.

10. I would have been glad to explain to you personally, at the meeting, the reasons for our inability to accept the proposals made to Lord Mountbatten by Mr. Jinnah. But since unfortunately you are unable to come, I must let you have my views to uphold them. They are as follows.

11. As regards your proposals one and two:—a number of well-armed raiders have entered Kashmir to accompaniment of massacre, arson and loot. Our troops have been sent there to drive out these raiders and protect Kashmir. So long as these raiders remain there, and law and order have not been established, our troops must discharge their duty. Afterwards they will be withdrawn, as I have already undertaken.

12. The raiders are either under your control or they are not. If they are under your control, you should withdraw them and, in any event, stop them coming through Pakistan territory into Kashmir. If they are not under your control and you can do nothing to stop them, then surely we are entitled to deal with them as we think best.

13. As regards proposal number three in your telegram of November 6th⁵ we entirely endorse Lord Mountbatten's view (*vide* paragraph seven above).

4. *See ante*, item 26.

5. This stated that the two Governors-General be empowered to restore peace, undertake the administration of the State and arrange to hold a plebiscite under their joint control and supervision.

14. It will thus be seen that our proposals which we have repeatedly stated are :—(one) that Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; (two) that Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir soil as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (three) that Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to U.N.O. to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date.

15. The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential, in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions, that there should be acceptance of principle that, where ruler of a State does not belong to community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is same as the State's, the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or other Dominion should be ascertained by reference to the will of the people.

16. The Major-General commanding our forces in Jammu and Kashmir has been given the most explicit orders to do everything in his power to ensure that no victimisation of any community is permitted.

37. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
9 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai

Thank you for sending me the note on Kashmir.² It is interesting and shows insight. I entirely agree that the problem is very much a political one and an economic one. It is because of this that I have been anxious to send proper people there.

On the economic side we must send essential supplies, namely, salt, sugar, kerosene oil and tea. I might mention that tea can easily be arranged from Kangra where the special kind of tea, i.e., green tea, which has a market in Kashmir, is grown. We have also to help in getting out the produce.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 1, p. 89.

2. Patel forwarded a note by Ramadhar of the Spinners Association. It stressed the need for political action to wean away Muslims from the Muslim League. It also drew attention to the severe economic crisis facing Kashmir and called for immediate remedial measures to prevent the spread of discontent.

of Kashmir which includes textiles, fruits, etc. I propose to look into this matter when I go to Srinagar. It might be desirable to station a representative of ours in Srinagar to control this traffic, both ways.

I do not know who the writer of the note is.³ He refers to his Association. Is this the Spinners' Association ?⁴ I should like to know so that I can get into touch with him. He may be able to help in making the necessary arrangements.

I am returning the note to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

3. Ramadhar (b. 1918); joined the Khadi movement at a young age; courted arrest in 1932 and in 1942; after release in 1945 posted as Secretary, All India Spinners' Association's branch in Jammu and Kashmir; Organising Secretary, Central Relief Committee, a sub-committee of the A.I.C.C., 1947-48.
4. The All India Spinners Association was started by Mahatma Gandhi in September 1925 as part of his programme to promote hand-spinning and the weaving industry.

38. Example of Communal Unity¹

During the past two weeks, the eyes of India have been fixed on Kashmir, where a battle is in progress between freedom and slavery. Many of us regret that we are not in Kashmir to face this invasion together with the people of the Valley. The whole of India feel anxious lest Kashmir falls to the invader.

But in these two trying weeks the people of Kashmir have written a page in the book of history which posterity will read with pride. Though the danger has lessened considerably, it is not yet completely over. We want to clear Kashmir of all raiders, in fact, every person who comes with evil designs. The citizens must not relax their vigilance or efforts. I assure you that, as in the past, so in the future, Kashmir and India will stand together and face the enemy. This is the pledge I give here today to your leader the *Sher* of Kashmir.

1. Speech at a public meeting in Srinagar, 11 November 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 12 November 1947 and *The Hindu*, 13 November 1947.

The so-called raiders had been well prepared in men and material; they had the latest weapons to fight with. We could not sit quietly in Delhi while Kashmir was being enslaved. So, despite the many difficulties facing us, we took upon ourselves the responsibility of coming to the aid of Kashmir. We had hardly a day to make preparations. There was no time and the raiders were marching rapidly towards Srinagar.

Our army and air force have fought gallantly to save Kashmir. The actions of Col. Rai and Brig. Rajinder Singh² gave the breathing space in which we could rush more forces to Kashmir.

The Indian Army is an old force with a distinguished reputation, but it is only now that the army has become truly Indian. This is the first time that, as soldiers of free India, you have had an occasion to show your mettle. Kashmir provided an opportunity for the Indian Army to demonstrate that they could run their affairs without foreign aid. I am proud of you. I congratulate you all, officers and men belonging to all branches of the defence services. But you must remember that all of you have been sent here to help Sheikh Abdullah and his administration to drive out the invaders; you have to bear this fact in mind in your dealings with the local administration and people. I am sure that the army will uphold the honour and prestige of the Indian Union.

I must say I was very proud of the way in which India, and the people of Kashmir, faced this menace. In spite of the proximity of the danger, Srinagar carried on its normal life; this indeed is a matter of considerable pride. While the army and air force discharged their role well, the spirit exhibited by the people, particularly by the citizens of Kashmir, during these anxious days, did much to save the situation. Without distinction of caste or creed, the people—Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs—rose as one man against the enemy. All of you must decide here and now that the spectacle of communal unity which has been witnessed in Kashmir during the past two crucial weeks will be maintained in the days to come.

You have not only saved Kashmir, you have also restored the prestige of India, your mother country. What has happened in Kashmir in the way of unity between the various religious communities has brought hope to my disappointed heart. Kashmir has set an example to the whole of India.

2. (1898-1947); Chief of Staff of Jammu and Kashmir Armed Forces; died in action near Uri on 24 October 1947.

39. Throw Out the Enemy¹

This is no time to cry. There is much work to do. Our first task is to throw out the enemy.

You have had a unique experience and have had a taste of what Pakistan means. You also know what destruction and slavery mean.

I congratulate you for setting before the rest of the country an example of unity between Hindus and Muslims. I am really proud of this fact. The Indian Army consists of young men who will sacrifice everything to complete their task.

1. Speech at a public meeting at Baramulla, 12 November 1947. Based on the report in *The Hindu*, 14 November 1947.

40. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

On return from Kashmir I have received your telegram No. 695-G dated November 10th.² I am surprised to see reference to some draft agreement. There is no such thing to my knowledge, but some kind of a formula for discussion was placed before me and I was told by Menon that he did not agree with parts of it. Lord Ismay also informed me that he did not think it feasible. When I saw it I made it clear to Mohammed Ali that we could not possibly consider it.

An essential preliminary is complete withdrawal of all raiders and invaders into Kashmir territory from Pakistan. We cannot withdraw our troops from Kashmir, or cease taking precautionary measures, till Kashmir is free from these raiders and there is no chance of further attack. Already the Kashmir State has suffered greatly. My recent visit to Kashmir brought home to me the urgent necessity of every action being taken by us to drive away every single raider from State territory. The acts of vandalism that they have committed in Kashmir shocked me beyond measure. No organised

1. New Delhi, 13 November 1947. *Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute* edited by P.L. Lakhanpal (Delhi, 1965), p. 79.
2. Liaquat Ali referred to a draft agreement prepared by Lord Ismay, V.P. Menon and Mohammed Ali.

authority can permit such savage behaviour in its territory. Hospitals, convents, churches, libraries, shops, in fact every place was ruined and looted. I saw large numbers of Muslim women with their ears torn because ear-rings had been pulled out. The population of Kashmir valley which as you know is chiefly Muslim complained bitterly of this outrageous behaviour and begged us to continue to protect them. We cannot leave them in the lurch.

2. News came yesterday of sack and large-scale massacre at Rajauri in Jammu Province by these raiders. We are going into these areas in Jammu Province to rid the people of this scourge.

During my stay in Kashmir our military officers placed before me numerous instances indicating the complicity of Pakistan Army soldiers in this invasion. I put it to you that the help given by Pakistan authorities to this barbarous raid is an act which must be resented very deeply by us and by the people of Kashmir. In order to clear up these charges against Pakistan authorities and Army, it is desirable, from your point of view as well as ours, to have a thorough enquiry into this matter, that is what part the North West Frontier Province Government, or civil officers, or Army of Pakistan have played in helping this raid into Kashmir.

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah is at present the head of the Kashmir administration and anything relating to Kashmir must necessarily have his approval and consent.

I would be glad to meet you to discuss these and other matters, but for the next few days I am completely tied up with important meetings of Congress Working Committee and All India Congress Committee; the Constituent Assembly follows immediately after. Our meeting I hope would be helpful, but it can only bear results when all raiders have been driven out of Kashmir and Pakistan Government has declared its firm policy to the exclusion of these raiders away from Kashmir.

41. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
13 November 1947

Dear Maharaja Saheb,

I was happy to meet you and the Maharani Saheba and I am grateful to you both for your courtesy and hospitality. I am sure that a frank exchange of views between us will be helpful in removing many misconceptions and in leading to a cooperative effort in solving the difficult problems that confront Kashmir.

1. J.N. Collection.

2. These problems obviously cannot be isolated from all-India problems. Indeed the fact that the Indian Union has rushed to the rescue of Kashmir in its hour of danger itself shows the intimate connection between the Indian Union and Kashmir State. During our brief conversation yesterday at Srinagar I placed before you certain basic factors of the situation. I think it is necessary that these fundamentals should be grasped. Unless this is done, we shall lose ourselves in pointless discussion over trivial details. We are face to face in Kashmir, as in India as a whole, with a dynamic and revolutionary situation which cannot be judged by past standards or by legal niceties. We have to face the situation boldly, otherwise the situation will overwhelm us.

3. As I pointed out to you, the only person who can deliver the goods in Kashmir is Sheikh Abdullah. He is obviously the leading popular personality in Kashmir. The way he has risen to grapple with the crisis has shown the nature of the man. I have a high opinion of his integrity and his general balance of mind. He has striven hard and succeeded very largely in keeping communal peace. He may make any number of mistakes in minor matters, but I think he is likely to be right in regard to major decisions.

4. But the real point is that no satisfactory way out can be found in Kashmir except through Shiekh Abdullah. If that is so, full confidence must be placed in him. There is no half-way house between full confidence and a half-and-half affair which has little advantage and many disadvantages. Even if a risk has to be taken in giving this full confidence, that risk has to be taken. There is no other way as far as I can see it both from the short-term point of view and the long-term one. Sheikh Abdullah is earnestly desirous of cooperating and is amenable to any reasonable argument. I would suggest to you to keep in close personal touch with him and deal with him directly and not through intermediaries.

5. Events in Kashmir have produced great changes in people's minds as well as in the facts of the situation. None of us can ignore this, whether we like these changes or not, and the path of wisdom is to recognise them and to adapt oneself to them. No one can undo these changes and they will proceed by their own momentum.

6. After I left Jammu yesterday I was handed a letter from Kanwar Dalip Singh in the course of which he writes as follows :

"Mr. Mahajan told me that the Kashmir Government objected to the use of Mr. Brijlal Nehru as Liaison Officer....I learnt that Mr. Brijlal has been sent away in disgrace from Kashmir."

7. I was amazed to read this and if I had known of it earlier, I would have spoken to you about it and asked Mr. Mahajan what exactly he meant by saying this. This raises rather important points which I think must be cleared up. I was not aware myself that Mr. Brijlal Nehru has been sent away in disgrace from Kashmir. This is the first intimation of the fact that I have had. I should like to know whether what Mr. Mahajan said on this subject was on his own account or under some direction from you. I sent Mr. Brijlal Nehru to Kashmir to try to help in smoothing difficulties and in bringing about as much cooperation as possible between the various elements in Kashmir. There was our army and Sheikh Abdullah in Srinagar and it was essential that their relations should be good. It was even more essential that Sheikh Abdullah's contacts and relations with you should be close and good. These have been our instructions to Kanwar Dalip Singh and all others who have gone from here in any capacity whatever, whether civil or military. In my anxiety to promote the good of Kashmir at this critical juncture, I have been continually thinking of how to help. I have, as a matter of fact, sent several persons in various capacities, some formal and some informal. Kanwar Dalip Singh was sent at my instance.

8. I thought that Mr. Brijlal Nehru might also be able to help because of his knowledge of Kashmir and of the principal parties concerned. I sent him, therefore, in an honorary capacity to help in this rather delicate task, without overlapping on other people's official duties. He has, in fact, done good work in Kashmir already and has been very helpful.

9. When Mr. Mahajan says that the Kashmir Government objects to the use of Mr. Brijlal Nehru as Liaison Officer, the first thing that arises is what he means by the Kashmir Government. Does it mean just Mr. Mahajan or something more? I was under the impression that, apart from other factors, Sheikh Abdullah had been appointed Head of the Administration and as such he could certainly speak on behalf of the Kashmir Government. Sheikh Abdullah has not objected in any way to Mr. Brijlal Nehru's appointment. Am I to understand that Mr. Mahajan is an overriding authority in all such and other matters? That was not my understanding of the agreement arrived at and I should like to be perfectly clear about this.

10. An even more important question arises in regard to objection being taken to any person we may choose to send to Kashmir. It is very unusual even for independent powers to object to any person being sent to them. If it is unusual in such cases, it is perfectly extraordinary that the Kashmir Government, or anyone connected with it, should take up this attitude, when we are going all out to help that Government. It is hardly possible to have any cooperative effort if this attitude is adopted. The natural consequence for us is to object to persons whom we do not approve of.

11. If Mr. Mahajan objected to Mr. Brijlal Nehru, whom I had sent, common courtesy demanded that he should speak or write to me about him and explain what exactly he means. To take this matter up with Kanwar Dalip Singh rather formally without any reference to me is an act of extreme discourtesy. For the moment I do not wish to say anything more about this till I know the facts more fully. But I hope what I have written will indicate that this apparently trivial matter is one of grave consequence and shows the difficulty of having dealings, however well-intentioned they might be, with the Kashmir Government. I shall be grateful if you could kindly enlighten me as to the true position, so that we can consider the matter in that light.

12. I am as anxious as you are for immediate relief to be sent to Mirpur, Kotli and other places which are besieged. I understand that our troops will move towards Mirpur very soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

42. Tribute to the Air Force¹

I have come here today to congratulate you on your remarkable work in saving Kashmir and creating greater confidence among the people of India in their country's strength.

I have been very keen to come and meet you young men personally. You have acted heroically under difficult conditions and circumstances ever since India was called upon suddenly to defend Kashmir against the raiders.

We had great sympathy with the people of that State when its territories were invaded by looters and raiders; but we realised that mere sympathy would not be enough and that we must take active steps to save its people from unjustified and uncalled for aggression. We could not see the State being devastated and its people massacred by ruthless invading armies. All roads to the State were in enemy hands and, if it had not been for the timely help given by you, Kashmir could not have been saved.

1. Speech at the Willingdon Aerodrome (now called Safdarjung Airport), New Delhi, 1 November 1947. From *The Hindu*, 20 November 1947.

The Kashmir operations were a hazardous task, but I am glad to note that the pilots and the crew have risen to the occasion and worked with bravery and efficiency. Your work in Kashmir has not finished and you must not slacken your efforts. Besides saving the State, your achievement in Kashmir has made the people of India realise that their Air Force is capable of facing an emergency. It has added to your prestige at home and abroad.

Indian pilots and crew can be compared favourably with those of the air force of any other nation in the world, but we do not have a sufficient number of them at present and we must try to train more young men for this work. Aircraft will be bought and I hope we will soon begin to manufacture them in India itself. But the more difficult task is that of training an adequate number of men to work them. Our aircraft have made nearly 750 flights to Kashmir and back during the past three weeks and carried three million pounds of load and flown for 600,000 miles.

42a, To Dwarkanath Kachru¹

New Delhi
20 November 1947

My dear Dwarkanath,

I have been receiving your letters. Sheikh Saheb wrote to me that he would like to come here. He is welcome to come whenever he can.

I have been wanting to enquire about a particular case which is rather sad. Mrs. Ishwari Devi was a refugee from Abbottabad to Srinagar. She had a child of 8 years, Omi by name, with her. They went to Srinagar aerodrome about a week or ten days ago intending to come to Delhi by plane. Owing to mismanagement and the heavy rush of passengers, she was pushed into the plane while her child was left behind. She begged the pilot to allow her to get out or to get her child in but the pilot would not listen to her and banged the door and came away. She is now terribly distressed about her child. Could you please enquire about this child Omi, 8 years old, and inform me by telegram immediately if you have news of her? If you find the child arrangements will have to be made for her transport to Delhi.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

43. To Dwarkanath Kachru¹

New Delhi
21 November 1947

My dear Dwarkanath,

I have received your letter of the 20th November. I have also received your previous letters.

2. I am horrified to learn in some detail from you what happened in Jammu on the 5th and 6th of November.² I am very glad indeed that Sheikh Saheb went to Jammu and tackled the situation with courage and ability. It is a difficult situation, but I am sure that Sheikh Saheb will be able to control it. All power to his elbow.

3. I think that the best course for Sheikh Saheb is to meet the Maharaja frequently and consult him. In the present circumstances this procedure will yield results sooner than otherwise.

4. It is also important that Sheikh Saheb and General Kalwant Singh³ should fully cooperate with each other. I am glad this is happening.

5. I hope adequate steps have been taken to give relief to the 3000 Muslims who, you say, were collected outside the city in the open.

6. I am writing to you briefly now as it is late and I have much else to do. We are trying our best to send civil supplies from here.

7. Twentyone Kashmiri Muslims from Simla arrived here some days ago. We are sending them back to Srinagar by air.

8. I find that there are about 600 Kashmiri Sikhs in Delhi. These were brought by air early this month. It is unfortunate that they were brought

1. J.N. Collection.

2. About 5000 Muslims from Jammu city had been kept in an evacuees camp for eventual removal to Pakistan. The first convoy to Pakistan under the protection of Kashmir State Forces had been ambushed on 5 November 1947 by Sikh and Hindu refugees from within the State. The second convoy was attacked on 6 November but the attackers were repulsed by the Rajput Regiment men who were the escort. One hundred and fifty attackers were killed and 90 wounded in these two incidents.

3. (1905-1966); passed out from Sandhurst in 1925; commanded Jammu and Kashmir Forces from November 1947 to May 1948; Chief of General Staff, 1948-50; Commander of a Corps, 1950-55.

and indeed they seem to have been hustled. They have come and asked me to help them to go back to Kashmir. They are typical Kashmiri Sikhs, more Kashmiri than Sikh.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

44. To Dalip Singh¹

New Delhi
21 November 1947

My dear Dalip Singh,
I have your letter of the 19th enclosing copy of a letter to Sardar Patel.

2 As for the petrol,² it should certainly be given to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad³ or to anyone whom he designates. I am taking steps accordingly.

3. Your account about your meeting with the R.S.S. people is interesting. There is nothing very new in it. They always say the same thing. Their big boss⁴ saw me some time ago and repeated all that you have been told. Nevertheless the R.S.S. is an injurious and dangerous organization and fascist in the strictly technical sense of the word. We have known about it for many years and some of our colleagues have been up against it for a long time. It is bad enough in Maharashtra where it originated. But the combination of R.S.S. and Punjab has produced something worse. I have little doubt that we have to stand up against this. If you have read the A.I.C.C. resolutions passed recently, you will find that we have said something about the R.S.S. and communal organizations in them. They are very well organised but extraordinarily narrow in their outlook and completely lacking in the appreciation of any basic problem.

4. I have written a letter⁵ to Sheikh Abdullah today and sent a copy of this letter to Dwarkanath Kachru who must be in Jammu. You can ask him to show you this copy. This will put you in touch with happenings

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Despite a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan for the continuance of existing arrangements of communication and civil supplies, Pakistan cut off after 15 August all supplies of food, petrol, salt and other essential commodities on the import of which Kashmir State depended.
3. On 22 November 1947, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was deputed to Jammu as the Chief of the Emergency Administration.
4. M.S. Golwalkar.
5. See *post*, item 45(a).

on higher levels regarding Kashmir. The fate of Kashmir is not going to be decided by the R.S.S., not even of Jammu, and the sooner this is appreciated the better. The only person in the State who, as an individual, will have the biggest say in the matter will be Sheikh Abdullah.⁶ If anyone can save Kashmir, it is he and not the R.S.S. or anyone else. If by any chance the U.N.O. intervenes, it is Sheikh Abdullah and his following that will impress them and show them that the people of Kashmir are fighting for their freedom against the raiders. The R.S.S. will merely support Liaquat Ali Khan's case against us.

5. We have been getting further particulars about the attacks on the Muslim convoys from Jammu on the 5th and 6th November. Liaquat Ali Khan has been shouting hoarse about them. From all accounts these attacks have created a very powerful effect in Pakistan and there is very great bitterness about them. If you meet Horace Alexander, he will tell you something about it. Indeed, but for these attacks, probably our military position in Jammu Province would be much stronger today. That is to say those attacks and the killings of Muslims have enraged the tribesmen and others and they want revenge. There is a feeling of desperation in Pakistan about Kashmir.

6. I have received further details about these attacks on November 5th and 6th and I have been shocked to read them. These reports from impartial non-Muslim observers indicate that there was a great deal of trickery and very probably connivance by the State Dogra troops in the massacre. Who was responsible for this I cannot say. But I feel strongly that there must be an inquiry. The extreme folly of sending these convoys in the manner they were sent amazes me. It shows a complete lack of political sense apart from inhumanity.

7. Gandhiji has also been greatly upset by these accounts. He asked me to write to the Maharaja and to Mahajan about them and say that this matter must be cleared up and the guilty persons punished. I am not writing to either of them; but I suggest to you that you might speak to them and point out that this is a black stain on all of us and that it has injured our cause tremendously. I think you might suggest to the Maharaja that he should promise an inquiry. This need not be held immediately; but it should not

6. Sheikh Abdullah carried on the struggle with his militia against the raiders till the arrival of the Indian Army after the accession of the State to India on 27 October 1947. On 30 October, he was appointed Head of the Emergency Administration. He maintained order and discipline with the help of volunteers and the State police force even when the threat to Srinagar was at its height. He offered the people his programme of "New Kashmir", evolved in 1944, which called for anti-feudal and anti-imperial struggles and promised a government based on the panchayat system and an independent judiciary.

be too long delayed either. You must remember that we are functioning on the world stage in Kashmir and it does not help to try to hide unsavoury occurrences. U.N. observers or others might come and inquire themselves into the allegations made.

8. I understand that Sheikh Saheb will be going to Jammu soon and from there he will be coming to Delhi. I have written to you enough to indicate that Sheikh Saheb should be helped in every way. His reputation has gone up tremendously by his handling of recent problems and the great integrity he has shown.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

45. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 404 dated 19th November. I have nothing to add to what I have already said regarding the so-called agreement² in my telegram No. 338 dated 13th November.³ I have been assured by parties concerned that this was no agreement at all but points noted down for discussion.

2. Immediately after the accession of Kashmir State to India we were entirely occupied, militarily and otherwise, in the Kashmir Valley and we were not in touch with the Jammu situation. We came to learn later that two convoys of Muslims had been brutally attacked in Jammu. We took immediate steps to prevent evacuation of Muslims from Jammu and to protect them there. Another convoy had started already but this was guarded by our troops and when this was attacked our troops inflicted very heavy casualties on the attackers, killing 150 of them, wounding nearly a hundred and capturing 500 of them. Since then there has been no evacuation, no convoys and no attacks. We have issued strictest possible instructions to Commander of our forces that they should do everything possible to protect Muslims in Jammu and these orders have been carried out with success during the last fortnight. We deeply regret the attacks on Muslim

1. New Delhi, 21 November 1947. J.N. Collection.

2. In his cable, Liaquat Ali reiterated the existence of the agreement. He also charged that no action was being taken to prevent atrocities being perpetrated on Muslims in Jammu and Poonch.

3. See *ante*, item 40.

convoys early in November and heavy casualties suffered by them. We should like to point out however that no troops of the Indian Union have been guilty of offences that you attribute to them. They have effectively protected Muslims. It appears that attacks on Muslim convoys were made chiefly by non-Muslim refugees.

3. Sheikh Abdullah has visited Jammu recently and has taken effective steps there to afford safety and security to the residents.

4. The Poonch area, according to the information available to us, has been overrun by raiders, and garrisons of state troops are mostly isolated and besieged. It is difficult to understand therefore how local Muslim population in this area could be victimised by non-Muslims.

5. We are quite sure that soldiers of Indian Union forces in Kashmir have afforded protection to Muslims according to strict directions, or have been engaged in fighting raiders.

6. As regards troops of States that have acceded to the Indian Union, some of these were sent to Kashmir State but they arrived after the attacks on Muslim convoys referred to above. There has been no allegation to our knowledge that they have participated in attacks on Muslims and indeed they have not been physically in a position to do so.⁴

7. I should like to draw your attention to certain resolutions passed recently by All India Congress Committee in Delhi defining the policy to be pursued in regard to migration of population, refugees, etc. These resolutions represent generally the policy of our Government.⁵

8. Your statement⁶ that we are not prepared to have discussion until raiders have been driven out of Kashmir must be based on some misunderstanding. We are ready for a discussion at any time. All that I have said, and would repeat, is that a settlement of the Kashmir issue cannot take place unless the raiders are made to leave Kashmir State territory.

4. Liaquat Ali Khan alleged that the forces of the Indian Union and of the States acceding to India were engaged in raids on Pakistan.
5. One of the resolutions stated that the movement of refugees would be regulated in accordance with the policy laid down by the Government which was "to protect the minorities" and "prevent their removal by force or by creating circumstances which compel their evacuation". No house not vacated willingly by a Muslim should be used for accommodation of the refugees, except by proper legal authority.
6. In his press statement of 16 November, Liaquat Ali deplored Nehru's insistence that there could be no discussions until the raiders withdrew and that all agreements concerning Kashmir should have Abdullah's approval. He saw no other alternative than an appeal to the U.N.O.

9. I must express my great regret at the remarks you have made in your press statement about Sheikh Abdullah.⁷ I regard him as a man of high integrity and patriotism. You know well his great influence in Kashmir. All communities look up to him but more specially and naturally Muslims of Kashmir. He has faced a very difficult situation with remarkable courage and ability. He is now Head of the Kashmir Administration and undoubtedly represents in a very large measure the popular will of Kashmir. It would be improper in every way for us not to consult him in any matter relating to Kashmir State.

10. The specific suggestions regarding reference to the United Nations in your press statement are :

- (i) "The U. N. O. should immediately appoint representatives in Jammu and Kashmir in order to put a stop to fighting, and to repression of Muslims in the State." Since United Nations have no forces at their disposal, we do not see how they can put a stop to the fighting or to the alleged repression of Muslims. This can only be done by an organised military force, and is being done by our troops. The fighting would also stop as soon as the raiders were made to withdraw and I have repeatedly asked your co-operation in stopping transit and supplies to raiders through Pakistan territory.
- (ii) "To set up an impartial administration of the State." It is not clear to me what U.N.O. can do in the present circumstances in Kashmir till peace and order have been established. We are convinced that Sheikh Abdullah's administration is based on the will of the people and is impartial. Anyone who goes to Kashmir and sees things for himself can appreciate this. Moreover, we have pledged that, so long as our forces are in Kashmir, protection of all sections of the community will be their first and sacred duty. This duty will be discharged without fear or favour.
- (iii) "To undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State on the question of accession." I have repeatedly stated that as soon as the raiders have been driven out of Kashmir or have withdrawn and peace and order have been established, the people of Kashmir should decide the question of accession by plebiscite

7. Liaquat Ali described Abdullah as a "quisling" and an "agent of the Congress for many years, bartering away the life, honour and freedom of his people for the sake of personal profit and power..."

or referendum under international auspices such as those of the United Nations. It is clear that no such reference to the people can be made when large bodies of raiders are depsoiling the country and military operations against them are being carried on. By this declaration I stand.

11. I have said enough to reassure you regarding our resolve to protect the Muslim population of Kashmir and of our desire to have the people of Kashmir themselves decide their own future under fair and equitable conditions. I would repeat that we are ready for a discussion at any time. But a discussion is to lead to a settlement the raiders must be out of Kashmir state. We cannot leave the people of Kashmir unguarded and in danger of attack. We have pledged our word to protect them.

12. In your press statement you have said that you have no control of the tribesmen engaged in fighting in Kashmir. Even so, it should be possible for you to deny them access to Kashmir through your territory, and also to stop supplies of commodities like petrol which, *prima facie*, they could not obtain from any source outside Pakistan. If you have no control over the raiders and we do not stop and drive them out, then indeed we are reduced to a state of affairs when all governments cease to function and the raiders, the looter and the killer become masters of the situation. That surely cannot be tolerated by our Government or yours.

13. I did not suggest that the Pakistan Army was participating officially in the raid. We possess however incontrovertible evidence that members of the Pakistan Army whether on leave or deserters have joined the raiders, and that the military equipment which can only have come from the Pakistan Army has been in possession of the raiders.⁸

8. To this cable Liaquat Ali Khan replied on 25 November 1947 that India's view was evasive and full of contradictions. He regretted that Nehru still supported Sheikh Abdullah "who you know is a quisling and a paid agent to disrupt the Mussalmans of Kashmir."

45a, To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

New Delhi
21 November 1947

My dear Sheikh Saheb,

I am sorry I have not written to you at any length for some days. I have been writing to Dwarkanath.

2. I received your letter about salt and sugar. You have received some sugar and I am taking steps to have salt sent to you very soon.

3. Dwarkanath sent me a report of your visit to Jammu. I had some reports from other sources too. I was happy to learn of the great success of your visit there and of the ability with which you tackled a most difficult situation. We shall, of course, help you whenever and wherever possible. But I feel more and more sure that decisions should be taken and arrangements made as far as possible in Srinagar and Jammu without our intervention at every stage.

4. You must have seen Liaquat Ali Khan's public statements about Kashmir. He has followed them up by long telegrams to me suggesting a reference to the U.N.O. of the Kashmir issue.

5. I enclose copies of his last telegram and my reply.

6. Dwarkanath writes to me that there is strong feeling in the leadership of the National Conference against a referendum. I know this and quite understand it. In fact I share the feeling myself. But you will appreciate that it is not easy for us to back out of the stand we have taken before the world. That would create a very bad impression abroad and more specially in U.N. circles. I feel, however, that this question of referendum is rather an academic one at present. We have made it clear and indeed it is patent enough that there can be no referendum till there is complete peace and order in Kashmir State and all the raiders have been pushed out. As far as I can see this desirable consummation will not be achieved for some months yet. In the Poonch area it is quite possible that these raiders might continue to function in the hills and it might not be worthwhile for us to make a major effort to push them out during the winter. Thus for some months the question of referendum does not arise in any practical form.

1. J.N. Collection.

These months will be full of developments and those developments will govern future events including the possibility of having a referendum. If this struggle lasts for several months, the chances of a referendum automatically fade out.

7. If we said to the U.N.O. that we no longer stand by a referendum in Kashmir, Pakistan would score a strong point and that would be harmful to our cause. On the other hand, if circumstances continue as they are and the referendum is out of the question during these next few months, then why worry about it now? Indeed I have seen an argument in an English newspaper partly supporting our viewpoint about the referendum and saying that other events are deciding the issue and that in any event there can be no referendum before the spring.

8. *There is no difference between you and us on this issue. It is all a question of the best tactical approach. I would personally suggest to you not to say anything rejecting the idea of a referendum but to lay stress on the fact that the people of Kashmir, by their heroic resistance, are deciding the issue themselves; also that it is a little absurd for people to carry on a little war in Kashmir and, when defeated, to want a referendum. If there is any serious intent on their part, they should have stopped this war and drawn back the raiders.*

9. I understand from Dwarkanath that you will be coming here a few days later. I am glad to learn this.

10. There are a large number of Kashmiri Sikhs who have been hurriedly sent away from Srinagar early this month by air. They all want to go back and I do not know what to do with them. Twenty-one Kashmiri Muslims from Simla were sent here. I am arranging to send them by air to Srinagar. This is the last Simla batch.

11. We have sent full and repeated instructions to our delegation at the United Nations General Assembly regarding Kashmir. It is quite possible that Pakistan might raise this issue there. We are going to oppose Liaquat Ali's proposals; but we feel that it might be desirable, under certain circumstances, to suggest that one or two observers from the U.N.O. might come to Kashmir. You have yourself invited observers from the Middle East countries. I think it would be a good gesture on our part to invite U.N. observers and to declare that we have nothing to hide. Whether we do so or not will depend on the circumstances.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

46. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

I am grateful to you for your message² regarding Kashmir which was communicated to me by your High Commissioner yesterday and fully appreciate your interest in this difficult situation and your desire for a peaceful solution.

As you are aware, I visited Kashmir on 9th. What I saw there brought home to me the urgent necessity for every action being taken by us to drive away every single raider from the State territory. The acts of vandalism that the invaders have committed in Kashmir shocked me beyond measure. Hospitals, convents, churches, libraries, shops, in fact every place has been ruined and looted. I saw large numbers of Muslim women with their ears torn, because their earrings had been pulled out. The population of Kashmir Valley, which is chiefly Muslim, complained bitterly of this outrageous behaviour and begged us to continue to protect them.

1. New Delhi, 23 November 1947. L/P&S/13/1968, I.O.L.R.

2. In his message dated 21 November Attlee stated that "there seems to be agreement on both sides that a reference to the people of Kashmir is the right way in which to obtain a decision on the final accession to Pakistan or India....The speediest and most satisfactory way of putting this idea into practice would be to have recourse to one special organ of the United Nations namely the International Court of Justice".

Our troops are in Kashmir to prevent these barbarities and to rid Kashmir of their perpetrators. Until this task has been accomplished there can be no question of holding a plebiscite because the conditions under which the people of Kashmir can freely express their will will not be there. We have repeatedly asked the Government of Pakistan to deny the raiders access to Kashmir through Pakistan territory and also to stop the supply of transport and of commodities like petrol which, *prima facie*, they could not obtain from any source outside Pakistan. To these requests there has been no response. On the contrary, we have been told that Pakistan has no control over raiders. In the circumstances we have no option but to continue military operations which are in the nature of police action to stop and to drive out raiders. Otherwise there will be a state of affairs in Kashmir when all government will cease to function and the raider, the looter and the assassin will become masters of the situation.

I think you will agree that what we are doing is to defend Kashmir against brutal aggression of freebooters. The invaders are like a scourge which has ravaged and still threatens Kashmir. In trying to drive them out of Kashmir, where they have no right to be, we are not threatening peace of Pakistan or anyone else.

When raiders have been driven out or have withdrawn and peace and order have been re-established, we shall be ready to let question of Kashmir's final accession be decided by the people of Kashmir by means of a plebiscite or referendum under international auspices such as those of United Nations. We do not, however, consider the International Court of Justice to be appropriate organ for providing requisite machinery. It has no executive authority under United Nations Charter nor trained administrative personnel at its disposal. The appropriate authority to provide the machinery would be the Security Council or Secretary-General of the United Nations. But necessary approach to one of them can only be made when normal conditions have been restored in Kashmir. Pakistan can help to shorten the duration of police action in Kashmir by denying raiders passage through its territory and by stopping supplies. If you can persuade the Pakistan Government to do so, it will greatly help to relieve the present situation.³

I shall be grateful if you will communicate to our High Commissioner in London the text of your message to me dated November 22nd.

3. The Pakistan Government had earlier sent a cable to the British Prime Minister reiterating the charges against India and elucidating what they thought were the conditions for a free plebiscite. It had proposed that a U.N. force or even a force drawn from the Commonwealth should conduct the functions of the government of Kashmir in the interim period.

47. Events in Kashmir¹

I am glad to have this opportunity of explaining to the House the course of events that have led to our intervention in Kashmir with the aid of armed forces and the attitude of the Government of India to the grave problems that have arisen in that State.

2. The House is aware that on the lapse of Crown Paramountcy on the 15th August this year, Kashmir did not accede to either Dominion. We were of course vitally interested in the decision that the State would take. Kashmir, because of her geographical position, with her frontiers with three countries, namely, the Soviet Union, China and Afghanistan, is intimately connected with the security and international contacts of India. Economically also Kashmir is intimately related to India. The caravan trade routes from Central Asia to India pass through Kashmir State.

3. Nevertheless we did not put the slightest pressure on the State to accede to the Indian Dominion because we realised that Kashmir was in a very difficult position. We did not want a mere accession from the top, but an association in accordance with the will of her people. Indeed, we did not encourage any rapid decision. Even in regard to a Standstill Agreement no speedy steps were taken by us although the matter was under consideration, even though Kashmir had entered into a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan soon after the 15th August.²

4. We learnt later that serious external pressure was being applied on Kashmir by the Pakistan authorities refusing to send to Kashmir supplies vital to the needs of the people, such as foodgrains, salt, sugar and petrol. Thus an attempt was being made to strangle Kashmir economically and force her to accede to Pakistan. This pressure was serious because it was not easy for Kashmir to obtain these essential supplies from India on account of the difficulty of communications.

1. Statement in the Legislative Assembly, 25 November 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. I, pp. 592-596.
2. The Standstill Agreement between Pakistan and Kashmir with regard to communications, supplies, and postal and telegraphic arrangements became operative on 15 August 1947. No agreement had been signed with India prior to Kashmir's accession on 26 October 1947.

5. In September news reached us that tribesmen of the North West Frontier Province were being collected and sent to the Kashmir border. In the beginning of October events took a grave turn. Armed bands moved into Jammu Province from the neighbouring districts of West Punjab, committed serious acts of depredation on the local inhabitants, burnt villages and towns and put a large number of people to death. Refugees from these areas poured into Jammu.

6. On the Jammu side of the border the local inhabitants, who are chiefly Hindu and Rajput in that area, took retaliatory measures and drove out the Muslims living in those border villages. In these border conflicts a very large number of villages were destroyed or burnt by both parties on either side of the frontier.

7. The raiders from West Punjab into Jammu Province were increased in numbers and spread out over that Province. The Kashmir State Army which had to meet these raids at numerous points soon found itself broken into small fragments and gradually ceased to be a fighting force. The raiders were highly organised, had competent officers and modern arms. They succeeded in occupying a considerable part of Jammu Province, more especially in the Poonch area, Poonch town, Mirpur, Kotli and some other places held out.

8. About this time the State authorities asked us to supply them with arms and ammunition. We agreed to do so in the normal course. But in fact no supply was made till events took a more serious turn. Even at this stage no mention was made of accession to India.

9. The leader of the popular organisation in Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, President of the Kashmir National Conference, was released from prison during this period and we discussed the situation in Kashmir with him as well as with representatives of the Maharaja of Kashmir. We made it clear to both of them that while we would welcome the accession of Kashmir we did not want any hurried or forced accession and we would rather wait for the people to decide. Sheikh Abdullah was himself of this opinion.

10. On the 24th October we heard that large armed bands consisting both of tribesmen from the Frontier and ex-servicemen had broken through Muzaffarabad and were marching to Srinagar. These raiders had crossed Pakistan territory and they were equipped with Bren guns, machine guns, mortars and flame-throwers and had at their disposal a large number of transport vehicles. They moved rapidly down the valley, sacking and burning and looting all along the way. We gave earnest consideration to this situation in our Defence Committee on the 25th and 26th October. The

position on the 26th morning was that the raiders were marching towards Srinagar and there was no military detachment capable of stopping them. They had been stopped for two days near Uri by the State forces under a gallant commander who resisted this advance to the point of death. These two days thus gained were very valuable.

11. We were asked at this stage both on behalf of the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah to accept the accession of the State to the Indian Union and to intervene with the armed forces of the Union. An immediate decision was necessary, and in fact it is now clear that if we had delayed the decision even by 24 hours Srinagar would have fallen and would have suffered the tragic fate that befell Muzaffarabad, Baramula and other places. It was clear to us that we could not possibly accept under any circumstances this ruin of Kashmir by brutal and irresponsible raiders. This would have been a surrender to frightfulness and fanaticism of the worst type and it would have had the most serious consequences all over India. To intervene at that stage was no easy matter and was full of risks and danger. Yet we decided to face this risk and intervene because any other course would have meant ruin to Kashmir and greater danger to India.

12. In accepting the accession however we made it perfectly clear to the Maharaja that his Government must be carried on in future according to the popular will and that Sheikh Abdullah should be charged with the formation of an interim government on the new model adopted in Mysore.³ Sheikh Abdullah, in our opinion, had undoubtedly the support of the large majority of the people of Kashmir—Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs. Further we made it clear that as soon as law and order had been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invaders, the question of the State's accession should be settled by reference to the people.

13. I shall not detain the House by dealing with the course of the military campaign that followed. The facts are well known and redound to the credit of our military organisation, our troops and our airmen. It must be remembered also that our operations have been very largely based on air transport in difficult circumstances. Our civil airlines and their air-crews functioned with remarkable success.

3. In Mysore an Interim Government was constituted of Cabinet Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. The leader of the Congress Party in the State was appointed Chief Minister. The other ministers of the Cabinet were appointed on his advice. A specific set of powers of the government was reserved for the ruler, and the remaining vested with the ministers. The ruler was given the right to appoint a dewan who would be a member of the Cabinet and preside over the meetings of the Cabinet.

14. One fact however which contributed to our success at least as much as the military operations was were concerned the maintenance under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah of the civil administration and the morale of the civil population. The civil population, completely unarmed, with the enemy within a few miles of the city behaved in a manner which showed extraordinary courage and coolness. They did so because they had a great leader and because Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs all joined together under him to throw back the enemy and to save Kashmir, their common heritage. This fact is one of the most remarkable events of recent times in India and one from which the rest of the country may take a profitable lesson. It was certainly a factor of the most vital importance in the saving of Srinagar.

15. The present position is that our troops have relieved Poonch and are within eight miles of Kotli. The terrain in which they are functioning is difficult and mountainous and the roads and approaches have been destroyed by the raiders. Progress is therefore slow. In this Poonch area occupied by the raiders several massacres of the non-Muslim inhabitants have taken place involving large numbers of persons.

16. I should like to say here that certain events happened near Jammu early in November which I regret very deeply. The Muslim convoys of evacuees were being taken away from Jammu when they were attacked by non-Muslim refugees and others and a large number of casualties were inflicted. The troops escorting them did not play a creditable role. I might add that none of our troops were present or had anything to do with this. We have issued the most stringent orders to our troops to protect the people, to function with impartiality and indeed to make friends with the local population. I am glad to say that they have carried out these instructions.

17. The House is aware that the Pakistan Government has protested emphatically against our action in Kashmir. In doing so they have used a language which is not becoming of any government and have alleged fraud and conspiracy on our part. I need only say that I am completely convinced that every action that the Government of India have taken in regard to Kashmir has been straight and above board and I can defend it at any time before the world. We have indeed been overscrupulous in this matter so that nothing may be done in the passion of the moment which might be wrong. The behaviour of our army has all along been good and worthy of our traditions.

18. I cannot say this of the Pakistan Government. Their case is that the genesis of the trouble was the extensive killing of Muslims in eastern Punjab and Kashmir and that the raid on Kashmir was a spontaneous reaction to this on the part of the tribesmen. I think this is completely untrue. I regret

deeply that in parts of Jammu Province Muslims were killed and driven out. This of course has had nothing to do with our Government or our forces. But this mutual killing has been a very tragic feature during these past months in the Punjab, and Jammu was powerfully affected by this. We have sufficient evidence in our possession to demonstrate that the whole business of the Kashmir raids both in Jammu Province and in Kashmir proper was deliberately organised by high officials of the Pakistan Government. They helped the tribesmen and ex-servicemen to collect, they supplied them with implements of war, with lorries, with petrol and with officers. They are continuing to do so. Indeed their high officials openly declare so. It is obvious that no large body of men could cross Pakistan territory in armed groups without the goodwill, connivance and active help of the authorities there. It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the raids on Kashmir were carefully planned and well organised by the Pakistan authorities with the deliberate object of seizing the State by force and then declaring accession to Pakistan. This was an act of hostility not only to Kashmir but to the Indian Union. It is only necessary to see the semi-official organs of the Muslim League and the Pakistan Government to find out the attitude of that Government. If we had allowed this scheme to succeed, we would have been guilty of betrayal of the people of Kashmir and a grave dereliction of duty to India. The results of these on the communal and political situation all over India would have been disastrous.

19. The Pakistan Government have proposed a simultaneous withdrawal of our forces and the raiders from Kashmir. This was a strange proposal and could only mean that the raiders were there at the instance of the Pakistan Government. We cannot treat with freebooters who have murdered large numbers of people and tried to ruin Kashmir. They are not a state although a state may be behind them. We have gone to Kashmir to protect the people and as soon as this duty is discharged our forces need not remain there and we shall withdraw our forces. We cannot desert the people of Kashmir till the danger has passed. If the Pakistan Government is sincere they can stop the entry of these raiders and thus accelerate the return of peace and order. After that let the people of Kashmir decide and we shall accept their decision. But if this armed conflict continues no opportunity is given for the people to decide by peaceful means and the decision gradually takes shape by the sacrifice and power of the people in this conflict.

20. In order to establish our *bona fides* we have suggested that when the people are given the chance to decide their future this should be done under the supervision of an impartial tribunal such as the United Nations Organisation.

21. The issue in Kashmir is whether violence and naked force should

decide the future or the will of the people. The raiders encouraged by Pakistan have sought to enforce by the sword accession to Pakistan against the obvious wishes of large numbers of the people in Kashmir. We cannot permit a success of this method to achieve political ends. It is a tragedy that Pakistan should ally itself to such methods instead of devoting herself to the urgent tasks of economic and social reconstruction.

22. Kashmir has gone through fire and I am sure that the House would like me to communicate their sympathy to the people of Kashmir for the tribulations they have been going through in recent weeks. This fair land which nature has made so lovely has been desecrated by people who have indulged in murder, arson, loot and foul attacks on women and children. The people have suffered greatly from shortage of the most vital necessities of life and yet, under the inspiring lead of Sheikh Abdullah, they have stood together in the hour of calamity and showed to the rest of India an example of what communal unity can achieve. Whatever the future may hold, this chapter in the history of Kashmir will be worth reading and we shall never regret that in their hour of distress we have been able to be of assistance to this gallant people. Kashmir and India have been bound together in many ways from ages past. These last few weeks have forged a new link which cannot sunder.

48. To Sri Prakasa¹

New Delhi
25 November 1947

My dear Prakasa,

Thank you for your letter of November 14. It is some letter. But I have carefully read it and it has helped me to understand the situation in Sind and western Pakistan.

2. You will not, I hope, expect me to answer in the same length. But I wish to deal with some matters that you have mentioned.

3. You should certainly come to Delhi and visit Benares in December as you suggest, subject of course to some development or complication not intervening. But I do not think you need go to eastern Pakistan at present. Apart from the fact that your presence is needed in western Pakistan, I

1. J. N. Collection.

rather think that your visit to eastern Pakistan may ruffle the surface of an otherwise more or less peaceful province. You know perhaps that there was a demand for us to appoint a Deputy High Commissioner in eastern Pakistan. But the Governor, i.e., Rajaji and the Prime Minister and his colleagues were definitely against this. Even those people who were in favour of it were ultimately weakened. The argument was that if we appoint a Deputy High Commissioner in Dacca, he would become a focus of some kind of agitation for transfer of populations, etc. All manner of complaints would come to him and given publicity. We did not want that to happen as we do not wish to encourage in any way the transfer of populations in the two Bengals. There are plenty of our colleagues in eastern Bengal who can help their people there and keep us in touch with developments. Therefore, for the present you might give up the idea of going to eastern Bengal.

4. I saw Mountbatten this afternoon and he told me of his conversation with you, more specially of what you said about Kashmir. I realise perfectly the state of feeling in Pakistan about Kashmir. Anybody who sees *Dawn* daily can appreciate this. Other sources of information confirm that there is a state of hysteria and desperation. All this is bad and might lead to trouble. But I was amazed to learn from Mountbatten that you hinted at Kashmir being handed over to Pakistan for the sake of peace all round. If we did anything of the kind our Government would not last many days and there would be no peace at all anywhere in India. Probably it would lead to war with Pakistan because of public opinion here and of war-like elements coming in control of our policy. We cannot and we will not leave Kashmir to its fate.

5. The fact is that Kashmir is of the most vital significance to India as well as to Pakistan. There lies the rub. Apart from this we have already committed ourselves by sending there our armed forces and it is quite impossible for us to withdraw. We have to see this through to the end whatever the future developments might be. Those developments depend upon many factors, our military strength of course, our internal conditions, and the internal conditions and military strength of Pakistan. All of us realise that this Kashmir venture is no easy matter. We did not undertake it light-heartedly and we are not pursuing it with any easy confidence. We know the difficulties perhaps more than you do. Nevertheless we are going to go through it and it is desirable that you should make this perfectly clear in your private talks whenever this question arises.

6. In Kashmir an internal revolution is taking place under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership. New forces are arising and a new set-up of Government is gradually taking shape. It is difficult to prophesy what will happen four or five months later. We are committed to a plebiscite and we stand

by it. But developments during the next few months will naturally govern decisions later.

7. Kashmir is going to be a drain on our resources, but it is going to be a greater drain on Pakistan. In a military sense we are stronger. The position however is this that even if we were somewhat weaker than we are, we cannot desert the people of Kashmir to whom we have given our pledge. Kashmir gives us an example of communal unity and cooperation. This has had a healthy effect in India and any weakening in Kashmir by us would create a far more difficult communal situation in India.

8. You must have seen the A.I.C.C. resolutions passed recently. They should govern our general policy.

9. In the course of a day or two some kind of a decision will probably be reached in regard to Hyderabad. I hope that this will mean easing of the tension there. Even so there may be some trouble.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

49. Record of Mountbatten's Meeting with Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Prior to Nehru's arrival, Mountbatten urged Liaquat Ali Khan not to annoy or antagonise Nehru. He pointed out that Pakistan was in a weak position since India had offered a plebiscite in Kashmir under the auspices of the United Nations thereby putting herself right in the eyes of the world.

Pandit Nehru said categorically that if the Dominion of India had not gone to the assistance of Kashmir when called upon, not only by the Ruler but by Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the popular party, he had no doubt whatever that the present Government of India would have been overthrown and that it would have been replaced by an irresponsible and extremist

1. New Delhi, 26 November 1947. Extracts. File No. D/74 No. 53. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.

government which, in his opinion, would certainly have declared war upon Pakistan.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan countered this by saying that the Government of Pakistan had had their position greatly weakened by not taking strong action against India, and that he personally was being abused in the vernacular press for failing to support Muslim interests.²

2. In the course of the meeting certain proposals were formulated; a plebiscite under U.N. auspices; minimum number of Indian troops at vital points; fair elections and, as far as possible, return of refugees to their homes or choice of stay in either Dominion. Nehru agreed to consider these proposal.

50. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

26 November 1947

My dear Lord Mountbatten,

I enclose copies of two telegrams received by me from the Prime Minister of Pakistan; also a telegram from our representative in Lahore.

In view of what Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan has said in these telegrams, I see no particular advantage in my discussing the Kashmir situation or indeed any other matter with him. The attitude he has taken up on the eve of his coming to Delhi is highly offensive and it is clear that he has no intention of discussing this matter on a reasonable and courteous plane.

The telegram from Panjabi shows the preparations being made on the Sialkot border. Other information received by us confirms this not only on that border but also on the frontier border. It appears that a new bridge has been built over the Jhelum below Kohala. No one can believe that the raiders can build these bridges or set up radio broadcasting stations.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32 (46) 48-PMS.

51. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
1 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahab,

I have twice written to you during the last few days, but each letter has been brief.² The stress of work is so great that I find it difficult to write at some length. I presume Mr. Mahajan has given you some account of what took place here. Sheikh Abdullah will give you a further account.

2. We have arrived at a stage when we must come to rapid and more or less final decisions about Kashmir with the Pakistan Government. The choice is between some kind of a settlement and continuing on a more intensive scale the military operations that are going on. Obviously, from both the narrow and the wider points of view, a settlement is to be preferred, provided it is a satisfactory one. In some ways the time is suitable for a settlement, in other ways it is more difficult.

3. During the last week there have been discussions³ between the Governments of India and Pakistan about all manner of vital and controversial issues between us, quite apart from Kashmir. Surprisingly enough, we have come to a settlement in regard to nearly all these, although previously we had failed to do so. All financial issues have been thus resolved, and these were the most tricky ones.⁴ We had appointed an Arbitral Tribunal to give a final decision on such points of dispute. That Tribunal has now very little work to do because we have arrived at a settlement ourselves.

4. Because of this I feel that the time is propitious for a settlement on Kashmir also. The pressure of events is all in favour of such a settlement and I feel sure that we should try our utmost to achieve it. The alternative is no settlement and carrying on this little war indefinitely and at the same time tension and conflict all over India with consequent misery to numberless persons. In Kashmir State itself these military operations against the raiders will mean, as they have meant, grave difficulties and suffering for the people of the State. Mr. Horace Alexander, who has just come from Jammu, informed me that the raiders are burning many villages and, no

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. I, p. 100-106.

2. See *ante*, items 10 and 11.

3. The reference is to the talks held between the Indian and Pakistan Governments on Kashmir.

4. On 9 December 1947, Patel announced in the Constituent Assembly that an agreement had been reached between India and Pakistan on all outstanding issues relating to the partition, except Kashmir, and three days later gave details of the agreement.

doubt, killing people. The terrain is such that it is not easy for large-scale armies to function satisfactorily. The land is all in favour of the raiders' tactics. With the approach of winter our difficulties increase. The only policy we can adopt is to protect the Kashmir Valley and the Jhelum Valley routes on the one side, and Jammu and the neighbourhood on the other, holding in check the raiders in the Poonch area. It is difficult for our troops to drive out the raiders from the whole of the Poonch area during this winter season. They may be hit occasionally and repulsed. Air action will also be difficult during winter.

5. All this is not through lack of troops but rather because of the terrain and the climate. In spring, we could drive out the raiders from the Poonch area also. But that means another four months; and meanwhile, the raiders and the Poonchi rebels will remain in possession of that area and harass the people of the State. Pakistan troops will be stationed on the Sialkot and other borders and will thus constitute a menace to the State. That is the military appreciation. Purely in a military sense we are not frightened of this position; but as I have said above, we cannot undertake to deal with the whole Poonch area during winter. Meanwhile, the stress and strain of conflict will fall on the State and the economic conditions of the State, already bad, will rapidly deteriorate. It is important that we remember this economic background for even military persistence depends largely on economic conditions and the morale of the people.

6. While a settlement is good and must be sought after, obviously we cannot do so to the injury of Kashmir or India. We have thus to balance various factors. Even if a settlement comes, there is no surety of good behaviour on the Pakistan side and even less on the part of the tribes. We have thus to be wary and vigilant.

7. You must have seen the draft proposals which were discussed by us with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. These involve a plebiscite under U.N.O.⁶ I know that you do not like the idea of a plebiscite; but we cannot do away with it without harming our cause all over the world. We are bound down to that proposal, provided, of course, there is a settlement.

5. It was proposed that Pakistan would seek to persuade the tribesmen and other invaders to withdraw from Kashmir and the rebel 'Azad Kashmir' forces to cease fighting, that India would withdraw the bulk of her forces, leaving only small contingents at certain points on the frontier and that the United Nations would be approached to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir after proper conditions had been established in the State by the Governments of Kashmir, India and Pakistan.

8. If there is going to be a plebiscite, then obviously we have to work in such a way as to gain the goodwill of the majority of the population of the State, which means chiefly the Muslims. The policy recently pursued in Jammu Province has alienated the Muslims there very greatly and has created a great deal of ill-feeling in certain parts of the country. The only person who can effectively deal with the situation is Sheikh Abdullah. I do not suppose he can convert the confirmed Muslim Leaguers and the like. But there is always a middle mass of opinion which is influenced by events and experiences.

9. From our point of view, that is India's, it is of the most vital importance that Kashmir should remain within the Indian Union. I need not go into the reasons for this as they are obvious, quite apart from personal desires in the matter which are strong enough. But however much we may want this, it cannot be done ultimately except through the goodwill of the mass of the population. Even if military forces held Kashmir for a while, a later consequence might be a strong reaction against this. Essentially, therefore, this is a problem of psychological approach to the mass of the people and of making them feel that they will be benefited by being within the Indian Union. If the average Muslim feels that he has no safe or secure place in the Union then obviously he will look elsewhere. Our basic policy must keep this in view, or else we fail. We have to take a long view of the situation and not be carried away by momentary urges nor by personal considerations.

10. The present position is that in Kashmir proper the mass of the population Muslim and Hindu is no doubt in favour of the Indian Union. In the Jammu area all the non-Muslims and some Muslims are likely to be in favour of the Union. In the Poonch area, however, there is little doubt that the mass of the population is likely to be against the Indian Union. In the balance probably an overall majority will be in favour of the Union. But this depends entirely on the policy to be pursued during the next few months. I repeat this because this is of the highest importance and we must face facts as they are.

11. The military situation is not too good, though I have no doubt that we can hold it in check. But we cannot expect to do much more during the winter. Meanwhile, all manner of developments are likely to take place all over India and Pakistan and they are likely to govern the situation. Whatever these developments may be, we have to be prepared for them and at the same time take a realistic view of the situation.

12. In discussing a possible settlement with Pakistan, these are the proposals which have already been considered and which Mr. Mahajan took with him. Some people have suggested that Kashmir and Janamu provinces must

be split up, one going to Pakistan and the other to India. I do not at all like this for many reasons, among them being that it is Kashmir that is of essential value to India. Then it has been suggested that the Poonch area might be cut off and go to Pakistan. There is something in this as that area is linguistically allied to the Punjab. It has also been suggested that Kashmir State as a whole might be more or less an independent entity with its integrity and defence guaranteed by India and Pakistan. This is likely to give trouble in the future and the conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir might well continue.

13. As I was dictating this letter I received Mr. Mahajan's letter of 30 November. In this he mentions that your reactions to various proposals are that you are prepared to leave the future in the hands of the Indian Dominion, but if the plebiscite goes against the Union, you will have no alternative but to abdicate. In no event do you wish to remain with Pakistan. I appreciate this attitude.

14. Further it is feared that if the State accedes to Pakistan ultimately, the Hindu and Sikh population will be in danger of being annihilated. I do not think you need fear any such result because, whatever happens, we cannot see the destruction of Kashmir in this way or the annihilation of any part of the population, whether Hindu or Muslim or Sikh. Effective steps can be taken against any such possibility. The question does not arise at present as the immediate issue is a military one and, if a settlement is arrived at, a plebiscite would be held many months later. During this period our troops must necessarily remain there and the State Forces and Home Guards should be built up. Economically the State should be helped.

15. You have mentioned the possibility of your abdication. The question of Kashmir is, of course, not a personal one and concerns the fate of nations. If you feel that it is desirable in the interest of the State and the people there to abdicate or to leave the State for a while, I have no doubt you will do so because the interest of the people will be uppermost in your mind. In that way, as a matter of fact, you might even draw nearer to your people.

16. From Mr. Mahajan's letter I gather that you leave this matter of negotiations with Pakistan entirely in the hands of the Indian Union. I think you are wise in so doing because there is no other way of dealing with the situation. I have had long talks with Sheikh Abdullah and known his general viewpoint. That is highly important as he can judge best the reactions of his people and what can be done with them and what cannot. We have to rely on him in regard to every step that we might take, otherwise that step will be infructuous.

17. The situation in Kashmir is, of course, a difficult one. We all know that. But I can assure you that none of us is terribly disheartened about it. We have faced many difficulties before and we shall face this and overcome it. The all-India position is definitely better so far as we are concerned. The whole point is how to proceed in Kashmir so as to lay the basis of future happiness and prosperity for Kashmir and the Indian Union, and to end the fighting if this can be done with security and honour.

18. The economic position of Kashmir is of vital importance and, therefore, it is necessary that Kashmir goods should come to India and find a market here and Indian supplies should go to Kashmir. Kashmir officials have discussed these questions with our officials here and some arrangements are being made. I hope these will be expedited and an immediate exchange arranged on a business-like basis. This will immediately be a visible evidence of benefits before the Kashmir people and will affect them powerfully as well as strengthen the State's economy. That economy has been shattered and every step must be made to prevent wasteful expenditure. Such an effort will also impress the people. When the people are suffering, any overhead waste is bitterly resented.

19. In my brief letter⁶ today I referred to the desirability of forming an interim government very soon in Kashmir. I know that you have been anxious to do so. I think that the time has come when there should be no further delay in this matter and a stable government should be established. This will have a good effect on the people of Kashmir, and others outside Kashmir will also realise that enduring arrangements are being made there. We have agreed that this interim government should be on the model of Mysore. In Mysore the leader of the popular party was asked to choose his colleagues, he himself being the Prime Minister or Chief Minister. The Dewan was also one of the Ministers and he presided over the meetings of the Cabinet. In following this precedent, Sheikh Abdullah should be the Prime Minister and should be asked to form the Government. Mr. Mahajan can be one of the Ministers and can formally preside over the Cabinet. But it would introduce confusion if Mr. Mahajan continues to be styled as Prime Minister.⁷ This interim government, when formed, should be in full charge and you will be the constitutional head of that Government.⁸

6. Not traceable.

7. In his letter to Gopalaswami Ayyangar on 17 December, the Maharaja of Kashmir agreed to designate Sheikh Abdullah, the leader of the popular party, as Prime Minister but insisted on having his own nominee as Dewan who would preside over Cabinet meetings.

8. The Interim Government was eventually formed on 5 March 1948.

20. We have to deal today in Kashmir, as elsewhere, with the minds of people. We have to influence them by convincing them of changes in policy and outlook so that they might realise that something entirely new and to their advantage has taken place. They have to feel that they themselves are functioning in Government through people whom they trust. Obviously the only possible policy in Kashmir State (and I would say in the whole of India also) is a non-communal policy where every citizen is treated equally and there is absolutely no harassment of one community against another. In the prevailing atmosphere if this fact had been realised and acted upon, our problems in India and Kashmir would have been far simpler. We have a hard task ahead, but we have also the strength and energy needed for it. We are going, I have little doubt, to solve our problems one by one. But we shall do so only if we proceed on the right lines which we can justify to the world. If we act rightly, we need not be afraid of the consequences.

With my regards to the Maharani Saheba.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

52. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have received information that Mirpur town has been completely destroyed² and out of 13,000 (half of 26,000) non-Muslims only 2,000 (half of 4,000) have reached within 15 miles of Jhelum. The fate of these refugees as well as of about 3,000 (half of 6,000) from the rest of Mirpur area is not known, but there are reports that large numbers of abducted Hindu women have been brought into Jhelum district by Pathans. The Pathans are causing panic among non-Muslim refugee pockets in that district, are firing indiscriminately and shot dead a Mahratta soldier the other day.

I am gravely concerned about the fate of the non-Muslim pockets in Jhelum district and of the Hindu refugees in particular the abducted women who have been brought from Jammu by the raiders. I shall be grateful if you will give all facilities to our Military Evacuation Organisation to evacuate them to India.

1. New Delhi, 2 December 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, pp. 31-32.

2. The killings of refugees in Mirpur took place on 25 November 1947.

53. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

New Delhi
3 December 1947

My dear Sheikh Saheb,

Bakshi's visit here has proved fruitful in many ways. He will tell you all about it himself. We have gingered things up. Several battalions are on the move and will be arriving daily in Jammu. Rifles are being sent. Other supplies are being arranged. We are collecting our aircrafts also.

2. Bakshi wanted tyres and batteries for buses and lorries. We are unable to send any till we know the exact sizes required. Bakshi will send these to us and we will take further steps in the matter. Tomorrow we shall also send 2000 blankets.

3. This evening Bakshi had a long talk with Lord Mountbatten and a briefer talk with Lady Mountbatten. He told him all he had in his mind, which was good. Bakshi has also got into contact with our various other persons who can help in this Kashmir business. I think we have done a very good day's work here today. Early in the morning we had a Defence Committee meeting lasting two hours where every prospect was thrashed out and certain decisions taken. On Friday morning we have another Defence Committee meeting in continuation of this last one.

4. I have more or less decided to pay a brief visit to Jammu on Saturday, the 6th December. I propose to start about 8 and reach there about 10. I want to be back by 5 p.m.

5. I understand that Bakshi Tek Chand's appointment has been cancelled.

6. In spite of all our present difficulties I have no doubt in my mind that we shall triumph and that Kashmir will function as a prosperous and free land. The tragic part of it is that so many more might die in the near future, and vast numbers have been rendered homeless.

7. Kashmir has become a symbol of the basic conflict in India. On the decision in Kashmir, one might almost say, depends not only the future of Kashmir but the future of Pakistan and to a considerable extent the future of India. Thus we are playing for much higher stakes than might appear on the surface. One has therefore to be careful about each step that might be taken and always have a full picture in view. I have no doubt about Pakistan's complicity in all this business and in spite of this I think that

I should stick to my old programme of going to Lahore on the 8th of this month for the Joint Defence Council meeting. Gandhiji also agrees with me that I should go. But I shall go there in strength and not to appease Liaquat Ali Khan or Pakistan. Many of the questions that you and I discussed while you were here last hardly arise in the present context and we are going to talk quite straight to the Pakistan people. I shall not write more here about this as I shall see you soon. I might mention however that there is increasing evidence that Pakistan is losing all initiative in the matter of these tribal and other levels. They have raised a monster which they cannot control and which is likely to shatter their governmental apparatus and system. Again we come back to the vital nature of the struggle in Kashmir.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

54. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
3 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Saheb,

I sent you a brief letter² this morning. Today we have taken many steps to send assistance to Kashmir. We have done a good day's work and adequate reinforcements are going to reach Jammu daily from tomorrow onwards. We are collecting our aircraft also to use them to the best advantage. We are sending rifles, some immediately and some two days later for the building up of the Home Guards which we consider important in the scheme of defence. These rifles are not surplus stock but from our regular army supply. We hope to send a couple of thousands blankets for the refugees tomorrow as well as some other supplies.

2. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad conveyed your invitation to me to pay a brief visit to Jammu soon. It is a little difficult to leave Delhi during the next few days. Nevertheless I have decided to go to Jammu on Saturday, the 6th December, starting from here about 8 a.m. by air. That means I shall reach Jammu about 10. I should like to come back reaching Delhi by 5 p.m. at the latest. On my way back I might fly over the Mirpur-Bhimbar area.

1. J. N. Collection.
2. Not traceable.

3. I can well understand your anxiety and distress at what has happened and is happening. All of us have shared this anxiety and distress. But I have not the least doubt in my mind that all this business will result in our victory and in throwing out of the raiders and invaders who have come into Kashmir. Unhappily we cannot revive the dead. But perhaps this experience will put new life into the people of the State as all vital experiences do.

4. So far as my own approach to this question is concerned I might repeat here what I said at our Defence Committee's meeting this morning. I said that whatever happened we would never tolerate these barbarous invaders possessing Kashmir State. We shall use all our strength, all our forces to free Kashmir and Jammu. There will be no end to this struggle till the State is completely freed. Even if by any mischance the raiders won some more success that would make no difference to our resolve, for this is not merely a matter of Kashmir, important as that is and dear as Kashmir's future is to all of us. This has become essentially a matter affecting all India and her future and in the same way it affects the whole future of Pakistan. Pakistan has gambled with its future and it is going to lose not only Kashmir but much else. You will thus see that the stakes are high, higher even than most people imagine.

5. I have thought hard as to the advisability of my going to Lahore on the 8th of this month for our Joint Defence Council meeting. My first inclination was not to go because of recent Kashmir happenings, but on further thought I have decided to go, as I think that my not going at this stage might somewhat injure our cause. But I am not going there weakly or in order to appease anybody, but rather in strength and with the full determination to carry on this struggle to a victorious issue. I propose therefore to have some straight talk with Liaquat Ali Khan and others there. You need not worry about my speaking or writing away any right that pertains to the people of Kashmir.

6. I hope to discuss these subjects more with you when I meet you on Saturday next.

7. I am glad that a Relief Committee has been formed with the Maharani Saheba as the Chairman. We shall send supplies to her as far as we can. For the present we are sending 2000 blankets.

8. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's visit has done a great deal of good here as he has been able to give first hand account by a person who has been in touch with events of all that has happened. He has discussed the situation with the Governor-General and Lady Mountbatten, some of our ministers in general and various officials who are in a position to help. It is largely due

to his presence here today that we have been able to organise supplies so rapidly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

55. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I have been drawing your attention to large concentrations of tribesmen and others in West Punjab near the border of Kashmir State and to the abduction of large numbers of women from Kashmir who are being offered for sale in West Punjab. During the last few days while we were supposed to be discussing possible terms for a settlement, these concentrations have been encouraged and additional raiders have been sent into Kashmir who have massacred thousands of persons there. We have reliable evidence about the part that officials of the Pakistan Government are taking in organising this invasion of Kashmir territory. I feel I must inform you that this is creating a very grave situation in regard to India-Pakistan relations. The Government of India cannot tolerate the continuance of the use of Pakistan territory for organising murderous raids into a part of Indian Dominion territory and must consider it as an act of hostility. This you will appreciate might involve far-reaching consequences. It is hardly possible to conduct any negotiations while this state of affairs lasts. In spite of repeated requests from us to you there has been no attempt on the part of the Pakistan Government to withdraw raiders or to express its disapproval of their action.

1. New Delhi, 3 December 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, p. 72.

56. To Tej Bahadur Sapru¹

New Delhi

5 December 1947

My dear Tej Bahadur Ji,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th November.² I am glad that steps are being taken in various parts of India under your leadership to help the people of Kashmir. Help and relief of various kinds are needed, but equally important is the psychological aspect, i.e., the feeling that people all over India are desirous of helping Kashmir during this crisis.

Some people have suggested that money should be earmarked for Kashmiri Pandits. That, I think, would be very wrong. We are proceeding on non-communal lines in Kashmir and Sheikh Abdullah is definitely acting in this way. We should, therefore, avoid all communal considerations.

The situation in Kashmir, specially in Jammu Province, has rather deteriorated during the past fortnight. But we are taking all possible steps to improve it. We are going to show no weakness in Kashmir. Of that you can rest assured.

Sarup is just due to reach Delhi.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. T.B. Sapru Papers (microfilm), N.M.M.L.
2. Sapru informed Nehru about the collection of Rs. 2,500/- at Allahabad for the Kashmir Relief Fund. He also referred to letters he had received expressing admiration for Sheikh Abdullah but complaining against certain members of the National Conference.

57. The Future Government of Kashmir State¹

We will clear Kashmir completely of the raiders. We do not believe in leaving things half-done. We will send more troops. We will muster all our resources and fight till we succeed.

The tribal incursion has caused great distress to the people. However, this is not the time to cry, but to unite and to go forward to the front and beat back the raiders who seek to force their will upon the people of Kashmir.

What form of government the people of this State would like to set up after the expulsion of the raiders is for you to decide. No part of India will interfere with that.

You must all live in unity and fight the enemy. Though Indian troops cleared the raiders from Kashmir, this would not have been possible without the cooperation of the local people.

But for the unhappy mutual fights that have taken place in a part of India for the last three months since the attainment of freedom, we would have played a far more prominent role in world politics than we have done.

I, however, hope that in spite of what has happened, India will emerge from the present trials and become a prominent force in the field of world peace and progress. In fact, by fighting against the forces that cause communal rioting, our country has become strong. In Kashmir, despite the distress of the people and the damage done to large parts of the country, the people have shown strength and faced difficulties with courage. They have also shown that they want to live in Kashmir as brave sons.

1. Speech at Jammu, 6 December 1947. From *The Hindustan Times*, 7 December 1947.

58. Record of a Meeting Convened by Lord Mountbatten¹

H.E. opened the discussion by emphasizing that the whole future welfare of India depended on an agreement over Kashmir being reached between the two Dominions. The effect that such an agreement would have on world opinion would also be very great. Unfortunately, since the last meeting between the two Prime Ministers on the subject at Delhi some ten days previously, events had occurred which had produced a setback in the outlook of both sides to the problem.² He invited both Prime Ministers to give their opinion as to how matters now stood.

Pandit Nehru started by pointing out that, whatever might happen in the future, as the result of a plebiscite, Kashmir was at the present time part of the territory of India. Invaders had come into Kashmir through Pakistan territory. In his view, they had undoubtedly been assisted by persons in authority in Pakistan. There had been no attempt at an open disavowal by the Pakistan Government of this. Regular soldiers of the Pakistan army, and equipment supplied by that army, had been captured in Kashmir. There were concentrations of regular and irregular forces in Pakistan territory, close to the borders of Kashmir. This all really amounted to nothing less than an act of war—and as such it had been treated by newspapers in Pakistan, which talked of the Indian troops as "the enemy". The present position was an impossible one; it must move either one way or the other.

Pandit Nehru said that he freely admitted that there had been atrocities on both sides. But during the last month there had been very few, if any, on the Indian side. In fact it was a physical impossibility that there could have been more than a very small number. On the side of the raiders, however, there had been, and continued to be, large-scale looting, destruction, massacre and abduction of women. It was the duty of India to fight the invasion until Kashmir was free of invaders. The first step, before there was talk of a plebiscite or anything else, must be the withdrawal of the raiders.

1. Lahore, 8 December 1947. Extracts. Those present were: Mountbatten, Nehru, Baldev Singh, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.

2. In early December 1947, Pakistan stepped up tribal raids in the Jammu area. After a reverse at Kotli, which had been heavily besieged for 32 days, the raiders attacked Mirpur, the second biggest city in Jammu Division, preparatory to an assault on Jammu.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he did not accept the view that the recent atrocities had been one-sided. Many thousands of Muslims had been killed in Jammu—some, while being evacuated from there. Many incidents had occurred since Kashmir had acceded to India. In particular, some women of good families had been abducted, taken back to Jammu, and there kept naked and raped.

Pandit Nehru said that the last attack on Muslims being evacuated from Jammu had taken place on November 5 over a month previously. This had happened before Indian forces had arrived in Jammu and restored the situation. Apart from this one incident, very few Muslims had been killed since the accession. Calculations made by subtracting the number of refugees who had arrived in Pakistan from the census population of Muslims did not hold water. There will still be a large number of Muslims in Jammu, including some in the local Home Guard. Every effort was being made, and would continue to be made, to recover abducted women. Any specific incidents on which information was provided would be energetically investigated.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that it was very difficult for the Government of Pakistan to provide such detailed information.

At H. E.'s suggestion, both Prime Ministers agreed that two teams, each consisting of a high-class representative of each Dominion, should be formed to tour both sides investigating the truth of the various reports that were received of atrocities and other incidents.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then drew a parallel between events in Junagadh and those in Kashmir.³ He reminded Pandit Nehru of how India had recognised the "sanctity" of Junagadh territory. The "Provisional Government" of Junagadh had been set up in Indian territory : It had been provided with arms by India; and then invaded and captured territory belonging to Junagadh. The Head of the "Provisional Government" had made public statement saying that its success was due to the assistance which had been provided by the Deputy Prime Minister of India.

Pandit Nehru, while openly admitting that India had been in some ways in the wrong about Junagadh, claimed that the parallel with Kashmir was not tenable because of the vast difference in scale between the two.

Pandit Nehru pointed out that many of the raiders who had come into Kashmir were armed with modern weapons, including some which had been

3. Junagadh, a small state in Kathiawar, four-fifths of whose population was Hindu and with a Muslim Nawab, acceded to Pakistan. The people of the State resisted and the Nawab fled to Pakistan. India refused to accept the accession and called for a plebiscite. Pakistan ignored the suggestion. Indian troops surrounded the enclave and then moved in when disorders broke out. In February 1948, a plebiscite overwhelmingly opted for India.

issued by Pakistan ordnance depots. He could produce proof that the N.W.F.P. Government had helped to arm the raiders, and given them every other sort of assistance.

His Excellency stated that General Messervy had categorically assured him that the Pakistan army had not issued arms to the raiders—on the contrary, orders had been given that this was not to be done. General Messervy had also told him that there might be a few Pakistan soldiers on leave taking part in the Kashmir fighting.⁴

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that there were 300,000 armed people on the frontier. This fact had been put on record by the ex-Supreme Commander. They had arms factories of their own, which produced first-class weapons. Some Pakistan army rifles might have been taken by soldiers on leave. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad said that the raiders also obtained arms from Afghanistan and Russia.

Pandit Nehru said that he considered that Pakistan territory was being used as 'a major base for operations against Kashmir. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad replied that many of the stories which were being circulated, and which might have led to this belief, were not true. But the feeling of the people of Pakistan with regard to Kashmir was very strong. They realized its strategic and economic importance to Pakistan. They felt that India's action in Kashmir was planned to encircle and strangle Pakistan. Pandit Nehru said that this feeling was not, in his opinion, spontaneous. It had been whipped up by the whole administration of, and in particular by the Premier, of the N.W.F.P.⁵

Pandit Nehru also claimed that Pakistan must be supplying petrol for the raiders' vehicles. This Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan denied. He said that the vehicles had been given to the tribes before partition by the British, and drew their petrol allowance in the normal way.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar said that he took it that the Pakistan Government was now ready to admit that raiders had passed through Pakistan territory. Did Pakistan recognise it as its duty, as a country having an international existence, to stop these raiders? Or did Pakistan disown all responsibility?

4. The Pakistan Government denied that any serving officers or troops of its army were fighting in Kashmir or that the Government had supplied the insurgents with arms and ammunition. This disclaimer was endorsed by Gen. Messervy, the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan Army. However, the Government confessed that it could not prevent Pakistani volunteers from crossing the frontier into Kashmir, and some of these might have military training and arms.
5. Khan Abdul Qayyum, himself a Kashmiri, had given the tribal raiders arms, ammunition, motor transport and fuel. On 7 March 1949, he justified in the Provincial Assembly a special grant to the tribesmen in the following terms. "The House will recall with pride the fact that in our greatest hour of danger the Mahsuds responded to our call by rushing to the rescue of the oppressed Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir State."

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan replied that he could not stop them. Any effort to do so would mean going to war with the tribes, which he was not prepared to do. As it was, the Government of Pakistan was under continual attack by the people for the attitude they had taken in regard to Kashmir. However, the Government of Pakistan had not recognised the accession of Kashmir to India. The murders of the Muslims in Kashmir had been the cause of the tribesmen attacking. These had been started with incursions of Akali Sikhs and R.S.S. bands....

Pandit Nehru then gave a description of past history in Pakistan from his point of view. According to this, the Kashmir troubles had started with incursions from Pakistan.

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad then turned the conversation to the feelings of the people of Kashmir itself—particularly the feelings of the Poonchis,⁶ who had rebelled against the Maharaja's Government. He appealed to Pandit Nehru, as an ex-rebel, to appreciate the point of view of these rebels.

The meeting next considered the basic policy of either Government with regard to Kashmir. The representatives of each Government were agreed that the ultimate aim must be to hold a fair plebiscite, whereby the will of people could be ascertained as to which Dominion the State should accede to. There was, however, a fundamental difference as to what should be the first step forward towards achieving this object. The Indian representatives claimed that it must be a declaration by the Pakistan Government that it would do its utmost to influence the raiders at present in Kashmir to withdraw, and to stop any further raiders going in. The Pakistan representatives claimed that an essential prerequisite to this action was a declaration by India that Indian troops would be withdrawn and that there would be an impartial administration in the period preceding the plebiscite.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that, once this assurance had been given, Pakistan would use the utmost force to ensure the withdrawal of the invaders.

Pandit Nehru said that it was out of the question that Indian troops should be altogether withdrawn. The Indian troops were disciplined, they would obey orders; Pakistan could not control the irregulars. If all the Indian troops were withdrawn Kashmir would be at the mercy of the armed men of Poonch. If they remained, he guaranteed that the Poonchis themselves would be free of harassment—nothing was further from his mind than to send punitive parties against them.

His Excellency pointed out that the only Indian troops at present in the

6. The inhabitants of Poonch had started a no-tax campaign in early 1947, and in August 1947, the Muslim majority of Poonch openly advocated accession to Pakistan. Later the raiders from Pakistan were allegedly helped by local insurgents to occupy large parts of Jammu and Poonch.

Poonch area were those engaged in protecting 45,000 non-Muslims in the city of Poonch itself.

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad said that the only practicable way of getting the raiders out was to have a change of administration. If this was done, Pakistan would do all in their power to withdraw the raiders.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he had discussed the draft agreement with the Azad Kashmir Government, who had said that they could not accept it in view of what had happened under the present administration. In the Kashmir Valley, no Muslim could be a member of the Muslim Conference without being arrested or at the least victimized.

Pandit Nehru pointed out that, if these Muslim Conference members were aiding and abetting the raiders, as they were known to be, the only way of dealing with them was to lock them up. It was out of the question that the administration should be changed.

H.E. pointed out that there was provision in the draft agreement for all political prisoners to be released prior to the plebiscite. He also stressed the point that, if a U.N.O. delegation was in Kashmir preparing for the plebiscite, it would be approachable by all parties, who would be able to lay before it their various complaints.

Pandit Nehru then took the line that the Government of India had already gone far further than they need have done. They had gone out of their way to offer a plebiscite. There was no necessity for them to have done this. Now they were told that they must change the administration.

Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar backed this up by saying that he wondered whether it was realized how unpopular the Government of India had become, both in Kashmir and India, on account of their pledge that there would be a free and impartial plebiscite. How could they now order the administration to be changed? There was no precedent for such a suggestion.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan brought up the change of Governors in the N.W.F.P. as an example of how an administration could be changed before a plebiscite.⁷ H.E. explained the full circumstances which had led to Sir Rob Lockhart taking over from Sir Olaf Caroe.⁸

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad again said that the essential prerequisite was an immediate promise of an impartial plebiscite—either a coalition, or someone from neither main political party.

7. Olaf Caroe, who was Governor of N.W.F.P. in 1946-47, was sent on two months' leave before the referendum in June 1947 and Lt. Gen. Rob Lockhart was appointed in his place for the duration.

8. (1892-1981); joined I.C.S., 1919; served in Punjab till 1923; served in N.W.F.P., as Deputy Commissioner up to 1932; Chief Secretary, Government of N.W.F.P., 1933-34; Resident in Waziristan and Agent to Governor General in Baluchistan, 1937-38; Secretary, External Affairs Department, 1939-45; Governor, N.W.F.P., 1946-47; his writings include *Wells of Power*, *Soviet Empire* and *The Pathans*.

Pandit Nehru pointed out that the plebiscite would take some time to prepare—especially if, as both sides agreed, it was to be conducted on adult franchise. During the intervening period of six months, or whatever it might be, there must be an administration of some sort. The present administration had done three great things—it had stopped the fighting in the area which it controlled, it had knit the people together on non-communal lines and it was the first fully responsible government which had ever been set up in Kashmir overthrowing the Maharaja's autocratic rule—which, incidentally, had been supported at one stage by the Muslim Conference). It would be fatal to upset it. He could see that circumstances might arise in which a coalition would be possible. But that question did not arise at the present time. The right conditions must first be brought about. Anyway, it was not for the Government of India, but for the people of the State themselves, to decide upon the form of government.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar gave his view that, if a coalition was put in at the present time, there would be grave risks of communal trouble in both Kashmir and Jammu. The great merit of the present administration was that it had brought communities together.

Mr. Ghulam Mohammad said that he was sure that a coalition would not result in communal trouble. He also said that a "fully responsible government" presupposed an election or plebiscite. It could not come before.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then gave his view that the people of Kashmir were bound to vote, in the plebiscite, in favour of whatever administration was then in power. The Kashmiris were an illiterate and oppressed people, and they would be bound to favour the authority in possession. If an Englishman went as administrator, they would vote to join the United Kingdom!

His Excellency suggested that the call of Islam would surely have a much greater influence upon the people of Kashmir. Religion was a factor of great importance among the illiterate. Also, the difficulties facing the present administration were so great that he would be amazed if it retained its hold on the people.

His Excellency then suggested that the two Governments might at least make a joint statement agreeing that all possible steps should be taken to stop the massacres in Kashmir and restore abducted women.

This suggestion met with no response from either side.

His Excellency suggested that the Government of India should put out a unilateral statement, on the lines of the draft agreement. The policy of India at least would then be clear to the world, and it might help Pakistan to induce the raiders to withdraw.

Pandit Nehru replied that he would not make such a unilateral statement. The question of a plebiscite in Kashmir did not arise until the raiders were thrown out. The first task must be to clear the State of outside ele-

ments. If necessary, he would throw up his Prime Ministership and take the sword himself, and lead the men of India against the invasion. Nothing else in India mattered—until Kashmir was cleared up though it might take five years or ten.

His Excellency suggested that U.N.O. should be asked to send out observers or advisers in some capacity to help the two Dominions solve the impasse which had been reached. The U.N.O. representatives could hold meetings with the two Prime Ministers. They could discuss the draft agreement, and ways and means of implementing it. They could set up a committee consisting of the principal contending parties in Kashmir. Would the two Governments agree to making a joint approach to U.N.O. or that one or other should make the approach?

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he would agree to U.N.O. advising on the impartiality of the administration before the plebiscite.

Pandit Nehru said that he would entirely reject this idea. Only when hostilities had ceased was he prepared to ask U.N.O. to send representatives for the plebiscite. The plebiscite only came into the picture when peace was restored.

His Excellency's final suggestion was that a joint statement should be put out in which the Government of Pakistan would undertake to do their best to induce the raiders to withdraw and no further raiders to go in; and the Government of India would undertake to call in U.N.O. advisers straightaway.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan made it clear that it was fully within his power to agree to issuing a statement calling upon the tribes to withdraw straightaway. If he did so, however, without being able to make one concrete offer in return his appeal would be taken no notice of. Not only would it be a dishonest thing to do, and as such lead to further deterioration between the two Dominions, but it would also result in such a deterioration of the position of the Government of Pakistan *vis-a-vis* its own people that the very existence of that Government would be endangered.

His Excellency asked whether he could count on Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's full support to the proposal that U.N.O. should be brought in, in whatever form this might be. This Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan undertook to do.

The full meeting then reassembled, with the addition of Mr. Mohammed Ali and Mr. H. M. Patel. The agreement which had been reached between the officials on the allocation of defence expenditure after August 15 was first taken and confirmed. A draft statement on the settlement of outstanding financial and economic issues was then considered. This was agreed, with minor changes, but considerable pressure had to be exerted by His Excellency on Pandit Nehru before he would agree that it should be published the following afternoon.

His Excellency then described the talk which he had had with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan before the meeting. Nearly all the rest of the time was devoted to efforts to induce Pandit Nehru to accept a reference to U.N.O.

Pandit Nehru was extremely adamant. He went to the extremity of saying that he intended to clear Kashmir with the sword, whatever happened. He asked under what section of the Charter any reference to U.N.O. could be made. He asked how Pakistan came into the picture at all. He reiterated his insistence that the first step was to drive out the raiders.

His Excellency drew attention to the great benefits an approach to U.N.O. would have. It was the only way to solve the present impasse, and stop the fighting—and to stop the fighting was the main thing at the moment.

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan reiterated that he would not mind in what manner the approach to U.N.O. was made. He would even agree that it should be in the form of an accusation by India that Pakistan was assisting the raiders. He agreed with His Excellency that the first thing that the U.N.O. Commission would probably do would be to ask Pakistan to use their influence to withdraw the raiders and stop further influxes. In these circumstances, his own position would be so immensely strengthened that he would be able to issue the appeal with impunity.

The position, as finally left, was that Pandit Nehru should examine the U.N.O. Charter and see if there was any way in which he could agree to a reference being made.

59. To Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah¹

New Delhi
12 December 1947

My dear Sheikh Abdullah,

I have not written to you since my return from Jammu. As you know we went to Lahore soon after and we had very long and exhausting discussions with Liaquat Ali Khan and others of the Pakistan Government. These discussions yielded no result and our vital differences remained. I shall not write to you about these discussions because Gopalaswami Ayyangar will be able to tell you all about them.² In regard to Kashmir there is at present a complete deadlock as between India and Pakistan. So far as the Government of India are concerned they do not wish to take any step

1. J. N. Collection.

2. Gopalaswami Ayyangar went to Kashmir to advise and assist the State's Emergency Administration.

without consulting your government. Nothing is going to happen during the next few days. But on the 22nd of December we are having a meeting of the Joint Defence Council in Delhi. Liaquat Ali Khan and Ghulam Mohammad are likely to attend this meeting and very probably we shall discuss the Kashmir situation again. I do not myself see any way to a settlement with them because our differences are basic. Nevertheless we must discuss and try our best to find a way out of the deadlock. I should very much like you to come to Delhi a day earlier, i.e., on the 21st morning, so that we may have the advantage of your advice. If Bakshi can come with you we will welcome that because he is very helpful. But I do not know if it will be possible for both Bakshi and you to come here. In any event I hope you will come.

2. I am going early tomorrow to Allahabad and from there to Calcutta. I hope to be back on the 16th night. On the 19th I go to Jaipur returning on the 20th.

3. As you will know the situation in Kashmir is extremely complicated from every point of view, military, political, communal, economic, national and international. We have to consider these in all the aspects and with all the wisdom and statesmanship at our disposal. The most vital issues are at stake for all concerned. Any false step may add to our difficulties. If it was a simple matter of using military force only, that would at least be a straight issue even though it might be difficult. But everything is so inter-linked that one factor affects another. We are acting now in Kashmir on a world stage and the greatest interest is being taken by other countries, more specially the Great Powers.

4. I shall not discuss here the military position about which you know as much as I do. Nor will I write about the India-Pakistan issue. Connected with both these, however, is the question of internal administration of Kashmir State which depends upon that. It is for this particular reason that I have requested Gopalaswami Ayyangar to go to Jammu and to consult you and the Maharaja. He is of course the ideal person for this kind of work because of his wide experience and his intimate knowledge of Kashmir. He knows all the parties concerned and the issues at stake. He has been present at our conversations with Pakistan. I hope therefore that you will discuss fully with him and give him your own views in the matter.

5. You know that the Pakistan Government is particularly anxious to push you out of your present position. To that of course we cannot agree. But because of this it becomes even more important than otherwise that we should stabilise the Government of Kashmir by taking the next step, i.e., forming a proper interim government. The present situation is unstable

and lacking in definiteness. The main difficulty in the formation of the interim government has been the fact that Mahajan was Prime Minister. It is clear that you should be Prime Minister and Mahajan should leave the State. Therefore the principal difficulty has disappeared. There are no doubt other difficulties also but they should be easily capable of being resolved. In the present context it is essential that the burden of administration should rest on you and your colleagues and at the same time that there should be close consultations between you and the Maharaja. You should deal with the Maharaja directly without any person intervening. Or if you are not there Bakshi should deal with him. This does not mean that your policy should be overruled but that in the interests of smooth working reference to and consultation with the Maharaja is desirable. It is the psychological approach that counts. Recent events have already deprived the Maharaja of any real authority to lay down policy or to take any effective part in administration. Nevertheless, even as a constitutional head, he can claim to be consulted and a lack of coordination between him and you will lead to difficulties. I would therefore suggest to you that while you adhere to any policy that you consider necessary, you should at the same time deal with the Maharaja in a tactful and consultative way so that he does not feel that he is completely ignored and bypassed. I do not think that he would come in your way.

6. As I have said above I am interested in this development not only for internal reasons but also from the point of view of our discussions with Pakistan. If we have a firm interim government established in Kashmir, our position is strengthened in our dealings with Pakistan. For the rest Gopalaswami Ayyangar will no doubt place all relevant considerations before you and the Maharaja.

7. There is one matter which hardly needs reminder. Still I want to draw your attention to it or rather of Bakshi's. I trust that every effort is being made to recover abducted Muslim women in Jammu. You told me that Ghulam Abbas's³ wife and daughter have been abducted. I do hope that these abducted women will be recovered and in this matter the Maharaja's active cooperation should be sought. Perhaps he cannot do much himself. But some of the persons connected with him might be able to help. The importance of this is not merely because of humanitarian reasons but also because of political reasons. I am writing to the Maharaja about this also.

8. As you know nearly all our outstanding disputes with Pakistan have been settled except for the major one concerning Kashmir. But that of course

3. Chaudhary Ghulam Abbas was the president of the Muslim Conference in Kashmir.

is the biggest of all. Whether it is settled or not, we have to proceed with every care and after full consideration of the consequences of every step taken. In that consideration your views have the highest importance.

9. The film taken about Kashmir, called *The Kashmir Story*, is a good one. It is being released today in Delhi and Bombay. It will be sent to Kashmir also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

60. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
12 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Saheb,

Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is taking this letter with him to Jammu. I am very glad that he is going there to confer with you and Sheikh Abdullah. He has already written to you at some length analysing the present situation and making some suggestions.

2. As you will no doubt realise that Jammu and Kashmir State has become a vital issue for all of us and any decision in regard to it is going to have far-reaching consequences. At the same time it is a very complicated and difficult issue from every point of view. The military aspect is not an easy one and we may be involved in military operations for a long time without any definite result. That does not frighten us though of course no one likes indefinite operations. The issue has drawn the world's attention and every step that we take has to be justified before the world at large. The Great Powers are specially interested. We have therefore to proceed with great care lest a wrong step might injure our cause.

3. During my last visit to Lahore we had very long discussions with the Pakistan Ministers about Kashmir. These discussions yielded no fruit as our differences were vital. In the ordinary course we are meeting again in Joint Defence Council on the 22nd December, next in Delhi and the subject of Kashmir is bound to be discussed then. Naturally we do not wish to take any major step without consulting the Kashmir authorities. You were good

1. J. N. Collection.

enough to tell me that you left these matters to the Dominion of India. Nevertheless we want to keep you fully in touch with the developments and to consult you about them. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar will put you in touch with all developments. I should have liked you to come here for consultations with all of us. But perhaps you may not consider this feasible. In any event I should like you to tell Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar what your own reactions are. Of course all our reactions point one way and I can well guess what your reactions are in regard to this matter. But the point is not merely to give our initial reactions but our mature views after considering all aspects of the situation.

4. I am asking Sheikh Abdullah to come here on or about the 21st December so that we can discuss these matters with him before our talks with the Pakistan Ministers. As you know these Pakistan Ministers are bent on pushing out Sheikh Abdullah. Of course they want to push you out also. They feel that Sheikh Abdullah is the principal barrier to the realisation of their desires. He has become the symbol of the popular movement against Pakistan in Kashmir. So far as we are concerned we cannot possibly agree to any proposal to push out Sheikh Abdullah because that would mean weakening the popular resistance to the invaders and raiders. The only way to save Kashmir is through and with the help of Sheikh Abdullah and his party. Also the only way to keep the Kashmir struggle non-communal is through him. Without him the Hindu minorities would undoubtedly suffer.

5. The Maharaja of Patiala came to see me on his return from Jammu and told me of his talks with you. I need not tell you that I can thoroughly understand your position and your views. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar can appreciate them even more. The question before us is how in certain state of circumstances we can go ahead and further the cause we have at heart. If any one of us could do just what we wanted to do, there would be no problem at all. Most of our actions however are limited and determined by events and all manner of factors.

6. Just at this present moment Kashmir State offers us an extraordinarily difficult problem for solution. Yet I have no doubt that we can and will solve it if we approach it with wisdom and statesmanship. The last few months have changed the face of India. The last few weeks have had a powerful effect on Kashmir. We have to take all this into consideration and then lay down a policy which is most likely to lead us to our objective. You know my views about this. Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is more competent than I am to judge the situation and to advise on it and I am very glad that he is going to Jammu for this purpose.

7. There is one matter which hardly needs mentioning and yet it is so

important that I should like to write about it. Ever since disturbances started in Jammu and Kashmir State there have been, most unfortunately, large numbers of cases of abduction of women, Hindu and Muslim. This has occurred all over the Punjab. We are trying our utmost to recover these women and we have succeeded already in some measure. I have no doubt that this is being done in Kashmir State also. You told us of a ghastly case when some Hindu girls were being recovered, were killed by their own relatives. This kind of terrible punishment of the innocents is horrible to think of and I trust that everything will be done to ensure safety and security for the women who are recovered. They must be made to realise that they will have a home to go to and that they will be treated with respect and affection. If their family is not prepared to do so, the State should gladly undertake this responsibility.

8. I understand that a considerable number of Muslim Conference leaders were abducted. Presumably they remained somewhere in Jammu and it should be possible to trace them. I trust every effort will be made to recover them. This will be of great help to us politically.

9. Nothing has exercised our minds so much during recent weeks as the problem of Kashmir. I have an intimate and personal interest in it and the mere thought that Kashmir should join Pakistan and become a kind of foreign territory for us is hateful to me. I want to do everything that is reasonably possible to prevent this. In order to prevent it however we have all to pull together and function in line with the new developments that have taken place. Otherwise our efforts may not yield fruit. It is towards this pulling together that our efforts are being directed and it is for this that Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar is going to Jammu. I trust that with your cooperation his visit will be a success. That will strengthen our hands greatly when we meet the Pakistan Ministers in Delhi on the 22nd December.

10. With regards to Maharani Saheba,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

61. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

Many thanks for your message of the 5th December, which your High Commissioner has communicated to me. You will be glad to hear that many outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan have been settled as the result of discussions which representatives of the two Governments have had since I last communicated with you and we anticipate that there will now be no need to go before the Arbitral Tribunal which was to have adjudicated on many of these questions.²

We have also had further discussions on Kashmir. Unfortunately, our differences on this vital issue have not been resolved so far. We hope to have further conversations about it when the Joint Defence Council meets in New Delhi on the 22nd of this month. My colleagues fully share my desire that this major cause of potential conflict between Pakistan and ourselves should be settled by peaceful and friendly negotiations.

1. New Delhi, 12 December 1947. File No. KS-2/47-K, M.H.A.
2. Although many issues that arose between the two Dominions after the date of transfer of power remained unsettled, complete agreement had been reached by 5 December 1947 on all partition matters through the efforts of the Arbitral Tribunal.

62. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Ever since my return from Lahore² I have given the most earnest thought to the settlement of all outstanding matters in dispute between India and Pakistan. My colleagues share my desire for such a settlement which is essential for the well-being of both India and Pakistan. It is our good fortune that agreements have already been arrived at in regard to many matters in controversy. But you will appreciate that it is difficult to make any progress if conflict and suspicion continue between the two countries. Such conflict is likely to affect all our other relations and may lead to a deterioration of the situation.

1. New Delhi, 12 December 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, p. 73.
2. Nehru had gone to Lahore to attend the meeting of the Joint Defence Council on 8 December 1947.

2. The major cause of this conflict at present is Kashmir. We have discussed this matter with you at great length without resolving our differences of finding a way out of the impasse. I need not reiterate the arguments which have been repeatedly advanced in support of our position. You are fully seized of them.

3. We have given further thought, in the light of our discussion in Lahore, to the question of inviting the United Nations to advise us in this matter. While we are prepared to invite U.N.O. observers to come here and advise us as to the proposed plebiscite, it is not clear in what other capacity the United Nations help can be sought. According to your own declaration to us you are not parties to the present struggle in Kashmir. We cannot treat with irregular invaders as a state. No Government can deal with such raids which have brought death and destruction to Kashmir except through military means. We owe an obligation to the people of Kashmir to restore peaceful and normal conditions and we have pledged ourselves to this end. We would gladly cooperate in an attempt to restore peace by settlement.

4. I trust that you will appreciate the logic and reasonableness of our position and our earnest desire to find a solution which is honourable to all concerned. I hope to meet you when you visit Delhi on the 22nd December to attend the next meeting of the Joint Defence Council and to discuss this matter further with you. I confess, however, that I find myself unable to suggest anything beyond what I have offered already, namely, to ask the U.N.O. to send impartial observers to advise us regarding the plebiscite.

I hope that your health continues to improve.

63. A Note on Kashmir¹

The overall situation has not very lately been very satisfactory. Nothing very much has happened, but there has been a progressive deterioration and the initiative appears to have been with the enemy most of the time. They are more favourably situated of course.

1. New Delhi, 19 December 1947. J. N. Collection.

2. It is perfectly clear, even if there was any doubt previously, that what is happening in Kashmir State is not merely a frontier raid but a regular war, on a limited scale, with the latest weapons being used on the part of the invaders. It is clear that the Pakistan Government is encouraging this in every way. Whatever the higher command of the Pakistan Army might or might not have done in this matter, there can be no doubt that Pakistan Army officers and men are helping the invaders in every way. They are also given leave, called Kashmir leave, which they employ in training the tribal people and the ex-servicemen and others as well as in serving in the forces entering Kashmir State.

3. We have reliable information to show that the tribal people had been collected and sent by the Political Agents in the tribal areas. The Political Agents function under the Governor. These tribal people were supplied with trucks and were taken to camps where they were lodged, fed, armed and trained and then sent in groups across the Kashmir border. There are concentrations of these forces including ex-servicemen, Pakistan Army personnel on leave and others all over the West Punjab-Kashmir border.

4. It is quite easy for them to send big raiding parties into Kashmir State territory, which they burn and destroy and kill and either stay on if it is safe or return to safety of their headquarters in Pakistan territory and rest and recoup.

5. It is evident that the operations of the invaders are controlled by an able staff. These operations are not those of irregular troops functioning spasmodically. Each step follows logically the previous step. The principal commander of these invaders is said to be Colonel (now General) Akbar Khan,² who was one of the ablest younger officers in the undivided Indian Army. (He is different from Major General Akbar Khan of the Pakistan Army who is much older.) General Kiani³ of the I.N.A. is also one of their able leaders. There are a number of other Pakistan Army officers functioning with these invaders, both inside Kashmir State territory and across the border.

6. We have thus to face well-equipped armies under able leadership, follow-

2. The tribal raid was organised and directed by Brig. Akbar Khan of Pakistan Army from Rawalpindi. He later became the Pakistan Chief of Staff and thereafter was imprisoned for his part in a plot against the government. He was known as "General Tariff"—the name of a Moorish hero who defended Islam in Spain a thousand years earlier.

3. Mohammad Zaman Kiani (1911-1980); commissioned in the Indian Army, 1935; joined Indian National Army, 1941; commanded an I.N.A. Division, 1944; after partition led guerillas and tribesmen to attack Kashmir; later joined Pakistan Foreign Service.

ing well-laid out plans. They have the backing of the Pakistan Government and Army and they can always go back to safety by crossing the border. Their tactics obviously are to draw a large part of the Indian Army into Kashmir State and to continue to harass it and lower its morale. They are functioning continuously on Indian territory which they have invaded and which they have partly ruined. Their own territory is quite safe. On the Kashmir side a large area has been destroyed, crops removed and vast numbers of refugees have to be catered for in Jammu and elsewhere.

7. This type of operations can continue for months and months and years without bringing any result. The longer they continue the greater harm they cause to India. The burden on Pakistan is relatively little.

8. All the Pakistan newspapers treat this war as a national war of liberation and give great prominence to it. They are full of stories of personal gallantry and of victories won. Many of these accounts are entirely false. But there is an element of truth in them and this work of publicity is done very ably. One of the principal persons in charge of *Dawn* in Karachi is Desmond Young.⁴

9. Our publicity is feeble in the extreme. There is very little about Kashmir in our newspapers or on the radio and what there is makes dull reading. There are no personal anecdotes although, I am told, that many acts of great personal bravery have taken place. In the recent Uri encounter one of the V.C.s of the Indian Army was killed.⁵ According to reports he fought with great gallantry. Something should have been said about it, but not even a mention of his death has been made. There are numerous other instances of this kind.

10. Apart from the larger question of our whole approach to this Kashmir affair, it seems to me that our outlook has been defensive and apologetic, as if we were ashamed of what we were doing and we are not quite sure of how far we should go. I see nothing to apologise for and a defensive way of meeting raiders seems to me completely wrong.

4. (1892-1966), Commander of a battalion of Indian Army in the First World War; between the wars edited newspapers including the *Pioneer*; joined again Indian Army in the Middle East in 1941; later Chief Press Adviser in Bureau of Public Information; author of *Rommel the Desert Fox*, and *Fountain of the Elephant*.
5. On 10 December 1947 in an encounter at Uri Jamadar Nand Singh was killed. He had won the Victoria Cross in the Second World War. He was posthumously awarded the Vir Chakra.

11. The first thing to be understood is that Kashmir is of the most vital consequences to us and that we are in deadly earnest about it. It does not matter how many reverses we may have, we shall continue this till we win. The sooner therefore we think and act on these lines the better. I realise fully the difficulties of the terrain and the situation. Nevertheless I cannot get over the feeling that our tactics have been unsuccessful. There is a certain heaviness of thought and action which is peculiarly unsuited to a conflict of the type we are waging.

12. If we are determined to carry this Kashmir conflict to a successful issue, whatever the consequences, as we are, then we have to think afresh and adopt different tactics. We cannot go on bartering away in the way we have done and allow the situation gradually to deteriorate further. We cannot go on carrying on this little war for months and months and may be a year or more. We should function differently even in Kashmir State territory.

13. But another bigger question arises. Are we to allow Pakistan to continue to train new armies for invasion and to allow its territory to be used as a base for these attacks? The obvious course is to strike at these concentrations and lines of communications in Pakistan territory. From a military point of view this would be the most effective step. We have refrained from taking it because of political considerations. We shall have to reconsider this position because a continuation of the present situation is intolerable. If Pakistan is not prepared to help in putting an end to this war or even to try to withdraw these invaders then we should help ourselves, even by crossing some part of Pakistan territory and hitting at their concentrations. This involves a risk of war with Pakistan. We wish to avoid war, but it is merely deluding ourselves to imagine that we are avoiding war so long as the present operations are continuing on either side.

14. Future operations might have to be coordinated between our forces in Kashmir State and those in East Punjab. Some efficient arrangement should therefore be made for this coordination immediately.

15. I am told that wounded soldiers from the Kashmir front who have been sent to Delhi feel that they are ignored and nobody pays much attention to them. This matter should be looked into.

64. To M.C. Setalvad¹

New Delhi
20 December 1947

My dear Mr. Setalvad,

As you know the Kashmir affair is giving us a great deal of trouble. Kashmir is vital to us and it is also vital to Pakistan, so there is a kind of conflict which is not easily resolvable by argument. Hence the military operations that are going on and finally such conflicts are settled only by superior force or fear of force.

Strictly, legally speaking, Kashmir belongs to the Dominion of India and the present invasion is an act of aggression which has to be repelled. This invasion is taking place through Pakistan territory and we have little doubt that the Pakistan Government has encouraged it and helped it in every way. They deny formal complicity with it, but it is obvious that tribesmen, ex-servicemen and Pakistan Army soldiers and officers on leave are participating. The civil government is helping by giving food, transport and accommodation. There are training centres. It may be said therefore that Pakistan is committing hostile acts against the Dominion of India by directly invading India or aiding or abetting aggressors who pass through its territory.

When we accepted the accession of Kashmir to India we said that the future of Kashmir will be finally decided after peace and order had been established by plebiscite or referendum of the people. We stand by our declaration. It is clear however that there cannot be both war and referendum at the same time and if war continues for long then the question of referendum may not arise at all.

Conditions for carrying on military operations in Kashmir State are not favourable to us chiefly because our lines of communications are bad and limited, while Pakistan can just walk in whenever it likes. We cannot enter Pakistan territory because that would involve aggression on Pakistan. This is a highly unsatisfactory position because while they commit aggression all the time we have to be on the defensive in Kashmir State. The mountainous terrain and the winter climate are also against us. We thus have to face numerous difficulties and if this kind of thing continues, this petty war can also continue for a long time without bringing any very definite result. In any event little in the way of result can be expected during the winter months and all we can do is to protect important parts of the State like the Kashmir Valley, the Jammu area, etc.

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

From a military point of view our easiest course of action would be to march into West Punjab territory bordering on Kashmir from East Punjab and hitting at the concentrations of enemy forces in West Pakistan adjoining the Kashmir border; that is to say hitting at the nerve centres of the enemy and the principal lines of communication. We cannot do so unless we are prepared for some kind of regular war.

I have tried to explain very briefly the position as it exists today. We do not want war and we shall avoid it. At the same time we have no intention of carrying on in the present way without any results and to our progressive disadvantage. On no account are we going to walk out of Kashmir. In a day or two we are going to discuss this matter again with the Pakistan Ministers who are coming to Delhi. I do not think this will yield any result.

We are therefore thinking now of making an approach to the Security Council of U.N.O. charging Pakistan as an aggressor country, encouraging raids and invasions on Indian Union territory and pointing out that while we have scrupulously avoided entering Pakistan territory, we cannot afford to allow Pakistan being used as a base for invasion and we may have to take necessary steps to prevent this. The issue before U.N.O. would thus be whether Pakistan has committed an act of aggression or not. Other issues may also arise but so far we are concerned we should like to limit it to that.

In case we make this reference to U.N.O. the matter may come up fairly soon before the Security Council, some notice of course being sent to Pakistan. In fact we shall ourselves probably inform Pakistan what steps we are taking. Normally such references come up within a fortnight of being made.

You will appreciate of course that this is a very vital matter for us and we want one of our best men to put forward our case. Inevitably I thought of you. I very much hope that you will be able to help us and to go to New York for appearance before the Security Council. I should not think that this will involve any considerable stay, probably U.N.O. will appoint a commission to visit India to enquire and report to them. We would give you a competent assistant well-acquainted with all the facts.

I hope you will be able to accept our invitation. For the present I do not know how things will take shape and I am writing to you merely to keep you informed of developments. After the Pakistan Ministers have come to Delhi and gone away, we shall consider the position in the light of all the facts and come to a final decision. This will be about some time the middle of next week and I shall let you know then how we stand.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

65. Talks with Lord Mountbatten and Liaquat Ali Khan¹

I

I told Pandit Nehru that he would find Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan in a very chastened mood, since he obviously was frightened at the situation, which appeared to me to be getting out of his control. I thought he would accept any appeal to U.N.O. in order to break the impasse and bring the fighting to an end, although his desire was to link the plebiscite with the appeal to cease fighting. Pandit Nehru said that this was out of the question, that the Government of India would never agree to this, and that he intended to tell Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan so. I begged him to let me explain this in a quiet and tactful manner, for I felt I would probably get him to accept it provided it were not done in a provocative way.

I told Pandit Nehru that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was most anxious to know whether it was intended to repudiate the payment of the balances due to Pakistan or to delay them until a settlement was reached on Kashmir. Pandit Nehru said that there was no question of repudiation and that India meant to stand by her obligations in this matter, though the date of payment was one which the Cabinet had not yet settled, as they were waiting to find out how matters were going to turn out in Kashmir. I begged him not to mention this latter fact to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, since I considered that we could never get any agreement with him under undue pressure, and that, so far from this factor being helpful, I considered it would wreck the prospect of any settlement. He agreed with this.

1. New Delhi, 21 December 1947. The first report printed here is Mountbatten's record of talks with Nehru prior to the meeting with Liaquat Ali Khan. This is from Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. The second report is Nehru's version and is in J.N. Collection.

II

I reached Government House at 10 p.m. to keep an appointment with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan who had arrived earlier in the evening. I was taken to the Governor-General first as he was anxious to see me before I saw

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan. Although he intended speaking to me for a few minutes only, actually our conversation lasted for nearly an hour, while, presumably, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was waiting for me.

2. Lord Mountbatten told me that he had had an hour's talk already with Liaquat Ali Khan and had found him in a friendly mood, eager to come to some kind of a settlement. In fact he had never found him so chastened. He said that it would be a tragedy if we could not take advantage of these circumstances now and put an end to the fighting in Kashmir, of course on terms advantageous and honourable to India. A continuation of the conflict, whatever the result, would mean a very great deal of trouble to India and even more so to Pakistan and would stop progress for a long time. Lord Mountbatten was greatly worked up and made repeated appeals both on national and personal grounds. He said that he had never been so exercised about any matter as this one because he felt that so much was at stake. The next day would be vital in the history of India. We were very near a settlement and the highest statesmanship and the good of India demanded that we should take advantage of the present favourable circumstances to bring about such a settlement. Favourable circumstances evidently referred to Liaquat Ali Khan's desire for a settlement. Lord Mountbatten referred to the great increase in the prestige of India all over the world if we could bring about a settlement and to our immediately applying ourselves to the various internal problems which demanded our attention. The settlement of course should essentially be on the lines we have repeatedly laid down, i.e., reference to the U.N.O. to stop the fighting and when this is done and peace and order restored a plebiscite under U.N.O. auspices.

3. Lord Mountbatten also said that Liaquat Ali Khan was greatly exercised at the possibility of the Government of India repudiating or going back on the financial settlements arrived at. These settlements according to Liaquat Ali Khan had taken place nearly a month ago and nothing had been done yet to implement them. Was the matter going back to the Arbitral Tribunal for decision?

4. I stated in reply that there was no question of our challenging or repudiating the financial agreements arrived at. The only question that arose was when to make the payments. We would stand by the agreements and the Arbitral Tribunal would not be concerned with them. Our difficulty was that if we made any payments now, when a kind of undeclared war was going on between us, that money would be used in carrying on that war against us. It would be foolish for us to make those payments until this Kashmir business had been settled.

5. Lord Mountbatten said that the money was really Pakistan's, i.e., it was

a joint fund and this part of it therefore belonged to them. He appreciated however our difficulty, but would suggest that we should not emphasize this fact of non-payment in our difficulty, but would suggest that this would raise further difficulties. We might make it clear that so far as the financial agreements were concerned we did not challenge them.

6. Regarding Kashmir I pointed out that the immediate issue was one of aggression directly or indirectly by Pakistan on India. No other issue arose till this was settled. We proposed to refer this particular matter to the Security Council of the U.N.O., charging Pakistan with aggression and asking U.N.O. to call upon Pakistan to refrain from doing so. Otherwise we would have to take action ourselves in such a manner as we thought fit to stop this aggression at the base.

7. Lord Mountbatten said he agreed with that reference, but could we not add to it that after law and order has been restored U.N.O. would supervise and carry out a plebiscite as we had previously declared? I said that we could not add this to our reference. It was entirely a separate matter and much would depend on developments. We were committed not only by our settlements but also by our general policy to allow the people of Kashmir to decide their future. Indeed it was not possible in the present context of things for us to hold Kashmir against the will of the people. But we were definitely of opinion that this could not be tied up to the present reference to U.N.O. In that reference there would no doubt be a historical narrative which would contain mention of the fact of our offering a plebiscite under U.N.O. auspices. Apart from that there would be no further mention of this. Our demand would be that aggression must cease and the raiders should withdraw. It was possible that as a consequence of U.N.O. taking action in this matter, whether by sending a commission or otherwise, other developments might take place. We would deal with them as they arose.

8. There was a great deal of talk roundabout this position. Lord Mountbatten was anxious that I should somehow talk on the plebiscite in some form or other so as to enable Liaquat Ali Khan to put it across his people who were greatly excited about Kashmir. I repeated what I had said before and informed him that our Cabinet had considered this matter and was quite clear that it should not bring in the question of plebiscite in this reference. That did not mean that we wanted to avoid a reference to the people. But how and when this should take place would depend on circumstances. We could not have a continuation of war and the idea of a plebiscite to go together. It was nearly three months ago that we had made this offer and it had not thus far been accepted and aggression had continued.

9. Lord Mountbatten mentioned also casually that Mr. Jinnah had been given a maximum of six months by his doctors and he was very ill.²

10. At about 11 p.m. we went to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's room. The Governor-General accompanied me although probably it was not his previous intention to do so. No doubt he felt that his presence might be helpful in bringing about a more friendly approach.

11. We were with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan for little more than an hour, till soon after midnight. I must say that I found him very much toned down and chastened, indeed almost, if I may say so, humble in his approach to the problem. Unlike previous occasions, there was hardly any argument or discussion.

12. Lord Mountbatten started off by saying that there was no intention on the part of the Indian Government to repudiate the financial agreements arrived at and that this matter would not go up before the Arbitral Tribunal. Further that we were thinking in terms of a reference to U.N.O. and that we stood by our previous statement to the effect that the people of Kashmir would have to decide after peace and order were established about their future.

13. I then stated our position in regard to Kashmir. I said that nearly three months ago when we had intervened in Kashmir we had made a unilateral offer for a plebiscite under U.N.O. auspices after peace was established and all the raiders had departed or been pushed out. This offer had been repeated but there had been no response. Indeed the aggression had continued with every kind of violence and had been supported by the Pakistan Government. The invaders had been collected, transported, put in camps near the Kashmir border, armed and trained, all in Pakistan territory, and they had then been sent in batches inside Kashmir State. We considered that aggression of one state against another as a hostile act against India. Obviously we could not tolerate this, nor were we prepared to carry on this petty war in the way we have thus far done. We had sent relatively small forces into Kashmir in the hope that hostilities would cease and the raiders would be withdrawn. No such thing had happened and we would necessarily have to take a more serious view of the matter and if no other development took place, we may have to strike at the base of operations and the lines of communications of the raiders. But as we were anxious to avoid far-reaching developments and being members of the U.N.O. we intended making a reference to U.N.O. charging Pakistan with acts of aggression and asking U.N.O.

2. Jinnah died of tuberculosis and cancer of the lungs on 11 September 1948.

to call upon Pakistan to desist. In the alternative we would have to take such further action as we thought fit and proper.

14. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan did not say much in reply to this except that he would welcome U.N.O.'s intervention as he was anxious that a third party should come into the picture. He complained of Sardar Patel's speech at Jaipur in which he was alleged to have said that India was prepared for war with Pakistan if the latter desired it.³ Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that we had decided at Lahore that no provocative speeches should be made and no responsible person in Pakistan had made any speech or statement of a provocative nature since then. Unfortunately Sardar Patel had done so and this did not help in producing the atmosphere we desired.

15. I said that I had not myself read Sardar Patel's speech fully and I did not know what exactly he had said or what the context was. The speech had hardly anything to do with Kashmir and any reference could have been only casual and in some other context. I pointed out the way Pakistan newspapers were behaving and more specially the demand in a leading article of a Karachi Urdu daily calling upon the Muslims to kill Sardar Patel. Our High Commissioner in Karachi had written to Pakistan Government on this subject. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that his attention had been drawn to this and he greatly regretted it. He was taking steps against that newspaper. He said further that newspapers in Pakistan and India were thoroughly irresponsible, more specially the Indian language ones, and he wished that something could be done to stop them. Lord Mountbatten expressed his own disapproval of the way many newspapers indulged in inflaming public opinion and had expressed his opinion that every newspaper should be licensed by Government, the licence being withdrawn in case of misbehaviour.

16. Lord Mountbatten said that as we were thinking of making a reference to U.N.O. it would be a good thing if the draft was shown to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan before it was sent.

17. I said that we would naturally send a copy to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, but the reference being in the nature of a charge against Pakistan it could not possibly be a joint reference. It would be for Pakistan to reply to it and for the Security Council then to take action.

3. Vallabhbhai Patel said at Jaipur that India would not desert Kashmir even if the struggle were on for ten years, but ultimately it would be for the people of Kashmir to decide their own fate and that would be possible only after the last raider had left the country.

18. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he did not think it necessary to see our draft reference. What was necessary was that both parties should be eager to stop this fighting.

19. In the whole course of the conversation no mention was made about the internal administration of Kashmir or about the armed forces of the Indian Union that might be left in Kashmir later on. These were the two points on which a great deal of argument had taken place on previous occasions.

20. Lord Mountbatten asked Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan if it would not be difficult for him to get the raiders out owing to the state of public opinion in Pakistan. He agreed that it was not going to be an easy matter.

21. There was some talk about raids on Pakistan territory by air and land.

22. I informed Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan that all the relatives of Ghulam Abbas, President of the Kashmir Muslim Conference, were alive and were in Pakistan except for one girl who was apparently in Amritsar and would be sent to Pakistan. The story about the murder and abduction of these people was thus not true.

23. Our talk then went on some other matters. I referred to Mehr Chand Khanna's case. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that he was meeting him the next day.

24. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan asked me if I had seen the Muslim League resolution about having a minorities charter. I said that I had not read it carefully but I had glanced through it. I added that so far as we are concerned our Constituent Assembly had already carefully considered this matter and laid down provisions for the protection of minorities. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that it would be a very good thing if both India and Pakistan would agree to similar provisions and would issue a joint statement to that effect which might be embodied in our constitutions. This would go a long way to lessen the feelings of fear and suspicion that exist. I agreed that it would be desirable to come to an agreement on these issues.

25. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then enquired about the order of precedence in India as to where the Prime Minister and Ministers came into the picture.

The whole conversation with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, which lasted a little over an hour, was almost entirely free from argument which had previously accompanied such discussions. It seemed to me quite clear that for some reason or other Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was eager and anxious for a

settlement. He hardly raised any difficulties to what I said, though of course he did not agree to everything. He expressed a strong desire that India and Pakistan should have friendly relations and should put an end to conflict and misunderstanding.

66. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
21 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Saheb,

Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar has shown me the correspondence he has had with you during the last few days.² I am very sorry to find that it has not been possible so far for the parties concerned to agree in regard to the next steps to be taken. Meanwhile, the situation changes from day to day and what is said today becomes rather out of date tomorrow.

We have to face an exceedingly dynamic and changing situation both in the military and the political sense. Decisions are governed far more by what is happening than by what we may desire to happen. In recent weeks there has been some deterioration in the military situation. There is no danger of any major event happening to our disadvantage. But it is true that all manner of small events happen which increase the morale of the invaders and correspondingly affect the morale of our people. The problem is a military one and political one. On the political side it is both internal to Kashmir and external, that is, as between the Dominions of India and Pakistan. We have been giving a great deal of thought to it, more especially in so far as inter-Dominion relationships are concerned.

It is patent that the present position in which the Pakistan Government and army, though remaining officially in the background, play a dominant role in the invasion of Kashmir, is most disadvantageous to us. We are justified in considering the acts and omissions of the Pakistan Government as hostile acts and omissions, which we are entitled to counter by military or other means. We have thus far avoided doing so for various political reasons, among them being that both India and Pakistan are members of the United Nations Organisation. It is *prima facie* improper for two members to come into direct conflict with each other without reference to the U.N.O.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. I, pp. 124-126.

2. It dealt with the changes proposed by Gopalaswami Ayyangar in the existing constitutional and administrative structure in Kashmir.

The fact that Pakistan has acted as an aggressor country is well known to us, but the manner of its doing so has been such as not to be known by the outside world.

The Government of India are now thinking of taking early steps to inform the Security Council of the U.N.O. that the Pakistan Government has been directly or indirectly encouraging and aiding aggression of Indian Dominion territory, that is, Kashmir State. Pakistan territory is used for transport, as a base of operations against Kashmir and in many other ways, for this purpose. We propose to ask the Security Council of the U.N.O. to call upon Pakistan to desist from doing so. Further, we propose to say that in view of what Pakistan has been doing we consider ourselves entitled to take such other and further action to stop this invasion which is bringing ruin and desolation to Kashmir State. This action may involve our entering Pakistan territory.

Our present intention is to make this limited reference to the U.N.O. without committing ourselves in any way. Meanwhile, of course, we shall continue to fight the invader and to drive him back. The reference will not stop us from our present activities in any way. But once reference is made it is possible that other developments might take place for which we have to be prepared.

Although our Government is clear on the line of action to be taken now, we shall finalise our decisions in two or three days' time after our talks with the Pakistan Ministers who are due to reach here tonight in connection with the Joint Defence Council. We have to proceed correctly from a national and international point of view so that any action that we might take in future might not only be effective but above board and in conformity with international procedure.

Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad arrived here last night and I have informed them of the proposed action of ours. I am writing this letter to you to keep you fully informed of this matter also. As soon as any final decision is taken. I shall, of course, communicate it to you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

67. Lord Mountbatten's Note of a Discussion with Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Pandit Nehru recalled that I had, at one of the earliest of the previous series of meetings held at Delhi between the Prime Ministers, read out a note expressing my Government's policy that all the agreements should hang together. He said that he considered the present situation to be tantamount to undeclared war, in which, in the opinion of the Government of India, Pakistan was encouraging the aggressors. It was not the question to hand over large funds to Pakistan in these circumstances.

Liaquat Ali Khan pointed out that these funds did not in any way belong to India; they were Pakistan's legal share of the cash balances.² It was not a question of a loan or a gift being made. He considered that they should be handed over straightaway.

Mr. Mohammad Ali made the point that all the financial agreements had been made on their own merits. With this Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar agreed, but gave his view that the whole background in reaching these agreements had been the intention to reach an overall settlement.

I asked to what extent the action of making a reference to U.N.O. could be taken as a detente to stop the fighting and lead to a decision to implement the financial agreements.

Nehru did not answer this. Instead he said that the fighting was taking place on Indian Dominion territory, which had been attacked. He said (though this was on the spur of the moment and rather a hurried remark) that he admitted that the delay in implementing the financial agreements was a method of bringing pressure against the Pakistan Government. But this was not the main pressure that was being brought to bear. The military pressure, which was in reply to aggressive military pressure against Indian territory, was of greater import.

This gave Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan the opportunity to point out that he did not recognize Kashmir as Indian Dominion territory—in exactly the same way as India did not recognize Junagadh as Pakistan territory. These remarks did not improve the atmosphere of the meeting.

1. New Delhi, 22 December 1947. Extracts. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire. Those present were Mountbatten, Nehru, Liaquat Ali Khan, Gopalaswami Ayyangar and Mohammad Ali.
2. Under the financial settlement between India and Pakistan, out of the Rs. 400 crores of the total cash balances Pakistan was to get Rs. 75 crores, out of which Rs. 20 crores had already been paid to her. As for the public debt, the whole of it had been taken over by the Union Government and Pakistan's share was to be repaid to India in 50 annual instalments on favourable terms. The settlement also related to sterling balances, pensions, military stores, ordnance factories and other fixed assets.

I then emphasized that the agreement to make a reference on Kashmir to U.N.O. had been reached the previous evening before the question of the date of implementing the financial agreements arose. Therefore, there was no question of pressure having been applied to Pakistan in order to make them agree to this procedure.

Pandit Nehru reiterated that the reference which he intended to make to U.N.O. would be on the question of whether or not Pakistan had supported the aggression against Kashmir. All the evidence which was available to him showed that they had supported this to a most serious degree.

Pandit Nehru then handed to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan the letter, which represented the first step in making a reference to U.N.O. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was in such a bitter mood that he first said that he did not wish to open or read this letter. But he subsequently repented, read it through, and undertook to send a reply as soon as possible—after he had consulted his Government. I suggested that Pandit Nehru should draft the formal application to U.N.O. without waiting for Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan's reply, so that this could be despatched with the least possible delay. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan then returned to the question of the implementation of the financial agreements, concerning which he confessed that he was very bitter. He said that he regarded the delay in implementation as equal to, if not worse than, repudiation. He would indeed have preferred complete repudiation.

Mr. Mohammad Ali made further reference to the financial position of Pakistan. The Rs. 20 crores which had been made available to them before August 15 were now nearing exhaustion. However, leaving aside all other possible sources of raising cash, there was no question at all of Pakistan running out of funds. Therefore, there was no question of pressure being applied in India's delay in making available Pakistan's share of the cash balances. He repeated his opinion that the attitude of the Government of India was not helping towards a settlement of the Kashmir issue, but rather the opposite. It was "putting up the backs" of the Pakistan Government.

To this Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar replied that the assistance which Pakistan was giving to the raiders was "putting up the backs" of the Indian Ministers to a far greater extent.

Pandit Nehru then weighed in with the remarks which I had hoped that he would refrain from making. He said that the normal military action for India would be to hit out at the concentrations of raiders, their bases and supply lines (which were, of course, situated in Pakistan territory). However, the Government of India wished to avoid any action which was likely to lead to war, and was restraining itself. Nevertheless, it was an impossible position that a territory which should be friendly was being used as a base for operations. In his view the situation would now either improve rapidly, or deteriorate rapidly. He advocated that all concerned should now work for rapid improvement; the rest would follow.

I suggested that no publicity of any kind should be given either to the proposed reference to U.N.O. or to the question of the date of implementing the financial agreements. With this Pandit Nehru agreed. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan agreed with the first point, but not with the second. He said that he wished to reserve his position with regard to publicity over the implementation of the financial agreements.

68. To Liaquat Ali Khan¹

New Delhi

22 December 1947

Dear Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan,

On various occasions, I have drawn your attention to the aid which the raiders into Kashmir State are deriving from Pakistan. They have free transit through Pakistan territory. They are operating against Kashmir from bases in Pakistan. Their modern military equipment could only have been obtained from Pakistan sources; mortars, artillery and Mark V-mines are not normally the kind of armament which tribesmen possess. Motor transport, which the raiders have been using, and the petrol required for it, could also be obtained in Pakistan only. Food and other supplies are also secured from Pakistan; indeed, we have reliable reports that the raiders get their rations from military messes in Pakistan. According to our information, large numbers of these raiders are receiving military training in Pakistan, which could only be under officers of the Pakistan Army.

2. The forms of aid, enumerated in the preceding paragraph, which the raiders are receiving, constitute an act of aggression against India because they are being used against a State which has acceded to the Indian Dominion. The Government of India, while protesting against the action of the Pakistan Government in furnishing or allowing such assistance to be furnished and urging that the Pakistan Government should stop such help and at least urge the raiders to withdraw, has so far taken no action itself which might involve entry by Indian forces into Pakistan territory. They have been hoping, all these weeks, though with diminishing hope, that the Pakistan Government themselves would put a stop to aid to the raiders which

1. This letter was personally handed over to Liaquat Ali by Nehru during the Inter-Dominion Conference on 22 December. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, pp. 74-75.

is of the nature of help to India's enemies. Since protests have failed to bear fruit, the Government of India now formally ask the Government of Pakistan to deny to the raiders :

- (1) all access to and use of Pakistan territory for operations against Kashmir;
- (2) all military and other supplies;
- (3) all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

3. The Government of India have always desired and still earnestly desire to live on terms of friendship with Pakistan. They sincerely hope that the request which they have now formally made will be acceded to promptly and without reserve. Failing such response, they will be compelled to take such action, consistently with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, as they may consider necessary to protect their interests, and to discharge their obligations to the Government and people of Kashmir.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

69. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
23 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Saheb,
I sent you a letter² three or four days ago on the subject of our talks with the Pakistan Ministers regarding Kashmir.

Our Cabinet came to the conclusion that the best course for us to adopt in the circumstances was to draw the attention of the United Nations Organisation to the aggression on Indian Dominion territory by people coming from or through Pakistan with the aid and encouragement of the Pakistan Government. The U.N.O. would be asked by us to call upon the Pakistan Government to stop this aggression as in the alternative we will have to take such steps as we might think fit and proper to do so. Prior to our approaching the U.N.O. it was considered desirable to send a formal request to the Pakistan Government asking them to stop giving any aid or encouragement to the invaders.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. I, pp. 126-127.

2. See *ante*, item 66.

This was the line we took up in our conversation with the Prime Minister of Pakistan and I gave him a letter to this effect. A copy of this letter is enclosed.

We shall now wait for a few days, which are not likely to exceed four or five, for Pakistan's reply. We shall then refer the matter to the Security Council of U.N.O. All this procedure need not take very long. The Security Council will probably have an early hearing of our representative and may then call upon Pakistan to reply to the charges made against them. They may thereupon send a commission to India.

Meanwhile, of course, we shall carry on our military operations as we are doing. Indeed, we hope to carry them on more vigorously. Future action will depend on other developments.

This matter has to be kept perfectly secret at this stage.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

70. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
25 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Saheb,

The news of the setback in Jhanjar reached us last evening. We were naturally put out by it. It was not important in a sense, but it did exhibit certain weakness on our side and lack of foresight. However, the only thing to be done in such circumstances is to pull ourselves together again and go ahead with greater vigour.

2. We spent several hours in conferences with some of our colleagues and military advisers. We asked General Thimayya to come over from Amritsar and he was present at our conferences. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was also here and we took advantage of his presence to consult him in regard to many matters.

3. We considered the situation in all its aspects which, as I have previously pointed out to you, means not only the Kashmir aspect but the larger national

1. J. N. Collection.

and international aspects. Kashmir is very much an all-India problem and to some extent an international problem today. The eyes of the world are upon it and the Great Powers are specially interested in its fate. We have constant enquiries from various Ambassadors in regard to it. What happens to Kashmir is of significance not only to India but to the rest of the world.

4. It was because of this that we came to certain conclusions a few days ago and I wrote to you about some of our decisions. Those decisions not only related to U.N.O. but essentially to further offensive action that we might take against the invaders. We are preparing for this both politically and in a military sense, and we were specially trying to raise irregular forces to support our regular army. We hoped to be ready for further action within two or three weeks. Recent developments, however, and specially the capture by the enemy of Jhanjar, have hastened the pace and we had to think afresh.

5. It is clear that no halfway objectives or measures are good enough and we are now mobilising for a total effort. We are taking all necessary steps to this end. Our resources of course are not unlimited and it is not easy to put out this all-out effort quickly. Nevertheless we hope to move quickly enough and within the next few days several important steps are being taken. These will affect the situation. We are preparing not only in Jammu and Kashmir State but also in other fronts.

6. I need not go into these measures now except to assure you that we propose to do our utmost to meet this menace and I have no doubt that we shall defeat it. One step that we are taking is of great importance in our eyes and that is the raising of sufficient irregular forces for guerilla warfare and frontier patrol. These will be raised in cooperation with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. But they will be under the control and general direction of our army commanders. We shall raise these irregular forces in Kashmir and also in East Punjab. Further regular army forces are also being sent. Our strength will grow immediately from tomorrow onwards. We should be in full trim by the middle of January.

7. For you as for us recent happenings have been distressing. But such setbacks only steel us to further resolve and effort. As I have said on many occasions we are going to see this Kashmir business through. Rest assured of that and even in the present, if I may say so, do not worry about the future. We shall pull through right enough.

With all good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

71. The Conclusions of the Joint Defence Council Meeting¹

I have read the paper prepared by the Conference Secretary, Joint Defence Council, in regard to the conclusions of a meeting held at Government House on Monday, the 22nd December, which was attended by the Governor General and Ministers of India and Pakistan.

2. I do not think that this paper gives a correct picture of what was agreed or what took place.

3. There is no question about agreement as detailed under Item or I on Kashmir. The Pakistan Ministers can hardly agree to being charged by us with various offences under international law. What happened was that I mentioned on Sunday, 21st night, that the Government of India proposed to make a reference to the Security Council of the U.N.O. charging Pakistan with aiding and abetting aggression on Indian Dominion territory and asking them to call upon Pakistan to put an end to this.

4. This was a unilateral declaration on our part which required no agreement.

5. The next day I handed a letter to the Prime Minister of Pakistan in which we formally charged them with this aggression and asked them to stop it. This letter would, of course, elicit a reply within a few days and thereupon we would probably take the action contemplated by us, that is, reference to the U.N.O. Here again it is hardly correct to say that this was an agreement. It was just an indication of possible developments. I do not know what the Pakistan Government may say or do about this and our action would naturally depend on their action.

6. As for our preparing a draft of the application by India to the U.N.O., this is entirely a matter for us to consider as to when and how to do it and not a matter of agreement between Pakistan and us. Naturally we are anxious to expedite this and we hope to be ready for any further step as soon as the time comes for it. But every subsequent step is governed by the previous step and when these previous steps are not known, subsequent steps cannot be determined.

7. Action in regard to Item II (Financial Settlement): I cannot stand

1. Note, New Delhi, 23 December 1947. Extracts. File No. 123-KU/56, M.E.A.

as it is when Item I is altered. It is a fact that in discussing Kashmir the question of the date of implementing the recent financial agreement between the two Dominions had not arisen.

8. It is also a fact that I confirmed on behalf of the Government of India that there was no intention to repudiate the financial agreements. We stood by them completely.

9. The way (iii) as stated does not appear to be wholly right. It is my business to report to my Cabinet what I consider proper. This is hardly an agreement between me and the Pakistan Prime Minister. As a matter of fact, I have received a letter from the Pakistan Prime Minister on this subject which is being sent to my colleagues in the Cabinet. This letter contains the Pakistan Prime Minister's views on the subject.

10. Item III: What step the Government of India will take in regard to the disputed land between East and West Bengal, it is for the Government to decide. I do not see how the Secretary General, Pakistan, and the Conference Secretary to the Governor General could come to an agreement about this matter. The *status quo* might be maintained. But the *status quo* has recently been changed by force of arms by the East Bengal Government and we have the strongest objection to this. If there is to be any enquiry, as there should be, the *status quo* prior to this aggression must be restored. This is the business of the Home Ministry and it is not proper for any agreement by outside parties to be made over the heads of the Home Ministry and the Cabinet.

11. Item IV: Licences for Arms. The draft given in appendix A is agreed to in so far as it goes. I would point out, however, that at a recent conference on Secretariat level an agreement was reached about the restoration of licensed arms and ammunition which had been confiscated. It was agreed that the two Dominion Governments should issue instructions to all the Provincial Governments to have the arms and ammunition restored wherever receipts for them were held. In case where no such receipts were held, the Dominion Governments should furnish lists of cases to each other and all such cases should be properly investigated. All this need not be stated in the press communique, but the following sentence might be added :—

“In cases where arms and ammunition have been confiscated contrary to the inter-Dominion agreement, the two Governments would take steps to restore them to the rightful owners.”

12. Item V: The Minister without Portfolio stated that he would enquire into this matter.

I find that the paper drafted by the Conference Secretary has already been sent to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. I regret that this should have been done without any reference to me as this, as I have stated above, does not give a correct picture of what happened. This is likely, therefore, to give a wrong impression and possibly to create misunderstandings.

This note is being sent to the Conference Secretary who has already been informed by telephone that I do not approve of this paper.

72. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Your telegram No. 1229 dated 25th December. I have been greatly surprised to receive this as it bears no relation to anything that has happened in Kashmir or Jammu during the last seven weeks. I have received no joint or other representation from Messrs. Alexander² and Symonds³ on the lines you mention. I have already expressed my regret to you for the attacks on the convoys in Jammu area that took place on the 4th and 6th November. The Indian Army had nothing to do with these. On the contrary they took most vigorous action against attackers killing 150, seriously injuring 200 and arresting 500. Ever since they have fully controlled the situation nothing of the kind you mention has happened. Your telegram therefore has absolutely no relation to facts or to anything that has occurred since the Indian Union troops have been functioning in Jammu. Muslim life is perfectly safe in Jammu. During the past six or seven weeks the invaders coming from Pakistan have perpetrated large scale massacres in various parts of Jammu Province. I have repeatedly drawn your attention to these facts and to the use of Pakistan territory as a base of operations against Indian Dominion territory resulting in massacre and looting and destruction on a large scale.

1. New Delhi, 26 December 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*.
2. Horace Alexander.
3. Richard Symonds (b. 1918); Deputy Director, Relief and Rehabilitation, Government of Bengal, 1944-45; with Friends Service Unit, Punjab and Kashmir, 1947-48; member, Secretariat, United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, 1948-49; U.N. Representative, Sri Lanka, 1953-55, Yugoslavia, 1955-58. Europe, 1959-62; Regional Representative, East Africa, 1961; Consultant, U.N. Population Division, 1968-69; U.N.D.P. Resident Representative in Greece, 1972-75, Tunisia, 1975-78; Senior Adviser, U.N.D.P. and U.N. Fund for Population Activities, 1978-79; author of *The Making of Pakistan* (1950) and other books.

I would draw your attention to the letter I gave to you personally on Monday the 22nd evening and would request a very early reply to it.⁴

4. See *ante*, item 68.

73. To General Roy Bucher¹

New Delhi

26 December 1947

My dear General Bucher,

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad telephoned from Jammu to say that he had approached General Kalwant Singh and asked him for the rifles etc., which you had said he could get from him. General Kalwant Singh told him that he had nothing to spare and therefore could not give anything. Perhaps something might be lying in Pathankot. I do not understand this whole business and where your supplies go to.

It appears from the latest reports that the position round about Naushera as well as other places is grave. I do not worry about this much but it does make me rather sad to think that these happenings will prolong the campaign because in any event we are going through it whatever the cost and whatever the consequences. We shall naturally continue our efforts in the political field, by reference to U.N.O. etc., to bring about some cessation of fighting if it is possible. But I am sure that this will not result in fighting stopping at present. Indeed there is every chance of its spreading more and endangering our security. We have thus to be prepared for every possible contingency and to be prepared soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.I

74. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

26 December 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th December which I received on the 26th afternoon.² I have read it with care and I entirely agree with you that we owe it to you to inform you what our views are about Kashmir. I am sorry to confess that I have not read the minutes of the last Cabinet meeting with any care. I do not know therefore what those minutes say about Kashmir. I entirely agree with you, and I think my colleagues of the Cabinet are of the same opinion, that fighting in Kashmir is most deplorable and the sooner it is ended the better. We realize fully, even though we might not have done so at the earlier stages, the dangers and risks involved in it. Even more so we feel that it is coming in the way of so much that we want to do and that there is a possibility of it doing great injury to us. We would therefore like this fighting to end as soon as possible. You mention in your letter that you missed the note of urgency in our Cabinet meeting of 20th December. I can't speak for the minutes, but I can assure you that all of us have felt this note of urgency and indeed it is difficult for me to apply myself to other work because of this. There is no question of our sending a report to U.N.O. in order to delay matters. We thought of this because U.N.O. might ask us for a report. That is the usual practice in the Security Council and we want to be ready to send a person at short notice if such a demand was made.

Ever since we have thought of making a reference to U.N.O. we have been anxious to expedite matters. We stayed our hands for two or three days because Liaquat Ali Khan was coming here. Since then we have been waiting to get his reply. It has not come yet and I feel that we should wait no longer. We propose therefore to make our reference within two days or so. There is no question of the *char* lands in West Bengal being linked with Kashmir.³ I don't think anyone even mentioned this. That question stands apart. It is true however that all aggression on the part

1. L/P&S/13/1862, I.O.L.R.

2. In this letter Mountbatten had cautioned Nehru about the consequences of sending Indian troops into Pakistan.

3. Mountbatten wrote that he had read in the minutes of the Cabinet meeting a reference to the "linking the issue of certain *char* lands in West Bengal with their reference on Kashmir." The lands in question were Narayanpur, Pakka, Fathepur, Gotha, Rianpur, Baidyanathpur, Tarapur, Manacharpur, Radhanagar, Dewanpur and Sarandaspur. In the Revenue Thana map of 1947 they were shown as parts of the Murshidabad District. They originally formed part of the mainland of the district when the river Padma flowed along the eastern boundary. The river having shifted westwards, these lands got detached from the district and appeared closer to the opposite bank.

of Pakistan is viewed more seriously than otherwise would, because of Kashmir. You will remember that from the very first date that we discussed the Kashmir issue, I have laid stress on the fact that we must drive out the raiders and establish peace and order in Kashmir State.

It was only then that the question of plebiscite arose. At no time did I think of accepting the presence of outside raiders in any part of Kashmir State. The position of inhabitants of Poonch who might have joined the raiders was different. There was no question of driving them out. As we had offered a plebiscite on the restoration of order and as we were committed to popular democratic government in Kashmir, there was no reason whatever for any people in Poonch to carry on revolt against the State. I felt quite sure that this situation could be dealt with easily when the raiders had been pushed out. No one thought, to my knowledge, of crushing the inhabitants of Poonch by brute force.⁴ This question hardly arose at present and there was no point in worrying about it. Much will no doubt happen before we have to face that issue, and what will happen now will no doubt govern subsequent developments. In any event there is no desire to coerce a large section of inhabitants against their will and by force of arms. At the same time, if any people carry on a war against a state, even when it is on a popular basis, then they have to be opposed. While we ardently desire peace and the end of fighting, we must not be unrealistic. Our desire does not lead to peace unless something is done to that end. We have not started the fighting. We have come into the picture to oppose a well-planned invasion and I do not see how we can submit to this kind of aggression. To do so would be to encourage wild elements in Pakistan and to invite continuing trouble not only in Kashmir but elsewhere in India. It would in fact not mean peace but war. I pointed out some time ago at a meeting of the Defence Committee that on no account would we submit to this barbarity whatever the cost. That was not an emotional outburst, but the result of cool thought given to the problem. I am convinced that any surrender on our part to this kind of aggression would lead to continuing aggression elsewhere and, whether we want it or not, war would become inevitable between India and Pakistan.

During these last two months I have studied the Kashmir situation very carefully and I have received numerous reports from the Frontier Province and the Punjab. I am convinced that the whole of this business has been very carefully planned on an extensive scale and that high authority in Pakistan has encouraged this. However that may be, the present situation is that the Frontier Province and a considerable part of the West Punjab have been turned into military training grounds where vast numbers of tribesmen, ex-servicemen and others are being armed and trained and then sent on to invade Kashmir. The resources of Pakistan are being employed to

4. Mountbatten had written that it would be morally unjustifiable "to impose our will on a predominantly Muslim population."

this end. It is quite impossible to conceive that over 100,000 men should be transported by train and motor transport, fed, lodged, trained and kept in camps without the fullest support from the authorities in Pakistan. We have direct evidence that the authorities are continuing this. The only inference to draw from this is that the invasion of Kashmir is not an accidental affair resulting from the fanaticism or exuberance of the tribesmen, but a well-organised business with the backing of the State. We are not dealing merely with tribal irregulars, but with regular armed forces properly led and with good staff work behind them. We have in effect to deal with a state carrying on an informal war, but nevertheless a war. The present objective is Kashmir. The next declared objective is Patiala, East Punjab and Delhi. "On to Delhi" is the cry all over West Punjab. How are we to face this? You will observe that I am not underrating the dangers which I think are considerable. Nevertheless I have no doubt that unless we meet the danger halfway at least, we shall be much worse off. The policy we have pursued thus far has been a cautious defensive policy and all the advantage has been on the other side. The Pakistan ministers have refused to dissociate themselves publicly from the invasion much less to check it in any way. Their newspapers have encouraged this invasion. The Muslim League in West Punjab is openly enrolling recruits. In fact everything is being done to help military operations against Kashmir State. I am not surprised at the Pakistan ministers being reluctant to say anything against this invasion because by their policy and acts they are committed to it. They are not anxious for peace and they want to present us with accomplished facts. Because of this they delay matters. If this is the correct analysis, as I believe it is, then we must not take any step which helps the Pakistan policy and we must not carry on our own operations in a weak defensive way which can produce no effective impression on the enemy. The stakes are not Kashmir only, but something even bigger than that so far as Pakistan is concerned. They have gone so far that it is difficult for them to withdraw even if they want to, and I doubt very much if they want to accept terms which it is possible for us to accept. From a strictly legal and constitutional point of view it is our right and duty to resist this invasion with all our forces. From the point of view of international law we can in self-defence take any military measures to resist it including the sending of our armies across Pakistan territory to attack their bases near the Kashmir border. We have refrained from doing this because of our desire to avoid complications leading to open war.⁵ In our avoidance of this we have increased our own peril

5. Mounibatten had felt concerned over the reported possibility of Indian forces taking possession of the "bases" or "nerve-centres" inside Pakistan from where the raiders launched their operations. He said his "reaction was not inspired by military considerations, but by the fact that it would mean war between India and Pakistan.... The idea that a war between India and Pakistan could be confined to the sub-continent, or finished off quickly in favour of India without further complication, is to my mind a fatal illusion...."

and not brought peace any nearer. Peace will come only if we have the strength to resist invasion and to make it clear that it will not pay. That is the only way Pakistan seems to understand. And if even the Pakistan high authorities understood and appreciated some other way, it is clear that the great majority of the invaders are incapable of understanding anything but the way of force. In the course of a Defence Committee meeting I have made it clear that we attach the utmost importance to Kashmir and on no account are we going to submit to armed invasion whatever the consequences. To submit to it means not only the loss of some territory but disruption of the whole of India and chaos. I have said that if necessary we shall employ all the resources of India to combat this horrible method of coercing a people. Even if the whole of Kashmir State was occupied by the enemy we would fight on and would not surrender. It is only the declared will of the people of the State ascertained under peaceful conditions of law and order that we will accept. On no account will we accept any decision enforced upon us. Two months ago we offered a plebiscite. That has not yet been accepted formally by Pakistan and war is being carried on. That does not indicate either a desire for peace or for a plebiscite on the part of Pakistan. I think this invasion of Kashmir is thoroughly immoral and bad, and, with this conviction, am totally unable to surrender to it for that will involve a complete degradation of India which I could not possibly tolerate.

Your suggestion that the question should be referred to U.N.O. and that they should be asked to send a commission involved a great many difficulties.⁶ First of all, according to Pakistan, they are no parties to this fighting. The actual invaders therefore were people with no formal standing as a state. We cannot ask U.N.O. to arbitrate between raiders and the Dominion of India. We cannot bring Pakistan into the picture when they deny complicity. It must be remembered that all the fighting has taken place on Kashmir State territory, i.e. Indian Dominion territory. We have not thus far touched Pakistan territory. We are the aggrieved party. Are we to seek the cooperation of the invaders and those who have done us this grievous wrong and appear jointly before the U.N.O. ? I do not think that would have been a proper procedure for us to adopt. Nevertheless your suggestion that the matter be left to U.N.O. was accepted by us in the only way it seemed feasible, and in acceptance with facts. This was for us to draw the attention of U.N.O. to this invasion, and to the fact that Pakistan was aiding and abetting it, and ask them to call upon Pakistan to refrain from doing so. This would inevitably be a unilateral reference. To say that it was an agreed reference would make it a collusive one without any force. Of course when U.N.O. is seized with the matter, other developments may take place. If Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan wants an excuse to put before his people,

6. Mountbatten wrote that "surely the main object should rather be to bring U.N.O. here...to get a team nominated to come out and deal with the business and help to stop the fighting...."

then he would have that excuse when we make a reference to U.N.O. We shall proceed with this U.N.O. matter. But, meanwhile, the situation is becoming a dangerous one. Vast numbers of the enemy are entering Kashmir at many points. This in itself shows that instead of checking this invasion Pakistan is pushing it forward with all its might. There are large concentrations near the West Punjab border also, where the cry is "March to Delhi". There is imminent danger of an invasion of India proper. Can we afford to sit and look on? We would not be discharging our duty to our country if we did so. We would deserve to be sacked immediately. We must therefore prepare for every eventuality, whatever that might be, and mobilise all our resources to that end. We have taken enough risks already; we dare not take any more. We can't even permit much longer the continuation of the use of bases in Pakistan to attack our troops and our territory in Kashmir. There is no question of small operations going on in Kashmir through the winter months, but of quick developments. If some development takes place which *endangers our position*, then we must take immediate action to defend ourselves, even though it might involve marching across Pakistan territory to their bases. We don't wish to do so unless we are compelled by circumstances. You repeat in your letter that the only thing to be done is to stop the fighting. Yes, certainly, but how? We neither started it, nor can we stop it. Of course we can in a sense surrender. That I am sure you would never advise us to do, and indeed if we thought of it, others will fight on and there will still be no peace even with surrender. Nobody on our side wants war. The very idea is hateful. What is a state to do if it is attacked and invaded and its very existence endangered? The fact that this is done in an underhand way makes matters worse and even more immoral. That cannot be an excuse. My conclusion is that we should immediately proceed along two parallel lines of action.

- (1) Reference to U.N.O. in the manner indicated above. As soon as we do this Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan will of course be informed.
- (2) Complete military preparations to meet any possible contingency that might arise. If grave danger threatens us in Kashmir or elsewhere on the West Punjab frontier, then we must not hesitate to march through Pakistan territory towards the bases. I have written to you at length. I hope I have explained what I have in mind. I think I represent the views of my colleagues also in what I have said above.⁷

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. Replying on 27 December, Mountbatten voiced his fears at the possibility of war breaking out between the two countries "before the U.N.O. can be brought in." He advised Nehru to write to Attlee since the "H.M.G. have a right to know if war is becoming imminent."

75. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi

28 December 1947

Dear Maharaja Saheb,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th December which has reached me this evening.

We have been continually giving earnest thought to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir State in both its military and political aspects. We have held consultations with our military advisers and have considered the matter in Cabinet. I have already informed you of some of the decisions taken regarding the military situations. We have decided now to prepare for every possible eventuality and this means an all-out effort on our part with far-reaching consequences.

While we are making all-round military preparations, we are also making a reference to the Security Council of the United Nations drawing their attention to the aggression committed by the Pakistan Government on Jammu and Kashmir State, i.e., Indian Union territory, and asking them to call upon Pakistan to cease aiding and encouraging the invaders forthwith.

We are making it clear in our reference that this is without prejudice to any action that we might have to take owing to the developing military situation. This action obviously means our sending Indian Union forces across Pakistan territory.

We have today sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of United Kingdom informing him of the situation and of our proposed action.² We have also sent him through the High Commissioner of U.K. in New Delhi a copy of our reference to the U.N.O. We have thought it fit to give the Prime Minister of the U. K. some little time to reply to us before we actually make the reference to the U.N.O. We propose to send the telegram to U.N.O. on the 30th. At the same time we shall send a copy of it by telegraph to the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

This, as you will realise, is a step of great significance with far-reaching consequences. It brings Kashmir State immediately on to the international stage. It is possible that swift developments might follow. The Security Council of the U.N.O. is in permanent session and they may hear this matter within a few days. If necessary we shall immediately send a representative to place our case before them. We are thinking of sending Shri Motilal Setalvad, the well-known lawyer of Bombay, to present our case before the Security Council if necessity arises. It is possible that the Security Council might send out a commission to India.

1. J. N. Collection.

2. See next item.

Meanwhile, of course, we shall carry on our military operations with full vigour. We would prefer not to enter Pakistan territory with our forces till we hear from the Security Council and also for other reasons. But we have retained our freedom to take this step at any moment that we think it is absolutely necessary. As soon as our reference goes to the U.N.O. this will become public property, that is to say the U.N.O. will give publicity to it as they do not usually carry on secret correspondence. The matter will immediately become an international issue. We have therefore to fashion our own steps accordingly. Pakistan will no doubt bring all manner of countercharges against us and the Jammu and Kashmir State Government. Our hands must be as clean as possible, or else our case will suffer. Where we have committed any errors we shall have to admit them and to show that we have taken subsequent steps to retrieve the error or to bring to account those who may have been responsible for it. This will show our *bona fides*.

I should have liked to send you copies of our telegram to the Prime Minister, U.K., and the reference to U.N.O. Unfortunately I have not got those copies at present and it is late at night. I shall however send them to you tomorrow by air mail.

Apart from the military aspect and this reference to the U.N.O. the political aspect has to be taken in hand as soon as possible. I understand that Shri Gopaldaswami has already written to you about this matter. I earnestly hope that you will take early steps as suggested by him. He has expressed his willingness to go to Jammu to confer with you if you consider this necessary. A draft proclamation will have to be issued. It would be desirable if he was asked to draft it for your consideration.

Sheikh Abdullah has come back to Delhi from his visit to Indore and I have informed him of these recent developments and about our reference to U.N.O. He has met Sardar Patel also. He is going back to Jammu now and I am sending this letter with him.

The Governor General is at present in Gwalior. I am sending him a copy of our reference to U.N.O. and our telegram to the Prime Minister, U.K.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

76. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

In the message that I sent you through our High Commissioner in London on the 12th December² I had expressed the hope that my conversations with the Prime Minister of Pakistan during his visit to New Delhi on 22nd and 23rd of this month might lead to solution of Kashmir problem. Unfortunately, though our talks were friendly, they yielded no result. To bring home to him the gravity of the situation, I handed to him personally a letter briefly specifying the forms of aid which the invaders of Kashmir were deriving from Pakistan and our request that such aid should be stopped promptly and without reserve.³ The text of my letter was shown to your High Commissioner in New Delhi on the 24th and he has, probably, already informed you of its substance. So far, in spite of a reminder which was issued on the 26th instant, Pakistan has sent no reply.⁴

2. Meanwhile, the pressure of the invaders, practically all along the frontier of Jammu Province and Kashmir, has greatly intensified. Our troops have been under heavy attack all along this line. At Jhanjar, one of the outposts which they held, they were attacked by 6,000 men armed with automatic weapons including medium machine-guns and mortars. At this point our troops were outnumbered by 30 to one. Naushera has been the scene of very severe fighting during the last two or three days. Nearly 19,000 invaders have massed in the Uri area, at the entrance to the Kashmir valley. Our intelligence reports indicate that approximately 100,000 tribesmen and Pakistan nationals are located in different districts of the West Punjab and many of them are receiving military training preparatory to joining in the battle against us.

3. These developments have created a military situation which is full of peril not only to Jammu and Kashmir State, but to us. Unless Pakistan takes immediate steps to stop all forms of aid to the attackers, who are operating from bases in Pakistan and therefore strategically enjoy a great advantage over us, our only hope of dealing with them effectively would lie in striking at them at their bases. This would involve our entering Pakistan territory. Such a step would be justified in international law as we are entitled to take it in self-defence. What is happening now is definitely an act of aggression

1. New Delhi, 28 December 1947. L/P&S/13/1936, I.O.L.R.

2. See *ante*, item 61.

3. See *ante*, item. 68.

4. The letter had called for an early reply.

against us by Pakistan. However as we are most anxious to act in conformity with the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations we are asking the Security Council to repeat to the Pakistan Government the request which I made in my letter of 22nd December,⁵ namely that Pakistan should take immediate and effective action to deny to the raiders :

- (I) Access to and use of its territory for operations against Jammu and Kashmir State;
- (II) Military and other supplies;
- (III) All other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the present struggle.

This request is without prejudice to the freedom of the Government of India to take, at any time, such military action as they may consider necessary in exercise of their right of self-defence.

4. I sincerely hope that the Government of Pakistan will respond favourably to this request. It has always been, and still is, our earnest desire to live on terms of peace and friendship with our neighbouring Dominion. But this relationship cannot be achieved by one-sided effort on our part. Pakistan must reciprocate.

5. The full text of our reference to the Security Council, which will be telegraphed to Trygve Lie⁶ on the 30th December, is being communicated to your High Commissioner.

5. The source has "23 December" which evidently is incorrect.

6. (1896—1968); legal adviser to Norwegian Labour Party, 1922-40; Minister of Justice, 1935-39; of Shipping and Supply, 1939-41; of Foreign Affairs, 1941-46; Secretary-General, U.N., 1946-53; author of *In the Cause of Peace*.

77. Lord Ismay's Note on Meeting between Nehru and Liaquat Ali Khan¹

The Prime Ministers talked alone for well over an hour and then invited me to join them. The following is a summary of the points which they raised in my presence on the subject of the Draft Kashmir Agreement which had been prepared by officials as a basis of discussion :—

- (i) With regard to the question of small contingents of Indian troops being left at certain points in Kashmir (see paragraph 2(a) of the Draft), Pandit Nehru said that he understood that Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was prepared to agree in principle to the retention of a small number of Indian troops in Kashmir after the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces, but that he desired information in regard to the number and the class composition of these detachments and the points at which it was proposed to station them. Pandit Nehru had undertaken to consult his military advisers.
- (ii) In the above connection Pandit Nehru thought that "certain points on the frontier" was not exactly what was intended. It would be better to say "at certain selected points."
- (iii) Lord Ismay said that if there had been any hope of the Draft Agreement being announced today, he would have suggested that the concluding passage of paragraph 2(a) of the Draft should read as follows : After "Kashmir territory" insert full stop and then the following sentence:—

"Both Governments recognize however that, following on the upheaval in Kashmir, the resources of Kashmir State are not at present adequate to maintain law and order. They further recognize that the maintenance of law and order in Kashmir during the period which will elapse between the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces and the holding of the plebiscite is essential if the plebiscite is to be free and unfettered. Accordingly, both Governments have agreed that small detachments of Indian troops of minimum strength to deal with disturbances in Kashmir, whether from outside or inside the State, will be stationed at certain selected points. The strength and composition of these detachments and the points at which they are to be stationed will be the subject of discussion between the two Governments."

Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan asked that the above formula might be placed on record in case it should prove useful.

1. New Delhi, 28 December 1947. Extracts. File No. 123-KU/56, M.E.A.

- (iv) Lord Ismay also suggested that the following sentence might be inserted in line 9 of paragraph 2(a) after the words "as quickly as possible" : "The Government of Pakistan have also undertaken to do their utmost to prevent any future incursions of tribesmen into Kashmir."
- (v) Pandit Nehru said that he had agreed with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan that Paragraph 2(b) should commence as follows :—
"On the cessation of hostilities an approach shall be made etc. etc."
- (vi) With regard to Paragraph c(i), both Prime Ministers had agreed that the word "free" should be substituted for the word "welcome".
- (vii) Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had suggested that the population of Kashmir should have proportionate representation in the army, police and levies of Kashmir State. Pandit Nehru had doubted whether this was practicable but said that he would think it over and perhaps mention it to the Maharaja.
- (viii) Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan had said that he had stipulated that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, for him to call off the tribes unless he could promise them :—
 - (a) the withdrawal of all Indian troops,
 - (b) a fair and unfettered plebiscite, and
 - (c) an impartial administration during the period which would elapse between (a) and (b).
 Now it was proposed that there should be a qualified withdrawal of troops and that there should be a distinctly impartial administration during the interim period. Unless some more satisfactory arrangement could be made in regard to these points he did not see how he could induce the tribesmen to withdraw.
- (ix) The two Prime Ministers have agreed that the legal position of Hanza, Nagar and Chitral should be examined. Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan explained that Hanza and Nagar had applied to accede to Pakistan, but their accession had not been accepted pending a clarification of the legal position. Meanwhile, he had heard that a telegram had been received from Hanza to the effect that if they were not allowed to accede to Pakistan they would accede to Russia.
- (x) Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan gave a description of the position in Gilgit. The Dogra troops had been disarmed and had left the country : a provisional Government had been set up : and the Gilgit Scouts were in charge and functioning. He suggested that the forcible occupation of Gilgit would be a task beyond the powers of the Indian armed forces.

78. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
28 December 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th December.

2. In view of the great importance of the step we are contemplating regarding a reference to the United Nations, we had a special meeting of the Cabinet today to consider it. At this meeting it was decided to send a telegram to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the draft reference was also approved. The telegram to Mr. Attlee has been sent already and a copy of the draft reference has been given to the High Commissioner for the United Kingdom. I am enclosing copies of both these papers.

3. We propose to send by telegram the reference to the Secretary-General of the United Nations day after tomorrow, that is the 30th December. We shall at the same time send a copy of it by telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

4. We have delayed making the reference so that Mr. Attlee may have time to communicate with us in case he thinks this is necessary. The draft reference is a full statement of our case before the United Nations and this will give all the facts to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. At the last moment, before referring the issue to the U.N., Mountbatten requested Attlee to fly to India to try to resolve the crisis by personal mediation. Attlee, however, thought that the U.N. was the proper forum for discussing the Kashmir issue.

79. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi

29 December 1947

My dear Baldev Singh,

We are taking steps about our reference of the Kashmir matter to the Security Council of U.N.O. We propose to make the formal reference tomorrow. I am asking for a meeting of the Cabinet tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m. in the External Affairs Committee Room to consider this matter and the possible consequences that might flow from it. These consequences are likely to be far-reaching.

We shall have to send someone to New York fairly soon to present our reference about Kashmir before the Security Council of the U.N.O. We have asked Setalvad to be ready for this. The date will be fixed by the U.N.O. itself and it may well be in about ten days from now or less. I think it would be desirable for someone to accompany Setalvad who could be acquainted with the military aspect and more especially Pakistan's participation in this invasion. It has struck me that Col. B. Kaul, who will, I presume, be going back to the U.S.A. soon, might be entrusted with this task. He could study the papers here and be coached by Thapar² and others for the purpose. As he is normally likely to go to the U.S.A. we would utilise his services for this purpose also. Otherwise we may have to send a special person.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. General P.N. Thapar (1906-1975); commissioned from Sandhurst, 1926; Director of Military Operations and Intelligence, Army Headquarters, August-December 1947; Military Secretary, 1948-49; Master General of Ordnance, 1949-50; G.O.C., Southern Command, 1957-59; Western Command, 1959-61; Chief of Army Staff, 1961-62; Ambassador to Afghanistan, 1964-67.

80. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

29 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am sending you separately a copy of a telegram sent yesterday to the Prime Minister, U.K., in regard to Kashmir.² We held a meeting of the Cabinet yesterday afternoon when we considered this telegram and the draft reference to U.N.O. I am sending you also a copy of this reference.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See *ante*, item 76.

Thus far we have only sent this reference to the U.K. High Commissioner for transmission to Attlee. We are taking no further steps for the present and we shall wait till tomorrow in case Attlee sends any kind of a message to us. I have also sent these papers to Lord Mountbatten in Gwalior by air early this morning.

The action we are taking is of vital significance and likely to lead to all manner of consequences and I should like the Cabinet to consider all these possible consequences as early as possible. I suggest that we might meet tomorrow at 3 p.m. in Cabinet here in External Affairs Committee Room.

Among the consequences to be considered are the possible effect on the British officers in the army. Also the reactions of the Governor General. He is coming back tomorrow and probably I shall have to see him tomorrow evening.

Setalvad came here for a day and helped us in preparing our memorandum for the U.N.O. He is prepared to go to New York, but was anxious to be in Bombay for some important case of his on January 10th. I imagine that this reference might well come up before U.N.O. before the 10th January.

I was thinking of going to Lucknow on the 31st and to Patna on the 2nd January for the Science Congress. But in view of developments I think I had better remain here and cancel these visits. Bapu, however, has been pressing me to go to Ajmer for a few hours at least. He has apparently been receiving messages from Ajmer about a continuing exodus of the Muslim population and he feels that either you or I should go there. I was intending, therefore, to visit Ajmer for a few hours on January 3rd on my way back from Patna. For the present I am keeping that date for Ajmer even though I do not now intend going to Patna.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

81. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
30 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Gopalaswami Ayyangar showed me the Maharaja of Kashmir's reply to him.² I was surprised to read this as the Maharaja had practically told us that

1. J.N. Collection.

2. In his letter of 28 December, the Maharaja of Kashmir insisted that Mahajan should be allowed to preside formally over the cabinet meetings and contended that both Nehru and Patel had earlier agreed to this. He added that he was not prepared to compromise with Sheikh Abdullah on this issue as he felt he had compromised enough.

he would agree to Mahajan going away. Mahajan himself had told us that he would no longer stay there. Apart from this I have received very disturbing news from Bakshi through the telephone about the way the arms that we have sent for them have been kept back and distributed to R.S.S. people. While Jammu was in imminent danger, a large part of the consignment of arms was just held back and Bakshi's Home Guards were fighting often without rifles and always with too little ammunition and dying in the process.³

It seems from a number of reports that have reached me that the R.S.S. is being supported and armed at the cost of Bakshi's Home Guards and that propaganda is being openly carried on by posters and otherwise against Sheikh Abdullah. In some distant parts of the State where there are no invaders, the R.S.S. is creating trouble by sending their emissaries. I am inclined to think that Mahajan sympathises with these activities and perhaps helps them.

The situation is a serious one and obviously cannot continue as it is. It will lead to internal conflict which will be disastrous from every point of view. The Maharaja, unfortunately, is terribly shortsighted and has a way of doing the wrong thing. He has suffered sufficiently in the past by his own errors and yet he has not benefited by that lesson. I fear he will get into great trouble if he does not appreciate the present situation and act accordingly. I am sending a letter⁴ to the Maharaja, a copy of which I enclose.⁵

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

3. Replying on the same day Patel wrote that though Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad had been with him practically the whole day on 29 December when he visited Kashmir, the latter had not mentioned that he had any difficulty about getting arms from the state authorities or that they were held back by them. Nor did Bakshi or anybody else inform him about the R.S.S. activities there. "Whatever may have been done by the R.S.S. in the beginning, there seemed to be no evidence of their activities now."

4. See *post*, item 83.

5. Agreeing that the situation was serious, Patel wrote that both he and V.P. Menon had tried to argue with the Maharaja but he had a catalogue of grievances against Sheikh Abdullah.

82. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
30 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have just received your letter of today's date about Kashmir.² I have also received a note from Gopalaswami Ayyangar enclosing a copy of a telegram from the Maharaja of Kashmir, in which he says that he cannot agree to Gopalaswami's suggestion. There is thus a complete deadlock and I just do not see what we are to do about it.³

I quite agree with you that the matter has to be dealt with tactfully with the Maharaja as with others. I have used up all the tact at my disposal in this matter without achieving substantial results. Considering everything, I think that Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi have taken a very sensible view of the situation and they have tried to appreciate the position of the Maharaja. But it must be remembered that they cannot function without popular backing, both Muslim and Hindu. They have tried hard to gain this popular backing of the Hindus and succeeded wholly in Kashmir and partly in Jammu. There is evidence of this by the fact that the leaders of the Hindu Yuvak Sabha movement which in the past were opposed to Sheikh Sahib are supporting him completely. That is to say that the local Hindus are with him to a large extent. But the R.S.S. and the Hindus from the Punjab are of a different type, and between them and Sheikh Abdullah there is a big gulf. I do not see how that gulf can possibly be bridged, especially as the R.S.S. is accused with reason of having organised killing of the Muslims in Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah has to keep the goodwill of the Muslims to some extent at least even in Jammu. He has succeeded in a measure and the latest evidence of this is that the local Muslim Conference is coming into conflict with the Azad Kashmir movement. Today's *Civil and Military Gazette* contains a full report of this.

All these developments are taking place because of a belief that there has been a change in the administration and Sheikh Abdullah is really in charge. Mahajan's presence is a constant irritant to these various elements as well as to Sheikh Abdullah's party. I have no doubt that even if we patch up something for the moment and Mahajan remained, there will be constant trouble and friction. That will be no solution to any problem. I repeat

1. J. N. Collection.

2. Patel wrote that the Maharaja of Kashmir was adamant about retaining Mahajan as his Dewan despite Patel's suggestion that he be replaced.

3. Ayyangar wrote to Patel on 30 December that he had failed in persuading the Maharaja of Kashmir who had created for himself the "inconvenient and gratuitous riddle...that he expects us to solve for his benefit."

therefore that I see no way out of this impasse except something drastic happening. I propose to do nothing for the present till you return from Assam. But events are moving fast and I do not know what might happen.

The trouble about the distribution of arms is a fairly old one and has been discussed with the military authorities here several times. Bucher is very annoyed that the arms specially sent for Bakshi were not given to him.⁴ He has asked Kalwant Singh for an explanation.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

P.S. I have just had a telephone message from Jammu (Bakshi) to the effect that a big attack has been made by the raiders on Suchetgarh and effect some distance away. Reinforcements were sent by our army and fighting is proceeding.

4. The Maharaja further wrote to Patel that "according to rumours I hear the supply of modern arms to the Home Guards is dangerous...obviously a great effort to create a rival army in the State is being made. I am not of course in confidence about these matters...."

83. To the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

New Delhi
30 December 1947

My dear Maharaja Saheb,

My letters to you are being delayed because of the irregularity of the air services owing to weather conditions.

Shri Gopalaswami Ayyangar showed me your letter to him which you had sent him in answer to his containing various suggestions. I do not wish to say anything about these suggestions and your reactions to them except in regard to one matter.

You have said that your decision about Mahajan is final. I am sorry to learn this because I think that this is not a right decision and it cannot lead us anywhere. As you know, all of us here have been and are clearly of the opinion that in the present set-up Mr. Mahajan's place is not in Kashmir State. This has nothing to do with his ability or competence which we all recognise.

You refer to the Mysore model and you quite rightly say that we had agreed to this. Of course we had done so at the end of October. But many

1. J. N. Collection.

things have happened since then which have completely changed the situation and we cannot ignore vital happenings.

In regard to the Mysore model also I might point out that while Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar continued as dewan and president of the Cabinet, in fact this was a temporary device which had no significance. The whole constitution is being changed rapidly and very soon there will be full responsible government there without any dewan or other representative of the Maharaja of Mysore. Apart from this you may be interested to learn that Sir Ramaswamy Mudaliar is intending to go on a lecture tour to Canada and the U.S.A. This in itself shows that he has no particular place in the Cabinet and not only can be spared but that he feels it better for him to be away.

Obviously the argument about Mr. Mahajan staying as dewan or president of the Cabinet does not relate to something *pro forma* but to something much more. If it is *pro forma* then there need be no insistence on his remaining. If it is something else then the Mysore model is not followed.

The situation in Jammu and Kashmir State is exceedingly critical from every 'point of view'. Unfortunately all of us had to pay for errors committed in the past. It is immaterial now to apportion blame for them. But the fact remains that a large part of our difficulties is due to previous wrong policies and mistakes. We cannot escape the effect and consequence of past acts. But we can learn from them and try to avoid mistakes in the present. More specially when the present is critical any mistake may have far more serious consequences than in any more or less static period. There are certain fundamentals in the present situation which cannot be ignored. Practically speaking there are only two kinds of functioning machinery in the State today, the military, i.e., the Indian Union troops chiefly, and Sheikh Abdullah's organisation and his position in Government. The latter has resulted from his position in the State and in his organisation and not from any personal reason. He represents a force and a force which is indispensable to the preservation of Kashmir State. There is no other power or force which can function in the present circumstances. Anything that is done to weaken these two forces is to injure not only the defence of Kashmir State but the future. That future ultimately will be decided according to the will of the people, whether there is a plebiscite or not.

Mr. Mahajan does not fit in with any of these dynamic forces in Kashmir today and unfortunately comes in their way. The occurrences in Jammu and roundabout towards the end of October and early in November are associated in the public mind, whether rightly or wrongly, with Mr. Mahajan's administration and they have had a disastrous result.

I am therefore quite clear in my mind that it is not possible for any set up to be framed in Kashmir with which Mr. Mahajan is associated.

The question obviously is not a personal one but one of larger policy. It is to be decided clearly on whom we rely and on whom we do not rely. No campaign can be conducted in a half-hearted way with divided allegiance.

If Sheikh Abdullah is to be made responsible he is to be relied upon completely and supported fully. He can of course be advised, but it would be exceedingly wrong to weaken his authority and effectiveness. It would be still more wrong to support in any way any group or individual who opposes that authority. Sheikh Abdullah should have the closest touch with you so that he should know your mind and you should know his. If anyone comes in between you and him the whole structure cracks up and conflicts persist.

From the military point of view it is of exceeding importance that Home Guards and irregular forces should be built up. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has done a good job of work in building up the Home Guard, but he has been hampered by non-supply of rifles, bren-guns, sten-guns, etc., and yet our army authorities have sent a very large number of arms including mortars, bren-guns, sten-guns. Most of these have not even reached Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad for whom they were intended and we are inquiring into this matter. We are told that apart from some which have been distributed to the State Forces, which was right, others have been distributed to R.S.S. groups. Further that quite a number of them are still lying unused even though the whole military situation cries aloud for arming the Home Guard. This news has amazed me and it shows how conflicting forces are at play which weaken the defence of the State and create ill feeling.

The R.S.S. in various parts of the country is at present engaged in active opposition to our Government and has created any amount of trouble for us. We do not propose to tolerate this and we have taken action against them and may take stronger action in future. In the situation as it exists in Jammu and Kashmir State typical R.S.S. activities are even more dangerous because they nullify to some extent the defence arrangements we have set up. I am told that the R.S.S. have issued posters against Sheikh Abdullah's administration and accused him for the fall of Mirpur etc. Further that recently some *masjids* were desecrated in Jammu town and that round-about Jammu attacks were made on Muslims and some of their women abducted. A greater folly I cannot imagine. But this is typical of the R.S.S. mentality which is incapable of understanding what is good for the country.

I understand that rifles and other arms have been kept back and not supplied for use in Kashmir proper, although there is great need for them there.

Recently a relief committee was appointed in Jammu at Sheikh Abdullah's instance and Her Highness the Maharani was made the president. Now I am told that a separate relief committee has been established with the R.S.S. president in charge.

I am also told that in the Kishtwa and other areas arms are being supplied to the R.S.S. In these areas there are no raiders from outside and those arms can only be used against the local population, thus adding to communal troubles.

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad has communicated much of this information to me by telephone. I do not know how far it is accurate, but I am greatly disturbed by it for it appears that a deliberate policy is being followed by some people to sabotage the work being done by Sheikh Abdullah's administration. If this is so then a clear decision must be made as to who is to be responsible. Obviously Sheikh Abdullah cannot function effectively if this sabotage goes on and either he retires from the picture or he is given full charge and those who come in his way are removed or suppressed. There is no halfway house. The removal of Sheikh Abdullah will necessarily have disastrous consequences and it will be difficult for us then to answer the case put up by Pakistan. We shall of course continue our military operations because we are committed to them and our honour is bound up with them. But all military operations have a certain amount of objective in view and have to be justified because of that objective. If that objective fades away that has an effect on the military operations also.

I have informed you about our reference to U.N.O. If U.N.O. send a commission here they will no doubt see for themselves what the position is, military and other. It would be highly injurious to us if the political situation is to our disadvantage.

I am writing to you in deep distress because the future of Kashmir State is very near to my heart and it pains me greatly to see that future being imperilled, specially when we are pouring in our men and treasure for the defence of Jammu and Kashmir State. It is for you to consider the final policy which must be clearly adopted by you, and it will be for us to consider what we should do in the circumstances. It has been our policy and desire that Kashmir State should continue undivided with the people's responsible government under your aegis. That indeed is the only way to protect your interests as a constitutional ruler. But much depends on how far you agree with this policy and how far you can give effect to it. We have come to the conclusion that Mr. Mahajan does not fit in with this policy and his presence will create continuing conflicts and will therefore prevent both effective defence and a building up of a political front which is so essential.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

84. Telegram to the Maharaja of Kashmir¹

Gopalaswami Ayyangar has shown me your letter to him.² I regret I am entirely unable to agree with your present decision. In existing circumstances that can only lead to conflict and possible disaster, I am writing fully to you.

We have been sending large quantities of arms of various kinds for distribution to Bakshi's Home Guards. We find these have not been given to him and have either been stored away or have been distributed to rival groups. This is wholly opposed to our policy.

We learn also that recently mosques in Jammu have been desecrated and Muslims attacked near Jammu and their women abducted. Any persons doing this are enemies of the State in the present critical situation and must be suppressed. Would beg of you to appreciate critical nature of situation and not permit dangerous activities which undermine defence as well as future of State.

1. New Delhi, 30 December 1947. File No. 34/18/48-Poll.(1), M.H.A.
2. See *ante*, item 82, fn 3.

85. Cable to C.R. Attlee¹

Many thanks for your prompt reply to my message of 28th December about Kashmir.²

2. I am glad that you concur in our view that a reference to the Security Council should be made, and we are instructing our permanent representative with the United Nations to do so immediately. I also greatly appreciate your offer of assistance through your representative on the Council in achieving early consideration of our reference.

1. New Delhi, 30 December 1947. L/P&S/13/1868, I.O.L.R.
2. Attlee thanked Nehru for keeping him fully informed of the happenings in Kashmir. He agreed that settlement could be achieved "only under the authority of the United Nations."

3. As regards paras 3 and 4 of your message,³ I wish to assure you once more that no one desires a peaceful solution of the present situation more earnestly than the Government of India. My colleagues and I have in the struggle for our own freedom, now happily achieved, convincingly demonstrated our faith in peaceful methods as a means of resolving political differences. The last thing that we desire is war with all its horrors, especially war with a neighbour. But the forms of assistance which the invaders of Jammu and Kashmir State have been drawing from Pakistan constitute in our view an act of aggression against us, and we think that we can adduce facts which will satisfy world opinion, as well as any impartial international body, of the correctness of our view. We have no intention of taking any action which we cannot justify as measure dictated by the paramount duty of self-defence.

3. Attlee urged that whatever the provocation, India should "do nothing which might lead to war." He disagreed that India would be within her rights in international law if she sent troops into Pakistan in self-defence. He felt that besides being wrong juridicially, this would "gravely prejudice" India's case before the U.N.O. specially after she had appealed to the Security Council.

86. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

You will remember that, on 22nd December, I handed personally to you a letter regarding Kashmir.² In my telegram to you (dated 26th December),³ I reminded you of the letter and repeated request for an early reply.

I regret to say that I have heard nothing from you so far, and, as we cannot afford to wait any longer, we are making a reference to the Security Council in terms of my immediately following telegram.

1. New Delhi, 31 December 1947. *White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir*, p. 75.
2. See *ante*, item 68.
3. See *ante*, item 72.

87. Lord Mountbatten's Record of Interview with Nehru¹

Pandit Nehru asked me what I thought of the appeal to U.N.O.² I congratulated him on this, and said I thought it was a masterly draft, but I regretted that it included the statement that India reserved the right to take direct action in Pakistan territory if this proved necessary. I pointed out that psychologically this could not help offending the members of the Security Council for they would be bound to feel that it was a form of threat : "If you don't jolly well hurry up, we will take the law into our own hands."

Pandit Nehru assured me that this was far from the impression they wished to convey, and that he was confident that U.N.O. would act quickly without this.

The Prime Minister told me how very upset he had been that in spite of immense precautions of secrecy to ensure that no news of the appeal to U.N.O. leaked to the press before U.N.O. itself released the information from New York, this had in fact appeared in full in all the papers that morning.

I told him that I thought that this was most unfortunate and I had been surprised to read it in the papers. He assured me that everyone in the Cabinet had realised the great need for secrecy, and that nobody outside the Cabinet Ministers, the Cabinet Secretariat and a few trusted officials had known about it except for the acting High Commissioner for the U.K. and his Secretary whom he did not suspect....

1. New Delhi, 31 December 1947. Extracts. Lord Mountbatten Papers, Broadlands Archives Trust, Broadlands, Romsey, Hampshire.
2. The Government of India urged the Security Council, on 3 January 1948, to call upon Pakistan to stop assistance to the raiders immediately. Otherwise India might be compelled in self-defence, to enter the Pakistan territory and take "such military action as they may consider the situation requires".

1. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
23 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

The Junagadh situation is developing rapidly and may lead to all manner of consequences. Essentially, this is a question of the relationship of India and Pakistan and we are already considering the possibility of military action.² It is desirable, and indeed necessary, that the External Affairs Ministry should be kept in intimate touch with all developments. Normally, telegrams relating to this, business should also go through the Ministry of External Affairs. You have been good enough to keep me fully informed. I think, however, that our Ministry as such should also be kept fully informed. This means that our Secretary-General, Girija Shankar Bajpai, should be kept in touch. I should like him to attend any consultations or conferences on this subject. V.P. Menon may also consult him whenever he likes about any developments.

I have been thinking that it would be desirable for us to send a message to the British Government about the Junagadh affair.³ This would be purely for their information. If you agree, could you kindly ask V.P. Menon to draft such a message and send it on to us ?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 7, pp. 384-385.
2. Junagadh's accession to Pakistan, announced on 15 August, was condemned by the Government of India on 25 September as violating the territorial integrity of Kathiawar and creating "a constant source of friction" between India and Pakistan. Reports of harassment of Hindus and the invasion of Babariawad and Mangrol by Junagadh led to the despatch of the Indian army into the State on 11 November 1947.
3. Patel replied on 24 September that he was "not quite sure whether anything needed to be said to the British Government at this stage."

2. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
28 September 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 28th enclosing a draft of a letter to be addressed to Gandhiji.

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. I have nothing to say about your draft. I am not quite sure, however, that you have got Gandhiji's meaning correctly. I have an idea that he meant something somewhat different from what you have suggested.

3. What Gandhiji said in one of his prayer meetings about war appears to have been misunderstood. I imagine he was giving a warning.²

4. We had a long meeting of the Cabinet tonight lasting over 3-1/2 hours in which we discussed the Junagadh affairs. There is considerable feeling over this matter. But what rather upset the Cabinet was a joint letter from the Commander-in-Chief, the Air Marshal and the Flag Officer Commanding of the Indian Navy. This letter seemed to us very extraordinary. In effect it was an announcement that they could not carry out Government's policy in case they didn't agree with it. That is a position which hardly any Government can accept. The expert opinion of military commanders is of the utmost value in coming to any decision. But where questions of policy are concerned the decision must rest with the Government. The mention of British officers as such also creates a difficulty if they are to function only when they approve of the action taken by the Government.

5. We are having another Cabinet meeting tomorrow evening at 6 to which we are inviting the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Hall and Air Marshal Elmhirst.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Addressing the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh in Delhi on 16 September, Mahatma Gandhi had warned that war was inevitable between the two countries if Pakistan "persisted in wrong doing". *The New York Times* of 19 September, however, reported this as "Mohandas K. Gandhi opened the subject of war..." while addressing "a Hindu youth organization". In a note to Nehru on 29 September, Mahatma Gandhi said, "The summaries sent to America...may be quite contrary with what I might have said". Later at a prayer meeting the same evening, he explained that not a single mention of war in his speeches could be taken as "incitement to or approval of war..." He had only endeavoured to show to the people how the present situation could lead to war. "This was done not to promote war, but to avoid it...Was it wrong to draw public attention to the logical steps that inevitably followed one after another?"

3. Solution by Referendum¹

As regards immediate action he was concerned primarily with Babariawad, now occupied by Junagadh forces, though it had acceded to India. But he recognised the possibility that an incident here could provoke a war. "The Government of India does not want a war with Pakistan or anyone else and would like to avoid it at almost every cost." Pandit Nehru continued :

Any war with Pakistan would undoubtedly end in the defeat and ruin of Pakistan provided no other nations are dragged in. At the same time it may well mean ruin of India also for a considerable time. A war with Pakistan at this juncture would necessarily lead to very grave consequences... Our international position, such as it is, would disappear.

It is exceedingly likely that Pakistan also does not want war, and has taken the steps it has chiefly to irritate us and to make us take some false steps so that they can appeal to U.N.O....

If this appeal were made, and the United Nations issued directions or suggestions, India would "naturally abide by those directions". Pandit Nehru concluded :

It is desirable that the Pakistan Government as well as the public generally should be informed :

1. that we do not accept in the peculiar circumstances the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan.
2. that we entirely disagree with the claims and contentions of Pakistan in regard to Mangrol and Babariawad.
3. that the Pakistan Government must withdraw Junagadh forces from Babariawad.
4. that in response to requests made we are sending our troops to Kathiawar—both to Porbandar and other places.
5. that we are entirely opposed to war and wish to avoid it. We want an amicable settlement of this issue and we propose therefore, that wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory, the matter should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people concerned. We shall accept the result of this referendum whatever it may be as it is our

1. This account of Nehru's analysis of the situation in and around Junagadh as presented by him in a paper at the first meeting of the Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet and of his talk with Liaquat Ali Khan on 1 October 1947 is printed in H. V. Hodson, *The Great Divide* (London 1969), pp. 434-35.

desire that a decision should be made in accordance with the wishes of the people concerned. We invite the Pakistan Government, therefore, to submit the Junagadh issue to a referendum of the people of Junagadh under impartial auspices.

Thus Pandit Nehru committed himself to the general policy in the last sub-paragraph before the dispute over Kashmir blew up, but in the knowledge that Junagadh might well be a trap designed to exploit the case of Kashmir.

He repeated his commitment in a talk with Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan which Lord Mountbatten engineered, with some difficulty, after the two had lunched with him on the same day on 1 October 1947 when Liaquat Ali had come to attend the Joint Defence Council meeting. They argued for a while about Mangrol and Babariawad, and the nature of the preventive military action which India was taking, and which Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan thought "savoured of pressure and the intent to commit a hostile act". Pandit Nehru replied : "We are determined that no hostile act should be committed by any Indian troops, but we also consider that the whole question of Junagadh must be reviewed."

4. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
2 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I am sorry I missed meeting you today. I went to your house in the afternoon, but you were out. As I didn't meet you, I decided not to send any lengthy telegrams to Liaquat Ali Khan and not to issue any press communique about Junagadh. I felt that perhaps a day or two delay would not matter and might even be desirable in view of my conversation yesterday with Liaquat Ali Khan.

2. I felt that I should send a brief message reminding him about the withdrawal of Junagadh forces from Babariawad and Mangrol. Therefore I sent the enclosed message.² Two other telegrams have come from Karachi. In case you have not seen them already, I enclose copies. Probably Liaquat Ali Khan knows nothing about them.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Not traceable.

5. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

15 October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

You will remember that when Liaquat Ali Khan came here last we discussed the Junagadh matter with him and pressed upon him to withdraw the troops from Babariawad and Mangrol.² He was more or less agreeable to this. We assured him, at the same time, that we did not wish to cross the Junagadh territory, as we were anxious to avoid any possibility of conflict. In order to settle this question of Junagadh, we invited Pakistan to agree to a referendum or plebiscite.

The next day I sent him a telegram to this effect and urgently asked for the withdrawal of the Junagadh troops from Babariawad and Mangrol. This was a week ago.

On the 5th October we issued a press statement which you will remember. In this it was clearly stated that our forces were not to enter Junagadh territory or to seek passage through that territory or to enter Babariawad or Mangrol. We sent another telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan again asking for the withdrawal of Junagadh forces from Babariawad and Mangrol. No answer to this has come yet. It is exactly two weeks today since this proposal was put to Liaquat Ali Khan and approved of by him.

Meanwhile, we are informed that the Junagadh troops have crossed the territory of another acceding State of ours in order to go to some other place. This is not only a further act of aggression, but also, in the circumstances, appears to be a deliberate flouting of our proposals.

All this is rather difficult to swallow and we can hardly sit by watching these developments. The smaller States of Kathiawar are getting nervous and rather frightened and have appealed to us for help. None of them is safe from this kind of aggression.

This matter will have to be considered by us very soon. I am, meanwhile, sending a telegram to Liaquat Ali Khan, a copy of which I enclose.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(46)/48-PM, Vol. I, PMS.
2. On 1 October.
3. Not traceable,

6. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

Our Regional Commissioner² at Rajkot was approached yesterday by Harvey Jones,³ Senior Member of the Junagadh State Council and Member-in-Charge of the Junagadh State Forces, with a letter from the Junagadh Dewan, Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto,⁴ appealing to the Government of India to take over the Junagadh administration. This request was made in order to save the State from complete administrative breakdown and pending an honourable settlement of the several issues involved in the Junagadh accession.

Sir Shah Nawaz has stated in his letter that he had already telegraphed to you to this effect. We have considered this request, and, with a view to avoiding chaos in the State and its repercussions, have agreed to take over administration of Junagadh with immediate effect. We have issued instructions to that effect to our Regional Commissioner, Rajkot, the text of which runs as follows:—

The letter of Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto of Junagadh dated November 8, addressed to you and brought personally by Harvey Jones, Senior Member of the Junagadh State Forces, offering immediate handing over Junagadh administration, has been considered by the Government of India. They consider that in view of the unanimous request of the Junagadh State Council, supported by public of Junagadh whose views were ascertained by the Council at a meeting held in Junagadh on October 7, and also in view of the complete breakdown of administration resulting in chaotic condition in the State, you should take over the administration forthwith and ensure peace and order at the earliest possible moment.

1. New Delhi, 9 November 1947. Ministry of States, File No. KS-68/48, M.H.A.
2. N.M. Buch (1908-1954); joined I.C.S., 1931; served in Punjab till his appointment as Director-General of Food and Civil Supplies Department, 1943-47; Joint Secretary, Ministry of States, August 1947; Regional Commissioner, Western India and Gujarat States, September-November 1947; Adviser to Indian delegation to U.N.O. on Junagadh and Kashmir issues; Regional Commissioner, Saurashtra, 1948-50; Chairman, Travancore-Cochin Integration Commission, 1949; Secretary, Ministry of States, May-July 1951.
3. Captain M.S. Harvey Jones.
4. (1888-1957); representative of Zamindars from Sind in Bombay Legislative Council, 1921-36; Minister, Government of Bombay, 1934-36; Dewan of Junagadh, 1947.

1. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
23 August 1947

My dear Krishna,

I have received a bunch of letters from you including the report on Kral.²

We shall probably be sending a telegram to you about the Kral affair to make a formal approach to the Czech Government informing them that we cannot agree to any separate dealings between them and Hyderabad.³ This is constitutionally wrong. It is a matter affecting our security and it is contrary to the old treaties and arrangements between States and the Government of India. Therefore, we must not encourage any such transaction. As for the Government of India purchasing arms from the Czech Government, I rather doubt if this will be feasible at present, but I am enquiring into the matter.

There appears to be no objection to your occupying a room or two in India House, but I suppose such an arrangement will hardly be satisfactory for any length of time.

About Vellodi, I am not worrying, though the whole episode has left a rather bad taste.⁴ You need not trouble yourself about Vellodi's future appointments. We are not quite certain what this will be; but, in any event, if he works in this office he will have to work under our directions.

Just at the present moment I am rather overwhelmed with happenings in the Punjab, both East and West. People there have gone quite mad and some terrible things have happened. We are tackling the situation with all our might, but it is a difficult job. We shall no doubt control the situation in a few days, but the Punjab is almost a ruined province and vast numbers of people are destitute wanderers. I am going to East Punjab tomorrow.

I am very dissatisfied with the developments in the Indonesian situation and I feel that the U.K. and U.S.A. have given indirect encouragement to the Dutch. We are sending some Red Cross supplies and doctors to Indonesia.

Today's newspapers announced the resignation of Chhattari and Monckton in Hyderabad. I am not sure about Ali Yawar Jung. This presumably means that the extremists there are in control. Meanwhile, they

1. V. K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Karel Bedrech Kral, a Czech national and an expert in optical instruments and gun sights, was involved in the efforts of the Nizam Government to purchase arms from Czechoslovakia.

3. See the succeeding item.

4. M. K. Vellodi was upset by the secrecy maintained over Krishna Menon's appointment as his successor as High Commissioner in Britain.

have all been talking to us officially of negotiations, and, in fact, we are expecting some kind of a delegation in a few days time.

I had a letter from Bee Batliwala a short time ago in which she expressed a desire to do some work at India House. She spoke to me about this in December last also when I was in London. At that time she said that she wanted to work in an honorary capacity. If you feel that you can utilise her services in any way you can certainly do so. She is fairly competent with some kinds of work.

Aruna Asaf Ali will be going to London soon. She will meet Asaf Ali there and then stay on for two or three weeks till Asaf Ali returns to India. I hope you will give her every help during her stay.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your memorandum dated 17th August, Kral. Naturally we take a grave view of the matter.² Unless you see any objection I suggest that you approach Czech Embassy in London immediately and request that transaction should be stopped immediately pending full and formal inquiry by Czech Government as it is (1) against our wishes (2) a threat to our security and (3) constitutionally incorrect and inconsistent with the old agreements under which arms could only be obtained by States through Government of India.³ These agreements continue to operate under standstill arrangements. This answers (a) and (f) of your memorandum. (c) of your memorandum: Whether we should buy arms has to be discussed with the Defence Minister and I propose to do immediately. It is unlikely however we shall be able to do as Czech equipment may not fit in with general equipment of our army. (b) and (d) of your memorandum: These are in a way connected

1. New Delhi, August 1947. V. K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L. This cable is undated. It is probably the cable Nehru refers to in his letter to V. K. Krishna Menon on 23 August 1947.
2. Informing Nehru of the arms transaction between Hyderabad and Czechoslovakia, Menon said that the latter had entered into the deal assuming Hyderabad had the Indian Government's approval. However, to forestall the finalisation of the deal, Menon sought instructions from Nehru.
3. Krishna Menon replied that he had initiated talks with the Czech Embassy and "no further progress in negotiations ... will be made unless you authorise."

since if we take action against Kral publicity will become inevitable. Armament information available here. Home Ministry have ordered his arrest but since Kral is in Karachi order has not been carried out yet but may if he returns to Bombay. Arrest if it takes place will provide publicity. Meanwhile, it would be best to mark time so far as publicity is concerned. (e) of your memorandum: If Czech Government do not prove responsive to suggestion we have made regarding (a) of your memorandum a protest would be necessary. We might wait for their reply. I am examining possibility of immediate action through our Customs authorities to prevent delivery to Hyderabad of any consignment of arms that may have arrived already or that may arrive hereafter. You can mention this to Czech Ambassador in London. Our information is that consignment may go to Karachi in the first instance and be flown from there to Hyderabad by air. If this happens effectiveness of action by our Customs authorities will automatically be reduced. (This need not be mentioned however to Ambassador.) We propose to send immediately for Belgian Charge d'Affaires and inform him that any transaction involving transfer of arms from whatever source in Belgium to Hyderabad will be inconsistent with Hyderabad's treaty obligations to us and that goods of this kind addressed to Hyderabad will on arrival in any Indian port be liable to forfeiture.⁴ Since no manufacturer would wish running the risk of this kind proposed warning might have effect of drying up Belgium as source of supply. B.S.A.⁵ transactions, I have no further information but shall make inquiries.

4. According to Krishna Menon's information Belgium was also involved in the arms transaction.
5. British Small Arms.

3. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
23 September 1947

My dear Krishna,

Many thanks for your letter of the 19th September. I think I have already answered your letter regarding the importation of arms by Hyderabad from Czechoslovakia. Bajpai tells me that, on the 14th September, he conveyed to you the substance of the reply given to us by the Belgian Charge d'Affaires on the same subject.

1. V. K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

Your letter regarding the supply of gold,² in which Nawanagar³ and Kendall are said to be implicated, reached me duly. Our people have no information about it. As you know, Nawanagar has now acceded to the Indian Union. Its neighbour, Junagadh, on the other hand, has acceded to Pakistan. This has created a difficult situation not only for us but for the Kathiawar States, which are predominantly Hindu, as a whole. We do not, of course, wish to encourage smuggling either of gold or of arms. Until, however, the situation over Junagadh becomes clearer, we shall have to look with a friendly eye upon all legitimate efforts of the other Kathiawar States to protect themselves.

I shall, as suggested by you, take up with Mountbatten the question of the exclusion of our army officers from the secret courses to which officers of the other Dominions are admitted.⁴ We shall, of course, value your continued interest in such matters, and there can be no possible objection to your discussing them personally and confidentially with people in London who may be in a position to help.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. A secret report received by Krishna Menon alleged that a person, by name Kendall, had had his boat repaired extensively and was proposing to sail to India under a Dutch flag with a cargo of 20 tons of gold.
3. Maharaja Jam Shree Digvijaysinghji (1895-1966); ascended in 1933; Chancellor, Chamber of Princes, 1937-44.
4. Krishna Menon wrote that he had received confidential information that "since or soon after 15 August" Indian army officers under training would be excluded from the secret courses open to other Dominions.

4. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
15 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I do not know if you have addressed the Hyderabad Government at all regarding the shootings and killings that have been going on there for some time.² I think it is worthwhile doing so. It may be an internal matter,

1. J. N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. A press note issued by the Nizam's Government admitted that six persons had been killed and three injured when police fired on a crowd of villagers in Galepally in Karimnagar district. In another incident in Nanded district, 12 persons were killed when police fired upon villagers proceeding to Dorli for a flag-hoisting function organised by the Hyderabad State Congress.

but it produces powerful reactions all over the place and I think we should express some strong opinion about it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Cable to V.K. Krishna Menon¹

Your telegram No. 3970 and 3980 dated 18th November.² We have issued notification forbidding flight of foreign aircraft across India without landing at specified airport on Indian territory.³ Landing planes will be subject to customs examination; planes which disobey instruction to land will be liable to be fired on.

2. From what you have said in your telegram No. 3980, we assume that His Majesty's Government cannot help either in preventing sale of planes to Hyderabad, or in ensuring that they do not carry parts which might be put to military use.

3. As regards the fourteen additional Halifaxes, purchase of which you say Hyderabad is negotiating, we have come to the conclusion that we do not want these planes which are uneconomical.⁴ We are not likely to want Dakotas either as we find that we can make thirty or more of them serviceable from surplus stock which was at first considered to be unusable. If new types of planes are required, you will be approached in due course.

1. New Delhi, 24 November 1947. File No. 27(1)/47-PMS.

2. Menon reported that Hyderabad had recently purchased a Halifax aircraft carrying bomb doors and other equipment of a bomber. Negotiations for the purchase of more such aircraft were proceeding. India could rightfully refuse transit facilities to such planes or ground them for customs examination.

3. Issued on 24 November 1947.

4. Menon felt that the only way India could prevent the purchase of such planes by Hyderabad would be by buying them herself.

6. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
24 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

In the course of the next two or three days you will probably be coming to some final decision with the Hyderabad delegation.² That decision will be of vital importance and the whole Cabinet is, of course, very much interested in it and in our approach to this question. It would have been desirable for them to be kept in touch with developments. I do not know if there is time for that now. If possible this might be done. In any event I should like to be kept informed and to see the texts of any memoranda or letters that might be exchanged.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 7, pp. 124-125.
2. The Hyderabad delegation led by Nawab Moin Nawaz Jung had come to negotiate the Standstill Agreement.

7. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
25 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have just heard on the radio that the Hyderabad agreement has been signed.² Congratulations. Whether this puts an end to the trouble there or not, is a matter for doubt. I enclose a letter for Kashinath Vaidya.³

I enclose a letter from Brijlal Nehru. I enquired from Bucher today about sending more troops. He said he was doing his best.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 7, pp. 125-126.
2. The Standstill Agreement formally signed on 29 November was to come into effect immediately and remain operative for a year. It was agreed that pending fresh arrangements, all agreements and administrative arrangements existing between the British and the Nizam's Governments would continue; the Government of India, however, could not send troops to Hyderabad to assist in the maintenance of law and order or station them inside the state, except in times of war. The agreement stressed that the Government of India would not exercise any paramountcy functions vis-a-vis Hyderabad. The two Governments would appoint their agents in Delhi and Hyderabad respectively. All disputes arising out of the agreement would be settled by an arbitrator appointed by the two Governments.
3. (1890-1959); lawyer; founder member, Hyderabad State Congress, 1938; Member, Standing Committee, All India States People's Conference, 1939-46; detained for joining Hyderabad States People's satyagraha, 1948; Member, Indian Parliament. 1950-52; Speaker, Hyderabad State Assembly, 1952-56.

LETTERS TO THE PREMIERS OF PROVINCES

New Delhi
15 October 1947

My dear Prime Minister,²

I suggested to you about the middle of August that you should write to me a letter every fortnight and I promised to write back to you in return. I hoped by this means to keep in touch with important developments in your province and also to keep you informed not merely of the more significant developments in the Centre but also of events in other provinces which have repercussions over the rest of India. Neither of us has been able to keep up to this programme. I have, of course, had correspondence with some Provincial Governors and Prime Ministers, but this has been spasmodic and confined to specific issues. We have all of us, I fear, been somewhat overwhelmed by the pressure of events since the 15th August. Yet it is in times of exceptional stress like the present that it is more than ordinarily incumbent on us to keep in close touch with each other, so that we can put forth concerted efforts to overcome the grave dangers facing us. I propose, therefore, that we should form the habit of a fortnightly exchange of letters and I intend to write to you on the 1st and 15th of each month. This of course does not mean that you should not write to me oftener, if you felt it necessary to do so.

2. I doubt if people realise—particularly in those provinces which fortunately have not felt the impact of the Punjab tragedy—the gravity and full significance of recent events. If the disturbances had not been halted in western U.P., they would eventually have spread eastwards right up to Bihar and West Bengal, and the whole of northern India would have been in chaos. Nor could the forces of disorder have, in that case, been kept confined to northern India. We would then have faced, quite apart from the butchery of innocent lives and the destruction of property, wholesale disruption of communications, disorganisation in food supply and the spread of epidemic diseases. We would in fact have faced complete chaos in the country and the destruction of all constitutional government. We have overcome this danger. Unceasing vigilance is still necessary and we have many grave problems confronting us, but I feel I can tell you that we have turned the corner and are in a position to face the future with confidence.

1. This and the following letters in this section are in File No. 25(6)-47-48-PMS. These letters have also been printed in G. Parthasarathi (ed.), *Jawaharlal Nehru—Letters to Chief Ministers 1947-1964*, Vol. 1 (New Delhi, 1985).
2. The heads of the provincial governments were addressed as Prime Ministers and Premiers till the adoption of the Constitution on 26 January 1950. Thereafter they were addressed as Chief Ministers and the provinces were called States.

3. There are some aspects of the present situation to which I would draw your attention. I have mentioned them in some of my public statements, but they are so important that I make no apology for reiterating them.

4. I know there is a certain amount of feeling in the country—how strong it is in your province you can judge better than I can—that the Central Government has somehow or other been weak and following a policy of appeasement towards Muslims. This, of course, is complete nonsense. There is no question of weakness or appeasement. We have a Muslim minority who are so large in numbers that they cannot, even if they want to, go anywhere else. They have got to live in India. That is a basic fact about which there can be no argument. Whatever the provocation from Pakistan and whatever the indignities and horrors inflicted on non-Muslims there, we have got to deal with this minority in a civilised manner. We must give them security and the rights of citizens in a democratic state. If we fail to do so, we shall have a festering sore which will eventually poison the whole body politic and probably destroy it. Moreover, we are now on a severe trial in the international forum. I have it on the authority of our delegates to the U.N.O. that the friendliness towards India which existed before the recent tragedy has changed and we are looked upon with distrust and almost with a certain degree of contempt. We cannot afford to ignore this feeling. We are dependent for many things on international goodwill—increasingly so since partition. And pure self-interest, apart from moral considerations, demands that world opinion should be on our side in this matter of treatment of minorities.

I would ask you, therefore, as a matter of great importance, to take steps to put across to the public the true basis of our policy. How exactly you should do so is a matter which I must leave to your judgment; it must depend on local factors.

5. The other important question to which I would draw your attention is the paramount importance of preserving the public services from the virus of communal politics.

There is a great deal of evidence that the services in Pakistan have got out of hand and are not amenable to the control of their government. You will have noticed that Mr. Jinnah himself referred, in a recent address in Karachi, to the indiscipline that has set in the services.³ This is already a serious headache for Pakistan, and will probably be more serious in future.

3. Jinnah told the senior officers on 11 October 1947: "I was pained to learn that a good many of our staff are not pulling their weight.... Some of them have been demoralised by the happenings in East Punjab and Delhi, and in others, the general lawlessness prevailing in some parts of the country has bred a spirit of indiscipline."

Fortunately for us, taking an overall picture, we have been fortunate in this respect and we have been able, generally speaking, to preserve the integrity of the services against the communal virus. But there have been lapses in the East Punjab specially in the police; and unless we are vigilant, the disease may spread. We would then be faced with a situation of the utmost gravity, viz., of having a government in office which could not get its decrees executed by its own servants, the sort of thing that is happening so frequently in the South American Republics. I would ask you, therefore, to allow no laxity in the loyal execution of government's policy by its servants, particularly in the matter of just and fair treatment to minorities. If we condone lapses in this respect, we shall be storing up serious trouble for the country in the future.

6. We have been so preoccupied with problems arising out of the disturbances in the Punjab that we have been able to give hardly any time to other problems of almost equal urgency. Our economic position is really quite serious. There has been a marked rise in price during the last twelve months; and since the war ended the rise in prices has been 57 points.⁴ The movement has been rather rapid in recent months, for between January and the middle of August this year the wholesale price index rose by 28 points. The rise in retail prices has probably been larger. This has not been due to any increase in currency—in fact, the total volume of money in circulation,⁵ whether currency or bank deposits, has slightly fallen since the end of the war—but to a fall in the production of consumable goods. I am afraid we have been losing all along the line in textiles, in steel and various other basic commodities.⁶ There seems also no end to our dependence on overseas sources for our food supplies.⁷ The only solution to this problem is increased production. This means both a positive drive towards that end and vigilant steps against anything that hampers production, such as strikes and lockouts. We have set up here a sub-committee of the Cabinet to examine and make recommendations regarding the machinery which will enable us to deal effectively with economic problems. This sub-committee is meeting shortly and I will keep you informed of any major recommendations which are likely to be of interest to provinces. In the meanwhile, I would ask you to keep this matter prominently in mind and see that every possible step is taken

4. The wholesale price index, with 1939 as base year, stood at 298.0 in September 1947.
5. In November 1945, it was Rs. 2,389 crores and it rose to Rs. 2,652 crores in April 1946. In September 1947, it was Rs. 2,452 crores.
6. The industrial production index, with 1937 as base, stood at 102.4 in 1947 compared to 120.0 in 1945. Correspondingly, the production of cotton textiles stood at 95.8 in 1947 compared to 120.0 in 1945, steel at 121.8 in 1947 compared to 142.9 in 1945.
7. In September 1947, India imported 97,000 tons of grains, pulses and flour, compared to 38,000 tons imported in January 1947.

SELECTED WORKS OF JAWAHARLAL NEHRU

which would increase production and reverse the spiral process now so dangerously in evidence.

7. I would like to draw your attention to the letter from the Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation No. R. & R. 1 (1) dated the 23rd September asking for information to enable the drawing up of a movement programme for at least a proportion of the refugees. I hope your Government is giving urgent consideration to that letter.

8. I enclose, for your information, a copy of a note by the Ministry of Railways which explains how the Pakistan Government are still exercising jurisdiction over some of the railway lines in parts of West Bengal.⁸ There is here a source of friction between the two Dominion Governments which might have repercussions on the law and order situation in East and West Bengal. For the present, I am mentioning this matter merely for your information. We are pursuing the matter with the Pakistan Government and hope that it will be settled smoothly.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. The entire earnings of the Bengal-Assam railway between the Kancharapara and Lalgolaghat stations including the Santipur-Navadwip branch of the Bongaon section were going to the East Pakistan railways.

II

New Delhi
2 November 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

In my letter to you, dated the 15th October,¹ I said that we had turned the corner and are in a position to face the future with confidence, though unceasing vigilance was still necessary. I little realised then how quickly our vigilance would be tested.

2. You must have followed developments in Kashmir. It is extraordinary how these developments remind one of the technique adopted by Hitler. Indeed, the whole policy of the Muslim League during the past few years

1. See preceding item.

has been singularly reminiscent of the Nazi tactic. The Kashmir incidents are a kind of climax to this policy.

3. I am enclosing a copy of a draft which I have prepared for my broadcast² on Kashmir and this will give you some picture of the situation. I have not emphasised in this broadcast the part which Pakistan has obviously played in this whole affair. But there can be no doubt about it that the so-called raiders are well-armed and even possess small artillery. They have competent leadership and probably officers of the Pakistan Army have helped in organising them. The actual tribesmen among the raiders are probably limited in numbers, the rest are ex-servicemen. Part of the Muslim element in the Kashmir forces has also gone over to them. Their equipment is good and they have a large number of lorries. It is impossible to conceive that all this could be done without the full connivance and help of the Pakistan authorities.

4. Our own information is that a Pakistan Army brigade was kept ready at the frontier near Kohala and another brigade was kept at Sialkot near the Jammu frontier. The idea was that as soon as the raiders captured Srinagar, they would announce accession to Pakistan and then the regular Pakistan Army would march in and take possession. It has even been suggested that Mr. Jinnah was thinking of some kind of a triumphal entry.

5. Another feature of Pakistan attack on Kashmir, which also reminds one of Nazi Germany, is the fierce, blatant and false propaganda that has been carried on by their radio and press. All this should put us on our guard. We may have to face a difficult situation in Hyderabad and the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen³ is a well-organised fanatical body which may cause trouble. Bombay, Central Provinces and Madras have to be particularly watchful. Needless to say the Government of India is fully conscious of the dangers and is carefully watching the situation. We should like the help of the adjoining provinces, especially in this matter.

6. One of the features of the Kashmir situation which is worthy of notice is the complete disintegration of the Kashmir administration at a moment of crisis. The Maharaja suddenly left Srinagar in the middle of the night accompanied by his Ministers. Most of the other officers also disappeared and there was no constituted authority left at all. The army itself, which was supposed to be strong, somehow faded away. About a quarter of it went over to the invaders, or deserted. The rest was caught in small pockets and

2. See *ante*, section 4, item 24.

3. A communal organisation which was demanding an independent State of Hyderabad.

generally did not put up any good show at all. It was the National Conference under Sheikh Abdullah's leadership that saved the situation. Our troops could have done nothing but for the stand of the National Conference. Even now the defence of Kashmir is largely based on the cooperation of our troops with the civil population which we are partly arming for the purpose.

7. The example of Kashmir shows how feeble the administrative apparatus is in the States and how rapidly it may collapse in a real emergency. Some of the States, especially in Rajputana and in East Punjab, have been behaving in an undesirable manner. There are cries of a Sikh State of Rajasthan and Jats than and the rulers have taken advantage of the communal troubles to suppress the popular movements. Provincial administrations, especially those adjoining the Indian States, have to tighten up their own administrative machinery and keep it thoroughly efficient. Trouble may come from the States and we have to stop it immediately.

8. Recent events in Kashmir and partly our action in Babariawad and Mangrol have been a severe blow to the Pakistan Government.⁴ They have a terrible sense of frustration. Already they were being overwhelmed by their problems. The vast numbers of Muslim refugees who have gone to Pakistan are a terrible burden on them and they cannot look after them. Because of all this they are suffering from the delusion that the Government of India are conspiring to destroy Pakistan. That, of course, is completely false. There is no conspiracy and there is no desire to destroy their state in any way. Any such attempt would lead to grave injury to us. War is a dangerous thing and must be avoided. Even to talk of war is not healthy. Only those who do not understand it or its consequences talk lightly of war. From the military point of view there is little doubt that if there was war between India and Pakistan, Pakistan as a state would perish. But, undoubtedly, India would suffer very great injury and all our schemes of progress would have to be pushed aside for many, many years. Therefore, we must do our utmost to avoid war, and that is our definite policy. We cannot be driven into extreme courses simply because thoughtless people shout and become bellicose. We must all, in our own way, try to make people understand the

4. On 1 November 1947, the Government of India sent a small force accompanied by a civil administrator to take over the administration of Babariawad and Mangrol in the Kathiawar region. Babariawad was a group of fifty-one villages held by Mulgirasias, the original landholders, and Mangrol was a small princely state situated between Porbandar and Junagadh.

situation and to reduce the tension so that normal relations might be maintained with Pakistan. Both statesmanship and expediency, as well as humanity, require this. That, of course, does not mean that we should surrender our honour or self-respect in the slightest. The danger really is not from any well-thought out action, but from acute despair on the part of Pakistan, for their leaders have put themselves in a hole and do not know how to get out of it.

9. It is essential for each province to develop its home guards and to strengthen its police service. We must not demand the military to keep law and order. They must be reserved for special occasions only and for the purpose they are intended. I might draw your attention to the fact that in recruiting for the home guard or the police the ex-I.N.A. personnel might well be used. They are trained soldiers and would easily fit in and do good work. I know that there has been some prejudice against them in recent months because of some occurrences in Bihar and elsewhere. It is also true that the I.N.A. people functioned on both sides during the Punjab disturbances. Also, that the Kashmir raiders are led by a prominent I.N.A. officer, Major-General Kiani. But all this can be said of our police force also, as well as parts of our army who have not been able to retain their discipline and impartiality in the stress of events. I think it would be definitely desirable to use selected I.N.A. personnel for the home guard and the police. They should normally be mixed with others and not kept as a separate unit.

10. I should like to say that our Indian Army has, on the whole, kept its balance very well. This cannot be said of the Pakistan Army which has rather gone to pieces and has not got too much discipline left. Our officers in the Army are a fine set of young men. They have had to face suddenly the Kashmir emergency, many of them without any experience of the kind, and they have shown great resource and courage, sometimes bordering on rashness.

11. I should like to draw your attention specially to the necessity for developing intelligence services. This is very important both from the provincial and the Central point of view. It is not easy to develop a good intelligence service suddenly as the men employed must be carefully chosen. Our old intelligence system has more or less broken down as it was bound to, because it was meant for other purposes, chiefly for tracking Congressmen and the like. The new intelligence service will have to be built differently. There are at present many dangerous tendencies and trends in the country which may broadly be called fascist. They are not only Muslim but also Hindu and Sikh. We should know all about this. The trouble in Delhi was largely due to lack of information in time.

12. The Information Films of India, which was started during war time, but was abolished in April 1946, is now being revived and it is hoped that by the beginning of next year Government's films and news-reels will again be in circulation. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting have written to your Chief Secretary to insert a condition in the licence of exhibitors in your province enjoining compulsory exhibition of films approved by the Central Government and Provincial Governments. As documentary films and news-reels are not commercially a paying proposition, commercial production and distribution is at present practically non-existent in India. I hope your Government will utilise this powerful medium to reach the masses, more especially for them to understand the various development plans that you are undertaking. Those films will also help to develop a social consciousness and a sense of corporate endeavour. I earnestly hope that your Government will accept the suggestion of the Ministry of Information.

13.⁵ When I was in Lucknow, you informed me of the difficulties which you were meeting with in the way of getting surplus machinery and stores from the Supply Ministry. I understood you to refer to stocks under Disposals and I accordingly took the matter up with the Minister concerned. I am now informed that the difficulty is not really in the Directorate-General of Disposals; what you are up against is the fact that certain stores which you want are not declared to be surplus and therefore not available for sale. I am having this point examined further and will let you know as soon as possible how your difficulties can be met.

14.⁶ I am glad to inform you that the trouble over the handing over of the Pakistan Railway in parts of West Bengal has now been got over. The Pakistan Government have issued instructions for the sections of the Railway in West Bengal territory to be handed over to India. One potential source of friction therefore disappears; and for every such small mercy you must be grateful in these times.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. This paragraph was written only to G.B. Pant, Prime Minister of U.P.

6. This paragraph was written only to P.C. Ghosh, Prime Minister of West Bengal.

III

New Delhi

15 November 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

When I last wrote to you, our military position in Kashmir was somewhat precarious and in Junagadh, although we had overwhelming military strength, our position, taken as a whole, was a very awkward one. You will have seen from the papers that in both States the situation has since developed satisfactorily from our point of view, though in Junagadh it has taken a curious turn which none of us ever expected.

2. The position now in Kashmir is that our troops have taken Uri from which one road takes off to Domel on the Abbottabad frontier and another to Poonch where a Kashmir detachment has been beleaguered for quite some time. The Kashmir Valley is now practically clear of raiders but for stragglers, and the threat to Srinagar has been removed. But the position in Jammu is not very good. We have not till now been able to divert to this region the forces necessary for the operations there; but we are doing so now, and the next phase of the campaign will be a move to rid Jammu of raiders. This will not be an easy task, for the communications are difficult and the area is very close to the West Punjab from which supplies can reach raiders easily. Nevertheless, it is a task which, I am confident, will be carried out satisfactorily by our army. I very much fear that much damage has already been done to human life and to property in Jammu, as it has been in Kashmir; and by the time we have succeeded in ridding Jammu of the raiders the suffering and misery of the population will have been serious. As I discovered during my recent visit to Kashmir, the raiders have indulged, wherever they went, in loot and destruction; and their treatment of women has been particularly shocking. Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs alike have suffered. No effort is too great to drive out this scourge.

3. I must warn you, however, that although things have improved in Kashmir, the position there from many points of view is still not satisfactory. The Maharaja's relations with Sheikh Abdullah continue to be strained and, politically, there are many loose ends to be tied. The Hindu-Muslim problem in Jammu is as bad as in West Punjab of which in fact this part of Kashmir is an extension geographically. While in the Kashmir Valley, under Sheikh Abdullah's influence, there is remarkable communal unity, and Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs alike have demonstrated cohesion of purpose and effort in the face of a common danger, in Jammu there is fierce communal passion, and the R.S.S., the Akali Dal and the Muslim League, operating in varying degrees, have created a situation full of explosive possibilities. For this

reason, our commitments in Jammu and Kashmir will, I fear, be onerous for quite some time to come.

4. We are watching here the effect of the events in Junagadh and Kashmir on Hyderabad. I know that the Provincial Governments of Madras, Bombay and the C.P. are particularly exercised over the situation in Hyderabad and over the possibility that the sabre-rattling of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen may lead to serious consequences. It seems possible, however, that recent events may have a sobering effect on the Nizam, if not on the Ittehad. We are not taking any chances. However, fascist gangs such as the Ittehad have a habit of breaking out in unexpected directions and it would be folly to ignore their potentiality for mischief. We are making dispositions of troops as well as we possibly can consistently with our commitments in the Punjab and elsewhere, but I know that the Provincial Governments concerned will continue to watch the situation with great care.

5. Looking at the States problem as a whole it seems to me that two historical processes are taking place simultaneously—the growing triumph of popular will in enclaves of sheer autocracy and the political consolidation of India rendered necessary by the withdrawal of British power and the lapse of paramountcy. Both processes are experiencing resistance, but I feel sure that both will triumph in the end. I would like you in this connection to be on your guard against the development of fissiparous tendencies about which I have received certain disquieting reports. Assam has some trouble with the Bengalees; West Bengal has some trouble with the Gurkhas in Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri who are said to be clamouring for the inclusion of these districts in Assam; there is trouble in Orissa between Oriyas and Telugus whose relations are said to be very much estranged. To some extent, these developments indicate a move for closer cultural ties between men of the same stock and language living in different provinces; and I have no doubt eventually some readjustment will be necessary. But at this stage of our national life any dispersion of our energies in internal schisms of this kind is likely to be dangerous.

6. More than one Premier have written to me about the need for enlarged facilities for military training. This is partly the reaction to the dangers to which we are exposed and partly to a fundamental defect in our national training. The Defence Committee will shortly consider the report of the National Cadet Corps Committee¹ which was set up before partition. That report will be circulated to provinces. The recommendations of the

1. The National Cadet Corps was formed on 13 March 1948.

Committee relate to training only in schools and colleges. If you have in mind anything more elaborate, I would suggest your preparing a concrete scheme and sending it to us here. More than one Provincial Government have worked out a scheme of home guards and it seems desirable to have some degree of uniformity. I am sure Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence Minister, will give you all possible assistance in working out your plans.

7. I would now like to draw your attention to two problems of rehabilitation in the solution of which your assistance is necessary.

The question of the continuation of the education of the students, who have been obliged to migrate to India from schools and colleges in Pakistan areas and have taken up their residence in your province, is no doubt engaging the attention of the Provincial Government. The Government of India, in the Ministry of Education letter No. F-73-97/47-E.I. dated the 8th October 1947, have already expressed the view that in the special circumstances, it is desirable to permit such students to join educational institutions without insisting on the production of migration or other certificates which the students are expected to produce in normal times. They have also stressed that the periods of studies in the institutions from which the students come should be taken into account in admitting them to schools and colleges in which they seek admission, even though the courses of studies may vary to a certain degree. I hope the proposal will be considered sympathetically by the Provincial Government.

The Government of India, in the Ministry of Education letter No. F-34-1/47-R dated the 1st November 1947, have already addressed the Provincial Governments in regard to the employment of teachers from Pakistan areas who have been thrown out of employment and have been obliged to migrate to India. The Government of India have been forwarding to the Provincial Governments, universities, etc. lists of such displaced teachers with full particulars of their qualifications, and I hope that there will be a satisfactory response from the authorities concerned for employing as many of these teachers as possible. I hope also that in view of the exceptional circumstances, the Provincial Governments, universities, etc. will find it possible to relax ordinary rules regarding provincial domicile and age-limits required in connection with a provincial appointment and try, as far as practicable, to place them in posts carrying salaries equivalent to those which the incumbents were receiving in Pakistan.

8. My Finance Minister will shortly be introducing the Central budget in the Constituent Assembly. He has been devoting a good deal of thought not merely to what may be called Central finance proper, but to the overall financial situation in the country including the resources and commitments of Provincial Governments. There are two points on which I suggest you may consult him. One is about the financial implications of the abolition

of the zamindari system² and the other about the necessity of finding alternative sources of revenue for the loss on account of prohibition. It is not my purpose to suggest that you should drop or slow down measures of social or agrarian reform which, in your judgment, may have become long overdue and for which indeed there may be clamorous public demand in your province. But the ways and means position at present is somewhat difficult and it would appear wise, before entering into heavy commitments, to consult our expert department before you come to your decisions.

9. During the last few days you must have seen references in the press to the possibility of early negotiations between us and the Governments of Burma³ and Ceylon⁴ for the settlement of all outstanding matters between the Government of India and these two Governments. The position is that we are anxious to see these negotiations through in course of the next two months so that by the time Burma attains independence and Ceylon attains Dominion Status, the problems of Indians residing or having interest in these two countries will have been satisfactorily solved. I have already invited Thakin Nu,⁵ the Prime Minister of Burma, to pay us a visit in the first week of December and am waiting for a reply from him. The Prime Minister of Ceylon, Mr. Senanayake, has himself expressed a wish to come over to New Delhi some time in December⁶ for the purpose of a discussion with me and I have written to our Representative in Ceylon⁷ that I will welcome such a visit. My Secretariat will doubtless keep you in touch with the nature and scope of the proposed discussions, but I myself will bear in mind the desirability of associating the Provincial representatives with the discussions when they start formally.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The bills abolishing the zamindari system were introduced in the legislatures of Madras, Bihar and U.P. between November 1947 and September 1949.
3. These were about the immigration of Indian labour into Burma, the claims of Indian evacuees who had left behind properties in Burma, and the citizenship rights of Indians.
4. Negotiations were being conducted regarding the legislative measures in 1947, depriving Indians in Sri Lanka of civil rights and privileges.
5. (b. 1907); leading member of Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League; foreign minister under Ba Maw, 1943-45; President, Burmese Constituent Assembly, 1947; Prime Minister, July 1947-57; 1958 and 1960-62.
6. The Burmese Prime Minister Thakin Nu, the Foreign Minister U. Tin Tut and the General Secretary of the A.F.P.P.L, U. Ba Swe, arrived on 1 December 1947 and stayed till 5 December.
7. V.V. Giri.

IV

New Delhi

22 November 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

I am writing to you a special letter apart from my usual fortnightly ones, as you are coming to Delhi and certain events have happened to which I should like to draw your attention.

2. The most important of these is the meeting of the All India Congress Committee which passed a number of resolutions which you must have seen.¹ These resolutions to some extent repeat the old policy of the Congress. But in the context of events today this policy takes on a new turn and is of vital significance. During the past months with the upsurge of communal feeling there has been considerable confusion in the minds of our people about the attitude that we should adopt. Even many Congressmen have given way to this mental turmoil and confusion. It became necessary therefore for the A.I.C.C. to repeat with emphasis this basic policy on which we have built up our national movement and which has led us to the success we have so far achieved.

3. I shall not repeat these resolutions because you have no doubt studied them carefully. They emphasize the non-communal, democratic and secular character of our approach to the nation's problems. They lay down a policy for the refugees. They make clear that we cannot compromise our ideals because communal organisations are for the moment shouting a great deal and influencing public opinion. They issue a grave warning against private armies.

4. As a Government, whether central or provincial, we cannot and should not show partiality to any group or party. But as a Government we are not merely a group of individuals but have certain ideals and policies. If any

1. The A.I.C.C. meeting, held in Delhi from 15 to 17 November 1947, adopted resolutions on elimination of foreign rule and the fundamental policy of the Congress, refugees and evacuees, the States, communal organisations, private armies, decontrol, the Congress constitution and objectives, and the Economic Programme Committee.

individual or group challenges and opposes those ideals and policies we have to accept that challenge and meet that opposition with full strength. We propose to do so.

5. It is not necessary for me to write to you about the disastrous results of the evil policy followed by the Muslim League and the Pakistanis during the past few years. All of us are fully aware of this and we have seen the consequence of it. We have to continue to be vigilant, for the consequences of that evil policy have not exhausted themselves yet. There is tension and danger still and we cannot relax. Some people talk rather foolishly of war not perhaps appreciating what this means. Such talks should not be indulged in. But we have to remember that the present situation is full of dangerous possibilities and we have to be prepared for all contingencies.

6. In Kashmir we have had a remarkable success which is redounding to the credit of our army, air force and airlines. It has also placed before the country a brave example of Hindu, Muslim and Sikh Kashmiris uniting in defence of their homeland, under the leadership of an outstanding personality, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Greater even than the military success has been this psychological triumph which has stemmed the tide of the communal current in India to some extent.

7. But it would be folly to imagine that we are out of the wood in Kashmir. Kashmir is vital to us from many points of view. Kashmir is also vital to Pakistan and so there is an inherent conflict in the situation, whatever form or shape it might take. In spite of our intense desire that Kashmir should remain with India we have offered a referendum of the people, in pursuance of our general policy. We are prepared to take that risk rather than abandon our principles. We hope and believe that the referendum will result in Kashmir remaining with India. But it is obvious that no referendum can take place till Kashmir is free of the raiders. This may take some months and during these months much may happen which will affect the possibility of a referendum. After all one cannot have it both ways—war and referendum. If a referendum is agreed to then this petty war must end. If this armed struggle continues for some time then the decision comes through other means than referendum.

8. The present position in Kashmir State is not very satisfactory and large numbers of tribal people and ex-servicemen from Pakistan are crossing the Kashmir border into the Poonch areas. In a military sense the problem is not difficult and we shall no doubt deal with it. But owing to the approach of winter and the difficult nature of the terrain it may take us some time to clear Kashmir wholly of the raiders.

9. The Hyderabad situation has no military significance for us in spite of

all manner of alarms. I do not know yet what the result of our talks with the Hyderabad Delegation will be.² But in view of the presence of a very bigoted and well-armed organisation in Hyderabad there might be some local trouble there.

10. Possibilities of trouble surrounded us and yet we have no fear in the military sense. We can meet these troubles and overcome them, but we have to keep prepared for all possibilities. It is undesirable for alarmist notes to be struck in speeches or statements. This merely frightens our people and creates sometimes an unnecessary feeling of panic.

11. I think I have previously written to you that in spite of the more obvious problems that confront us, the basic problems still continue to be economic. We dare not delay in tackling it however occupied we might be. I trust that your Government will push ahead with development schemes, for our ultimate future depends upon them. Provinces, which have been thinking of liquidating the Zamindari system or of other measures of social reform, should finish these tasks as soon as possible. We cannot take too much time over every step for we have to go far. I should like to draw your special attention to the A.I.C.C. resolution on economic policy.³ This will be drawn up by a sub-committee later but the general approach is clearly indicated in the preamble.

12. I have drawn your attention previously to the urgent necessity of building up home guards. We hope that soon arrangements will be made for the proper training of our youth in schools and colleges. Later we hope to have a proper militia.

13. We are giving intensive thoughts at present to the question of controls which has agitated the public mind for a long time and about which the A.I.C.C. passed a resolution.⁴ We hope that during your stay in Delhi a small conference will be arranged between the Prime Ministers of Provincial Governments and some representatives of the Government of India to dis-

2. A delegation consisting of Moin Nawaz Jung, Abdur Rahim and P.V. Reddy was in Delhi from 31 October to 7 November 1947. The Government of India rejected its plea for changes in the draft standstill agreement. The delegation came again on 25 November 1947 to finalise the agreement. On this occasion, Mountbatten was also present at the meeting.

3. The resolution on economic policy laid down that real democracy based on social justice and equality could be achieved by the following methods : planned central direction, control of production and distribution, decentralisation of political and economic power, realization of regional and national self-sufficiency, development of key industries in the State sector and exploitation of natural resources.

4. It recommended the need for decontrol, specially of foodstuffs and cloth.

cuss this vital problem and to find out a solution by general agreement which can be given effect to cooperatively by the Centre and the provinces alike in full measure.

14. I would again draw your attention to the necessity of building up an effective intelligence service. The old intelligence service represented the old regime and is totally unsuited to present conditions. It is, therefore, to be rebuilt anew with new objectives and methods.

15. There is one matter which I should specially like to mention to you and that is the relation of the Governor and the Ministers in each province. The Governor is a constitutional head now and the burden of responsibility falls on the Ministry. But that certainly does not mean that the Governor should be ignored. As a matter of fact many of the Governors at present are old and valued colleagues of ours. We sent them to the provinces because we wanted to give every help to the provinces. Some of the provinces have in fact profited by the presence of a new Governor a good deal. There has been every cooperation between the Ministry and the Governor and he has been able to help and advise his Ministry. In some cases however the Governor has been rather isolated and the Ministry has not developed the practice of conferring with him, sending papers to him or of taking his advice. This is very unfortunate and it means our wasting some of our best men when they could be perhaps more usefully employed elsewhere. If we find that a Governor is not being utilised sufficiently in a particular province, then we shall have to consider the question of removing him from the province and giving him some more worthwhile work to do.

16. In strict constitutional practice the Governor should be kept informed of all important happenings and should be consulted by the Prime Minister or other Ministers in regard to every important step taken, such as legislation, economic policy and the like. We have a tremendous number of difficult problems to face and the Ministry should welcome the help and advice which an experienced and well-tried Governor can give. I trust therefore that where there is not this full cooperation between the Governor and the Ministry, a change will come about leading to frequent consultation and cooperation.

17. Finally, I should like to repeat that the danger to us is not so much external as internal. Reactionary forces and communal organisations are trying to disrupt the structure of free India. They do not realise that if disruption comes they will also be swept away in this process. But of course disruption will not come and we have to meet these reactionary forces squarely and firmly.

18. I regret that some of the Prime Ministers do not write to me regular letters. I am thankful to others who have done so.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

V

New Delhi
2 December 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

I wrote to you last only 10 days ago. Since then events have moved fast and we have taken vital decisions, some of which will have the most far-reaching effects on our future. There is little doubt that this old country of ours is pulsating with life; and however ugly some of the recent manifestations of this energy may have been I feel that we are on the move in a vigorous dynamic way.

2. In my two previous letters I had written to you about Hyderabad and the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen. You will now have read in the papers that the Nizam has signed a standstill agreement for one year. This is exactly the same agreement as the one which the Chattari Delegation had previously executed; and the Nizam had gained nothing from his dismissal of Chattari and the installation in power of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen representatives. In retrospect it seems to me that if the Nizam has gained nothing by this, it has not been altogether without advantage to us. If the Nizam had signed this agreement when it was presented to him by the Chattari Delegation it would have been savagely attacked by the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen and there might well have been great turmoil and confusion in the Deccan. Now that the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen has itself sponsored the agreement there is a chance that it will be worked smoothly or at any rate without any major attempt to wreck it by subversive and violent means.

3. I expect some people are a trifle disappointed that we have not yet got Hyderabad to accede to the Dominion of India. You will appreciate, of course, that what has happened actually might be described as accession for a period of one year. This is a limited gain. But in view of our commitments in the rest of the country, particularly in Kashmir and the Punjab, and the nature of our relations with Pakistan we would have been foolish to bring about a situation which would have involved us in any major military com-

mitment in South India. Moreover, it seems to me quite clear that the Nizam cannot possibly reverse the process initiated by the signing of the standstill agreement. He is bound in due course to align his fortunes irrevocably with the Dominion of India; and internally he is bound to give increasing attention to the views of his people, however much he and the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen might dislike doing so. The breathing space which he has got by the standstill agreement may be of some tactical value to him at present, partly in assuaging his own pride and partly in giving him some freedom of the manoeuvre in dealing with his internal difficulties. But this same breathing time is also of value to us and cannot possibly do us any harm.

4. I think we may now say that, as a result of the signing of the agreement with the Nizam, the process of political consolidation which I referred to in my letter of the 15th November has advanced notably. India, instead of falling apart as many people feared and some evil ones had hoped, is now a political entity; and its foundations are deeper than before the 15th of August because instead of depending for stability on the external authority of the British Crown the new India is relying increasingly on the solid foundation of the will of the people.

5. In dealing with this subject in this broad historical perspective I am not ignoring the possibility that there might still be dangers ahead in the immediate future. I appreciate that the Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, which is trying to entrench itself behind a facade of an interim government, may precipitate matters internally but I am convinced that any action we may have to take will be what may be called "police" action, not military. You will of course continue, as we shall here, to keep a close watch on developments in Hyderabad.

6. The position in Kashmir is, broadly speaking, much the same as I stated in my last letter. One detachment of our forces deployed from Uri has taken Poonch; and another deployed from Jammu has taken Kotli. I regret, however, that we were not able to relieve Mirpur which fell to the raiders. In the meanwhile the position has somewhat deteriorated in the hinterland of Jammu; large numbers of raiders have struck between Jammu and Naushahra; there has been much arson and looting; and thousands of refugees are streaming across the country. We have received reliable information that several thousands of well-armed tribesmen have gathered in Gujrat and Jhelum districts and some also in Sialkot.

7. We have now reassessed the military situation in Kashmir. This was necessary in any case because the immediate objectives which we had planned for originally have been largely gained and we had to consider what

next to do. Also, the onset of winter, the extension of our lines of communication, the disposition of large numbers of raiders in neighbouring West Punjab districts, and the attitude of the people of Poonch towards our army which has been described as not friendly, have all made it necessary to decide on the second phase of our plan.

8. You will have seen in the newspapers that we have had exploratory talks with the Pakistan Ministers on various subjects including Kashmir. Nothing could have been more inauspicious than the beginning of these talks. Liaquat Ali Khan had sent me, just before he arrived, a copy of a telegram addressed by him to Mr. Attlee which was most offensive and I had almost decided that it was no use trying to enter into discussions with him. But when I met him and talked to him, he was not unreasonable and we have made some progress. I shall be going to Lahore on the 8th December for the Joint Defence Council meeting and I expect to continue my talks there. We are keeping in touch with Sheikh Abdullah.

9. In the meanwhile, there have been discussions on some other highly controversial issues which had been previously remitted to the Arbitral Tribunal. These discussions were conducted in an atmosphere of cordiality and have resulted in agreements which I regard as eminently satisfactory. I cannot account for this change of atmosphere so far as the Pakistan authorities are concerned except, I suppose, that they now realise that their economy has become shattered and they just cannot afford to have increasing conflict with us.

10. Altogether, the situation today is much brighter than it was a fortnight or even a week ago. I do not think that is merely a fortuitous patch; I believe it is a sign that things are definitely taking a turn for the better. However, it would be disastrous to be complacent; and I am not altogether without some apprehension about the tribesmen. There is increasing evidence that those of them who have congregated in Gujrat and Jhelum are not amenable to the control of the West Punjab Government and it is by no means unlikely that they may create a problem for us to deal with. At a conference I had yesterday with the senior officers of the Defence Services, I told them that while war is an evil thing for both victors and vanquished and we must never think in terms of aggression against Pakistan, we must be absolutely prepared in case of eventualities and keep our Defence Services in a state of fighting efficiency. There will, in the immediate future, be no question of demobilisation; there may even be, if it becomes necessary, a certain degree of re-mobilisation. If Pakistan knows that our Defence Services are maintained at a high level of efficiency, that would by itself prevent any mischief.

11. I will now turn to a topic entirely different from the above but none the less pressing and important. Your Government will have got the circular telegram No. 10053 dated the 28th November from our Ministry of Food regarding the revision of foodgrains policy. This is a major step which we have taken after very considerable thought and not altogether without some misgiving. The issues are highly controversial; and over them the press is divided, the public is divided and almost every Cabinet has been divided. But the fact that there have been genuine and sharp differences of opinion did not make a decision any the less urgent; we simply could not evade it and let events overtake us. I am sure that now that a decision has been taken, your Government will do everything to implement it faithfully. The greatest single fact or that will ensure that the revised policy will conduce to the public interests is the psychological factor, and if you can make the people feel that not only is the policy intended for their benefit but that you are fully confident that it is going to work for their benefit, that will have the greatest possible value.

12. I fully recognise that the decision taken by Government entails a certain amount of risk. The new policy is based on the expectation that decontrol would bring out more stocks than at present under control; and that these stocks would be distributed without serious hoarding or profiteering. Only experience will show whether these expectations will be fulfilled or not. If they are, the country would gain immensely; the pace of return to normalcy would be quickened; administrative personnel at present engaged on controls would be released for more urgent and productive tasks; and there would be general public satisfaction. On the other hand, should the shortage in the country be really serious and there should be an increase of hoarding and profiteering on the part of traders and large producers and of panic among consumers, then consequences would be extremely serious. The economic structure of the country as a whole will be shaken severely. Our plans for the development of the country will suffer a serious setback. In these circumstances the need for watching developments carefully and being prepared against possible emergencies cannot be overemphasised. Specific suggestions have been made regarding the safeguards,¹ which are necessary for this purpose, in paras 10 to 12 of the circular telegram to which I would draw your particular attention.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. These were: fixation of basic quotas for surplus areas, a ceiling on import quotas for deficit areas, restriction on inter-provincial movement of foodgrains and continuance of control on rice, wheat and millets.

VI

New Delhi

7 December 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

Reports have reached me of big demonstrations organised by the R.S.S. in some provinces. Often these demonstrations have been held in spite of prohibitory orders like Section 144. Some provincial authorities have taken no action in this matter and apparently accepted this defiance of orders. I do not wish to interfere with your discretion in this matter. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that this acquiescence in defiance is likely to have grave consequences.

2. We have a great deal of evidence to show that the R.S.S. is an organisation which is in the nature of a private army and which is definitely proceeding on the strictest Nazi lines, even following the technique of organisation. It is not our desire to interfere with civil liberties. But training in arms of large numbers of persons with the obvious intention of using them is not something that can be encouraged. The fact that the R.S.S. is definitely and deliberately against the present Central and Provincial Governments need not be considered enough for any action to be taken against them and any legitimate propaganda might certainly be allowed. But their activity more and more goes beyond these limits and it is desirable for Provincial Governments to keep a watchful eye and to take such action as they may deem necessary.

3. Some Provincial Governments have taken action against periodicals for promoting hatred between communities. Probably the newspapers of the R.S.S. are more to blame in this matter than any other newspapers or periodicals outside Pakistan. It is amazing how they carry on this communal propaganda in its extremist form.

4. I have some knowledge of the way the Nazi movement developed in Germany. It attracted by its superficial trappings and strict discipline considerable numbers of lower middle class young men and women who are normally not too intelligent and for whom life appeared to offer little to attract them. And so they drifted towards the Nazi party because its policy and programme, such as they were, were simple, negative and did not require an active effort of the mind. The Nazi party brought Germany to ruin and I have little doubt that if these tendencies are allowed to spread and increase in India, they would do enormous injury to India. No doubt India would survive. But she would be grievously wounded and would take a long time to recover.

5. Our young men, now full of vitality, find few outlets for this vitality and so they drift towards wrong channels. This is a serious matter for the future of the country and we cannot look on silently while this is happening. It is of course completely opposed to Congress policy in the past or in the present. Unfortunately a number of Congressmen, without thinking, are attracted to this development of fascist and Nazi modes of thought and practice. I have ventured therefore to draw your attention to this for we will ignore it at our peril.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

VII

New Delhi
19 December 1947

My dear Premier,

I have addressed you hitherto as Prime Minister but today I am addressing you as Premier. This is in accordance with the proposal which was conveyed to you in previous correspondence from my Secretariat and which was agreed to by all the Provincial Heads of Cabinet who replied. One of them was in fact somewhat indignant with me the other day that I continued to address him as Prime Minister.

2. I have just returned from a brief tour of Allahabad, Kanpur and Calcutta. For me it has been an unforgettable experience. I saw hundreds of thousands of faces—there were 10 lakhs on the Calcutta maidan alone—all so eager, so full of affection and trying so pathetically to express their joy at the occasion. Looking at those faces, I felt reassured that the Congress continues to draw its strength from the heart of the people and, in spite of all the travails through which we have gone, the Congress message continues to find a ready response from them. It is good to know this. But along with this sense of gratification, I felt an immense and almost overpowering sense of responsibility. Many of the bodies were weak and emaciated and the clothes were tattered; and these millions look to us with a faith which is almost child-like in its simplicity to give them food, clothing and shelter. We have in the past, in taking part in the political fight against the British rule, been in continuous touch with this emaciation and this misery which have, in fact, been the driving force of our activity. But we can no longer, now that we are in the seats of power, afford any delay in the solution of this problem. That would be a betrayal of a trust; and it would spell disaster on the country.

3. The Central Government has, during the last few days, been thinking more and more of this basic problem of poverty—which we had temporarily put in a second place amidst the preoccupations of communal disorder. You may have noticed from the papers that I spoke at length to the Associated Chambers of Commerce in Calcutta; and I stressed that the sole test of our economic policy, by whatever name it is called, is the raising of the level of the common man. Our Industries Minister has also been having an industries conference, one of whose primary tasks is to suggest ways and means of stepping up the production of various commodities of primary importance, both immediately and in the long run.¹ This conference was very representative of all the various interests concerned and it achieved a remarkable success which is full of promise for the future. Representatives of capital and labour, as well as of the provincial governments and States, decided unanimously to observe a three-year truce in industry—no lockouts, strikes etc.—and to have a machinery for the settlement of industrial disputes. I would particularly draw your attention to all the resolutions of this conference as they are of far-reaching importance. The Central and Provincial Governments are pledged to give effect to them as speedily as possible.

4. As I informed you in my letter of the 15th October, we have appointed here a Cabinet sub-committee to go into economic questions, and I suggest it would be a good idea if you had a similar sub-committee of your Cabinet to discuss economic problems in so far as they affect your province. Ministers tend to get submerged in the affairs of day-to-day administration. These affairs are important enough, but it seems to me of the greatest importance that some at least of the Ministers must be in a position to devote continuous thought to the question of ways and means of fulfilling the primary economic functions of Government. It is necessary also, as I explained in my speech to the Associated Chambers, that we must deal with these problems with the same sense of urgency as in the event of war.

5. The recent strike² of Government servants in Madras illustrates very sharply the difficulties we are in and the dangers we shall have to face if we do not give close thought to economic consequences of State action in various fields. There has been a sharp rise in the cost of living in Madras. This

1. On 18 December 1947 the Industries Conference at Delhi called upon the labour and the management "to agree to maintain industrial peace and avert lockouts, strikes or slowing down of production during the next three years".

2. The non-gazetted employees of the Madras Government were on strike from 5 to 21 December 1947.

has happened elsewhere but the rise in Madras has been somewhat sharper than in the rest of the country, and the effect on the salaried classes there has undoubtedly been severe. The difficulty has probably been accentuated by the fact that salaries in Madras have tended to be on the low side. The Madras Government are anxious to deal fairly with their employees but are hamstrung by their financial difficulties. In a recent letter to me the Madras Premier wrote as follows :—

With the loss of revenue of 17 crores owing to the introduction of complete prohibition, the revenue of this province will actually be about 30 crores. Our present salary bill is about 24 crores. New schemes which had to be sanctioned in the course of the year cost another crore. The Special Police Force units and the Home Guards and Civic Guards proposed to be started will cost the Government another three crores with the result that the salary bill of the Government will be almost equal to the revenues leaving no money for nation-building activities or other ameliorative measures.

This is a serious situation. The Madras Government feel that if their employees do not call off the strike, they must face it resolutely and not yield to their threats. This of course is right but something more may have to be done. In any case, it seems necessary that each Provincial Government should review its financial position carefully, particularly in regard to schemes of social reform which they may have in contemplation involving immediate loss of revenue. You will recollect that in a letter dated the 15th November I particularly stressed the importance of consulting my Finance Ministry on such proposals.

6. While on this subject of economic conditions in the country, I would like to draw your attention to the problem of the Grow More Food Campaign.³ An officer of our Ministry of Agriculture has started on a tour of various provinces with a view to ascertaining why this campaign was such a failure and what can be done to get it going again on the right lines. That it has been a failure is a fact which, I fear, admits of no doubt and yet it is astonishing that it should have been a failure considering that everyone knew of the urgency of making it a success and all the resources of Provincial Governments and the Centre were harnessed to make it a success. This is a matter which requires urgent review on the part of all Provincial Governments.

3. The Grow More Food Campaign was initiated by the Government of India on 6 April 1942.

I am aware that the proper assessment of the Grow More Food Campaign was rendered difficult by the paucity and, in some areas, the complete absence of statistical data. We are giving renewed attention here to the necessity of having a central statistical organisation, but no such organisation can function effectively without competent provincial counterparts. The Ministry of Agriculture have requested the provinces in their letter No. F9-7/47-St. dated 23/27th November 1947 to examine the proposals received from the F.A.O. for conducting a world agricultural census in 1950 and to consider what measures they will have to undertake to collect the data required by the F.A.O. The occasion of the world census provides a valuable opportunity for collecting accurate data relating to the various aspects of the food and agricultural economy of the country which are so essential for plans of development. I hope your Government will take every possible step to mobilise all statistical data lying unused in village, tehsil and district records and undertake special enquiries for collecting such data as may not already be available.

7. Some of the letters that I have received from Provincial Premiers refer to the feeling in the country that the campaign in Kashmir has proved to be a slow affair. This is quite true. Although we have sent an army of a fairly considerable size to Kashmir, they are having to fight in conditions of extreme difficulty both of terrain and of lines of communication. Moreover, there is authentic evidence that increasing pressure is being put on our troops from fresh hordes of armed people coming through Pakistan. Thousands of Pathans have already come down to Jhelum and Gujrat districts and to some extent into Sialkot and there they are being grouped, trained and kept in formation with the obvious connivance of Pakistan officials. We must presume that the Pakistan Government is directly encouraging this heavy infiltration of tribesmen and others on the Kashmir-Jammu border, but there is also evidence that to some extent these people are getting somewhat out of hand and the Pakistan authorities are not finding it too easy to control them. From the merely military point of view, the army authorities are satisfied that they have enough resources to hold the position, but it would be ignoring the realities of the situation to expect any spectacular military success in the winter. In the meanwhile, I have received a telegram from Liaquat Ali Khan which, in its tone, is in marked contrast to his previous effusions and expresses the desire for a peaceful and honourable settlement. Nevertheless the activities of the Pakistan authorities in regard to Kashmir belie this approach and we have to give serious thought to our future course of action. The gap between us is so wide at present that it is difficult to see on what basis a settlement can be made in the near future. However, he will be seeing me in Delhi next week and we shall go into the matter further.

8. I have written to you more than once of the steadily increasing political consolidation of the country. This process took a further march last week in

the shape of agreements between the States Ministry and certain Rulers of the Eastern States and the Chhatisgarh States in Central and Eastern India. The incorporation of large numbers of States which for centuries had been subjected to autocratic and tyrannical misrule into the administrative framework of provinces is a welcome political development. At the same time, it imposes a heavy obligation on the provinces concerned to see that the new areas brought under their administrative control are brought up as rapidly as possible to at least the level obtaining in the provincial areas.

9. I had written to you in my letter of the 2nd November regarding Home Guards. I have not yet been able to get a clear picture of what is actually being done. One province speaks of 2500 Home Guards, another of 1200 in the provincial capital and a couple of thousands in the districts and a third speaks of a scheme for training a million Home Guards in a year. The selection, training and disposition of these Guards is a matter of the utmost importance and I hope you will keep me and the Home Ministry informed in some detail of what you have actually achieved in your province and what your further plans are.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Status of the Constituent Assembly¹

Jawaharlal Nehru: Mr. President,² Sir, I am not quite sure which of these two questions I am supposed to take first. I am suffering under a disadvantage. I have been trying to follow what has been said in this House very closely; but, roughly speaking, I have heard about one-fourth of what has been said. I do not know whether the acoustics of this hall have changed or owing to our experiences of the last few days our voices have changed or something has happened. It is either a roar or a whisper. I found it difficult to follow either the roar or the whisper.

If I may deal with the constitutional point that has been raised more or less as a layman than as an expert, it seems to me perfectly clear that this House is obviously a sovereign body and can do just what it likes, admitting that the House does only things which it has itself decided to do. It can change its own decisions. It can change its own rules but so long as the rules subsist, it follows its own rules. If it wants, it can change them. Therefore there is no doubt that this House has the right to carry on as a Legislative Assembly if it wants to from tomorrow or any time it likes but before doing so, it should come to that decision and frame its rules accordingly. I would therefore submit that the proper course for us to take is for the President to appoint a small committee which can report to us in two or three days time as to what rules we should have for this interim period. There is an obvious difficulty in our functioning as the Legislative Assembly as we are. For instance, questions may be asked and members of Government in charge of those portfolios will have to answer. Well, Sir, you are yourself a member of Government and if a question is asked in regard to the Department of Food or Agriculture, is the President supposed to reply or who is supposed to reply?

A difficulty arises. A number of Ministers are not members of this House. They may, I think, ever under the existing rules attend the House and speak without voting, but all these things will have to be gone into and clarified before we can really function as a Legislative Assembly. There is no doubt that we can make any rules we like. We can ask the Ministers to come and function as members of the House if we so choose. Therefore I beg to suggest that the President do appoint a committee to report to us, say, within three days as to how we should function during this intervening period. We are

1. Reply to a debate on the status and scope of work of the Constituent Assembly and on the reported acts of insult and dishonour to the national flag at Agra Fort, Hyderabad and Jabalpur, 20 August 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. V, 1947, pp. 26-33.
2. Rajendra Prasad.

meeting now obviously as the Constituent Assembly, though we can meet otherwise also. It is clear that if this Constituent Assembly as such had no work to do, supposing we had finished our preliminary work of laying down the principles of the Union Constitution a fortnight or three weeks ago, we would not be meeting today. We would have met on the 14th night and 15th morning for that particular purpose and adjourned till September or October for the next session of the Constituent Assembly. We are meeting, therefore, because we had not finished our work a fortnight ago and we want to complete it in the next week or whatever time it may take, so that the real detailed constitution may complete and then we may meet some time in October, possibly, finally to pass that constitution; so that at the present moment rather casually treating this as a Legislative Assembly will lead us into all manner of difficulties, but if the House so chooses i.e. in regard to information being supplied by members of Government or anything else, naturally the members of Government will be happy to supply it. The point is that everything should be done in a methodical way. So I submit, Sir, that the best course would be for you to appoint a committee to report in two or three days as to what procedure we should follow and if necessary we can change our rules to that end.³

Now, in regard to the questions put by some of the members, some of them I could not follow at all. Seth Govind Das said something and except for the fact that he said something about Jabalpur, I did not at all follow what happened in Jabalpur. I tried to follow him, but I am sorry, due probably to my own hearing, I could not. So also another member whom I could not easily follow. But briefly, I would say this, that obviously the Government in common with the House attaches the very greatest importance to the fact that the national flag should be honoured and that any dishonour to the flag anywhere must be enquired into and necessary steps taken. Two or three instances that were brought to notice regarding something that happened at Agra Fort are being enquired into. I believe the U.P. Government....⁴

I cannot say off-hand, because I have received 7,000 telegrams in the last four or five days and it is a little difficult immediately to say whether I received the particular telegram. It is physically impossible for an individual or for a group of individuals to analyse them or even to read them quickly.

3. On the suggestion of Nehru, the President of the Constituent Assembly formed a committee with G.V. Mavalankar as chairman, and Hussain Imam, Purushottamdas Tandon, Ambedkar, Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, Goplaswami Ayyangar and B.L. Mitter as members. The committee reported on 25 August 1947 that the Constituent Assembly might also function as a dominion legislature though the two types of work should remain distinct from each other.
4. Balkrishna Sharma intervened to ask if Nehru had received his telegram about incidents concerning the national flag.

We are doing it with all possible speed.

Now, we are enquiring from the U.P. Government regarding those incidents and I am sure our Defence Department is also enquiring and we shall take necessary steps.

As regards Jabalpur, I know nothing. I shall be very happy if Seth Govind Das will supply me with the facts separately and we shall enquire into the matter and take the necessary steps.

About Hyderabad I understand that our States Department immediately enquired into this and the Hyderabad Government categorically denied any insult to the national flag and they said that they had allowed it to be flown everywhere and certainly to their knowledge any such thing did not take place.

2. Legislative Work¹

Recent changes and developments have put an end to the old Legislative Assembly and the Constituent Assembly will now function as the Legislative Assembly for India. The Legislative Assembly Department is for the present rather headless till such time as the Constituent Assembly functions as a Legislative Assembly. Probably, the correct view is that the President of the Constituent Assembly becomes automatically the head of the Legislative Assembly Department.

In any event it is clear that the Legislative Assembly Department should function from now onwards under the directions of the President of the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly has recently appointed a sub-committee to consider when and how the Constituent Assembly should function as a Legislative Assembly. This sub-committee will report soon and probably before the Constituent Assembly session and some final decisions will be taken by the Constituent Assembly.

Meanwhile, as I have said above, the Legislative Assembly Department should function directly under the President of the Constituent Assembly. This does not mean that it should be merged into the Constituent Assembly Secretariat. It should continue as a separate entity. It should, however, fully cooperate in any work of the Constituent Assembly which is allotted to it or any members of its staff by the President of the Constituent Assembly.

1. Note, 23 August 1947. File No. 16(7)/47-PMS. Since some doubts had arisen about the position of the Legislative Assembly Department, Nehru clarified the position in this note to the President of the Constituent Assembly.

3. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
6 November 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have your letter of the 2nd November about the proposed conference of Governors.²

I consulted my colleagues about this and while they welcome the opportunity of meeting the Governors here, they point out some difficulties. The position of the Governors is very different from what it was previously and constitutionally their authority is very limited. We can hardly deal with them over the heads of their Prime Ministers and Governments. This might lead to misunderstanding. Most of the subjects that might be discussed are subjects with which the Provincial Governments are dealing.

At the same time it is obviously desirable for the Governors to meet together here and meet us to discuss the general situation and in particular the relations that should subsist between them and their Governments. No particular agenda for this is necessary.

I think it would be better if the Prime Ministers were previously informed of this conference, so as to avoid misunderstanding. I am, therefore, writing to the Prime Ministers on the subject.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 9-GG/47, p. 9, President's Secretariat.
2. Mountbatten had proposed that a conference of Governors be held early in 1948 with an agenda including subjects such as food, economic conditions, law and order and minorities.

4. To Premiers of the Provinces¹

New Delhi
6 November 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

You must know that it used to be the practice in previous years for the Viceroy to invite all the Governors once a year or so at a kind of Governors' conference in New Delhi with a view to discussing important matters affecting the Government of the country. The position now is different and Governors function as constitutional heads, just as the Governor-General.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

Real discussions have now to be conducted between the Prime Ministers or other representatives of the Central and Provincial Governments.

Nevertheless, it seems desirable that all the Governors might meet in Delhi and have informal talks with the Ministers of the Central Government as well as among themselves. The present Governors are our colleagues and their help and cooperation should be taken in our work; it is indeed being taken in some provinces. The situation we have to face is a difficult one and it is desirable for all of us, Governors or Ministers, to appreciate it fully. Only then can there be proper cooperation.

There is also the question of the relations between the Governors and their Ministers. It is desirable to clear this up. While the Governors cannot, and should not, interfere, except perhaps to draw the attention of the Central Government in important matters, it is clear that they can be of help to Ministries because of their experience of public affairs and the problems of the day. That experience should be fully utilised by the Ministries.

It is proposed, therefore, to invite the Governors to New Delhi sometime in January or February, subject to developments. The invitation would go from the Governor-General, but, in effect, it would be a meeting of the Governors with the Ministers of the Central Government, or some of them. It would be desirable for you to have a talk with your Governor before he comes here.

January and February are far off and much may happen, and will no doubt happen, before those days. I have thought it desirable, however, to inform you of this proposal, even at this early stage. I am sending a copy of this letter to your Governor also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Welcome to the New Speaker¹

Mr. Speaker, we meet in this room after a relatively brief interval and there are many old faces here and many new ones. But this interval has seen a sea change in the fate of our country and in the face of our country. We

1. 17 November 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. I, 1947, pp. 1-2.

meet today in a new capacity that of a sovereign legislative body.² We meet as the representatives of a free and independent India. We meet, I regret to say, as the representatives of not the whole of India as we have known it, but minus a part of it. Not only have these great and historical changes taken place, but during the last few months other events have happened which have brought shame to our country and to us. Nevertheless, we have faced these events in the past and we have to a large extent overcome them, if I may say so. But the problems that face us are colossal in their magnitude and it is a happy omen that we should start our business here today by the election³ that has taken place and which has placed you, Sir, in that high office. You bring to us the accumulated wisdom of that high office and those of us who have had the privilege of knowing you, value you as a councillor, a friend and a guide, and a leader in this House. It is a matter of great gratification and pleasure to me, to my Government and I am sure to every member of this House, that you have accepted this high office, because in the difficult times ahead you will have to face also difficult problems in guiding us, and we shall have the satisfaction of knowing that our guide is a true and trusted guide.

Therefore, Sir, with deference, I congratulate not you so much, but the House on the choice that it has made. I trust that, under your guidance, all of us, whether we are members of the Government or not, or members of this House, will discharge our duty without fear or favour, without affection or ill will to anybody. We have started this new life of ours by taking a new oath of allegiance, not to any external authority but to the interests of India, and in taking that oath I have no doubt we hope to discharge that duty to every single citizen of India, whatever he may be, wherever he may be, to whatever creed, religion or caste he may belong, without any partiality or without any favour.

I welcome you, Sir, and I congratulate the House on this happy occasion.

2. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, the Legislative Assembly, of which G.V. Mavalankar was President, was automatically dissolved on the Independence Day and the Constituent Assembly became the supreme sovereign and legislative body.
3. G.V. Mavalankar was unanimously elected Speaker of the Constituent Assembly (legislative side) on 17 November 1947.

6. To G. V. Mavalankar¹

New Delhi

12 December 1947

My dear Speaker,

I have just received your letter of the 12th. I am exceedingly sorry that you should have been put in this difficult position because of lack of foresight on our part. Munshi² told me that everything had been settled. Perhaps the method adopted was not a very satisfactory one. As the parties concerned had agreed, I had nothing further to say in the matter. Anyhow these arrangements were to tide over a present difficulty and a proper solution was to come later.

Satyanarayan Sinha told me this afternoon that another hitch had arisen. As Rajendra Babu had gone out of Delhi, I could do nothing more in the matter. I am myself going away for four days tomorrow morning.

I think you are perfectly right in the attitude you have taken up in your letter. It is unfortunate that this controversy³ should have started and taken the turn it has done. The sooner we end it the better. We shall try to put right any lacuna a little later.

I propose to attend the next meeting of the Steering Committee.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(47)-48/PMS.
2. In his Draft Constitution, K.M. Munshi provided for a Council of Elders to advise the President. Munshi, who believed at this time that the President should be directly elected, provided for a council comprised of 10 vice-presidents (who were to be representative of communal groups and princely states) and certain Cabinet Ministers. Only on the advice of this council could the President dissolve Parliament, assent or refuse assent to Bills and promulgate ordinances. With the concurrence of six members of this council, the President could take action against the will of Parliament.
3. There was a controversy on the position of Rajendra Prasad on the legislative side and Mavalankar as Speaker. Rajendra Prasad agreed to the election of another Speaker, provided he was subordinate to the President of the Constituent Assembly. Mavalankar demanded equality of status and full control over his Secretariat. Rajendra Prasad later retained the Presidentship of the Constituent Assembly, and Mavalankar took over as Speaker of the Legislative Assembly.
4. The rules of procedure of the Constituent Assembly provided for election by the Assembly of eleven members as a Steering Committee for arranging the order of business for the day, grouping similar motions together, securing assent of the members to composite notions and acting as a liaison body between the various wings, organs and functionaries of the Assembly.

7. To Govind Ballabh Pant¹

New Delhi
17 December 1947

My dear Pantji,

Under our present rules made by the Constituent Assembly a Minister can only continue in office, if he is not a member of the Constituent Assembly, for six months. Some ministers are not members of the C.A., and we have to take steps to get them elected before the 15th February, when the six months expire.

2. One of these Ministers is Maulana Azad. The present rules lay down that a Muslim should be elected by the Muslim members of the Provincial Assembly. We want to change this rule and make the election by joint electorates, i.e., by all the members of the Provincial Assembly. But this can only be done by the Constituent Assembly, and this is scheduled to meet in April next. It is proposed to have a special meeting of the Constituent Assembly on the 27th January, i.e., a day before the meeting of the C.A. (Legislative) for this purpose.

3. There is at least one Muslim vacancy in the U.P., that of the Raja of Mahmudabad. There may be another when Khaliquzzaman formally resigns. It may be possible for Maulana Azad to be elected even by the purely Muslim members if we request them to do so. But neither Maulana nor I would like to do this. It would be far better for him to come in through a joint electorate and indeed this is the principle we have adopted in the C.A.

4. I hope you will delay the election to fill the vacancy caused by the Raja of Mahmudabad's resignation till the rule is changed at the end of January. Further that you will fix up the election some time before the 15th February.

5. You mentioned to me when we saw each other last about the steps you intended to take against the R.S.S. Lal Bahadur gave me some further details of the information you possess. He told me that probably you will take some action within a fortnight and the first step you intended taking was to inform the leader of the R.S.S. of the evidence you possess. I am glad you are moving in this matter as it is becoming very evident that the R.S.S. is a most objectionable and dangerous organisation and it has been responsible for a great deal of the trouble we have had. In Ajmer recently it was the R.S.S. that functioned. I am sure we must not allow this mischief to continue.

1. J.N. Collection.

I hope you will move in this matter soon, if possible sooner than the fortnight.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. To Sri Krishna Sinha¹

New Delhi
29 December 1947

My dear Premier,

I have your letter of the 25th December. I do not wish to go into this matter. I think it will be desirable that certain uniform rules should be laid down for the governance of the relations of the Provincial Ministers and the Governor. It is perfectly true and you are right in saying that the Governor should not overrule any decision of the Ministry. At the same time, the Governor should be in a position to advise on any matter, but it is for the Ministers to accept that advice or not. He should, therefore, be cognizant of what is happening.

In all such matters, rules and regulations count or should count for little. It is the spirit of cooperation that helps in tiding over difficulties.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

REORGANISATION OF THE ARMED FORCES

1. To Padma Shumshere Jung Bahadur Rana¹

New Delhi
5 September 1947

My dear Maharaja Sahib,²

On my return to Delhi yesterday I received your letter of the 24th August regarding Gurkha regiments in the Indian Army.³ I quite agree with what you say in your letter and I do not see any necessity for a referendum. Indeed, I had pointed this out previously to the Supreme Commander here and, I believe, the proposed action was suspended immediately.

With all good wishes and my expressions of high consideration for Your Highness.

I am,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 4(4)-C.A./47. M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. (1892-1965); Commander, Pattan Brigade, 1910-29; led first Nepalese Contingent to India, 1915-16; President of Development Board, 1935-40; General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Nepalese Contingent in India, 1940-43; Chief Justice of Supreme Court of Nepal, 1943-45; in-charge of eight provinces of Nepal Terai, 1946-47.
3. He had written that a referendum on the future of the Gurkha regiments was unnecessary as the Governments of India and Britain had, with the approval of the Nepal Government, already agreed to allot to themselves six and four regiments, respectively. It was only necessary to ascertain whether the Gurkhas of the four regiments joining the British army were willing to serve abroad or not.

2. To Sir Claude Auchinleck¹

New Delhi
5 September 1947

My dear Field Marshal,

On my return yesterday to Delhi, I received a letter from His Highness the Maharaja Padma Shumshere Jung of Nepal. I enclose a copy of this letter. This letter is more or less on line with what we have said on this subject.

In view of the grave situation in India and the demand for military reinforcements in a number of places, I suggest that we should employ all the Gurkha regiments, including those who are intended for the British

1. File No. 4(4)-C.A./47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

Army. Thus far they are in the Indian Army and there can be no objection to their employment.²

I understand that there are a large number of Indian battalions in the North West Frontier Province at present. I suppose they have been kept there, pending reorganisation. While some of them may perhaps remain there for the present, others might well be employed elsewhere. They can be used for guarding camps of evacuees in northern Punjab; some of them might also be used for guarding camps of evacuees in the Frontier Province itself where the situation is tense and dangerous and many incidents have happened. I hope, however, that it will be possible to get some of the battalions across from Pakistan territory to Indian territory.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. Replying on 8 September, Auchinleck stated that all the 27 Gurkha battalions "now belong to the Army of India and are entirely at the disposal of your Government,..."

3. To Sir Claude Auchinleck¹

New Delhi
8 September 1947

My dear Field Marshal,

Thank you for your letter of the 8th September about the future of the Gurkha regiments.²

I have personally no objection to the procedure you have suggested or recapitulated but I do not think it quite fits in with the views of the Maharaja of Nepal as contained in his letter. I suggest, therefore, that this question should be finally settled after the Tripartite Conference.³ In this matter I feel that we should not do anything which might not be approved by the Government of Nepal.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 4(4)-C.A./47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Auchinleck wrote that Gurkha personnel of 19 Indian battalions would have prior claim to serve India and those men from the eight British battalions who also wished to serve India would be posted to the vacancies caused in 19 Indian battalions. Conversely, men of the British battalions would have first preference to serve the British Government and only in case of choice it would be extended to men from 19 Indian battalions.
3. The tripartite agreement signed on 9 November by the Governments of Britain, India and Nepal offered to the Gurkha soldiers protection of employment in their existing battalions under the Indian and British armies and also option to move from one army to another, if they so desired. The agreement also provided arrangements for substantial adjustments and facilities during the transitional period.

4. Nationalisation of the Armed Forces¹

Before the partition of India had become almost a settled fact, a target date of June 1948 was fixed for the complete nationalisation of the Indian Defence Forces. The Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee also came to the conclusion that nationalisation should be completed by June 1948, and they made various proposals to this end. Later the partition of India and the reorganisation necessitated by it delayed the carrying into effect of some of the proposals of this Committee. Subsequent happenings and disturbances have also come in the way of progress to this end.

2. It is agreed by all concerned that complete nationalisation should take place as early as possible. The main obstacle is said to be the lack of a sufficient number of officers, and more specially top-ranking officers. It has been stated that the present army requires about 19,000 officers, and the maximum number of Indian officers available is about 11,000. Thus there is a considerable gap which cannot easily be filled by promotion without loss of efficiency. These figures relate to a united army. But they give some indication of what the requirements will be for the divided armies of India and Pakistan. The present combined strength of the army for India and Pakistan is apparently about 400,000 combatant ranks.

3. Before the figure is fixed for the number of officers required, there must be a definite figure for the strength of the armed forces. This matter was discussed repeatedly in the Cabinet before the partition, and it was decided that the land forces should not exceed the pre-war level, that is between 210,000 and 220,000. These included, prior to the war, both the Indian units and the British Army units. In future there will obviously be no British Army units. But the total figure was fixed roughly at 210,000. This was prior to the partition.

4. The formation of Pakistan necessitates our reconsidering this figure. Normally speaking the figure should be reduced. It may be 175,000 or 150,000 land forces for India. These two figures might be taken to be the upper and lower figures.²

1. Note, 16 September 1947. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. At the end of July 1947 a provisional formula was reached for dividing the defence forces. Of the Indian army, 70 per cent would remain with India, and 30 per cent would go to Pakistan. The Royal Indian Navy would be similarly apportioned, 70/30. It was proposed that eight of the ten squadrons of the I.A.F. be transferred to India.

5. It is true that the partition does not make India more secure. Indeed it might be said to add to her insecurity and, therefore, an adequate army should be kept. Nevertheless more or less the same considerations apply now as previously, and an army of 175,000 should be adequate provided there is a trained militia behind it serving both for internal security and as a reservoir for the army.

6. During previous discussions a number of points were emphasised:—

- (1) That the strength of defence depends now-a-days more on the industrial development and potential of the country than on armed forces which cannot be fed sufficiently with war material unless there is industrial development. Otherwise the defence forces would have to depend upon another nation to supply them with the necessary equipment and material, and this would make them rather helpless. Further that modern war, even more than in former days, depends upon scientific research and application to keep abreast of the technique of warfare. It is necessary, therefore, to build up the industrial and scientific research before we can utilise our army to the full. Industry is also necessary to raise the standards of the people and thus give staying power to the country. The question thus becomes one of priority. If we spend too much on maintaining an army and too little on the development of industry and science, we do not add to the wealth of the nation and our resources shrivel up and we cannot even maintain that army.
- (2) We cannot aim in India now on being immediately prepared for a major war. If we did so, we would waste our energy without giving ourselves time to build it up. For the present we should aim at having defence forces which can keep internal security and preserve our frontiers. These defence forces should be capable of rapid growth in time of need.
- (3) Our financial and economic position being what it is, we cannot possibly afford the luxury of a large army.
- (4) It is better to concentrate on the development of the air arm which will strike rapidly and effectively and is relatively cheaper to maintain. Also this is likely to be most important to the defence forces in the future.

7. All this leads to the conclusion that the land forces should be relatively small but efficient, and should be backed up by a militia. The air arm should be developed as far as possible and the Navy, small but capable of develop-

ment, should be kept. For the rest we should concentrate on industrial development and scientific research.

8. The land forces should not exceed 175,000 men and should preferably be about 150,000. How many officers will we require for these forces? In one of the plans prepared by the General Staff provision was made for an army of 250,000 for an undivided India, and it was estimated that the officer requirements for such an army would be 7,952 combatant officers and about 900 medical officers. The officer requirements for an army of 150,000 or something more for the Dominion of India might be calculated on this basis. The number of officers would be at most 5,500.

9. In the report of the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee the number of officers required is stated to be 6,900 for all forces. It is not clear what the strength of the army was supposed to be. In this report it is stated that the Indian officers available by the end of 1947 would be over 9,500. There would be, of course, a shortage of senior Indian officers. It would appear that there is no shortage at all of Indian officers as a whole even now.

10. Then there are a large number of E.C.O.s many of whom have been disbanded. Probably the standard of these officers is not as high as it should be. But they have had some very valuable war experience and with a little more training many of them would make far better officers than new recruits. During the peak period of the war there were 14,900 Indian officers. A number of these must have been killed. A number may be totally unsuited for further employment or may not desire it. But there must be a considerable number among the disbanded E.C.O.s who would welcome service and who would prove capable and efficient if given a little more training. Thus there appears to be an adequate number of Indian officers available even now for complete nationalisation and to this can be added more who can be made available after a relatively short training. The question of lack of officers, therefore, does not arise at all.

11. The only possible difficulty might be a certain lack of senior and experienced Indian officers. It is difficult for me to judge of this. But if we provide for certain senior British officers in an advisory capacity or an advisory position and also probably some technical personnel, then the necessity for further employing British officers does not arise at all.

12. The figures I have given may not be wholly correct, but I imagine that they are approximately correct. They lead to the conclusion that there should be no difficulty at all in nationalising the Indian Army completely in the near future, keeping some technical British personnel and probably some senior advisors. I do not understand why it is supposed that there

is a lack of Indian officers. The figure of 19,000 officers which has been mentioned is not clear. Presumably it relates to a much larger army, that is of about 400,000. As we are proceeding on the basis of a smaller army, the number of officers is less and is well within the number available. This applies both to combatant officers and medical officers. It should, therefore, be relatively easy to nationalise the whole of the Indian Defence Forces rapidly.

5. India Above All¹

Soldiers of India, *Jai Hind*. I am for the first time speaking to you on the air today. For a long time now I have wanted to meet our soldiers, to tell them something about the new things happening in the world, to try to understand them and to make them understand me a little. But I do not get the opportunity because I am tied down to in so many things. However, I hope I will get more opportunities in the future. I have never worn a uniform except when I was in school, long years ago, but I consider myself a soldier and I fought for India's independence like a soldier in my own way.

You have been in the Indian army for years. You have been in the old Indian Army which has often shown its courage and valour to the world and was highly respected. That old army has now taken on a new colour and become the army of independent India. What does it mean? It has a great significance for everyone, for every Indian and for every soldier, because independence brings new responsibilities with it. We can now walk with heads held high and that is something to be proud of. But we have to take on new responsibilities and it is not possible to continue in the old way either in the army or in the country. Every individual in the country has to take on those responsibilities. But, in a sense, the soldier, whether in the Army, Navy or Air Force, has some special responsibilities. Along with the respect in which he is held, his responsibilities and burdens also increase

1. Broadcast to men of the armed forces, New Delhi, 18 September 1947. A.I.R. tapes, N.M.M.L. (Original in Hindi.) Also published in *The Hindustan Times*, 19 September 1947.

because as a free individual and the soldier of a free country he has to function in a new way. He has to constantly bear in mind his country's dignity and honour. He must not do anything which could be a blot on his country's name because when the world looks at him, it looks at his country. Earlier he was merely a soldier in an army, but now he becomes the citizen of an *independent country and it is in his power to increase or diminish his country's honour*. So what do you have to do? Whatever I have to do, you have to do the same. There is not much difference. Every individual has to bear in mind always that we have to serve our country because only when the country is strong and progressive, we are strong and alive and go forward. If our country becomes weak, we too will fall. We are alive only so long as India is alive. If India falls in any sense, then what value would our lives have? So the foremost task of every Indian, and especially a soldier, is that he should put his country above everything and serve her.

And what does a country mean? Bricks and stones alone do not make a country. It is the people who make a country. Whatever religion they may belong to, whoever they may be, if they are the citizens of our country, they are our brethren. If they all serve our country and have country's interests at heart, and do not look to any other country, then we have to maintain brotherly relations with them and serve them because they are our brothers too. So your task is not to take sides but to serve the country and her citizens.

Nowadays, unfortunately, there is unrest in some parts of our country. There have been riots. In such a situation, the soldiers have a greater responsibility because it becomes their special task to maintain peace, protect the people and the country from danger. The country is faced with danger, not from any external source but from the danger arising out of our own weaknesses and our quarrels. If we do not bring these under control—we are, of course, trying to do so and will succeed—then we will get weakened from within and our newly-won freedom will become meaningless and we will get a bad reputation in the world.

So the first task before us is to establish peace and to reassure all Indians that we can maintain peace so that they may go about their daily tasks peacefully. In this, the soldiers belonging to our army, to our air force and navy have a great responsibility to shoulder. We have had enough of riots. We have to stop them and establish peace and then turn our attention towards the big questions of development that are facing us. We have to eradicate poverty from our country, ensure the uplift of hundreds of thousands of people by providing them opportunities for work, by setting up new mills and industries and several other things. We have to increase the wealth of our country so that we too become one of the great countries of the world. All of us have to do this, and we are, all of us, comrades in this great task. We have to work together in a disciplined and orderly way which the army teaches us. *Jai Hind.*

6. Services of the British Army¹

The Joint Defence Council has decided to close down the Supreme Commander's Headquarters sooner than it was previously expected. This necessitates a fresh consideration of the employment of British officers in the Indian Army. The Government of India propose to consider this as a matter of urgency and to decide it in terms of the general policy to nationalise the Indian Army as rapidly as possible.

During the last few months, officers and other ranks of the Indian Army, both British and Indian, have had to face a very difficult situation and have worked under considerable strain. The duties they have had to perform have not been the normal duties of a soldier and must often have been distasteful to them. I should like to express my appreciation of the way in which these duties have been discharged during this critical period.

I have been told that there has been criticism of the work of the British officers of the army. Any such general criticism, I think, is wholly unjustified and I should like it to be conveyed to the Commander-in-Chief that we have valued the services of British officers during this emergency.

1. Draft statement for circulation among British officers, 24 September 1947. R/3/1/87, I.O.L.R.

7. To John Matthai¹

New Delhi
13th October 1947

My dear Matthai,

Thank you for your letter of the 8th October sending me a note on the proposal to establish in railways a corps of armed forces for defence. I entirely agree with your proposal and I hope it will be given effect to soon.

1. File No. 20(2)/47-54-PMS.

In this connection, I would suggest for your consideration and that of the Defence Minister the possibility of utilising some of our ex-I.N.A. material. All of this is not good but some of it is definitely first-rate, both as regards officers and men. If you and the Defence Minister agree, it would be easy to find out a few competent young officers who could be used for this purpose.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Cable to Liaquat Ali Khan¹

The Chairman of the Joint Defence Council reports that at the meeting held on the 16th October when the Supreme Commander's paper proposing the closing down of his Headquarters on the 30th November was taken a complete impasse was reached, the Indian representatives supporting the Supreme Commander's proposal and the Pakistan representatives opposing it.

The Chairman informed me that the Council had invited the Indian Cabinet to consider the situation raised by this impasse, and accordingly a meeting was held at which the minutes of the J.D.C. meeting of the 16th October were considered. Sardar Baldev Singh and Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar gave us a first-hand report of the meeting.

From this it is clear that your objections to the Supreme Commander's Headquarters being closed down by the 30th November were twofold.

- (a) That a system which had been agreed between the two Governments before the transfer of power to enable the partition of the Armed Forces to be fully carried out was being unilaterally abandoned before the completion of the task.
- (b) That the consequence of this abandonment would be that neither Government could be sure of obtaining their fair share of stores held in the other Dominion.

The feeling of my Cabinet as regards (a) was that the Supreme Commander must be the best judge as to whether the system could be usefully

1. New Delhi, 18 October 1947. Auchinleck Papers, The John Rylands University Library of Manchester.

maintained to the original date once the major tasks of partition and reconstitution of the Armed Forces had been completed. The Indian Cabinet feel strongly that the Supreme Commander is right in wishing to close down his Headquarters, which includes a Field Marshal as Supreme Commander, a Lieutenant General, an Air Marshal and a Vice-Admiral as Deputy Supreme Commanders, as well as a number of other general officers, once the movement of all major units had been completed; otherwise we should be faced with the anomalous position of having more senior officers to look after the stores of the two Dominions and the interests of British officers than there would be in the Headquarters of the armed forces of the two Dominions combined.

As regards (b), it was the opinion of the Indian Cabinet that your objections could be completely met by devising a system which would ensure that both Dominions would definitely receive the full quota of stores allotted by the Joint Defence Council. The Cabinet noted that the two Ministers representing them at the meeting of the J.D.C. on the 16th October had given the assurance that Pakistan's allotted share from stores held in India would be sent over to you. The Indian Cabinet unanimously endorsed this assurance. We have no doubt that a similar assurance will be given by your Cabinet. The Indian Cabinet further suggested that the Supreme Commander should be asked to supply duplicate lists of all stores at present held by him in both Dominions, one copy being given to each Dominion Government before his Headquarters closed down.

Finally, the Cabinet endorsed the proposal of the Chairman of the J.D.C. that the Army Commanders-in-Chief of each Dominion should become full members of the J.D.C. and that they should set up an Inter-Dominion Committee to take the place of the A.F.R.C.² and arrange for the transfer of the appropriate stores, and the finishing off of any other matters concerned with the partition and reconstitution of the armed forces. They would report progress at each fortnightly meeting of the J.D.C.

The Government of India are of the opinion that in the circumstances outlined in the Supreme Commander's paper, the Inter-Dominion Committee is the right solution for finishing off the process of partition.

Subject to U.K. Government agreeing to the proposed arrangements for looking after British personnel,³ the Government of India therefore intend to inform the Supreme Commander that they accept his proposals and will implement them.

A copy of this telegram has been sent to the Supreme Commander and will be sent on Monday to Lord Ismay.

2. Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee.

3. See also *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 3, pp. 307-310.

9. Continued Cooperation of British Officers¹

The terms and conditions of service² under which British officers may volunteer to serve in the Indian Armed Forces, after the closing down of the Supreme Commander's Headquarters, have been published.

The policy of my Government is the complete nationalisation of the armed forces of India in the shortest possible time. In order to achieve this aim, the help of a number of experienced British officers, especially in technical appointments, will be of the utmost assistance to my country. I, therefore, wish to assure those British officers who may be prepared to volunteer, and who are asked to assist in this great task of the sincere friendship and support both of myself and of my Government. I am sure that in the new order that we are building up in India there is plenty of room for British assistance and cooperation, which will also help in maintaining close and friendly relations between India and England.

1. Message forwarded to General F.R.R. Bucher, Chief of General Staff, 18 November 1947. From *The Hindu*, 22 November 1947.
2. The terms and conditions remained the same except changes made in leave travel allowance facilities to home and back. Two thousand eight hundred out of a total of 8,000 British officers in the pre-partition Indian Army had volunteered to serve on; but now these were asking to be released from their contracts, under the three months' notice clause, in rapidly increasing numbers.

10. Service to India¹

Soldiers of Free India. *Jai Hind*. Some months ago, I told the Commander-in-Chief that it was my desire to meet as frequently as possible the officers and men of the Indian Armed Forces, to visit units, to see them at work and at play, and to talk to them. I wanted to know you and speak to you because it is very necessary that we should understand each other. In an independent country it is very necessary for those in authority, who represent the people, to know what is in the minds of the men of the armed forces. There should be no distance between the people generally and the armed services; they are all one, because recruitment to the armed forces is made from the masses.

1. Speech inaugurating the forces programme on A.I.R., Delhi, 1 December 1947. From *The Hindustan Times*, 2 December 1947.

The old idea that the army was a separate entity does not hold good now. It, therefore, becomes essential that we should understand each other. However, owing to extreme pressure of work and the many vital problems requiring immediate attention, I could not meet most of you, although I have had occasions to meet and talk to some. Therefore, I decided to speak in a few words to you this evening over the radio.

Our country has become free. What is the meaning of freedom? It means that we are free to do things without outside interference. It does not mean that anyone is free to do what he likes because such licence would lead to chaos. If everyone takes the law into his own hands, it becomes the law of the jungle. That sort of freedom does not become the civilised people.

Ours is an ancient land with an ancient civilisation dating back to thousands of years. Our new-born freedom has brought us great responsibilities. If anything goes wrong, it will be our fault. We cannot blame others. If we do good, we reap the benefits; if we do evil, we suffer. Therefore, it behoves young men of the armed forces specially to realise these responsibilities. Your duty is to serve your country and your countrymen.

They call me the Prime Minister of India but it would be more appropriate if I were called the first servant of India. In this age, it is not titles and positions that matter, but it is service that counts, and you, in particular, have a great opportunity to serve, but you must take care not to abuse this opportunity.

You know that our forces are operating in Kashmir to drive out those who invaded that State. Why did our forces go to Kashmir? We do not want to invade other countries and enslave people. As we have wanted freedom for our country, so do we desire freedom for other countries, especially those in Asia. Kashmir, of course, is a part of this land. Our forces went there not to oppress or conquer. They went there because the people of Kashmir were in peril and their country was being overrun by forces of aggression. When Kashmir was being ravaged by the raiders, the people asked us for help. It was thus our duty to go and help. We sent our forces who performed their task speedily and courageously. Much has been accomplished, but a more difficult task lies ahead and I am confident that they will succeed.

I went there and spoke to our men. I told them that they were there as guests and as friends and as servants of the people of Kashmir, and that on their actions depended the fair name of India. Any ill-considered action by our men in Kashmir would bring discredit to India. I am glad that while performing their duty, they have established cordial relations with the people of Kashmir. We must constantly remind ourselves that whatever our religion or caste, we are all one people.

I regret that the recent disturbances have given us a bad name. Many had acquiesced in the prevailing spirit. This is not true citizenship. Citizenship consists of service to the country. We must prevail on evil-doers to stop

their activities. If you, men of the Navy, the Army and the Air Force, serve your countrymen without distinction of class or religion, you will bring honour to yourselves and to your country. *Jai Hind*.

11. The Army's Responsibilities¹

The personnel of the Indian Army should not get swayed by the human earthquake which has engulfed the Indian subcontinent. The Indian military had to perform an important part in the national life and shoulder heavy responsibilities in a country which has survived a terrific upheaval. The men and officers of the Indian Military Evacuation Organisation who are on duty in Lahore should play their part in a befitting manner to enable India to raise her head high in the comity of nations.

1. Address to men of the Indian Military Evacuation Organisation at Lahore, 8 December 1947. From *The Hindustan Times*, 9 December 1947.

12. The Spirit of Freedom¹

Men of the Air Force, *Jai Hind*. When I think or speak of India, I still think in terms of India as it existed a few months ago, the great country extending from the Khyber to the Cape Comorin, and this I hope is also the attitude of all right-thinking people. Mere enactments and political changes should not be permitted to change our conception of India which has been and still is one single cultural unit.

The barriers which religion has raised in front of us give us the wrong impression that we on this side of the border are Indians while they on the other side are not. Everybody in Pakistan has the right to call himself a child of India.

1. Speech at a gathering of men of the Royal Indian Air Force, New Delhi, 23 December 1947. Based on reports from *The Hindustan Times*, 24 December and *The Hindu*, 25 December 1947.

The biggest harm communal riots have done is psychological. It is this psychological disaster against which I am fighting and against which I am asking everybody else to fight. The narrowness that has crept into the country is short-lived but a fight has to be put up against it lest it leaves a permanent impact.

Communalism is a narrowing creed. It can never give rise to a free society. The only thing communalism can give rise to is fascism. This may seem a surprising statement but both fascism and communalism are the product of a narrow attitude of mind. Both ultimately lead to authoritarianism.

India must not become a communal state. It shall be established and run in a spirit of international outlook where there will be no place for narrow nationalism. I am amazed to see people putting forward the idea of a communal state. These ideologies may lead people to success in the initial stages but ultimately such ideas will bring them to a sad end. I must warn you against subscribing to such narrow and anachronistic ideas.

The burden of building a new India rests, to a large extent, on her youth. Youth must, therefore, think and worry about the state of the country. The existing mood of indiscipline among the youth is not conducive to freedom or progress. India is politically free today but freedom and independence have brought rights and entailed obligations at the same time. Freedom is a continuing right and a continuing discipline. Otherwise freedom is short-lived.

The spirit of freedom is more important than anything else. It is even more important than a strong army, navy or air force. The spirit of freedom is parenthetical with discipline. Without discipline freedom degenerates into licence. We have got into the habit of flouting authority. We had to flout authority in the past because it was a foreign authority. But now we must impose discipline on ourselves. We have to develop the discipline of free men if we are to go forward.

Today, India presents rather an unpleasant state of affairs. Its people are thinking in terms of their respective communities and not as members of one nation. This thing started with the fantastic theory of two nations, and it is a pity that now that doctrine has come to be accepted even by those who previously opposed it. The application of that doctrine may prove disastrous to India's growth as a strong and free country. This limited outlook is contrary to all modern political thought, and it will lead to a shrivelling up of India. I have a firm conviction that India can never belong to the middle ranks. It will either be a very great country or be a very small one. If our approach to our problems is correct and our minds remain broad, I have then no doubt that our country will occupy a leading position among the nations of the world.

A study of world history would reveal that no country had been so tolerant of new ideas as India. Christianity came to India long before it spread to Europe. The Jews came here ages ago and they were welcomed. Tol-

rance is a sign of India's cultural maturity. In the past, India's doors had been open to all outsiders because it was sure of its ground. It learnt much from foreigners but ultimately it always triumphed over them and succeeded in maintaining the distinctive character of its culture and civilisation. Turning one's face away from new streams of thought and refusing to benefit from them only shows weakness in one's ranks.

When Islam came to India, not in the guise of political conquest but as a healthy cultural influence, India welcomed it. The tolerance for which India was once famous has given the country a name among the most civilised countries of the world. The salient feature of the Indian culture has always been that it received foreign influences and made a healthy synthesis of the indigenous and the foreign.

I ask you, men of the Air Force, to rise above petty things, and look to the glorious future that lies ahead of your country. I remind you that India has inexhaustible resources of power and wealth waiting to be exploited by the right men. The Himalayas are to me the largest storehouse of concentrated energy in the world. I have no doubt that, given the right social atmosphere, India can rise to heights which many of the older people did not imagine it was capable of.

1. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
13 September 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have made enquiries and find that no kind of order or instruction has been issued regarding the censorship of telegrams, foreign or internal, nor indeed has the matter been considered.

2. While there is no censorship, there is an old Telegraphs Act which empowers District Magistrates to stop any objectionable matter being sent by telegram. This was in frequent use some years ago when many of our telegrams used to be stopped or mutilated. But, to my knowledge, it has not been used in recent times at all.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. To Norman Cliff¹

New Delhi
13 September 1947

Dear Norman Cliff,²

With reference to your enquiry at the press conference about censorship of telegrams, I find that no orders or instructions of any kind have been issued, nor is there any present intention of having any censorship. There is an old Telegraphs Act which empowers District Magistrates to stop objectionable messages. This was used frequently some years back in regard to telegrams sent by Congressmen. It has not been used, to my knowledge, for a considerable time.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. (1894-1977); British journalist; lived in north Bihar, 1928; foreign editor of *News Chronicle* (London) and based in New Delhi, 1935-47.

3. To Lord 'Mountbatten'¹

New Delhi
15 September 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th September in regard to censorship of press messages. As I have already informed you, there is no desire on our part to have any censorship, more especially of foreign messages. I entirely agree with you that any censorship, at the present moment, would defeat its own purpose and do us harm.

It is a fact, however, that most inaccurate and alarmist telegrams are sent by individuals to the press and officers of Government. It is also true that many of the messages sent by foreign correspondents have been equally inaccurate and sometimes tendentious. I have just seen a bunch of clippings from the foreign press which give these messages.

Nevertheless, I am quite clear that there should be no censorship of the press, and that it would be better for us to proceed on the lines suggested by you.² The Telegraphs Act may or may not be kept; it is a relatively unimportant measure and I do not think it comes in our way at all at present. This would hardly be the time to undertake a repeal or amendment of it.

In view of the fact, however, that some instructions were issued by our Communications Department, I am making it clear to that Department that no messages from accredited press correspondents should be stopped or censored. I imagine this will be enough to meet the difficulty that has arisen.

I note what you say, that an Indian officer should give reports in the Map Room. I think this would be the proper way of dealing with this matter. General Rees will give a weekly survey.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 32(46)/48-PMS.

2. Mountbatten suggested that, to prevent inaccurate reporting, it was better to provide more factual information to the press and to maintain personal contacts with correspondents rather than consider censorship.

4. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

15 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I feel that we are using up too many men and soldiers in guarding Ministers' residences or persons at a time when there is a great need of these men elsewhere. I am, therefore, suggesting to the military authorities that not more than two soldiers should be posted to each Minister's house, apart from such policemen as may be necessary.

As for policemen also I have got far too many. There is a camp of five in the grounds and besides this I always have three plainclothesmen in attendance. I think these might be reduced somewhat.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 449.

2. Patel agreed with Nehru and wished the uniformed guard posted in his bungalow to be withdrawn.

5. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

23 September 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have been thinking a great deal about fixing up some more efficient machinery to maintain contact and some kind of supervision of the Central Government over the East Punjab Government. Frequent visits by Cabinet Ministers help a little. But something more is needed. There are at least three major problems in East Punjab :

- (1) The refugee problem which, as you pointed out, involves reception, short-term arrangements and long-term arrangements.
- (2) Law and order in the Province.
- (3) Frontier precautions.

2. We are concerned with all these and in fact with the whole functioning of the East Punjab Government. But more specially we are concerned with

1. File No. 20/16/GG/47, pp. 4-5, President's Secretariat.

matters involving the use of the military. The question of frontier defence is also becoming more and more important.

3. The East Punjab Government is facing with some courage the terrific problems before it. But still it is hardly a corporate body with a clear purpose and it has little experience; except for the Governor. There are also minor inner conflicts, such as between the Sikhs and the Hindus. Amritsar is in a continuous state of extreme excitement and disquiet. The Deputy Commissioner of Amritsar,² a good man, has just had to go on leave presumably because he couldn't face the strain without taking some rest.

4. All these and other factors have led me to the conclusion that it is desirable for us to have a representative of the Cabinet specially looking after East Punjab affairs and spending most of his time there. So far as the refugee problem is concerned, Neogy is of course in charge. But there are many other matters with which Neogy will have nothing or very little to do. If a representative of our Cabinet stays in East Punjab, he can speak with authority and assist the East Punjab Government in many ways. More specially he can help in coordinating the activities of the civil and the military. He will also interest himself specially in frontier defence.

5. I can think of none of our present members who can be spared for this purpose or who would be particularly suitable. I feel, therefore, that we should add to our number for this purpose. I have consulted some of our colleagues and they have agreed with me. Such an additional member should, I think, be a Minister without Portfolio placed specially in charge, on behalf of the Cabinet, of East Punjab affairs and frontier defence.

6. After giving a good deal of thought to this matter I decided to invite Mr. N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar. I asked him to come down from Madras and he arrived here two days ago. I have had long talks with him and he has finally agreed.

7. Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar is a man of great executive ability and experience and was recently the Chairman of the Armed Forces Nationalisation Committee. He is a quiet, efficient man who has spent most of his life in public service. As Neogy is going to East Punjab tomorrow on a short

2. Nakul Sen (b. 1910); joined I.C.S., 1934; served in the Punjab till his appointment as Joint Secretary, Ministry of Rehabilitation, 1951-54; Commissioner, Jullundur Division, 1955; Chief Secretary, Punjab, 1956-57; Secretary, Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals, 1964-66; Secretary, Department of Social Welfare, 1966-67; Lieutenant-Governor, Goa, 1967-73.

visit, I am asking Gopalaswami Ayyangar to accompany him. On his return the necessary steps can be taken to make him a member of the Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
25 September 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th September.² Before I received your letter I have had a press statement issued about Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar's appointment as Minister without Portfolio. As a matter of fact I myself had thought it first that the appropriate title would be "Minister of State". I found, however, that Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar felt that this would give him some kind of an inferior status to other Ministers. It was because of this that I did not pursue this matter any further. I want him to feel that he is as much a Minister as any of us.

2. We are all greatly worried about the civil service manpower available. Nearly all our Ministries are working with depleted staffs.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 20/16/GG/47, p. 7, President's Secretariat.
2. Lord Mountbatten suggested that 'Minister of State' was a more appropriate title for Gopalaswami Ayyangar. This was the customary title for a Cabinet Minister working away from the capital or outside his own country, whereas the title of minister without portfolio was normally reserved for a minister who attended cabinet regularly without any departmental duties.

7. Telegram to C.M. Trivedi¹

You must have seen press announcement of appointment of Mr. Gopalaswami

1. 26 September 1947. File No. 20/16/GG/47, p. 8, President's Secretariat.

Ayyangar as Minister without Portfolio. His immediate task is to deal with security and administrative problems other than those relating to refugees which have been created by the present situation. We want him to serve as link between us and the East Punjab Government at highest level. For this purpose, he will have to spend a good deal of his time in East Punjab and we should be grateful if you will arrange immediately suitable residential and office accommodation for him in Jullundur and also means of transport.

2. The new Minister is most anxious to have someone with Punjab experience to assist him in his work in your province. For this duty, name of S. N. Haksar² has been suggested. He was at one time promised to us for Indian Foreign Service. Recently we were informed that he could not be made immediately available for that Service. In view of the importance to East Punjab of the work which Mr. Gopalaswami has undertaken, I hope that your Government will find it possible to release Haksar immediately for attachment to our new Minister. Haksar's headquarters will be Jullundur. We are arranging separately to provide an officer who will function as Secretary in New Delhi. The intention is that this officer should be of the seniority and status of Joint Secretary.

3. Mr. Gopalaswami will be attending our meeting with you and your Ministers tomorrow and looks forward to a discussion with you about immediate problems of common concern.

2. (b. 1909) joined I.C.S., 1933; served in the Punjab in various posts until 1948 when he joined the Indian Foreign Service; ambassador in Turkey, 1954-56; Afghanistan, 1957-60; Italy, 1960-64, Egypt, 1964-66; and the Netherlands, 1966-68.

8. To Amrit Kaur¹

New Delhi
26 September 1947

My dear Amrit Kaur,

I received three letters from you today, all dated today. Thank you for the

1. J.N. Collection.

bunch. One is about Susanta Sen,² the second about public institutions in Lahore. I have already asked the Deputy High Commissioner in Lahore for information about certain public institutions. I shall now ask him for the others also.

2. In your third letter you refer to the recent appointment to the Cabinet. Such appointments are not supposed to be mentioned to the Cabinet formally. A name cannot be discussed in the Cabinet as this introduces all manner of difficulties and the person concerned is put in a delicate position. The usual practice is for the Prime Minister to make his choice after consulting some or all of his colleagues privately. Even this consultation business, if it includes all, creates difficulties because nothing can be kept secret here. I think it would be irregular and a bad precedent if the P.M. formally consulted all his colleagues in regard to Cabinet appointments. In the present instance I did not pick and choose the colleagues I consulted but took the group specially dealing with Punjab matters, the group which met Liaquat Ali Khan when he came here, and discussed this matter with them. They agreed entirely. Thereupon I asked Gopalaswami to come to Delhi and talked to him for two days. It took that time to get him to agree as he was reluctant almost to the last. The day he agreed I informed the Governor-General of my intention, and on that same day I informed the Cabinet after its formal sitting. Two days later he was appointed.

3. About the telegram which Liaquat Ali sent to Attlee, I dealt with it in the usual course and there was no question of my consulting the Cabinet as no principle was involved. It so happened that I got the message when I was with Bapu and I showed it to him and Vallabhbhai who was there. The answer was merely a matter of drafting. The Governor-General got to know of it through Lord Ismay who gave him an oral account as he had seen no papers. Later I sent him a copy of my reply. It was my intention to mention this matter before the Cabinet yesterday; but I clean forgot about it in the long discussions over textile matters. I am sorry for this error. I shall have the papers circulated.

4. Almost every day I have to send numerous telegrams to foreign countries or to Pakistan. Some of these are highly secret and deal with matters which are ripening. When the time comes for any important matter involving policy, it is placed before the Cabinet. Otherwise any Ministers concerned

2. F.R.C.S., M.R.C.P.; physician, Irwin Hospital, February-May 1942; Civil Surgeon, New Delhi, May-October 1942; set up private practice in Delhi; was physician to Nehru for some years; left India in 1956 and later set up a clinic at Saskacchawan in Canada.

are consulted. Circulation of these documents involves a certain measure of publicity which is not usually approved of in foreign correspondence of this sort. There is no question of keeping anything secret from any individual member of the Cabinet but rather an avoidance of any step which might result in a leakage. Where foreign countries are involved, a leakage might result in international incidents.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

9. To S.P. Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
28 September 1947

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

I have been wanting to see you; but there has been so much work to do that it was difficult to find the time to go anywhere. I hope you are better now.

2. I have read the following A.P. message from Kolhapur dated September 25th :

Mr. L. B. Bhopatkar,² President of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, addressing a press conference here this morning said that Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee was in the Indian Cabinet as a representative of the Hindu Mahasabha and would stay there as long as the Mahasabha asked him to remain. His allegiance was to the Hindu Mahasabha and *Bhagwa Jhanda*.³ That had been made clear even before his joining the Cabinet. It was the *Bhagwa Jhanda* which was flying over Dr. Mookerjee's house in Delhi and not the Tri-colour.

3. This raises a new point which, I think, should be cleared up. When I invited you to join the Cabinet you made it clear to me that you would continue to remain in the Hindu Mahasabha. Further you told me that you had telephoned to Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Bhopatkar on the subject of your joining the Cabinet. I replied that of course you could remain in the Hindu

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. (1880-1960); advocate, Marathi journalist of Pune and a prominent member of the Hindu Mahasabha; President, All India Hindu Mahasabha, 1946-49; defended V.D. Savarkar in the Gandhi murder case.

3. Saffron-coloured flag of the Hindu Mahasabha.

Mahasabha. So far as I remember there was no mention of your joining the Cabinet as a representative of the Hindu Mahasabha owing allegiance to that Sabha's mandate. Certainly this was not made clear to me in any way and if this had been mentioned, it would have created difficulties. I did not even know that the *Bhagwa Jhanda* was flying over your house instead of the National Flag. It seems to me very odd that a Minister should fly any flag but the National Flag.

4. I shall be grateful if you will let me know what the facts are.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. Mookerjee replied on 30 September 1947 that though a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, he had not joined the Cabinet "as a nominee of any organisation nor had any question been raised at any time about his being "bound to accept any mandate from the Hindu Mahasabha". He added that while the national flag flew over his house from 15 August 1947, the *Bhagwa Jhanda* also flew from time to time.

10. To S.P. Mookerjee¹

New Delhi
30 September 1947

My dear Dr. Mookerjee,

Thank you for your letter of the 30th September. You are quite right in saying that you told me that you would continue to remain in the Hindu Mahasabha when you joined the Cabinet. I agreed to this. You further informed me that you had consulted Mr. Savarkar and Mr. Bhopatkar. What Mr. Bhopatkar is reported to have said at Kolhapur, however, went beyond this and hence my previous letter to you.

2. According to reliable information reaching us from intelligence reports and other sources, the R.S.S. has played an important part in the Delhi disturbances and is even now a very disturbing element. I am informing you of this as you spoke to me once about the R.S.S.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

11. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

11 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I had a message from Govind Ballabh Pant to say that the way many of our newspapers are presenting news about the Punjab, in a rather one-sided way, is creating great excitement. He asked if something could not be done to tone down this presentation, so that a calmer atmosphere may prevail. He mentioned that the A.I.R. broadcasts had also this exciting effect.

Some days ago Master Tara Singh gave a press interview² about Muslims in northern U.P. being made to leave, also in Delhi. As nothing was said by us in answer to this, people felt that this might be our policy. In a statement by Liaquat Ali Khan appearing today, it is stated that at last Sunday's conference in Lahore³ the Ministers from the Government of India present wanted to include Muslims from Delhi province and the western districts of the U.P. in the evacuation programme. All this is leading to numerous queries and excitement. The Nawab of Chhatari has written to me about this and is going to see me. Others have also enquired. I think this matter has to be cleared up. I propose to give a press conference tomorrow afternoon.⁴

I am afraid our press is not very helpful. The recent statements published about the position in Hyderabad have not helped us. Again, the news about Mountbatten's going to London and somebody else taking his place had no basis in fact, so far as I know, except that Mountbatten does intend going there for a short period for the wedding.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 291.
2. Master Tara Singh said on 5 October 1947 that the Sikhs and Hindus would vacate in Pakistan about 2,500,000 acres of land more than the land vacated by the Muslims in India. To provide more land to the Hindu and Sikh refugees, the Muslims of Delhi and adjoining parts of U.P. should be directed to vacate their lands and urban property and migrate to Pakistan.
3. Referring to the conference of 5 October 1947, Liaquat Ali Khan, in a statement on 9 October, alleged that the Indian ministers had "blandly proposed" to include Muslims from the Delhi Province and the western districts of the U.P. in the evacuation programme. He said that Pakistan would refuse to facilitate abandonment by Muslims of their homes and property in India outside the East Punjab.
4. See *ante*, pp. 138-154.

12. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
12 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your long letter of 12 October about the Delhi Administration.² I am grateful to you for your having written to me at length on this subject. I thought it necessary to draw your attention to various facts coming from different sources to me. It is for you, with your more direct sources of information, to judge the position and to take such action as you may think fit and proper.

2. For me it is not easy to judge of individual officers without going deeply into the question. My general impression has been that the administration in Delhi has not functioned as effectively as it should have done and that it has been watered down very greatly by the addition of numbers of people who are more of a hindrance than a help. One can understand the natural feelings of officers coming from the Punjab and I am not prepared to blame them too much. But because of these feelings, they are not as effective as they should be in a crisis of this kind. When I suggested to you to replace some of these officers, it was more with an intention of bringing some fresh blood here than to punish in any way any particular officer. But I realise that the choice is limited for you and it may be difficult to improve matters in this way.

3. When I was in Amritsar quite a number of people (Hindus) asked me if it was not possible to send some U.P. officers there. They felt that a new element from another province would be free from local rivalries and jealousies.

4. I mentioned the names of, I think, four persons to you in my previous letter because I had heard persistent complaints about their activities from quite a number of independent persons, among them being several Congressmen. Then Indira Gandhi mentioned to me also that two or three of those persons were speaking openly in her presence against the Government's policy and asking people not to pay any attention to it. It seemed to me that this kind of open defiance should not be encouraged in any way and they

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Patel defended the selection of special police officers and magistrates by M.S.Randhawa, Deputy Commissioner, Delhi, and opposed his transfer from Delhi but disapproved of his speeches. He also said that conditions in Delhi were improving and there was no truth in the allegation about a systematic effort by officials to sabotage the Government's policy.

should be warned accordingly. I thought that some inquiry should be made and I asked Sanjeevi³ to find out about these persons so that his report might be sent on to you. I do not yet know what his information is. I suggest that you might find out from him. I was not interested in their arrest unless specific reasons for their arrest were placed before you.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

3. T.G. Sanjeevi (1898-1960); joined Indian Police Service in 1922 and served in Madras state till 1947; Director, Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, April 1947 November 1950; Inspector General of Police, Madras, 1950-53.

13. To H. K. Sherwani¹

New Delhi
13 October 1947

My dear Haroon,²

I have received your letter of the 4th October.

We should like to do everything in our power to rehabilitate the Anglo-Arabic College³ here. I do not know what the exact position is now, but I am enquiring into the matter and shall certainly give it full protection. As for grants, this matter will be considered favourably, but just at present I think it is too early to go into it.

As you know, we have had a bad time and this has shaken us all up. It is amazing how human beings can behave when normal restraints are removed. Still I hope that we have turned the corner.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. H.K. Sherwani Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. (1891-1980); a historian of medieval India; principal, Nizam's College, Hyderabad, 1945-46, and of the Anglo-Arabic College, Delhi, 1946-48.
3. Now Dr. Zakir Husain College.

14. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
15 October 1947.

My dear Vallabhbhai,

With reference to your letter of 15 October enclosing notes about the Ministers' salaries,² I have also written a note, a copy of which I enclose. These will be circulated and we shall consider them at the informal meeting either tomorrow or the day after.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 444.
2. The notes were written by Shanmukham Chetty and Patel. While Chetty suggested Rs. 2,500 per month free of all taxes, and a free, furnished house, inclusive of electricity and water charges, Patel suggested Rs. 2,000 per month as salary. Chetty also suggested an entertainment allowance of Rs. 1,000 per month for the Prime Minister.

15. Salaries of Ministers¹

I am in general agreement with the note by the Minister for Home Affairs.

1. Salary of the Ministers should be Rs. 2,000 per month free of all taxes and a free furnished house inclusive of electricity and water charges.
2. Official entertainments, that is, parties on a more or less large scale which can be considered official, should be paid out of the Hospitality Fund. Apparently each department has got such a fund. There might be one joint fund for all the Ministries and this should be voted for by the Legislature.
3. I do not like the idea of a special entertainment allowance for the Prime Minister. It is true that the P.M., both as P.M. and as Foreign Minister, is supposed to entertain considerably. Nevertheless, at the present juncture entertainments are not to be encouraged except when they are considered essential.

1. Note, 15 October 1947. Extracts, *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 445-446.

4. The equipment allowance of £250 should be abolished. But a Minister should be allowed an advance for the purchase of a car.
5. No saloons are necessary for Ministers. He should be entitled to a first-class compartment if he travels by train.
6. It seems to me essential that some planes should be kept for the use of Ministers. There were, I believe, some such planes. I do not know what has happened to them. The proper thing to do would be to have a number of planes belonging to the Indian Air Force available for ministerial use. This is the practice in England. I do not know if this is possible here owing to the small number of Air Force planes that we possess, and these are generally of the small size. One or two Dakotas and two or three small planes like Expeditors or Avros might be kept.
7. I do not know what the rate of allowances for car journeys is. The daily allowance for Ministers seems hardly necessary as they are always somebody's guest everywhere. If it is considered necessary, it should be halved, i.e., Rs. 15....

16. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
15 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Your letter of 15 October² about the evacuation of Muslim refugees from Kalka.

2. I received an urgent message from Amrit Kaur from Simla by telephone that 8,500 Muslims, who had been evacuated from Simla, were lying in an open space in Kalka in a very bad condition and must be removed immediately to Lahore. Most of these people belonged to middle-class families. They had been deprived of their luggage and were in a precarious condition in the open as it was cold at night. There were practically no arrangements

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. In his letter, Patel urged that the Cabinet Emergency Committee's decision to give first priority to evacuation of Muslim refugees from Delhi be adhered to because any deviation would set in motion competing demands from other places for priority.

for them. The message was an urgent one and Amrit Kaur wanted action to be taken immediately.

3. I discussed this matter with Neogy, Neelakantan and Bucher. I was told that this could be done fairly easily in two or three days' time without very much dislocation of other arrangements except that possibly one additional train out of the several that we were sending from Delhi might have to be delayed by a day or so. There was no lack of trains. The question was really one of escort. In effect, the Delhi evacuation was not affected much by it though perhaps there might have been a day's delay in one of the trains. It seemed to all of us that in view of Amrit Kaur's message something should be done immediately about Kalka.

4. I do not know what has been done since then. But I imagine that the Kalka people have been sent away.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

17. To Pitambar Pant¹

New Delhi
18 October 1947

My dear Pitambar,

I have your letter of the 27th September² which I have read with interest. It is a good letter.

I am writing to you briefly, as I have little time. It seems to me, on the whole, that it will be better for you to return to India when you have finished your present work in America. I do not want you to hurry back, but come when you have got through your present courses.

I would like you to come here and take your chance in the Foreign Service. I imagine that you will have no difficulty in being chosen. After that we can consider what place to allot to you. If you go to Russia now, it will no doubt be a good training, but this work would be of a temporary character. It would be far better if you were taken into the Foreign Service; so I suggest that you return to India when you can and apply for the Foreign Service here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 2(128)/48-PMS.

2. Pant wrote from New York that he was glad about his posting to the Indian Embassy in Moscow and sought Nehru's guidance in the matter.

18. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
21 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a letter from Amrit Kaur² about Ministers' salaries. I am inclined to agree with her, that is to say, that Ministers' salaries should be Rs. 2,000/- per month (tax free etc.) plus Rs. 500 a month as entertainment allowance to each Minister. In effect, this means Rs. 2,500 as suggested by some Ministers. I suggest, therefore, that in the proposals the Home Ministry might draw up this basis might be adopted.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 446.
2. Amrit Kaur wanted reconsideration of the Cabinet decision. She was anxious that people should appreciate that the ministers' salaries were being fixed keeping in mind the poverty in the country.

19. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
22 October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have been thinking about your proposal about the Commander-in-Chief's House and I have mentioned this matter also to some of my colleagues. We all agree that whatever the future constitutional arrangements might be, India's relationship with England will be close. We agree also that because of this special relationship, the representative of the United Kingdom should be accorded a certain favoured-nation treatment, in the sense that you meant this.

About the Commander-in-Chief's House, there have been some proposals. It is clear that the House is too big and pretentious for the future Commander-in-Chief and has to be used for some other purpose. The present Government House is, as you pointed out three months ago, not very suited for the purpose it was meant. There are certain advantages in using its reception rooms for official parties. It may also be used for distinguished guests from abroad. But probably such uses will only mean a

1. File No. 34/GG/47, pp. 3-4, President's Secretariat.

partial use of the Government House and a large part of it may remain unused. It has been proposed that this part should accommodate a museum.

If the Government House is not used for the Governor-General, then some other house has to be found for him. It seemed to many of us that the present Commander-in-Chief's House might suitably be used by the Governor-General then. We can hardly set about putting up new buildings on a big scale. We have to concentrate on relatively small houses. We must, therefore, use such big buildings as we have and the most suitable one for the Governor-General's residence appears to be the Commander-in-Chief's House.

This was the first reaction to your proposal. We shall give more thought to it later. In any event, you can rest assured that the United Kingdom High Commissioner will have first claim on a suitable building.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

20. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
24 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Some time back, you will remember, you mentioned to me a telegram² which you had received from Krishna Menon about Sudhir Ghosh.³ I had not seen this telegram. Telegrams which are addressed to particular persons are sent from our Cypher Bureau direct and not circulated.

Later I asked for a copy of this telegram and it was shown to me. I did not think it necessary to take any action in the matter as you were dealing with it. In the course of some letters from our High Commissioner in London a reference was made to certain difficulties which had arisen in

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 460-461.
2. Krishna Menon cabled Vallabhbhai Patel on 26 September 1947 to say that he had decided to take over charge of the Public Relations and Information Department in London from October 1947 as "I feel somewhat guilty in allowing things to drift as they have done during this critical period."
3. (1916-1967); Mahatma Gandhi's emissary in his negotiations with the British Government, 1946; Public Relations Officer, Indian High Commission, London, 1947; Regional Commissioner, East Punjab States, 1948; Secretary, Hindustan Steel Ltd., 1955-59; Senior Deputy General Manager, Rourkela Steel Project, 1959-60; member, Rajya Sabha, 1960-65; author of *Gandhi's Emissary*.

regard to the maintenance of discipline in the High Commissioner's establishment. Sudhir Ghosh was mentioned in this connection and it was stated that he was not easily amenable to the discipline of India House. I sent no reply to these letters on this point as you were seized of the matter.

I have now had another message from Krishna Menon in which he states that Sudhir Ghosh has acted in an unusual manner and without informing him or the Deputy High Commissioner had arranged to come to India with Lord Ismay. Some mention of leave for a fortnight had previously been made but further particulars had not been supplied. Ismay casually mentioned to Krishna Menon that Sudhir Ghosh wanted to return with him to India. Ismay was very much surprised to learn that Krishna Menon knew nothing about it.⁴

I do not know all the facts or what steps you may have taken in this matter. Before replying to Krishna Menon's telegram I should be grateful if you could kindly let me know how matters stand.⁵

I am sorry that there has been this continuous friction between Krishna Menon and Sudhir Ghosh. It is clear that work can only be done if a certain discipline is maintained in a large establishment. Krishna Menon has complained that there has been no discipline at all and hence work has suffered greatly at a very critical time.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

4. On 14 October 1947, Sudhir Ghosh telegraphically sought Patel's approval to fly with Lord Ismay to India to visit Delhi and Punjab as it would help him in his work of combating the grossly exaggerated propaganda in the British press. He added: "I will of course secure approval and sanction of my superiors."
5. Patel, in his reply of 25 October 1947, asked Nehru to suspend judgment "until we have the other side of the picture before us". He added: "at the time Krishna Menon was appointed, I had grave misgivings as to whether he would allow Sudhir Ghosh to function at all. I know that he cannot tolerate the presence of anyone who has as high contacts as Sudhir has."

21. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
27 October 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

As you know, I have been worried at the fact that a number of newspapers have been started here during the last three months or so which are of a very

1. File No. 20(3)/47-PM, Vol. I. Special Section, PMS.

low class. They represent worst type of journalism that used to prevail in the Punjab. They are poisoning the atmosphere of Delhi and lowering our standards.²

I do not know how one can deal with this matter. Press regulations and laws go some way, demands for security may help a little, but there is so much in these newspapers which is tendentious and objectionable and yet which perhaps does not offend against any specific provision that it is difficult to do much in the matter.

Then there are patent falsehoods and lies. These, of course, can be contradicted but contradicting anything coming out in a very low class paper is also often undesirable and it gives publicity to that paper and to its canard. Some time back there were repeated references in these papers to Asaf Ali and the most atrocious charges were made about his being an agent of Pakistan and his sending munitions to Pakistan. The whole thing was completely false and malicious. I thought of issuing some statement but then resisted because the paper was a wretched rag.

There are frequent references to me containing lies and similar false references to you. I do not mind very much these personal references to me though naturally this kind of thing creates a false impression in the minds of those people who may read this.

I am enclosing a cutting from the *Hindu Outlook*³ of the 21st October. Previous to this references occurred to Vijayalakshmi's purchase of furniture and Persian carpets. All this was completely false except that some simple furniture was bought in Stockholm for the embassy equipment. Now there is a specific statement of an amazing character. The U.P. Government is supposed to have presented her with six hundred silk sarees and silver articles worth rupees twenty thousand. The whole thing is fantastic and I cannot imagine any person outside the lunatic asylum saying anything like this or believing in it. What has one to do about these monstrous and excessively crude statements?

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. On 9 October, the district magistrate of Delhi had imposed pre-censorship on eight newspapers published from Delhi and ordered each of them to deposit, as security, amounts varying from Rs. 500 to 1000.
3. A weekly published by the Hindu Mahasabha. Early in November 1947, the Delhi Administration banned its publication.

22. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
28 October 1947

My dear Krishna,

I have not written to you for a long time, although there has been a great deal to write about. I have, however, sent you quite a number of telegrams about developments here. I find it difficult to write because I do not know where to begin and where to end. Latterly also it has been far from easy to find a few minutes. I am afraid I feel rather worn out, though I am in good health.

I decided suddenly to send you this brief letter not so much to discuss the urgent and vital problems that are facing us, but about Sudhir Ghosh. Ismay arrived here last night and he brought Sudhir with him. Ismay told me that you were greatly upset over various matters connected with Sudhir Ghosh. I knew that, of course, although I had hoped that you would not allow anything to upset you.

It is obvious that Sudhir Ghosh has no place in the set-up of India House. Whether he can function satisfactorily elsewhere or not, or in some other capacity, I do not know. I shall probably see him and I shall also discuss this question with Sardar Patel.

The long telegram you sent originally to Sardar Patel about Sudhir Ghosh did not come up before me.² It was only some time after its receipt that it was mentioned to me. As you had addressed it to Sardar Patel, I left him to deal with that. Then your other and longer telegram came to me on the same subject.³ I enquired from Sardar Patel what he was doing about Sudhir and he told me that Sudhir was coming back to India for consultation or report. Now he is back and in the course of the next few days we shall deal with this business. Do not allow it to upset your other work.

Although I have not written to you for long, I have been receiving from all manner of unexpected quarters eulogistic accounts of the work you are doing and how India House has improved since you went there. I have been very glad indeed to learn this, not that I doubted it. What has pleased me is that you have succeeded in impressing even those who were previously our critics.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. See *ante*, item 20, fn. 2.

3. In his telegram of 23 October 1947, Menon complained of Sudhir Ghosh's "humiliating" treatment of him and the Deputy High Commissioner when questioned about his proposed visit to India and why he had not informed Menon of it.

We seem to live here from crisis to crisis. The last three or four days have been wrapped up in Kashmir. Ultimately we took the decision to send troops there by air. This was done in the very nick of time. One more day's delay would have meant the sack of Srinagar and a large-scale massacre. It would have been difficult then even to reach the valley. Our decision was taken in the afternoon. Our aircraft resources are strictly limited. Nevertheless, we worked hard and by early morning a company of our troops was in Srinagar; another company came in the early afternoon. Very soon after their arrival they engaged the raiders thirty miles from Srinagar. All this was a remarkable piece of organisation work—both at headquarters here and at the other end.

More troops have been sent today and more will follow tomorrow, all by air. The position in the valley is a difficult one, but we think we shall hold it. The Pakistan Government, adopting Hitlerian tactics, wanted to take possession of Srinagar in a rush raid. They then wanted to recognise a provisional government there and get Kashmir accede to Pakistan. Everything was ready for Jinnah's triumphal entry into Srinagar. A whole brigade had been mobilised.

This plan nearly went through, but it has collapsed now. Pakistan is now faced with having to declare war, if they wish officially to enter Kashmir with troops. I do not think they will do so, but unofficially they will give us a lot of trouble, pushing out their tribesmen and ex-servicemen well-armed into Kashmir.

I shall not write any more now.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

23. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
4 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

As you know the rulers of some States, for instance, Alwar, Bharatpur, Jodhpur, are misbehaving in their States. The brother of the Bharatpur ruler is a Minister and is definitely implicated in dacoities and looting.²

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-51*, Vol. 5, p. 360.

2. On 5 November, Patel replied that his Ministry was already collecting evidence about Bharatpur and that further action against the State would depend on the nature of evidence.

Jodhpur has installed a foolish young man of 18 to be Home Minister. Venkatachar³ had to leave because of these changes.

These rulers are exceedingly foolish and are injuring themselves and their States. It is perhaps true that we cannot take any very effective steps against them at present. That is for you to judge, but to remain silent at their misbehaviour may also have bad consequences.⁴ I suggest that your States Ministry might point out to them that what they are doing is objectionable and harmful. Further that we might stop all export of arms and petrol to these States. Petrol is specially important.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

3. C.S. Venkatachar (b. 1899); joined I.C.S., 1922; served in various capacities in the United Provinces and Central Indian States, 1923-37; Agent to Governor-General of India in British Malaysia, 1937-41; Commissioner of Allahabad Division, 1941-46; Prime Minister, Jodhpur, 1946-47; Secretary, States Ministry, 1951-55; Secretary to the President of India, 1955-58; High Commissioner to Canada, 1958-61.
4. Patel replied that the internal position of some of these States was already under consideration, and that it was necessary to handle the State questions with caution and tact.

24. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi,
8 November 1947

My dear Krishna,

I have your letter of the 25th of October.² I have also read the long note about the P.R.O. I have not thus far interfered in this matter, but it is clear to me that Sudhir Ghosh has no place in the India House. I am finding out from Sardar Patel how matters stand at his end. Meanwhile, I suggest to you not to worry too much about this matter. There are many other things which are more important. This will straighten itself out.

I have not written to you much for some time. Events move fast here and we are never out of a crisis. Kashmir occupies the stage today and it may well lead to other developments. I hope that you will put our view of the case regarding Kashmir before the press and other people there.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Krishna Menon wrote that he did not wish to write to Patel about his fear of Sudhir Ghosh's continuing as Public Relations Officer indefinitely as "it is quite obvious that he disapproves of me and in any event I appear to have made a mistake by taking up this matter with him."

We have received information from all manner of odd sources to the effect that this Kashmir invasion was planned long ago and people in foreign countries knew about it; also that this is part of a larger scheme. I wonder if you can obtain some information about this matter.

It is not yet definitely settled whether Mountbatten will go to London or not for the wedding. On the whole I am inclined to think that he should go in spite of the difficult situation here.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

25. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
8 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Sudhir Ghosh came to see me two or three days ago and we had a talk. I do not know if you have come to any decision about him. The personal aspect has come to the forefront but I am not concerned with this. It seems clear from various accounts, the latest of which is Bidhan Roy's, that Krishna Menon and Sudhir Ghosh do not fit in with each other and it is unfair to both to be yoked together in one place. In fact, things have come to such a pass that Sudhir Ghosh can hardly go back to London without our asking Krishna Menon to resign from his post.²

From all accounts that I have received from various sources, Krishna Menon has done very good work and he has brought some order into the office of the High Commissioner in London. There is a general appreciation of his work from different quarters, including many that were previously unfriendly. I have no doubt that he must continue there.

The consequence of this is that Sudhir Ghosh should not be stationed in London. How far he is suitable for some other foreign appointment, I do

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 468.

2. Patel replied that "it is impossible—nor would it be fair—to ascribe in any hurry blame or responsibilities over the most unfortunate differences that have taken place between Sudhir and Krishna Menon." Nor could the allegations be ignored as they would seriously prejudice Sudhir Ghosh's future if unrefuted. He would come back if Krishna Menon as a consequence of his return would force the issue to the extent of leaving.

not know. Could you kindly let me know what you propose to do about London in this matter?³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

3. Patel informed Nehru that Sudhir Ghosh, who was in India, had to return to London to wind up his affairs and to arrange for his wife's return. Patel was surprised that Krishna Menon was opposed to this even though he had already assured him that Sudhir Ghosh could certainly be called back to India, if he could not get on with him.

26. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
13 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Three or four days ago I wrote to you about Sudhir Ghosh and enquired what you proposed to do about him. I pointed out that whatever the merits, it is quite clear that he did not fit into the present set-up at India House. If he was sent back there, Krishna Menon could not continue. Obviously, Krishna Menon has to continue there, as he has done remarkably well. The consequence is that Sudhir Ghosh should not go back.

I have not heard from you on this subject, but on my return I received a cable this morning from Krishna Menon as follows:—

I received the following en clair telegram from the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting dated 11th November. Begins: Sudhir Ghosh returning to his post shortly. His leave extended by one week. Will let you know date and time of his departure. Ends. No other communication of any kind has been received by me from the Hon'ble Minister or Ministry of Information and Broadcasting since Sudhir Ghosh left, or in answer to my request and facts sent to Sardar Patel.

On reading this telegram I had an enquiry made from Bhalja² and he told us that Sudhir Ghosh was due to leave tomorrow morning by air. I have asked him to delay his departure till I have had an opportunity of discussing this matter with you.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 468-469.

2. G.S. Bhalja.

27. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
15 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 14th² about Sudhir Ghosh.

2. I have not gone deeply into the charges, counter-charges and replies. I glanced through Krishna Menon's charge-sheet rather hurriedly and the impression produced upon me was that Sudhir Ghosh and he did not fit in at all either temperamentally or otherwise. I felt that there had been indiscipline; but when people do not fit in, this almost inevitably happens. Most of the other charges could also be explained in that way. But, as I have said, I did not read them carefully.

3. I have been influenced to some extent in coming to this decision by reports from Dr. Bidhan Roy and from some other people coming from London.

4. You are perfectly right in saying that it was totally unnecessary for Krishna Menon to prepare this charge-sheet. All that was necessary was for him to say that he could not pull on with Sudhir Ghosh. Anyway, as the charges were made Sudhir Ghosh had obviously to be given a chance to reply to them.

5. Sudhir should certainly go back to London to wind up his affairs and arrange for his wife's return. I did not know that his wife was there with him.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 471-472.

2. Patel held that "to condemn Sudhir Ghosh on Krishna Menon's allegations alone without giving Sudhir Ghosh an opportunity to present his side of the case would have been the height of injustice and unfairness to a man whose capabilities, integrity and character have won high praise from more distinguished persons."

28. Standing Committees¹

Sir, there is this difficulty² which you were good enough to point out and to which the Honourable Finance Minister has also drawn attention. I think the difficulty, however, need not frighten us. Ultimately in regard to these financial proposals it is the Standing Finance Committee that will have the final word. As such I see no reason why it should be intimidated by any suggestion on financial proposals coming through another Committee. No doubt the Standing Finance Committee will look into it, and if it does not fit in with the financial programme, it will negate the suggestion. In any event whether you put those words or not, I have no doubt that any proposals which are to be examined by any of the Standing Committees will have to be examined in relation to their financial aspects. The whole picture has got to be considered by the Standing Committee.

The Standing Committees of the past have met normally twice a year and their meetings have often been formal meetings, restricted to problems placed before them. I am not myself conversant with these meetings—I have attended only one or two—and the meetings did not strike me as being very helpful. I hope in future the Standing Committees would perform much more important functions. We have said that they should meet at least twice a year, and I do not wish to change that working in the Rules. But I hope that they will be able to meet often. I hope also that they will not only meet oftener but meet really to survey the whole scene of their activities, and not merely confine themselves to the problem before them. I should certainly like to put the whole picture before them and take their help in the matter. There are, however, some exceptions to this. Obviously sometimes something has to be done urgently, and the Standing Committee cannot meet. We must also have authority to do some things which cannot easily be placed before them for reasons of State policy or security. Those things cannot be placed before them. Subject to that, I hope each Standing Committee will be given the fullest cooperation and information by the Minister concerned.

1. Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 19 November 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. 1, pp. 226-233.
2. There was apprehension in the minds of some members of the Constituent Assembly as to how any deadlock would be resolved in case of a serious conflict of view between the Standing Committees of the Ministry of Finance and other ministries.

I am prepared to accept the amendment moved by Mr. Ayyangar.³ But there is one small matter to which I should like to draw the attention of the House. At the end of Rule 3 there is the proviso "Provided that (i) in cases of urgency a reference to the Committee may be dispensed with by Ministry concerned and (ii) the following cases shall be excluded etc." The second proviso is all right. It gives the protection I ask. But I am not quite clear, from the way it is printed, whether the first proviso applies to the whole Rule or not. The way it is printed with the colon makes rather confusing. I hope it refers to the whole Rule. If so, I accept the amendment moved by Mr. Ayyangar.

I have just stated that I look forward to the Standing Committees meeting pretty frequently. But it will not be desirable to fix a number like four in these Rules. What the Rule says is they should meet at least twice a year. They may meet many more times. I think, however, that to lay down a statutory rule that every Committee should meet at least four times a year will perhaps be undesirable and might place some difficulty. As a matter of fact, apart from the administrative matter, if the members of the Committee themselves want to meet at any time I am quite sure that they can meet. They will have the fullest cooperation of the Ministry.

I hope that the committees will work smoothly and frequently, but I would request the Mover of this to leave it at that and not have a hard and fast rule about every committee meeting at least four times a year.⁴

3. According to Ananthasayanam Ayyangar's amendment, the concerned minister or any member elected by the Standing Committee could act as chairman, and in the absence of the minister, an officer designated by him could act as secretary. Also, the limitation on the subjects be placed before the committee should be removed.
4. On Nehru's assurance, H.V. Kamath withdrew the amendment proposing that the Standing Committees meet four times a year.

29. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
19 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have had a message from London about the passports which have been

1. File No. 20(3)/47-PM (Vol. I), Special Section, PMS.

issued to Jambhekar² and his wife,³ who is Sarojini Naidu's sister. It appears that they desire to travel to Scandinavian and Slav countries. Their passports bear the endorsement that "no future endorsements for any country should be granted without reference to Government of India." It is because of this endorsement that a reference has been made to us.

I understand that the matter has been pending in the Home Ministry for some time and that the Ministry is inclined not to give permission for any further endorsement to be made. The police report apparently is that Jambhekar is a well-known Communist, and so is to some extent his wife. Apparently, this is the main reason for not giving them any further facility.

I am inclined to think that this fact should not be considered as a barrier. It really does not matter at all if a few Communists from India go to Soviet Russia; that will not make them change very much. But the fact of our preventing anybody from going without any other valid cause would probably injure our reputation more. I suggest, therefore, that they might be allowed to go to the Slav countries with one proviso that they are in a position financially to go to these places. The authority giving the endorsement should satisfy himself about this proviso. We do not want them to be stranded and then to apply to us for help.

As they are waiting in London for further instructions from India, I shall be grateful if this matter is expedited.⁴

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. R.M. Jambhekar (b. 1907); trade union leader and member, the Communist Party; imprisoned for organising textile workers' strike in Bombay, 1939; editor, *Indo-Soviet Journal*, 1946-50.
3. Suhasini Chattopadhyaya, youngest sister of Sarojini Naidu.
4. After Patel had agreed Nehru instructed the High Commission in London to issue the necessary endorsements for visiting Scandinavian and Slav countries.

30. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
20 November 1947

My dear Krishna,

I am sorry I have been unable to send you a proper letter for a long time. Anyhow we keep in touch with each other to some extent by telegram.

1. Sudhir Ghosh Papers, N.M.M.L.

This note is being taken by Sudhir Ghosh who is going back for a short while. I understand he will not remain in his present post and he has to make arrangements to wind up his affairs in London and to bring back his wife. He has thus far received no instructions about his future work. These will be sent to him later.

I am sorry there has been so much trouble over Sudhir's work in the India House. As he could not function there to your satisfaction it was obviously not desirable for him to continue there. But now that this episode is closing, I trust that you will see to it that it ends properly and with as little ill will as possible. I should not like Sudhir to leave with some kind of a black mark opposite his name. He has to work elsewhere and should be able to do so under favourable auspices.

Yours,
Jawaharlal Nehru

31. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
25 November 1947

My dear Krishna,

The Mountbattens returned last night and I had a talk with him this afternoon. Apart from telling me of the various functions in London he discussed Kashmir which occupies his mind as it does ours to a large extent.

2. As I was dictating this letter I received your three letters dated 21st November. The Sudhir Ghosh affair is bad enough, but I do wish that you would not take it quite as seriously as you have done. It was totally unnecessary and unwise of you to send a list of charges. It was far easier to ask for his recall. However, that matter is over. You are entirely mistaken in thinking that it is anybody's intention to keep Sudhir Ghosh indefinitely in London. I doubt if he will be in charge of his business for more than two weeks or so and even then he should conform to your directions. In fact his chief business is to wind up his affairs such as they are. You know the situation in India to some extent and that Sardar Patel is very sensitive about his own nominees. The principle behind these appointments will have to be considered later as we are full of other difficult problems at present. But you should be quite clear on this issue that Sudhir Ghosh is not remaining there.

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

What he is going to do in future, I do not know, nor am I very much concerned with it. I gave him a brief letter for you when he came to see me on the eve of his departure. I hope you did not read any special meaning in that letter.²

3. I think you should write to Sardar Patel explaining to him the new set-up of your Public Relations Department and how it functions satisfactorily under the two men you mentioned.

4. I might as well tell you that I am entirely dissatisfied with Sudhir Ghosh and I can well understand how difficult it must have been for you to work with him.

5. About your coming here in the middle of December, I am not quite sure if that is a good date from my point of view. To some extent all dates are alike and all are busy days. But the next two or three weeks are particularly heavy. Perhaps after the 20th December it will be more suitable. However, I shall cable to you.

6. About Kashmir I fear that Mountbatten takes too rosy a view about a settlement being reached if I speak to Liaquat Ali Khan. I am going to meet Liaquat Ali tomorrow. The differences are too deep and the conflict of interests too great for any quick settlement. Neither India nor Pakistan can think with equanimity of being cut off from Kashmir. Recent events have made it even more difficult for us to walk out. Indeed it is quite inconceivable for us to leave Kashmir in the lurch after all that has happened. We shall of course abide by our promise to have a plebiscite when the time comes for it. But that time cannot come till this petty war is over. Meanwhile war-like operations continue and all manner of internal changes are taking place.

7. I have just received a letter from Rajkumari Amrit Kaur.³ I do not quite know what it means. But as it refers to India House I am enclosing it.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

2. Ghosh informed Patel that Nehru's letter of introduction to Menon did not help him as his remark that he was being sent by Patel though put innocently was read with "some unusual meaning" by Menon and Vellodi.

3. In her letter of 25 November 1947, she had conveyed to Nehru the sense of insecurity and consequent lowering of morale of the personnel working in India House in London following the changes being made there.

32. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi

26 November 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of today's date enclosing copy of a letter to the Minister of Defence. You were also good enough to write to me on this subject on the 4th November.

2. In your letter you have suggested a meeting today, 26th November, of the Education Sub-Committee of the Cabinet. I am not quite sure that there is such a sub-committee and I do not know if any kind of a meeting took place today. I am sorry to say that I was too much engaged in other matters to enquire about it.

3. The question you have raised in your memorandum and your letters is an important one and not easy of answer without the fullest consultation and consideration of educational and other authorities. But so far as the limited proposal contained in your letter to the Minister of Defence is concerned, that is to say that the three Lawrence schools² should continue to run until the end of the school year 1948, I am entirely agreeable. It may be, of course, that necessary changes are made in the curriculum or other functioning of these schools even during this period. But their essential character could be kept intact. This is my personal opinion as I have had no opportunity to consult my colleagues, the Ministers of Education and Defence.

4. I think it will be desirable to have some specialized schools of the type you mention, but they should be made to conform, as far as possible, with Indian conditions and Indian standards. Otherwise there will be a hiatus and a certain class consciousness will be encouraged. But this matter can be considered later. For the present I am agreeable to your proposal regarding the three Lawrence schools. I am sending copies of this letter to the Ministers of Education and Defence.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The Lawrence schools in Lovedale, Sanawar and Gharagali were originally started by Henry Lawrence for the children of the British personnel in the Indian army.

33. Linguistic Provinces¹

The attention of Government has been drawn to the resolution² referred to in the question. Government are fully aware of the demand in some parts of the country for new provinces to be formed primarily on a linguistic and cultural basis. Many years ago this demand was recognised by the Congress³ and Government accept the principle underlying that demand. In giving effect to that principle, however, many other considerations have to be borne in mind. Apart from linguistic and cultural aspects sometimes also there is no clear demarcation and cultural and linguistic areas overlap. Hence a very careful enquiry is necessary before a decision can be arrived at. Government are anxious not to delay the enquiry or the decision. But, as the House is fully aware, the country has had to face, ever since the new order started functioning, a very critical situation resulting from partition. A living entity had a part severed from it and this unnatural operation resulted in all manner of distempers which have naturally affected the political, social and economic structure of the country. Reactionary forces took advantage of this situation to consolidate themselves and to raise separatist cries. The old equilibrium having been shaken up, disruptionist tendencies came to the fore. To a large extent we have faced this crisis and overcome it. But many dangers still surround us. There are numerous urgent demands in the economic and other spheres. When there are a multitude of such demands a certain priority has to be observed, otherwise there would be dispersion of effort and ineffectiveness. First things must come first and the first thing is the security and stability of India. Before we can undertake any major schemes we must have a strong state and a smoothly running governmental machinery. The first essential therefore is for India as a whole to be strong and firmly established, confident in her capacity to meet all possible dangers and face and solve all problems. If India lives, all parts of India also live and prosper. If India is enfeebled, all her component elements grow weak.

1. Reply to N.G. Ranga's question on Government's policy regarding the creation of new provinces on a linguistic basis, 27 November 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. I, 1947, pp. 793-795.
2. The joint sub-committee of the Union and Provincial Constitution Committees adopted a resolution on 12 June 1947 stating that as soon as the Dominion Constitution became operative, the Government should appoint a commission to examine the creation of new provinces on a linguistic and cultural basis.
3. In 1928 the report of the All Parties Committee (Nehru Report) recommended the formation of provinces on a linguistic basis. The election manifesto of the Congress of December 1945 had said that provinces should, as far as possible, be constituted on a linguistic and cultural basis.

I suggest to the House that every problem must be viewed in this context today.

It is necessary to have a reconstitution of the provinces, or some of them. But if we tackle this problem in a large way at present, there is grave danger of our energies being diverted from some of the more urgent tasks. In the case of some provinces the problem may be relatively easy, in the case of others it would be very difficult and very controversial.

The final determination in regard to the creation of the new provinces appropriately rests with the Constituent Assembly. Government propose to take up this matter in the Constituent Assembly and ask for steps to be taken for preliminary enquiries to be made on this subject. One or more boundary commissions may also be appointed. It would be desirable not to complicate the issue by having too many simultaneous enquiries.

The demand for the province of Andhra, which, if I may say so, is a perfectly legitimate demand, raises relatively few difficulties and it can be included among the provinces in the constitution⁴ as was done in the case of Orissa and Sind under the Government of India Act of 1935. This decision can be implemented soon after the constitution is adopted.

The creation of the provinces of Maharashtra and Karnataka involves greater difficulties as any marked change will powerfully affect the structure and economy of the provinces concerned. This question will require very careful consideration in all its bearings so that the final decision may be a just one and acceptable to the parties concerned.

It must be remembered that the creation of a new province inevitably affects all the neighbouring provinces and the interests of these will have to be considered. Every decision must of course be considered from the point of view of the country as a whole.

There is no reason why enquiries referred to above may not be completed within a year or so.

Lakshmi Kanta Maitra asked whether the Government would take into consideration the cultural and linguistic affinities of the region before the new provinces were created.

JN : Naturally, Sir, all these questions can be considered at the right time.

4. The J.V.P. (Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel and Pattabhi Sifaramayya) committee, appointed by the Congress at its Jaipur session in December 1948 to consider the question of linguistic provinces, in its report submitted in April 1949, recommended postponement of the question for a few years, but, said, the case of Andhra could be considered if certain conditions were created.

Renuka Ray said that there was a strong demand for realignment of Bengal and Bihar on linguistic lines. The issue had not been raised in the Assembly because the Central Government was confronted by more immediate difficulties. She wanted an assurance of sympathetic consideration of the issue when raised later on and not to let it go by default.

JN : I must express my appreciation of the fact pointed out by the Honourable Member that, because of wider considerations, they did not press a certain demand that they had in their hearts or minds. But I must say that the grace of all that has been taken away by a fresh demand for an assurance.

N.B. Khare asked under what section of the Adaptation Act the Boundary Commission would be set up.

JN : I cannot mention any particular Act but without any Act I am quite sure we can appoint any number of boundary commissions.

R. R. Diwakar said the Kannada people would be the greatest sufferers as at present they were being distributed over several administrative agencies.

JN : I certainly realise the feelings in Karnataka and the desire to take action in this matter.

R. R. Diwakar asked if it would be possible to see that Karnataka became a province before the new constitution came into operation.

JN : As the Speaker⁵ has already pointed out, the right course would be to proceed through the constitution-making body.

5. He had suggested that the issue should be decided by the Assembly when it functioned as a constitution-making body.

34. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

3 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a letter from Dr. Sivakamu, a lady in charge of a hospital in Alwar. I think something should be done about this matter. The way the Alwar

1. J.N. Collection.

authorities have behaved in regard to mosques and even graveyards is disgraceful in the extreme.² To destroy a historical monument of value is a sacrilege, and the Maharaja must be pulled up. No great publicity has thus far been given to his misdeeds. But publicity will come and that will reflect to some extent on the *Government of India* also. I hope you will take some action in this matter.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. N.B. Khare, who was the Prime Minister of Alwar State from April 1947 to February 1948, and president of the All India Hindu National Front, Alwar, was alleged to have told the Hindu Mahasabha leaders in November 1947 that they could pull down the mosques and whoever would do so in the shortest time would get the land where those mosques stood. There was looting of the Muslims for eight days.

35. Note to the Members of the Cabinet¹

For sometime past members of the Cabinet have not been able to meet informally as they used to do. Meetings of the Assembly and various committees have hardly left any time for such informal meetings. Yet it is important that we should meet frequently and keep in touch with various developments. Often there is a complaint that something is done by a particular ministry about which other ministers know nothing. This is a legitimate complaint as there can be no joint responsibility if vital matters are not considered jointly. Sometimes, in the Assembly, members of the Congress Party have spoken on important issues on diametrically opposed lines. There is no reason why there should not be latitude of expression but where vital issues are concerned it is obviously desirable for asserting uniformity of policy.

2. Partly the fault lies with the Government in not having considered yet our general economic policy. If some broad principles are laid down by Government then it would be easy to fit in other matters with it.

3. At meetings of the Congress Party in the Assembly complaints have been made that important bills are placed before the Assembly without any previous reference to them and almost at the last moment. Sometimes this is inevitable. But here also the difficulty has arisen because of a lack of a clearly defined policy.

1. New Delhi, 10 December 1947. J.N. Collection.

4. It is necessary therefore that the Cabinet should consider what our basic economic, industrial, labour and financial policy should be. The question of planning also has to be considered in this connection. It was for this purpose that an Advisory Planning Board was appointed a year ago. It was also for this purpose that the Economic Sub-Committee might make its proposals for the consideration of the Cabinet at an early date. This work must be finished by the Cabinet before the budget session of the Assembly.

5. Meanwhile, I should like to have an informal meeting of ministers at my house today, December 10, 1947, at 7 p.m. This will be chiefly to consider the Kashmir situation. I trust that ministers will find it convenient to attend the meeting.

36. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi

11 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You told me some time back that Sudhir Ghosh was returning to London to wind up his affairs and bring back his wife. I do not know if he is still in London or has left his post there. In case he has not been transferred, I hope this will be done soon as the position in India House must necessarily be difficult after all that has happened. Our work will suffer greatly.

I was reminded of this matter today when Mountbatten asked me about it. I do not know the exact position now and so I am writing to you to enquire.²

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 472.

2. Patel replied on 12 December that he was also anxious not to keep Sudhir Ghosh there for a day longer than was necessary and that he would be returning to India in the following week.

37. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
17 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

You will remember my mentioning at a Cabinet meeting that the appointment of a board to choose candidates for the Foreign Service had been held up in the Home Ministry. It is now two months since the Cabinet came to a decision because it was felt that something should be done quickly and the normal delays should be avoided.

2. Discussions have taken place at a departmental level without any satisfactory result. The Home Ministry has raised some objections. Personally I do not think that the interpretation put by the Home Ministry is a reasonable one. But even if it was correct, something should be done to get over the decision. That something has to be done by the Home Ministry who ultimately will have to issue the requisite notification.

3. It has to be noted that the Cabinet decision does not affect normal recruitment to the Indian Foreign Service which will continue to be made through the Federal Public Service Commission. It relates to some temporary steps to be taken in view of the urgency of securing a number of recruits and thus supplementing the recruitment by the Commission which is still going on. This temporary recruitment will also be by a board which is independent and which is at least as representative as the Federal Public Service Commission. The Commission has to nominate one of their members to this board and they should be asked to do so.

4 I shall be grateful if early action is taken in this matter.²

Yours.
Jawaharlal

1. File No. 22(22)-FSP/47, p. 32/corr., M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Patel replied on 17 December 1947 that, following the Cabinet decision of 23 October 1947, the Ministry of External Affairs should get the approval of the Federal Public Service Commission by setting out the circumstances necessitating recruitment without consulting the Commission because, by a convention, no post should be excluded from the purview of the Commission.

38. To O.P. Ramaswamy Reddiar¹

New Delhi
20 December 1947

My dear Premier,

The Governor of Madras, General Nye, was asked to stay on in August last. It was understood at that time that he would stay for another year, that is, till August next. I have been asked by the Governor General if this arrangement holds, and I have told him that I see no reason why it should not hold. From all accounts General Nye has functioned well in his office and there would be no point in changing him for a few months and having a new Governor. What we shall do after August next will depend on the progress made by our new constitution and on other circumstances which we can consider later. I hope you agree with this course of action.

I met General Nye when he came here some months ago and I was very favourably impressed by him. He is a man of outstanding reputation as a soldier and has risen from the ranks. Probably he would have been a Field Marshal now if he had stuck to soldiering. He is just the type of man whom we would like to keep in India, if there is any possibility of doing so in some form or other. However, this question does not arise now.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

39. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
23 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Gopalaswami Ayyangar² has sent me copies of correspondence which has passed between him and you last night regarding 150 motor vehicles being sent from East Punjab to Kashmir.³

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 1. pp. 121-122.

2. He was Minister without Portfolio at this time.

3. Patel had objected to Gopalaswami Ayyangar corresponding directly with the East Punjab Government on this matter as he felt that the matter fell within the purview of his Ministry. Gopalaswami had replied that he had had no intention of encroaching on another Ministry's jurisdiction.

I must confess that I am greatly surprised to read this. I do not appreciate the principle which presumably the States Ministry has in view in regard to its work. That Ministry, or any other Ministry, is not an *imperium in imperio*, jealous of its sovereignty in certain domains and working in isolation from the rest. If that was so then the Government would not be a close-knit organism working together with a common purpose, and the Prime Minister would have no function to perform. But I do not wish to consider the wider question of principle at this stage though it may have to be discussed later.

The present issue relates to Kashmir. This raises all manner of connected issues—international, military and others—which are beyond the competence of the States Ministry as such. That is why it has to be considered by the Cabinet as a whole frequently and by various Ministers separately or together. And that is why I have to take personal interest in this matter as Prime Minister to bring about coordination in our various activities.

Gopalaswami Ayyangar has been especially asked to help in Kashmir matters and at our request has visited the State twice. He has to deal with East Punjab also and the M.E.O. there. Both for this reason and because of his intimate knowledge and experience of Kashmir he has to be given full latitude. Accordingly, after repeated talks with representatives of the Defence Ministry, all manner of arrangements have been made about supply of arms and equipment, etc. In this connection the urgent need of motor vehicles has been repeatedly raised. Ultimately it was decided to ask the East Punjab Government to relieve a number of these for Kashmir and steps were taken accordingly.

I really do not understand where the States Ministry comes into the picture, except that it should be kept informed of steps taken. In any event I do not understand why the States Ministry should intervene and come in the way of arrangements being made. All this was done at my instance and I do not propose to abdicate my functions in regard to matters for which I consider myself responsible.

May I say that the manner of approach to Gopalaswami was hardly in keeping with the courtesy due to a colleague?⁴

Yours,
Jawaharlal

4. On receiving this letter, Patel considered resignation, but agreed to drop the issue.

40. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
23 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have just received your two letters of today's date.² First as regards Iengar's visit to Ajmer. I told you that I intended going to Ajmer from Jaipur. Iengar was going with me to both places and information of this was sent to the officers concerned. Quite apart from what the local authorities did, the recent occurrences in Ajmer were of primary importance and were likely to have far-reaching consequences. Next to Delhi itself, Ajmer is probably more important from this point of view than any other place in India. What happens in Ajmer might well affect our whole policy for better or worse. It was for this reason that I decided to pay a visit there, not so much from the local but the national point of view. Suddenly, owing to the death of my nephew,³ I had to cancel my visit. I thought this would have a bad effect in Ajmer as my visit had been announced and was eagerly looked forward to. That visit was intended to show to the country generally that we were anxious to do all in our power whenever such a situation arose and were taking a personal interest in it.

As I was not going, I asked Iengar to proceed to Ajmer with my apologies and further to say that I would try to come later if that was necessary. I felt I owed that personal approach in the circumstances.

There was no question of sitting in judgment over any officer or official account. It was an approach to the public, especially the sufferers in the recent riots, in order to hearten them and lessen their fear. After such an occurrence I think it is very desirable for such personal approaches to be made both from the point of view of the officers and the public.

I think Shankar Prasad is a good and impartial officer—that has been my experience of him in the past. Why his prestige or reputation should suffer by my sending someone to Ajmer, I do not quite see.⁴ In any event the most important consideration is surely the effect on the public and not merely the reaction of an officer. We can hardly function on the purely official level when panic seizes the people or psychological conditions arise which may lead to disaster. The stakes are too high for us to get tied up in official red tape.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, pp. 10-12.

2. Patel protested at Nehru sending his Private Secretary, H.V.R. Iengar, to assess the situation arising out of communal riots in Ajmer as it would be interpreted to mean that Nehru was dissatisfied either with the account Patel had given him or with the local authorities.

3. A.K. Nehru, son of Shamlal Nehru, died on 17 December 1947.

4. Patel wrote he would not be surprised if Iengar's visit had "disheartened Shankar Prasad already and of course affected his prestige."

You will appreciate that I am also concerned with the prestige of our officers and am anxious that nothing should be done to injure it in any way. But the prestige of an officer or indeed our own prestige is after all a secondary matter when other vital issues are at stake. If we do the right thing with the public, our prestige will take care of itself, and so will the officers'.

An important question arises—am I to be constrained in taking any action in regard to inspection or visit or like matters, which I consider necessary? That surely is an impossible position for me or any Prime Minister anywhere. Am I not to send a personal representative to any place either for a private inquiry or to convey a message? That would make me a prisoner without freedom to act in accordance with what I might consider the needs of the situation.

About your second letter, I am very sorry that what I wrote to you gave you pain. I am myself very unhappy about the trend of events and the difficulties that have arisen between you and me. It seems that our approaches are different, however much we may respect each other, and the issues that have arisen have to be considered very carefully and objectively by all of us. If I am to continue as Prime Minister I cannot have my freedom restricted and I must have a certain liberty of direction. Otherwise, it is better for me to retire. I do not wish to take any hasty step, nor would you wish to take it. We must, therefore, give full thought to the situation that has arisen, so that our decisions may be for the good of the country we have sought, to serve these many years. If unfortunately either you or I have to leave the Government of India, let this be done with dignity and goodwill. On my part I would gladly resign and hand over the reins to you.⁵

Yours,
Jawaharlal

5. In his reply of 24 December 1947, Patel said it would be impossible for him to function "under the restrictions of ministerial responsibility" which Nehru considered legitimate. He also said that there was no question of Nehru resigning.

41. To Gopinath Bardoloi¹

New Delhi
24 December 1947

My dear Bardoloi,
Thank you for your letter of the 15th December which I have read with interest.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

The Kashmir affair is dragging on and is likely to give us a good deal of trouble before it is settled.

In spite of your various troubles I have a feeling that Assam is going ahead in many ways. I am sure it has a bright future. It seems to me that the only way to tackle our problems is to do so constructively to development schemes and not negatively. I am glad that you are thinking on these lines. I do not attach much importance to the position in Tripura² or to the minor troubles you have had in Naga Hills.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. See *ante*, pp. 249-250.

3. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 1, p. 42.

42. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
25 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I have had a telegram from Mr. M.S. Aney in which he has stated that he is agreeable to accept the post of Governor of Bihar. I shall now write to the Governor General so that necessary steps might be taken.

I saw Bapu this evening and he suggested that you and I might see him together. I think this will be a good thing. 7 o'clock tomorrow the 26th evening has been suggested for our meeting at Bapu's place. I hope this suits you.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, p. 411.

43. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
29 December 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

Thank you for your letter of the 29th about Ajmer. I am sorry Shankar Prasad has felt at all mystified or upset or imagined that there was any inquiry.² The whole object of Iengar going there was to convey my personal regret at my inability to go and my personal interest to the various people concerned who were much agitated. Quite apart from this fact, it was clear that the Muslims of Ajmer were terrified and were leaving in large numbers. As I had told you, I have received telegrams from Sind also, among them from Prof. Malkani, to visit Ajmer immediately in order to calm down the apprehensions of the Muslims there. Bapu had likewise asked me to do so.

Iengar did give me a report on his return. I have not got it with me, but I shall try to find it and send it to you.

I understand that about 10,000 out of 50,000 Muslims have been left in Ajmer and the exodus continues. I do not know how far these figures are correct. This indicates that while the situation is fully under control, there is fear among the Muslims of further attacks upon them. I do not know if this fear is justified. But we should try to remove it. The R.S.S. there and elsewhere is in an aggressive mood and issues threats which frighten many people.

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 6, p. 16.
2. Vallabhbhai Patel forwarded copies of letters exchanged between Shankar Prasad, Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, and his Private Secretary, V. Shankar, concerning Shankar Prasad's embarrassment at Iengar's visit to Ajmer being interpreted as lack of confidence in him.

44. To C.M. Trivedi¹

New Delhi
29 December 1947

My dear Trivedi,

Thank you for your letter of the 27th December about Haksar. I hope Haksar will come here soon so that we can go ahead with our arrangements.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

I am rather worried about reports from Hindus in East Punjab about instances of Sikh aggression. How far this is true, I do not know. I understand that the allocation of lands has also been rather partial. This complaint is also made about senior services.

I do not know if you saw the reports of the U.N.R.R.A. advisers about East Punjab. I think it was sent to you by Iengar. This report has troubled me and I do not quite know what we should do about it.

The Kashmir situation is developing rapidly and we are making a reference to the Security Council of U.N.O. We may even have to enlarge the area of our military operations which means that we might have to enter Pakistan territory in places so as to reach the bases from which they attack Kashmir State. You can well imagine what this may lead to. So, East Punjab has to forget its little troubles and internal feuds and be prepared for a serious development.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

45. To Hare Krushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
29 December 1947

My dear Mahtab,

Thank you for your letter of the 26th December. I am very glad that the little States surrounding your Province have been merged.

As for the other matter as to whether Seraikella and Kharsawan should be attached to Orissa or Bihar, it is difficult for me to express an opinion without knowing all the facts. Primarily I take it this should depend on the wishes of the inhabitants as well as on other obvious factors. I must confess, however, that the kind of agitation that has been going on in Bihar is most undignifying.² The matter must be settled amicably between the parties and, if necessary, under directions from the Centre. It is absurd for provinces to quarrel about it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Following the decision of the rulers of Kharsawan and Seraikella to merge their states with Orissa, an agitation began for their merger with Bihar, for geographically these states were part of the Singbhum district of Bihar and the majority of their population were Adivasis. Kharsawan and Seraikella were finally merged with Bihar on 18 May 1948.

1. To Abul Kalam Azad¹

New Delhi
22nd August 1947

My dear Maulana,

I understand that your Department has received a letter from Dr. Tara Chand, Vice-Chancellor, University of Allahabad, asking for a special grant on the occasion of the Diamond Jubilee celebrations of the University. He has asked for ten lakhs of rupees. Your Department will no doubt go into this matter, though I cannot say about the sum that might ultimately be granted.

I feel, however, that from the larger viewpoint it is very urgently necessary that we should give immediate aid to some of our universities, more especially for scientific and technical training. The Allahabad University has a good Science Department, but this has been starved for lack of equipment and hundreds of prospective science students are thus just waiting to be admitted.

In the report of the Committee appointed by you (Scientific Man-Power Committee)² a recommendation has been made that the existing facilities in the universities should be augmented and help should be given for this purpose. I suggest that these two approaches might be coordinated and a grant made to the Allahabad University, earmarked for scientific and technical training.

Could you kindly let me know what you propose to do with the interim report³ of the sub-committee of the Scientific Man-Power Committee? This has already been circulated and it should be considered soon in Cabinet.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 40(23) 56-PMS.

2. The Committee was appointed in April 1947, with Shafiat Ahmed Khan as chairman, to ensure the proper development and utilisation of India's scientific manpower resources.

3. The report, submitted in August 1947, recommended urgent measures for scientific and technical training including award of grants, creation of scientific research in Britain and priority for import of scientific equipment.

2. Reorganisation of Scientific Research¹

This meeting has been called with a view to discuss the future set-up of scientific research. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture, for instance, deal with important aspects of scientific research, but the greater part of it comes under the Ministry of Industries and Supplies, which is an administrative charge of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. It is, however, necessary to ensure for scientific research as much coordination and encouragement as possible. Without proper coordination, there is bound to be considerable overlapping and waste.

I have placed scientific research under my personal charge.² However, I have no desire to interfere in the work now being carried on; but I am interested in scientific research and wish to be closely associated with it and help in its promotion. I realise I cannot undertake anything of a detailed or routine nature. I feel it is highly desirable to have a committee of the Cabinet, specially charged with the task of promoting scientific research.³ The Ministers in charge of the various departments concerned with scientific research, including the Minister for Transport, should be members of this committee. The committee could meet at least once a month, and as and when necessary.

The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research is an autonomous body with the Minister for Industries and Supplies as its Chairman. I understand that while the Council has internal autonomy in certain matters, it functions through a department of the Government.⁴ It is conceivable that the Prime Minister could function as the Chairman of the Council, while there could be a Vice-Chairman who may be concerned with its administrative functioning.⁵

In conclusion, I might say that there is no intention of finalising arrangements for scientific research at this stage.⁶ However, we must think of scientific research in relation to planning and consider at a later stage proposals for a suitable planning machinery within the Government of India, perhaps a Planning Commission.

6. It was agreed to continue research in the fields of medical science and agriculture under the aegis of the concerned ministries. A suggestion to place all government organisations concerned with scientific research under the Member for Planning and Development was not accepted. As a compromise, a scientific consultative committee was formed.

3. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
23 August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 23rd August.² The problems you have discussed are of the greatest importance and must be tackled with speed and efficiency. We are all quite alive to this fact and we hope to give full attention to them very soon.

I entirely agree with you that whatever policy we should adopt should be fully supported by the whole weight of party machinery and by all other means possible to us. I feel, however, that our present policy needs some revision and we have to approach the public in such a way as would appeal to them. We have somehow managed to carry on during the past year, leading a hand to mouth existence. This is a risky business always. At the present moment there is no doubt that there is a very great deal of criticism in regard to our present food and other policies.³ Procurement

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. In his letter of 23 August 1947, Mountbatten expressed concern over the deteriorating economic situation resulting from the possible breakdown of urban food rationing and a coal crisis affecting industry, railways and public utility services either of which would inevitably cause serious price inflation. He urged that the Congress machinery be used to reinforce the administration's efforts to deal with this situation.

3. The Government adopted a policy of progressive decontrol in regard to food, sugar, *gur* and cloth. It was believed that if controls on prices were removed hoarded goods would come into the open market. Mahatma Gandhi supported decontrol because he considered controls bad for public morale.

can be improved no doubt but it would help greatly if this was done in a favourable atmosphere. Unfortunately the Punjab tragedy has for the moment tied us up completely.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
23 August 1947

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I enclose a copy of a letter I have received from Lord Mountbatten. I think that not only must we give urgent consideration to the problems he has raised but think on new lines. Our past policies have not been too successful. Unfortunately the Punjab situation absorbs our attention. But this economic matter is at least of equal importance. Your own time is taken up mostly by the Constituent Assembly. I wish the Constituent Assembly was postponed or adjourned so as to allow us some time to grapple with these problems.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

5. The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research¹

I thank the members for their kind sentiments. Many urgent problems have been engaging my attention in the midst of which, however, I made it a point to attend the meeting of the governing body. I wished to associate myself with the Council in my individual capacity since I am interested in its work, and also in my official capacity in order to show what importance the new Government attaches to scientific development in India. After a big change

1. Speech at the meeting of the governing body of the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research, 25 August 1947. File No, 17(12)/47-PMS.

we have to face a very large number of problems and the work should therefore go at a fairly faster speed. The problem of refugees and communal troubles in the Punjab and elsewhere have been assuming large and painful proportions and have to be tackled not in an emotional but in a scientific manner. The members of the governing body will appreciate that it is difficult for me to devote much time to many aspects of the work of the Council. In so far as the matter of policy and important matters are concerned, I would like to be associated with the Council's work. I expected the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the new activities in the planning to be coordinated. For the present, Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee² will, however, look after the day-to-day routine work of the Council.

2. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, as Minister for Industries and Supplies, was elected Vice-President of the Council.

6. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi

22 September 1947

My dear Rajendra Babu,

I have your letter of today's date. I am very sorry that you have been ill. I think you are wise to go to Pilani for some time to recuperate, although we shall miss you greatly. We are living through very difficult times and a continuing crisis, the magnitude of which few people realise. It is difficult to spare you at this time, but obviously your health must come first. In your absence I am quite agreeable to Bhabha² looking after urgent matters relating to the Food and Agriculture Ministries.

I must confess that I do not particularly like the idea of your going to Australia for the wheat agreement.³ Normally, Ministers do not go for such purposes. In view of the crisis in India,⁴ your presence here is eminently

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.L.

2. C.H. Bhabha, Minister for Commerce.

3. An agreement to buy 65,000 tons of wheat from Australia was reached in December 1947.

4. The crisis of the stage of foodgrains was aggravated by partition, the refugee problem, the failure of the rabi and kharif crops in 1947 and the shortage created by the wheat crop in 1947.

desirable. This crisis is a continuing one and is not likely to resolve itself soon.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To Rajendra Prasad¹

New Delhi
25 September 1947

My dear Rajendra Babu,

At yesterday's Cabinet meeting we considered the question of your visiting Australia for the wheat agreement. All our colleagues were unanimously of opinion that it would not be fitting for a Cabinet Minister of the Government to visit Australia for this purpose; further, that in the present emergency, Cabinet Ministers should remain in India.

I might mention to you that in connection with the Japanese Peace Treaty and the Canberra Conference² great pressure was brought to bear upon us to send a Cabinet Minister to Australia for a few days. We resisted this, however, as we did not think that a Cabinet Minister should leave India and we sent Sir B. Rama Rau instead. I think it would be desirable if you sent a senior official to Australia for this purpose instead of going yourself.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. A Conference of Commonwealth countries to discuss their attitude to peace terms for Japan was held in Canberra from 26 August to 2 September 1947.
3. The matter was handled ultimately by the Indian High Commissioner in Australia.

8. The I.L.O. in Asia¹

I welcome the delegates on behalf of the Government and people of India. The importance of bringing about a tremendous raising of the standard of

1. Inaugural speech at the Asian Regional Labour Conference, New Delhi, 27 October 1947. *The Hindu*, 28 October 1947.

living in Asia, which is very low at present, is not a question of rich and powerful countries being generous, though generosity is always good. Poverty at any place is a danger to prosperity everywhere, just as any infectious disease somewhere might be a danger to healthy conditions elsewhere. I commend the I.L.O.'s famous declaration of Philadelphia in 1944.² If only the world was governed by the principles laid down in that declaration, there would hardly be any major trouble in the world.

Most countries of Asia are still, or are likely to continue to be, predominantly agricultural. The approach to labour problems in India must primarily take into consideration agricultural conditions.

We cannot make real progress under a semi-feudal land tenure system. We as a Government are committed to remove, to alter, this old land tenure system. We are committed to the abolition of what is called the zamindari system or the big landlord system. I am sorry that there has been a little delay in this because of other reasons,³ but we do wish to proceed in this matter as rapidly as possible. We think that is a basis and foundation for the other kinds of progress envisaged.

In other countries of Asia, too, agricultural and land tenure problems will have to be tackled rapidly so as to create that basis on which they can build better living conditions.

I hope that the time will come soon when every form of colonialism will disappear from Asia and I hope that this conference, very representative as it is, will be even more representative of the people of Asia than it is today. I am glad to welcome here—I believe they have come for the first time to such a conference—people from Burma, Malaya, Ceylon and certain parts of Indo-China and I understand that representatives of the Philippines who have not come will be coming soon.

I regret that some nations of Asia are not represented here like Japan, Korea, the Indonesian Republic and the Viet Nam parts of Indo-China. I appreciate the difficulties of this organisation, which as an inter-governmental organisation cannot by-pass governments in approaching the people direct, though, in its original Charter, an attempt was made to get the cooperation not only of governments but also of workers and employers. I hope that this difficulty will be got over and that these countries will in future find proper representation. We cannot ignore vast areas of territory because some dominating Power—the metropolitan Power if it so chooses to call

2. The Charter passed at the I.L.O. conference in Philadelphia on 10 May 1944 reaffirmed the fundamental principles of the I.L.O., stipulating that "labour is not a commodity, that freedoms of expression and association are essential to sustained progress, that poverty anywhere constitutes a danger to prosperity everywhere..."
3. Land reforms were impeded because circumstances differed from province to province and because in some provinces like Bihar and U.P. zamindari abolition was challenged in the courts.

itself—considers itself the representative of those people and is not prepared to give proper representation to others.

Some months ago the Asian Relations Conference was held here.⁴ It considered all manner of problems, especially economic problems. That was a historic occasion and this conference is also one of historic significance. I admire the work that the I.L.O. has done. Perhaps, inevitably, the attention of this Organisation has been concentrated, more perhaps than factors of geography warranted, on problems other than Asian problems. I do not wish to minimise the work it has done in China, India and elsewhere in Asia. Nevertheless, the perspective was largely, if I may say so, European. Again, political factors also came in. A number of Asian countries were under colonial domination and politics and economics are inter-laced. One effect of this political domination over various Asian countries was to turn the minds of men in those countries towards the achievement of political freedom. Economic issues were somewhat hidden by this political struggle for freedom, although economic issues can never be ignored and are apt to produce catastrophic consequences if you seek to ignore them. Now that these countries in Asia are politically free or, I hope, on the verge of political freedom, these economic questions are coming very much to the fore.

We meet here in Delhi and many of you know that we are faced with very grave problems of many kinds, more especially economic problems, in India. Our time is taken up by the problems of the moment. Nevertheless, we have welcomed your coming here in spite of our preoccupations because we do think that the problems of the moment will pass, but the essential problem which you seek to tackle will remain and will have to be tackled.

We talk of world peace and even now, when we are meeting here, the United Nations' General Assembly is meeting in New York. Nevertheless, the essential basis of world peace must be, as the Philadelphia Declaration stated, social security or social justice in every country.

There are hardly any regions of the world which are more closely and heavily populated than India, China and Indonesia. Not only because of their vast numbers, but also because of various other reasons, the well-being of the people living in those regions and the raising of their standards are exceedingly important.

India is faced with very great problems. Nevertheless, the most important question in India is an economic one and if people do not solve it, India's troubles will increase. Essentially, this is a problem of poverty, of unemployment, semi-starvation of large numbers of people and of low standards of living for vast numbers. The I.L.O. in the past had dealt with living conditions of industrial workers. Nevertheless, if I might say so, it had paid somewhat more attention to industrial labour than to agricultural

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 2, pp. 503-516

labour. I do not wish to pay any less attention to industrial labour, because that is very important and even in India it is a very important and vital element. Nevertheless, India and most countries of Asia are still or are likely to continue to be predominantly agricultural countries. The approach to their problems must, therefore, primarily take into consideration agricultural conditions.

One of the principal reasons for the poverty of India is the over-burdening of land and lack of other occupations. This can only be remedied by transfer to other occupations of a large proportion of the agricultural population of India. Therefore, even from the point of view of land, India wants development of industry—big industry, cottage industry, and every other kind of industry. Therefore, the agricultural and industrial aspects of the question cannot be separated.

Again, we have to think of the development of social services, sanitation, education, transport and so many other things. In other words, the whole problem becomes interrelated and we have to advance all along the line. And when we arrive at a stage of imminent crisis, as we have done today, not only in India, but all over the world, we will have to act quickly.

I assure this conference that India will try to carry out the decision of the I.L.O. to the utmost of her ability. In the past, we have tried to do so, but I cannot say how far we have completely done so. There has been one difficulty in our way in the past. While the Government of India might agree to these conventions and recommendations of the I.L.O., there have been parts of India called the Indian States which were not wholly amenable to our influence. Labour laws in those States did not keep pace with labour laws in the rest of India. That was not only bad for the people of those States, it was bad for the rest of India too, because it tended to keep down standards in the rest of India. I hope that in future there will be a certain uniformity about it.

9. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
24 November 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

As you know, a meeting of the All India Congress Committee was held in New Delhi a week ago. This meeting considered the present situation and passed a number of important resolutions. You must have seen these resolutions in the newspapers. Nevertheless, I am sending you a copy of some of the resolutions bearing on general policy.

1. *Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945-50*, Vol. 4, pp. 549-550.

Many of the members of the Cabinet are also members of the All India Congress Committee and they took part in these discussions and in the passing of these resolutions. Naturally, therefore, it is their desire as well as mine that the policy followed by the Government in regard to these matters should be in line with the resolutions passed by the A.I.C.C.

I would draw your special attention to the last resolution, i.e. the resolution on Congress objectives. This resolution is in the nature of a general directive for the formulation of an economic programme. It is vague as it is because a committee² has been asked to draw up this programme. Nevertheless, it signifies clearly what the Congress is aiming at and what, I trust, the Government will work for.

It is becoming increasingly important that the Government of India should lay down its economic, industrial and labour policy as speedily as possible. Some attempt has been made from time to time to deal with the problems separately. It is hardly a satisfactory method. Some kind of a comprehensive picture must be seen towards which we can work in each individual sector. Hence it is necessary that we should consider this problem in its entirety and lay down a more or less precise policy.

Probably the best way to do so will be to consider the report of the Advisory Planning Board with the recommendations of the Economic Sub-Committee which was formed some time ago.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. The Economic Programme Committee consisted of Nehru, Azad, N.G. Ranga, Jayaprakash Narayan, Gulzarilal Nanda, J.C. Kumarappa, Achyut Patwardhan and Shankarrao Deo.

10. To Homi J. Bhabha¹

New Delhi
2nd December 1947

My dear Homi,

I have your letter of the 10th November. We are anxious to help you in every way in developing atomic energy in India. So far as I am concerned I shall do my best to afford you all the necessary facilities but I cannot guarantee what funds will be available for the purpose.

I do not quite know what kind of letter you want from me. It is rather

1. File no. 17(30)/47-PMS.

difficult to write in the air and I do not wish to make what might be called official approach at this stage to governments. However, I am enclosing a brief note.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

ENCLOSURE

Dr. Homi J. Bhabha is Chairman of the Board of Research on Atomic Energy in India.² In view of the fact that India possesses very large resources of minerals suitable for the generation of atomic power, India is destined to play an important part in research on atomic energy in cooperation with other countries. We would like to welcome this cooperation, more specially in Great Britain, Canada and France. I trust that it will be possible for us to cooperate in this work on mutually advantageous conditions. Dr. Bhabha, who is a distinguished Indian scientist and Head of the Board of Research on Atomic Energy in India, will, I trust, meet with courtesy and cooperation from his brother scientists in other countries.

2. The board was set up in June 1947 to work under the C.S.I.R., in cooperation with other countries for the exploration of raw materials and for planning and development of research on atomic energy.

11. To V.K. Krishna Menon¹

New Delhi
2 December 1947

My dear Krishna,

I have your letter about M.N. Saha.² I am not in favour of any official approach to the Prime Minister or any other U.K. Minister in regard to atomic energy. Apart from this, if any approach has to be made, it should be by Dr. Bhabha, the Chairman of our Atomic Research Board. The proper approach is by professors to professors. Homi Bhabha knows well the atomic energy experts in England and he will have no difficulty with them.

I understand that he intends returning to England. Probably he will contact there the British atomic energy authorities. He has asked me to send him some kind of a letter of authority. I do not quite know what I am

1. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Meghnad Saha.

to write to him about but he should be given all facilities. We are anxious to develop our investigations in regard to atomic energy.

I expect to see you here round about 21st December. Mountbatten asked me where you would stay. I think you had better stay with me, although our little house is apt to be crowded.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

12. Economic Perspectives¹

Mr. President,² Members of the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Gentlemen, I am grateful to you for giving me this opportunity for the second time to meet you,³ listen to you and to address you and I am thankful to you, Sir, for the friendly words with which you welcomed me. At the very outset I must apologise to you and crave your indulgence for the fact that I am not presenting before you a carefully written address as would have been fitting on this occasion, because you have dealt, and I should deal, with high matters of policy and it is right that what I say should be carefully framed and should convey exactly what I want to convey. But unfortunately, owing to the stress of events, I have found it difficult, indeed impossible, to prepare a written address as is the custom on such occasions and my attempts to prepare notes met with failure. Ultimately I did endeavour to collect my thoughts a little more in the plane while travelling to Calcutta this morning but unfortunately I fell asleep. I have put down some notes but, I fear, I may not be quite as concise as I should be. Also, may I say right at the beginning that what I propose to tell you does not always necessarily interpret the policy of Government, because all these matters have not been formally decided upon by the Government of India so far? I do believe, however, that what I say—what I am going to say—represents the general trend of Government policy. But it would not be right for me to commit Government in each particular what I say.

1. Address to the Associated Chambers of Commerce, Calcutta, 15 December 1947. The text has been extracted from the proceedings of the annual general meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of India maintained by the ASSOCHAM.
2. H.D. Cumberbatch.
3. For his speech on 16 December 1946 see *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 1, pp. 419-429.

The questions we are dealing with in Government are of the highest importance and we have given them a good deal of thought and yet unfortunately so many things have intervened during the past year that much that we intended to do has not been done. Last year, when I was addressing you in this room, I think I hinted at the fact that we were going to deal with these various questions very soon. Well, we did make an attempt in some measure. If you remember, we appointed an Advisory Planning Board just about a year ago—I think it was in November or December last. And though that committee presented its report three months later, it was not a very detailed or full report nor it was meant to be so after so short an interval. It was a survey of various activities of Government departments as well as non-official organisations and we wanted to make that a basis for full consideration by the Cabinet—by the Government of India—of the various problems involving economic policy and planning. Unfortunately, just about that time when we might have considered the Board's report, other questions came to the forefront which led ultimately to the partition of India. It became impossible in these circumstances to deal with these matters, and something we ought to have done nearly a year ago still awaits action. Nevertheless, we shall have to consider these questions soon because our policy cannot be carried on vaguely or, so to say, in the way of drifting towards something not precise. We propose to take all these matters up soon and we are considering them. The Cabinet has appointed a sub-committee for that purpose and in the course of the next few weeks, I hope, we shall go more deeply into these questions and place before the country and before the Legislature at its next session our proposed general policy governing economic matters, industry, labour etc. It will ultimately be of course for the Legislature—the Indian Parliament—to decide.

Meanwhile, I should like to put before you in answer to what you, Mr. President have said, certain observations—certain ideas of my own—that I think represent largely the viewpoint of Government. Well, obviously, the first thing we have to remember is the fact of this partition. Independence has come bringing many things in its train and the first was this partition. Now, partition has had a far-reaching consequence in all fields from the psychological to the practical and the economic. The partition has led to a tremendous upsetting of lives, to massacre and looting, and to all manner of other doings in parts of northern India; but I need not go into that. You have referred to that, Sir, and everyone knows all about it. It is equally obvious that this partition has had the most powerful effect on the economy of India, using the word 'India' in its larger sense including the present Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. India as a whole might well have been considered, and was, a fairly self-sufficient unit which could develop as such; in which planning could take place so that one part of it could fulfil the wants of the other part. Now, this partition has created all manner of difficulties in our economy—the more industrialised

parts of India are in the Dominion of India and the more agricultural and less industrialised parts in Pakistan.

Some major industries have been peculiarly affected a great deal—the jute industry. We have jute cultivation very largely in Pakistan and the whole processing of jute in India. While we have the large bulk of the cotton textile factories in India, a good deal of the raw cotton comes from Pakistan. So also many other things. All this has created difficulties enough for each part of this divided India, formerly a more or less balanced unit. The divided parts are facing difficulties because they are not balanced units. And while ultimately they may become so in time probably the difficulties in the way of Pakistan are greater than the difficulties in the way of India.

Then again our economic life has been upset by many other factors due to partition. Our communications have been affected and many other things. I need not go into it all or into the other consequences of partition resulting in the major disaster in the Punjab and round about the Punjab causing such a tremendous strain upon us—a drain on our resources, diverting our resources to the relief and rehabilitation of vast numbers of human beings uprooted from their homes, diverting our transport system to the removal of the evacuees and the refugees from one part of the country to the other—with the result that most of our normal activities have been either suspended or delayed. You know what a vast undertaking this business has been; this exchange of populations which has run, I believe, to between seven and eight millions and on the whole it must be said that the organisations that were responsible for this exchange have done an extraordinary good piece of work. The railway administration, the military organization and other organizations—I can say so because I know every step of the process—they have done a very fine piece of work in bringing a vast number of uprooted human beings from one part of the Punjab to the other—from the East to the West and the West to the East. All these have been tremendously upsetting factors but I think we have got over the major difficulties. I think that, psychologically speaking and that is of greater importance at the present moment than any other aspect of the problem, we have gone a good distance towards the healing process, if I may say so, although much remains to be done. I do not know how long it will take for us to get over the results of this uprooting, but I believe that the process may also be not so long as I previously imagined. We have come to a number of agreements with the Dominion of Pakistan in regard to a large number of very controversial matters. That perhaps shows that there is a desire on both sides to come to a settlement so that we may both go ahead. There are still many difficult hurdles to surmount but the spirit to overcome those difficulties is there and I hope that, gradually or rapidly, we will be able to overcome most of them. It is hardly necessary or desirable for me to discuss the question of partition itself. You, avoided it, Sir, and there is no particular point in my dis-

cussing it; but one thing I should say is this: that the very consequences that have faced us, have shown even more than the theoretical considerations which we had before us then—how inherently unnatural partition is. We have to do many unnatural things by stress of circumstances and I have little doubt that it will require in the future many readjustments to make it less unnatural. It is obvious to me that the two countries constituted as the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan, not only geographically close to each other but historically, culturally, economically and in many other ways dependent on each other, cannot remain indifferent to each other. They have either to live as close friends or else they will drift further apart. There is no middle way. I hope and believe, I am certain, that somehow or other the only possible solution is to live as close friends, and have many things in common; naturally that is a development which can only be brought about by friendship, amity and goodwill. It is going to be an inevitable development; whether it takes place soon or a little later depends on the wisdom and statesmanship of the various people concerned.

Now, Sir, you touched upon a variety of topics and I should like to say something about some of them. You referred to first things coming first. You did so in a particular context; that is to say, you felt that Governments here were interfering too much in industry and not paying enough attention to the peasantry, to the ryots who form the largest part of our population. I agree with you that first things should come first but perhaps we may differ occasionally as to what are first things. We thought till recently that the very first thing was political independence, and therefore our energies were diverted to that end. That having been achieved, obviously we have now to face the economic problem as a whole. How is one to face it? It is not an easy matter for anyone, for a person like me, a layman, to say; and in dealing with these questions before this very distinguished and expert gathering, a layman like me might well quail. But a feeling I sometimes have is that great experts have a way of seeing things lopsided, and of thinking only of their particular aspect of the problem, knowing it thoroughly no doubt, but perhaps not attaching sufficient importance to the various other problems of this complicated life of ours. Now, a politician has many failings and may be superficial, as he often is. But he would cease to be a successful politician if he did not have the capacity to take into consideration and remember a thousand things at one and the same time; and that gives him a certain wideness of outlook, a certain balance and a certain poise.

So when we come to think of first things first, what are those things? Many, I know, may give a definite answer. Suppose, we could have some kind of a gallop poll and consult the big crowd that was standing outside this building as I arrived as to what they considered first things. Their opinion might differ from that of this distinguished gathering. Their opinion would not be a learned opinion but it would nevertheless be something that cannot be ignored and it would, I take it, be something which arose out of their own


experience—out of their own difficulties, their desires and urges. Now, in a democracy that opinion can obviously not be ignored. In fact, in the ultimate analysis, it is that opinion that prevails. And unless the expert can get his opinion endorsed, the expert has failed in his primary endeavour.

We talk about various 'isms' and in the course of your address, Mr. President, you have expressed your strong abhorrence of communism. Well, quite apart from other matters, it would be improper for me to speak in that language in regard to a country with which we are friendly, in regard to a country whose Ambassador is coming to India within the next few days. But apart from this, I think this business of talking in terms of 'isms' is a dangerous business. It may be helpful occasionally in the sense of crystallising a certain set of ideas but often enough it leads us astray. For my part, I do not share your abhorrence of communism although I dislike many things that have happened and are happening.


I dislike very much the denial of individual freedom. I believe in individual freedom, I believe in democracy. But when you talk about democracy and when somebody else talks, they do not always talk in the same language. We have thought in terms of democracy as the giving of a vote to a large number of people or even to every adult citizen. I think that is a very valuable thing, but I think that after all it is only one of the initial steps in democracy. It is not democracy itself. Democracy is presumably a means to an end. What is that end? The well-being and progress of the community. I am strongly in favour of democracy and of individual freedom because I think the individual cannot progress if he is regimented too much, unless he can grow to his proper stature. But, then, there may be many kinds of regimentation and many kinds of pressure which curb and suppress individual growth. What opportunity for growth is there today for vast numbers of Indians whether they work in the field or elsewhere?

I agree with you entirely that the peasant and ryot must have first claim on us. Now, what opportunities have they had to develop themselves in any way or even to have a full meal or proper clothing or housing much less education and the opportunities of growth? They have not had them and I have no doubt that if they did, large numbers of them would distinguish themselves in many fields of life.

Now, the system that has been applied—call it what you like—the political and the economic system which has led to this degradation of scores and scores of millions of Indian community—whatever 'ism' it may be—has been a failure because it has produced this degradation of Indian humanity. That, I think, is the first thing to understand and realise. Any system which produces misery and poverty in a country has failed somewhere. We may differ as to the cause of that failure but the fact of failure—the fact of poverty, the fact of unemployment—stares us in the face. Now, if this is so, we have to find out the remedy for that. We have to find out what objectives to aim



WITH MAHATMA GANDHI AND RAJENDRA PRASAD,
OCTOBER 1947



ADDRESSING THE ASSOCIATED CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE,
CALCUTTA, 13 DECEMBER 1947

at, apart from any 'isms', socialism or capitalism or anything. It may be thought that an immediate variation of the present capitalistic structure might meet our demand and help us to get rid of the poverty of the Indian people. If so, let us experiment with it. If not, then inevitably and all the more logically, scrap it and try something else because the essential thing before us is how effectively and fairly rapidly to solve this problem of poverty.

Then again I would not immediately venture to express an opinion—it is a difficult question. I propose to think about it not in terms of any authoritative set of ideas. Suppose we put down some kind of simple objective like this, that we have got to supply food to the hundreds of millions of Indians, we will have to calculate the quantity of food with calories etc. required for proper diet and we have to produce it. We have got to supply so much cloth to the people of India to clothe them adequately—so many houses, so much medical attention, so much education etc. It is no good being told that this cannot be done. A Government which goes about telling people that 'we are very sorry we cannot feed you' or 'we cannot clothe or house you' will not last very long in the modern age. That Government will go in spite of any expert opinion to the contrary. So you must devise a policy which fairly rapidly gets rid of the various burdens the Indian people suffer from. You have to devise certain schemes, certain controls etc., certain priorities, something that may be considered more and more from the point of view of the masses. You may, let us say, decide that lipsticks should not be imported into India. It would not be harmful—though I may say I have no personal objection to lipsticks.

But you have to concentrate on the production of necessities from the point of view of the masses. You may concentrate on production of something so that you may get goods from other countries in exchange for it. Inevitably Government will have to consider how to encourage the production of this and not encourage production of that. Immediately this comes to be regarded as an interference, an inevitable interference; you have to decide as to where the available capital should go, to encourage capital going in the direction of certain necessary productive activities and not so much in others. In war time every Government had to concentrate on the winning of war. Many things that normally we would have liked to have, we had to do without. Well, the war is over and in India our struggle for political independence is also over; but another struggle and an equally important and perhaps much more important struggle, namely the economic well-being of the masses, is far from being over. In fact it is being pushed ahead with vigour. The only way to look upon it is in terms of war, that is to say, in terms of doing and encouraging the absolute necessity from the point of view of winning that struggle for the masses. All this leads us to think, to a large extent, in terms of a war outlook, a war not of violence but in terms of working hard and winning this struggle for the economic better-

ment of the people. What is the first priority in regard to that and how can that be done by any Government unless there is careful thought and planning to that end and unless the vagaries of private enterprise are limited, unless the dominant motive of the country is not the motive of private profit but some other profit which leads to the betterment of the masses. The motive of profit may be left, private enterprise may well be left, but both become limited in scope because something which is more dominant comes into the picture. As a matter of fact, it is not merely a question of what I may say about it or you may think about it; it is a question of what—in a democratic Government and country—what vast masses of people think about it, because their pressure does force Government to certain actions and if that Government is slow in taking them, then that action comes not in a proper and regulated way but in an unregulated and improper way which is worse for all concerned and is harmful to the country's interest. Even looking at it from the purely economic point of view—and not being an economist I speak with deference to those who are experts—it seems to me that conditions in India today, as in many other parts of the world, are conditions of such rapid change that old ideas and methods cannot possibly be applied without their being changed also. The logical and reasonable one would say that in a changing world, in order to keep pace with it, the social structure should also keep pace with the changing conditions. One thing, we may think of is the technological change that takes place so rapidly now-a-days. Obviously because of this technological change the whole social structure is affected. In England the whole social structure was affected by the industrial revolution. The steam age was followed by the electrical age which again powerfully affected the production of everything. It changed the structure of society; economic relations were affected and it may be that before very long, even in course of say 10 years, this atomic age may once again change the economic structure altogether. Now if that is so, and we still think in terms of the economics of the middle 19th century, that is not logical or reasonable. Some obvious changes have to be made—I do not mean to say that every change that is suggested is a good change—but the economics of the pre-industrial age do not apply to the economics of the post-industrial age, nor the economics of the 19th century to the 20th century. If we are to be practical, as businessmen are supposed to be, we have to think always in terms of change. In my own experience, if I may say so with deference, many people who call themselves practical merely mean that they cannot change and that, I should have personally thought, was not being practical but static in a changing world.

That is the approach. First things first. The first thing is the good of the Indian masses and everything should be judged by that standard. If there is any obstruction in the way of the good of the Indian masses, that obstruction must go. How do the millions of India benefit or prosper?—that is the real test of any policy, economic, political or otherwise, that we

may put forward. I should have personally thought, apart from the immediate problems that face us, that one of our urgent needs was to develop and encourage, to put into operation, these various big schemes and projects in India which would give us greater power, electrical power, more land under irrigation and more power generally for industry etc. As you know, at the present moment, there is a considerable number of these big schemes. There is the Damodar Valley Scheme.³ Some of the schemes are in extent and scope bigger than the Tennessee Valley Scheme. Now I should like the Government, the Central Government and the Provincial Governments, to give every importance and every priority to the development of these schemes and I hope we shall give them every priority and I will not like anyone to tell me—our Finance Minister or anyone else—that we have not got the wherewithal to push these schemes. These schemes are investments and we must find money for them. If necessary, we must borrow money in India or abroad and we must get them through, for unless we do that we cannot increase the productive capacity of India very greatly. That I would give first place; and for the rest, at the present moment I believe that the increase of production in every field of activity is most important. On that there is general agreement.

At the same time, while we have been talking about this increase of production, the distressing fact has been that production has gone down in the last year or so for a number of reasons; and the fall has been considerable. That, I take it, as one of the distressing symptoms in India's economy today. Why it has happened, I cannot immediately say. It may be a post-war symptom, it may be due to the conflict between the employer and the employee; it may be a certain psychological atmosphere or many other things. Whatever the reason, it has a most harmful effect and we have to get hold of it.

We have talked such a lot about our "Grow More Food Campaigns" but I confess it with shame that these campaigns have not resulted in any major development anywhere in regard to the production of more food. Of course, somewhere, in some back garden, we have produced a few vegetables and the like; but on a big scale I do not think anything much has been done. Why that is so? It troubles me. There is something wrong in the approach to this problem. There was previously the political difficulty—you could not somehow harness the energy of the nation in these campaigns. Well, we ought to be able to harness it today.

Then, there is the labour difficulty to which you have referred in your address. I agree with you that there has been a great deal of indiscipline among labour. A number of destructive tendencies have been at work which have interfered with production and the rest. At the same time it is rather an easy way of explaining this phenomenon by casting the blame on labour

3. The Damodar Valley Project was a multi-purpose scheme designed to control floods, irrigate about 7,63,800 acres of land and supply power to the extent of 350,000 kilowatts.

or on a number of agitators who inflame labour or on the Industrial Disputes Act⁴ or certain adjudications which gave awards possibly not liked by certain employers. I think that is a very simple way of looking at the problem. There may be many other causes. But undoubtedly, at the present moment and for some time past, there has been a kind of psychological deadlock between the employer and the employee. That may have been encouraged and increased by those people who are called agitators but this business of making the agitator responsible for the evils of society is not, I think, very helpful. For my part I have long been an agitator myself and I feel a kind of fellow-feeling and sympathy for them. Agitators, like all other human beings, are both good and bad. Undoubtedly the field of labour offers an opportunity to encourage certain tendencies but the fact remains that this labour trouble is much deeper than something which has been created by the agitators and the rest.

After all it is not something in India only. We see in countries of Europe, in America and elsewhere the same phenomenon happening. There must be something behind it. We see also that we have got into this vicious circle of rising prices and we cannot get out of it. Apart from that there is a deep distrust among the workers in India of the employers. I entirely agree with you that employers are not ogres—they are both good and bad. But there is this deep distrust and I put it to you that during these war years the behaviour of at least some big business was such as to make people distrustful of its bona fides—all this business on a large scale of black-marketing and the rest which I have never been able to explain to myself—how and why in spite of this very heavy rate of taxation, vast fortunes were more.

Now, the result is that labour, apart from its great difficulties, is very distrustful and at the same time labour has gradually become more organised, more alert and more resentful of any steps taken against it. This is a natural phenomenon. We may regret, as I do regret, this indiscipline. It is a disruptive force and totally unnecessary strikes, often lightning strikes, whatever harm they may do to production, ultimately harm labour much more than anybody else. Nevertheless, the whole history of the development of industry for the last hundred years or more has involved this development of trade unions fighting for their rights and, these rights being denied to them, getting to a stage of deadlock through the favour the employer class gets from the government of the day. But in the process the labour was gradually growing in strength. Some of you may have read, as I have read

4. The Industrial Disputes Act, which came into force from March 1947, provided for setting up of tribunals for the prevention and settlement of disputes. It made conciliation mandatory in disputes in public utility services and optional in other cases.

the history of the development of the working classes in the United Kingdom during the last 130 years—how they had to work under the most tremendous handicaps and gradually, slowly, after a great deal of suffering, emerged successfully though every little step took in their own defence and every issue they so fearlessly fought was contested by the employer class. Now, if the British worker today has this ingrained in him this feeling which has come in the process of the last many generations, that he has to be wary and alert against the incursions of certain other elements in the essential structure, it is not surprising. So, if the Indian worker is today severely distrustful of his employer, it is also not surprising because this sub-conscious feeling is behind him. If we find a worker in India misbehaving today surely we can understand it. We can sympathise with him even though we may disagree with him. We have to approach him in a friendly way and explain the conditions. After all, we have arrived at a stage today, which both the employer and the employee must understand, namely, that we cannot go on increasing wages, we cannot go on increasing either profits or wages, because we have not got anything to increase. This has to be understood by all concerned. This has to be explained in a friendly way and I do not think it is possible or right for trade unions etc. to be not welcomed, not encouraged. That kind of policy is doomed to failure.

Now, Sir, you spoke about outsiders coming into trade unions. I recall one occasion 18 or 19 years ago when I was suddenly elected president of the All-India Trade Union Congress. I disliked the idea and I tried not to accept it because I thought it was highly improper that a person, though with labour sympathies but not an actual worker having first-hand knowledge of labour conditions, should be made president. I thought that the choice should fall on an actual worker, not necessarily highly intellectual, with full knowledge. Nevertheless I found in those days that the trade union movement was a new movement in India, practically speaking, a movement of less than 30 years even now. It has had a very brief career and at that time it was barely a 10 years' old movement. I found that while the theory was quite correct that outsiders should not come in, in practice it was difficult to do that. Some of our people—good people—helped them, some of our worst people went to help them and exploited them. Undoubtedly bona fide leaders should be allowed to help and it is very difficult to make a rule that no outsider should be permitted. I think the time has come when fewer and fewer outsiders should go there. Labour in India should rely upon itself as the British labour movement does.

Then you expressed your disapproval of the Industrial Disputes Act and various adjudications.⁵ Now, obviously I cannot discuss any individual

5. President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, H.D. Cumberbatch, had said: "We have seen adjudications awarding all manner of prizes to labour; many of these have brought impossible burdens to the industries or else brought about inflation. Labour ultimately obtained no real benefit."

adjudication. I do not know much about it, but the question before us is how far we are to proceed with the principle of adjudication, arbitration, conciliation etc. Are we to leave these industrial disputes to be fought out by trade unions, and by the employer and the employee or are we to have some other process of settlement? That is the question. It seems to me at the present moment no Government can afford to leave these disputes to be fought out in this way. No Government at the present moment, specially when there is something like a crisis in production, can afford to do so. Therefore the only other way is to have a system of fair settlement, fair adjudication. It may be that a particular adjudicator does not function as well as he ought to. You might say because a judge has given not a very good judgment therefore we should abolish our civil and criminal courts. That would be a fantastic proposition. I say it is equally fantastic to say that in modern society we should leave these matters to be decided by industrial struggles on a large scale. I think the time must come, has come now, when all such disputes must be decided by the fairest tribunal methods that a state can produce.

You wanted Government, Mr. President, to pay more attention to agriculture, to the peasant, and to leave industry alone for a time. You said that too much attention was being paid to every detail of industry—what with various factory acts—and not enough attention to the peasantry. I fear this charge about our not thinking enough of the peasant can hardly be justified. In fact, apart from Government policy and speaking for myself, speaking for the great organization which I represent, the National Congress, I can tell you that the one big issue that has always been before us is the state of the peasantry. Perhaps you know that one of our first measures, given high priority, is to change the land system in India. I am sorry it has been such slow work—and slow work partly because of the difficulties of the problem, partly because of other factors coming in like partition and our political difficulties. But the mere fact that we have given this problem such high priority shows how much importance we attach to it. We are more interested—though it is rather absurd to make comparisons—we are more interested in the peasant than any other group of human beings in India for the simple reason that the peasantry represent some 80 per cent of the total population; for the simple reason that if we do not show interest in the betterment of their condition, the condition of 80 per cent of the electorate, they will push us out. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, while we want to help the peasants and agriculturists, industry also is of dominant importance in India. Agriculture can produce wealth but it will produce more wealth to more people are drawn from agriculture and put in industry. In fact, in order to improve agriculture we must improve industry. The two are allied. Industry, by bringing together large numbers of workers, produces a big problem which has led to this conflict between capital and labour, between employer and employee all over the world. We have to face that.

We cannot just ignore industry and leave things to chance. At no time can these things be left to chance, certainly not at the present time. The proposal that the Government might leave industry alone for a time might even be taken to mean Government should not intervene in the security services when there is trouble. Suppose there is a big strike, would the employer like Government to come and protect the industry or leave things to chance? I presume you want protection; you are entitled to protection. If there is violence it ultimately comes to this, that leaving things to chance means protecting the employer against the possible unorganized action of the employees. That is not leaving things to chance. It is really siding with one party. It simply cannot be done. No Government can afford to allow matters of this kind to develop when violence breaks out.

Suppose you have no strike but people simply sleep and slow down production. This is a more difficult thing to tackle; production goes down, the industry goes down and the country goes down. You must make industrial workers feel psychologically that you are giving them a square deal and certainly that you are being fairly treated also. Once that psychological feeling has come and once also a certain assurance through legislative measures etc. has come, I think the major part of this labour problem will be solved. As I was listening to you, Mr. President, about Government not interfering with industry by further legislative measures etc., I suddenly thought of similar appeals having been made so many times in so many countries during the last 100 years. Similar appeals were made when the 12 hours day was introduced in England and again the 12 hours came down to 10 hours a day. In our time the appeal was made that industry could not go on like this. It may be that there may be some provisions of a legislative nature which may be harmful; but what I wish to put before you is that it is just impossible for any Government today not to interest itself very closely in the relations between the employer and the employee, the peasant and other groups.

You referred to the experiments in socialism and socialisation which the Government of the United Kingdom was indulging in and, if I am right, you did not seem to favour them. You rather—I think—look forward to their failure so that something else may take their place.

Now, speaking for myself, I am very much interested in those experiments and I hope that they will succeed. It is not for me to judge of the economy of Great Britain or to make suggestions but I have followed with the greatest sympathy and goodwill the very brave efforts that the Government and the people of the United Kingdom have been making to face their present grave economic crisis. I think their stand has been a most courageous one which certainly has evoked admiration for them. Personally, I think it is quite impossible for any Government to go back to the old type of economy—the pre-war economy if you like. War has upset many things. What type of new economy will develop ultimately in various countries is

dependent partly on world factors and partly on the factors governing a particular country.

In India we have to develop, we have to consider, many things and one is the balance between rural and urban economy. It is fair to say—and I think you were right to say it, although you stressed a different aspect of the question—that we have been thinking primarily in terms of urban economy and forgotten the rural aspect of our national economy. Now we have to find a balance between the two and you know there has always been trouble in every country between the village and the town—in every country, whether that country is a capitalistic country or trying to be socialistic. We have to find also a certain balance, an equilibrium, between various parts of India.

At the outset of my remarks I referred to Pakistan as being largely agricultural and to the Dominion of India as being more industrialised. Before this division took place, many were thinking in terms, quite apart from the question of partition, of producing a more balanced economy in various parts of India—more industry in Pakistan and more food production and the rest in India. I do think that we must have a more evenly-spread economy and not too much concentration in certain areas. It will also help if we have a self-sufficient economy in various regions of India as that would assist in reducing the problem of transport.

Apart from that there is another question worthy of your consideration. You know that the Congress has talked a great deal about cottage industries and has tried to push them. Most people have immediately considered the question of cottage industry as something opposed to large-scale industry. May be in some particulars this opposition was there but I always have laid emphasis on the fact that there is nothing antagonistic between the two. I have not a shadow of doubt that large-scale industry has to be encouraged in India. At the same time I am quite convinced that we have to encourage small-scale industry and cottage industry also. But what I wish to put before you now is that, in the present context, when we wish to increase our production, we have paid insufficient attention to the development of small-scale industry producing common articles. Both large-scale industry and small-scale industry are important from the point of view of finance, employment for people and adding to the production of India.

Production by itself will not solve the problem, distribution is essential. Obviously, if by introducing new methods of production, we increase our production and at the same time add to our unemployment problem, that will be no solution of our difficulties. So we have to take all these things together, and in getting rid of this unemployment problem immediately, we can take to small-scale production in addition to large-scale production. I just do not see any real conflict between the two and indeed, I think, today both are essential.

You have referred also to the question of controls. Government's policy in regard to controls has recently been declared by our Food Minister. It

is a cautious policy. We came to the conclusion that we should not allow things to drift as they are now drifting. At the same time the Food Minister declared that the Government would act cautiously and if we thought that de-control had left the monopolist to profiteer on a large-scale, if prices soared above certain levels, then immediately we would re-introduce control and far severer controls because obviously no Government can permit a major disaster of that type happening. What happens depends largely on industry, for industry and finance can control the situation to a large extent.

I have not said anything about bigger economic policy because I do not think it would be proper for me to commit Government in any way but I think I have indicated sufficiently that our approach to the problem will not be a theoretical approach based on this 'ism' or the other, but is a practical approach with the objective of achieving good results as rapidly as possible. Nevertheless, I have little doubt that that approach will involve a large measure of socialisation in regard to certain industries. This does not mean that we are going to do away with private enterprise. Private enterprise is going to continue and I think ought to be encouraged, but in regard to certain basic, certain key industries, I have little doubt that the tendency will be for them to be State-owned or at any rate to be State-controlled. Probably we shall proceed on the basis of having to control our public corporation. So basic key industries and public utility concerns would normally be State-owned, whether the State is the Central Government or a Provincial Government or a municipal corporation. At the same time, if we have any kind of real planning, it is inevitable that a measure of State direction and State control should apply to other industries also. But a large field will necessarily still be left to private enterprise. We want to develop and industrialise our country rapidly and in order to do so undoubtedly it would help us greatly to have foreign assistance, foreign capital, foreign technical assistance. We are not going to stop that. In fact we would welcome it. At the same time, you will realise that we are anxious to preserve our economic independence. We do not want to encourage foreign capital to come in at the cost of bartering away any part of that independence. We should like foreign capital to come on favourable terms. It will be a business transaction; we shall take technical assistance on advantageous terms. Obviously, for the Government of India the aim will be the good of India. Foreign creditors will of course consider their own aspect of the question, but I do think there is a large field in India, specially during the next many years when India is going to develop rapidly, if there is co-operation between other countries and India in this process of development. I think, therefore, that such British and other foreign interests as exist in India will have and should have this large field open to them; whether they will function exactly on the old lines, I cannot say, but inevitably such changes that have taken place in economy will affect them, just as they will affect equally any other Indian business. You cannot have any special privileges for foreign interests in India.

I have taken up a good deal of your time and I have placed before you some of my ideas and some of the things that I am looking forward to. I am grateful to you for this opportunity for giving expression to my thoughts and I hope that even though those views may not be entirely to your liking, or meet with your approval, you will agree there is a great deal in common between us and in future there will be every prospect of our working harmoniously together. I thank you.

13. The Primacy of Production¹

Dr. Mookerji, friends and comrades, I venture to address you in this way, more specially on this occasion, because probably no other major subject that we have to tackle requires so much a spirit of friendly cooperation than this subject of industry, labour and the general economic set-up of the country. It is rather presumptuous for me to come here at this fairly last stage of this conference and the gatherings that you have had during the last few days, not having taken part in them and now presumbaly to offer you good advice.

Many of you are more or less experts in your fields, whether it is labour or industry, and though I am very greatly interested in all these matters and perhaps sometimes have an advantage over the experts, in the sense that a layman can see the whole picture in proper perspective more than a specialist in his special field of activity, nevertheless, I would have liked to have had the chance and opportunity to have taken part in your discussions during the last few days and known more as to how the mind of this gathering, of those who are participating in these discussions, was working.

It is obvious that in these very vital matters there are differences of opinion—vital differences of opinion and approach. There are what are called ideologies, there is what is called the practical approach which, I have often found, is far removed from anything that might really be called practical or that can be practical. A practical approach need not necessarily be just looking one yard ahead of you, it requires looking further ahead also.

1. Address to the Industries Conference, New Delhi, 18 December 1947. From *Indian Information*, 15 January 1948.

Well, in a way, there are these differences and it would be a little absurd to think that you can charm away those differences and find some complete unanimity by just pure goodwill and good advice. Nevertheless, I think, without doing away with those differences of approach, if we do appreciate that in a certain context of events, it is necessary and highly desirable to function together, well, we create an atmosphere which helps in coming to some, if you like, not permanent—at any rate, semi-permanent or temporary conclusions.

Now, why are these approaches different? I suppose partly because of some difference in one's outlook on life itself, on the objectives of life, etc., on the social set-up and the rest; but to put it very crudely, leaving out these wider objectives, the differences arise because various groups aim at getting some prize or the other, some benefit or the other. Capital may want a certain prize, labour may want a certain prize; the consumer, the producer, everybody wants naturally to benefit himself or his group.

But a time comes when it may well happen that while the conflicting groups are fighting against each other, the prize vanishes and there is no prize left for anybody to take hold of. So it becomes important at that time to moderate one's own ardour or one's own particular desire to hold the prize, and save the prize itself. It is not necessary to give up the hope of getting the prize but rather to put first things first, that is to preserve the prize and then either in a friendly way come to future decisions or, if you like, have a conflict about it; but when the conflict endangers the prize itself, then obviously it is an exceedingly unfortunate and foolish way of approaching anything.

You all know that the India of today for the last few months has passed through all manner of tremendous crises. We have had to face colossal problems and have survived all manner of surgical operations. We are not likely to have another operation of that type because the consequences of that operation have been so tremendous that few of us realised previously that they would be so bad.

We knew they would be bad; therefore we resisted the operation and resisted what might be called quack remedies. But, unfortunately, sometimes quacks succeed, even in the best regulated household. And the result is that we have had operations and you have seen what a tremendously upsetting consequences followed them. We have not yet got rid of those consequences and have to still face problems of colossal magnitude.

While we have had to do this, on the other hand, we see, and we have seen, a progressively deteriorating economic situation. We talk, and rightly so, of the problems of distribution. In fact, most of our troubles and conflicts and ideological controversies are related to distribution. But important as that is, there must obviously be something substantial to distribute before you can start the process of distribution. Therefore, we come to the problem of production.

Production becomes the first essential, but with it is intimately aligned distribution. You cannot really separate the two. Production depends on many factors and one of the most important of those factors is the psychology to produce, apart from the technical equipment, etc., that we may have. And one should also have the efficiency and there must be the capacity and the psychology to produce. If that psychology is lacking then inevitably production goes down as it has gone down.

Now, you can analyse the past few months or few years as you like; there are so many factors. There are the consequences of war—a certain tired feeling after hard work. There are the consequences of political upsets, of the partition and of the communal troubles and the like. But I should say perhaps one of the major things we have to face in industrial relations is this psychological background, which makes labour feel that it does not get a square deal, that somehow it is overreached all the time, which makes the employer class feel that they are threatened with all manner of dangers and that labour is not pulling the weight and is only threatening strikes and slowing up work, and so on and so forth. So they approach each other not only with a complete lack of confidence but in a spirit of extreme hostility.

How are we to get over this? On the one hand, I think it is perfectly true to say that there has been a tendency on the part of labour or certain labour groups to take advantage of certain difficulties which the nation has had to face, to have strikes and stoppages of work and slowing down of work at a time when it meant hitting the nation. If that kind of thing continues with labour—which undoubtedly has and should have the sympathy of vast numbers of people in this country—a slight barrier begins to grow up between the large labour element and the rest of the country. And it is not good to let that kind of barrier grow up.

That is so far as labour is concerned. So far as the employers' side is concerned, I hope no one will challenge me when I say that during this last war a certain section of the employer class did not behave well; in fact, they behaved exceedingly badly, exceedingly egotistically, and far from giving a square deal to anybody, they thought mostly of themselves and of little else. I have yet to understand how, in spite of such tremendous and heavy taxation in India, these vast fortunes by certain individuals or groups were made. I just cannot understand it; and we have to find out some means and machinery to prevent this kind of shameful traffic with human beings and profiting at the expense of the nation and others.

So it is easy to find fault with certain sections of labour or certain sections of the employing class. But what we have to do is not merely to find fault but to seek remedy. You cannot turn everybody into angels on either side; there would be no problems if people were advanced enough to think and act in that way. One remedy is to create conditions under which if I may say so—those who are not angelic do not find it easy to flourish and find difficulties in their way. That is, you have to create inducement to fair dealing and

honesty and certain disadvantages attaching to any other course of action.

Leaving out the people who may be not up to the right standard in fair dealing and honesty, the real difficulty comes when honest people get involved into conflict. If they are completely honest, they hold different views and they get into conflict. Normally, people who are not honest sometimes make up their differences sooner because they have nothing strong to stick to. They are not used to any anchorage but just float about, and so under pressure of events, they come to terms. But honest people who hold opinions very stoutly do not come to terms because they think that any other way is the wrong way. Now I take it that most of us who are here are honest people, and people who have thought about these matters, and hold strong opinion about these matters and, therefore, find it a little difficult to accept the other person's view.

Nevertheless, the major fact confronts us; that all manner of perils face us in India today. And although other perils for the moment be at the forefront, the ultimate peril is the slow drying up of the capacity of the nation to produce. That affects us politically, economically and in every other way, and gradually our strength goes down to resist these very perils that face us. Therefore, you have to stop this drying up of our productive capacity.

I believe you have been thinking about this and you have also passed a number of resolutions on the subject.² We must increase our production; we must increase our national wealth and the national dividend and only then can we really raise the standard of living of our people.

We may here and there make some adjustment by a more equitable distribution of existing wealth. That must be done really not so much because it makes too much of a difference in raising the standard of life—it does, but not very much—but it must be done because it creates conditions for advance; because if that is not done, there is continually that feeling of not having a square deal and people do not put their heart and soul in the work they do, thinking that they are not being properly treated, and so on. Therefore, it becomes essential first of all to see that where there are gross inequalities at present we work towards a rapid reduction of those inequalities. But ultimately more wealth can only come from more production of all types and kinds of goods.

Presumably, many of you here represent big industries and the like, and I have no doubt that production through big industry is essential. But in the present context of events today, I should like to say that when we talk of increased production, whether of food or of any other commodity, it is necessary for us to encourage small-scale production in a large way also.

2. On 17 December, the conference adopted resolutions on the short-term and long-term objectives of national policy on industry and industrial planning.

This question is often considered as if there was an inherent conflict between large-scale production and small-scale production. Perhaps it might indicate a different approach. But leaving that idea of conflict aside, it seems to me obvious that, at the present moment, more specially, and possibly later, the two have to go together. And especially as short-term planning, there must be production on a large-scale of small things as all manner of things can be produced in a small way and there is a shortage of all manner of commodities. But we are really concerned at the present moment with bringing about a psychological atmosphere and creating some kind of machinery wherewith to tackle any conflict that may arise.

Now, if we are facing some perils along with the rest of the world, with some special troubles of our own, how are we to proceed? The very first thought that comes to one's mind is that in this rather dissolving world, which is heading again for a big-scale conflict, the sooner we put India on *its feet in every possible way, the more chance there is of our pulling our weight* and surviving and having some influence in the near future. None, not even the very biggest expert, can say how long this very precarious peace in the world will last. We hope it will last many years, but it may break at any time. And if that happens, you will realise that all manner of unforeseen things will take place. It will shake up even more than anything has yet done.

And how should we face that emergency? By building up, before that happens, an economically strong and well-balanced India with a strong enough defence apparatus. And remember what defence apparatus means today. People talk in terms of army, navy and air force strength. Obviously, defence means these. But far more than the army, navy and air force, defence means industry and production. Not all the soldiers in the world will do any good to India otherwise. People talk about compulsory military service. From one point of view I am not in favour, generally speaking, of compulsory military service. But I am in favour of it in this sense, that it will make our people a little more disciplined, and also from the physical culture point of view, and so on.

But this business of compulsory military service means nothing important from the defence point of view, because the real problem is not to make people war-minded, but to give them the means of fighting. If you have millions and millions of men walking about with antique weapons and lathis, it is not much good. But you have to have production of all the essentials of warfare. In fact, in war, weapons and everything else and all manner of things are necessary. If you are industrially strong, you can build up your army, navy and air force at short notice. If you depend on buying your warships and everything else in a foreign country and that source dries up, it is all useless to have only a few thousand men shouting about war. So that, in the ultimate analysis, even this war business brings you down to production and the growth of industries, small and big.

Many things contributed to the winning of the last war, but I think the final reasons were two: the amazing capacity of American industry and scientific research. It is these which won the war, not so much the soldiers and others. Therefore, we must, from every point of view—external and internal—stop this slowing down of production and increase it rapidly by starting new industries; and also tackle problems of unemployment and of raising the standard of living. These can only be done if there is peace in industry; without peace there, it simply cannot be done. And I take it that the object of this conference is to have peace in industry for a certain period at least, which will give us some breathing time.

In a draft resolution³ that I have been reading, a period of three years is mentioned. I am not interested in any particular period, and for some time past my mind has hardly functioned in regard to long-distance objectives except in an idealistic kind of way. I can make no plan for myself a few days or a few weeks ahead, as I do not know where I shall be. So I am not very much interested in whether it is two years or three years.

The point is that it would be a tremendous thing for India if all of you and all those whom you represent came to the conclusion that you should give a chance to this and have a period of truce when there would be no strikes or lock-outs. And how can you do that? Of course, it is too much to expect this to be done unless there is some machinery and apparatus to settle disputes to the satisfaction of the people concerned, or more or less to their satisfaction because there cannot obviously be hundred per cent satisfaction when two parties are in dispute. I suppose it is not beyond the wit of man or even beyond the wit of this Government to produce some such machinery or scheme. Whenever there are such schemes, it is curious that objection is raised about them on both sides.

The other day I was in Calcutta and the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce there went on repeating and telling the audience that Government should not interfere or intervene in any way. He thought that if Government stood aloof, industry would flourish. It was very interesting for me to hear that, because I had thought that that particular viewpoint had almost vanished from the earth. But still it existed in Calcutta. At any rate, the labour on the other hand wants Government interference quite enough. But when employers talk of arbitration and adjudication, their idea of arbitration and adjudication often is that they should go on if they succeed well, otherwise they are free to do what they like.

3. The resolution, adopted unanimously on 18 December 1947, called upon the labour and management to maintain industrial peace by averting strikes and lockouts and not to permit the slowing down of production during the next three years.

That I can understand psychologically. It is a relic of old times, but practically speaking it becomes impossible to have arbitration and adjudication if you approach it in that spirit. So if we can, as I think we can, have a proper impartial machinery—which machinery in the modern world is bound to incline towards labour rather than towards others—we can resolve these difficulties or such difficulties as may arise from time to time.

I am not for the moment talking about the final resolution as to the future economic policy and the merits or otherwise of nationalisation, although inevitably they arise. For the present I think the first step should be a kind of adjustment of minor differences while we are considering major objectives of policy. I have just said something in Calcutta and elsewhere and I will not repeat them here.

Speaking as a person who is a believer in the socialisation of industry, I should like to say this, that far too much attention is often paid to acquiring existing industries by the State or bringing them under State control. In many cases, existing industries of the basic type may have to be acquired and run by the State. But it seems to me a far better approach to the problem if the State concentrated more and more on new industries of the latest type and controlled them in a large measure, because then the resources of the State go towards ensuring regulated progress instead of merely trying to acquire control over something which already exists. Of course, one has sometimes to do that.

I say this because I am, to some extent, if I may venture to say so, of a scientific bent of mind and I try to think more in dynamic than in static terms. The existing industry today that most people think of—capitalists, socialists or Communists—is something of which they think in static terms as if it was something which will keep going, while, as a matter of fact, this has become completely out of date and most of it should be scrapped.

If you think in a somewhat dynamic way, you can see that we are passing through one of the major ages of transition when completely new sources of power are being tapped. Something of the nature of the industrial revolution or electrical revolution or something even more far-reaching than that is taking place. If somebody at the time of the industrial revolution thought in terms of the pre-industrial age and talked about acquiring this or that, he would be completely out of the picture some time or later when a new age came and there were new sources of power.

In the same way we are on the verge of that and whether it takes ten, fifteen or twenty years—I doubt if it will take more than that—many of our methods of production will become completely out of date, and what you are thinking of acquiring today may have no value at all. That is a warning. I hope that does not frighten people and make them think that they should not invest money in any industry. But one has to be very wide awake today about these changes and one must think in terms of the future rather than the past, because the past is not only dead and gone; but we cannot go back

to it, and even the present is rapidly changing. If you approach it in terms of the future, then many of the present day conflicts will seem out of place, or, at any rate, they will assume a new aspect and you get out of the rut of your old mode of thinking.

These are some considerations for us to ponder over. But for the present I do hope that you, who represent great forces in the country—industrial, labour and governmental—will come to an agreement on this period of peace and reconstruction and building up, and, meanwhile, we shall think of the larger policies for industrial and economic development and give effect to them fairly rapidly. For my part, I attach probably more importance to the development of our big schemes—river valley schemes—than to anything else. I think it is out of those that new wealth is going to flow into this country.

When I see a map of India and I look at the Himalayan range—I like the Himalayas myself; I like mountains and all that—I think of the vast power concentrated there which is not being used, and which can be used, and which really can transform the whole of India with exceeding rapidity if it were properly utilized. It is an amazing source of power, probably the biggest source anywhere in the world—this Himalayan range, with its rivers, minerals and other resources. Therefore, I attach more importance to the development of these big river valley schemes, dams, reservoirs, hydro-electric and thermal power and so forth, which, once released, will simply drive you forward. But before we release power we have to know how to control it and use it in the proper way.

We have been in some way or other connected with this Government for the last sixteen months or so. One of the first things that we did when we came to this Government was to think of these economic plans and these various schemes, and we appointed an Advisory Planning Board for a rapid survey⁴—not a detailed survey—of these schemes, so that we might consider some basic policies. The Planning Board reported fairly soon. It worked necessarily with some superficiality, but nevertheless it did well, and then immediately we got caught up in this business of approaching partition. After partition we again got caught up with the business of the after-effects of partition. So all these vital problems could not be solved. There they remained.

But part of the difficulty has also been the wrong psychology in the industrial field. So if we start at this end, governmentally, I hope, we shall approach this problem fairly soon, and I hope also that this procedure which my colleague, Dr. Mookerjee, has initiated—that is, to confer with representatives of all shades of opinion—will be adopted whenever necessary in the future. But in order to approach that properly, one has to have some breathing space.

4. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 2, p. 6 and fn 4.

I do not ask you to give up any of your particular ideologies and beliefs. Stick to them. But just realize that even your particular ideology may have a greater chance of advancement if we have some peace and build up something now for the next year or two, and, meanwhile, we develop those other policies; and if you want a fight, let us have a fight afterwards. At any rate, let us have something worth fighting for; otherwise the thing we fight for vanishes and that is not good enough or wise enough.

I heard last evening—I have not myself seen it in the newspapers—that in Bombay an announcement has been made that there will be what is called a token one-day strike against adjudication machinery and decontrol.⁵ I will not go into these two matters here. But it seems to me quite astoundingly irresponsible for any organisation, whatever its views and ideologies, to indulge in strikes at this moment and in this way, even though they may be token one-day strikes. It shows a complete lack of understanding of the political situation, of the international situation, of the national situation, of the economic situation, of the human situation, or for that matter of any situation.

I should not like to criticise any people without discussing the matter with them but I confess that it passes my understanding how any responsible person can indulge in this kind of token strike at a moment when there is always the possibility of something like that giving rise to even bigger problems and bigger conflicts, when all of us here and all over the country are thinking in terms of finding some way out of this impasse, even though it may be a temporary way out. So just at this moment to indulge in this kind of token strike seems to me to be very unfair and very unfortunate.

Now the strike, as I have just learnt, is against this compulsory adjudication and decontrol. Opinions may differ about either of these matters, but so far as decontrol is concerned, we have announced a policy which is a very cautious policy.⁶ The subject of control is of exceeding complexity and difficulty and opinions differ. The decision that Government has arrived at has been taken after the most careful thought. And even so, we have guarded ourselves that if anything tends to go wrong, we go back, or we reconsider our position. The whole machinery of control is being kept even where control is being withdrawn.

Now, whether we are right or wrong is another matter. We may be wrong, but the only way to proceed about such matters is to be always ready to correct an error as soon as one is convinced that it is an error. We are

5. On 14 December 1947, over 60 labour unions in Bombay decided to stage a one-day strike on 29 December 1947 to protest against compulsory arbitration and the lifting of controls.
6. While deciding on progressive decontrol of foodgrains to check hoarding and profiteering, the government wanted the organisation of food control to continue until decontrolling had proved a success.

ready for that, but the point I wish to put before you is this. This Government is supposed to be a popular Government and to represent the wishes of a large majority of people. If that is so and if that Government takes any measure like this, how do those who oppose the measure proceed? Either they are in a majority or in a minority. If they are in a majority, it is very easy for them to put an end to the Government. If they are in a minority, any action that they may want to take means that a minority is trying to coerce the majority and that inevitably leads—it may of course lead to a temporary success for the minority—to the majority getting angry and setting on the minority.

After all, if a conflict arises, the two can play at the same game of trying to coerce the other part of the community. Even from the narrowest point of view of a group, this business is unwise and does not pay; but it does a lot of harm to the community. Though the strikers may be justified in expressing their wishes in any way they like, such as meetings and peaceful demonstrations, and show that they disapprove of decontrol and adjudication, I hope that this type of token strike will not be followed because not only does it mean the loss of production for that day, but it may mean petty conflicts. If someone does not go on strike then you pull him out and then there is trouble. Then somebody is arrested by the police and immediately a vicious circle starts.

I would beg those who think in this way to reconsider their decisions and try to think in a larger way or, if I may say so, in a more rational way and consider the consequences of these actions. It may be that many of these things happen because of some cause which does not appear on the surface. For instance, some kind of election may be pending and people think that if they behave in a particular way they may have a pull in the elections—municipal or provincial.

Ultimately, it becomes a question for all of us to consider whether we are to think in terms of some petty election or some permanent and larger interest. Of course, if we are interested in the former, i.e. in the small things, then it is not much good talking about bigger things; they will escape us. I am sure there is quite enough determination and sense in this country to get over these petty difficulties and to face the larger issues.

Therefore, to come back, I hope that this conference will yield this very substantial result, namely, that we shall start in a friendly way, we shall decide on some kind of truce in industry for a period, and we shall devise means to see that everybody gets a square deal as far as possible and, meanwhile, we shall sit down and think about our larger policies.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

I. General

1. To K.P.S. Menon¹

New Delhi

12 October 1947

My dear KPS,

I have received your letter which you sent through Tarlok Singh. I have also read your letter of the 22nd September addressed to Bajpai.

2. The telegram that Bajpai sent to you on the 20th September was sent after consultation with me and after he had given full thought to the matter. I have considered the various points you have raised. I do not know what the future set-up of even the Government of India will be during the next few months or that I will continue as Prime Minister. Much less do I know how our Foreign Ministry will work. We are passing through very grave crises which are essentially more political than communal in spite of the terrible communal repercussions which have shaken the entire country.

3. In spite of the future being rather vague, one has yet to provide for it and it was because of that that I have thought of the set-up of the Foreign Ministry. We are so short of personnel that we have stopped all expansion in foreign countries. Indeed it is with great difficulty that we can keep up where we are. Our most urgent demands today are for service in connection with the Punjab and everything else has to give way to it.

4. In these conditions, all the normal rules about services, promotions, etc., have to go by the board. We are likely to change the method of recruitment to the Foreign Service also. The Federal Service Commission has been a pain and a torture because of its slow working. We are devising some more rapid and efficient method of selection.

5. In our Foreign Ministry it seems to me that the most important appointment is that of the Secretary-General. Almost everything depends upon him. Normally he is going to be a senior Ambassador. I put Bajpai in this office, in spite of a certain reluctance to begin with, after having some experience of his work as Officer on Special Duty. He has done his work with very great ability and has loyally carried out the policies we have laid down. He is, I believe, the most senior man in the whole Secretariat establishment and has held the highest post including that of Member of the Governor-General's Council. From the point of view of seniority and status he is No. 1 in the service. As for his personal record in the past and his general approach to others, I can only judge with such

information and experience as I have myself had. Whatever he may have been in the past, I believe he has changed considerably. He is ill and I doubt if he can put in effective service for long. My appointing him was not popular because of certain reports of his activities in the United States when many of us were in prison. Hence my own prejudice against him. I found that those reports were somewhat exaggerated and his other qualities certainly outweighed them. I am so tired of second-rate work that sheer efficiency appeals to me. Personally I do not know how I could have carried on during the last difficult few months without the help of Bajpai in the Foreign Ministry.

6. When I approved of the idea that you should be Foreign Secretary it was with the intention that you should succeed Bajpai later as Secretary-General. I could think of no other more suitable person and it seemed right that you should first take charge of the Foreign Secretary's work. I considered the F.S. to be of ambassadorial status.

7. It seems to me that the objections you raise are none of them very important in the present context of things. Each one of us has to work his hardest regardless of where for the moment he might be working. We have got to face a situation in this country which hardly any country has had to face in history. In these circumstances one can't think or act according to old established routine. The personal factor should not come in at all. Certainly as long as I am concerned with any department or office I should not like personal considerations to come in the way of any work. As a matter of fact, I am quite sure that in the Foreign Ministry there can be and will be no difficulty arising out of personal factors.

8. You mentioned Vellodi. I think Vellodi is good; but I have not been favourably impressed by his personal reactions to various matters. He behaved in an odd way which surprised me. I think we must all develop a little more sense of discipline and impersonal working, something that the old Communist Party used to inculcate in its members. Vellodi, of course, will be utilised to advantage somewhere or other, where exactly I cannot say at present. On the whole I would rather not have him in the office here for the present.

9. My father, after being President of the Congress, functioned as its Secretary because it was felt then that we must have a competent Secretary. I did likewise. This hierarchy of posts has, no doubt, some importance. But it might be overdone. The main thing is that work must be done efficiently and rapidly. It is quite possible that a Minister wouldn't stand a chance of being appointed to any high secretarial or ambassadorial job because of his lack of experience.

10. I would suggest to you to think over this matter and not allow any personal considerations to influence your decision. I think that the Foreign Secretary's work here is at least as important, if not more so, as that of the average ambassador. At the present moment the really important diplomatic posts, so far as we are concerned, are at Washington, Moscow and London. These are the nerve centres, and the biggest nerve centre for us is our office here which must control them and direct them.

11. Life here continues to be nightmarish. Everything seems to have gone awry although superficially we seem to be improving. But our foundations have been shaken and all our standards seem to have disappeared. Only a certain pride and a sense of duty keeps one going. The Punjab is just a seething mass of human beings on the move or in camps. Other danger spots which might blaze out are Kashmir, Hyderabad and Kathiawar. On the top of all this is the steadily worsening economic situation. We have gone down terribly in the world's estimation. Perhaps rightly, because we have gone down in our own estimation. We have to build anew and that building must begin with the foundations at home. If the roots dry up, how long will the leaves and flowers continue?

12. I have received your letter of the 20th September. I was particularly interested in what you have said about Zaffrullah. Your account about Sun Fo's² changing politics and T.V. Soong's³ financial manipulations is also very interesting.

13. Jain,⁴ who used to be in Tokyo, was suddenly appointed, without my knowledge, the Economic Adviser of the new Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation. I mentioned to the Minister later that Jain's record was none too good and that he had to be withdrawn rather hurriedly from Tokyo. This has got him in some trouble, but I do not think there is much scope for expansion in his present job even if he continues in it.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

2. (1891-1973); Mayor of Canton, 1921-24 and 1926-27; Member of the Kuomintang and President of the Parliament, 1932-33; Prime Minister, 1948-49.

3. (1891-1971); Governor of the Central Bank of China, 1922-23; Finance Minister, 1925-33; Foreign Affairs Minister, 1941; President of the Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, 1944; Prime Minister, 1944; retired to America in 1949.

4. L.C. Jain (b. 1901); Secretary, Banking Inquiry Commission, U.P., 1929-30; Professor of Economics, Punjab University, 1931-45; Representative to the Philippines, 1946; Political Representative, Indian Liaison Mission in Japan, 1946-47; Economic Adviser to Ministry for Rehabilitation, Government of India, 1947-48; United Nations Economic Adviser to Afghanistan Government, 1952-54.

2. Representation of States in International Delegations¹

I agree generally with this note.²

2. The States, as represented by the States Ministry, should be kept in intimate touch with all international developments which affect them. Further, their representatives, who may include Rulers, Administrators and States people, should form part of international delegations, wherever this is desirable or feasible.

3. There can be no question of the States being represented in all international delegations and conferences in which the Government of India participate, because of the vast variety of these conferences, most of them being of a technical nature. In some of these, States will not be interested at all; in others, they might be interested but they are not likely to have any trained personnel to take part.

4. The suggestion that representation of States be in proportion to population, area, etc. also seems to me unwise and unfeasible. Any fixing of this proportion would lead to difficulties.

5. Normally, representatives are chosen by the particular Ministry concerned. Unfortunately, even External Affairs Ministry has often not been consulted and this has resulted in a certain lack of coordination. In future the representatives will continue to be chosen in the primary instance by the Ministry concerned. They might be asked to confer with the States Ministry in regard to a State representative wherever this is considered necessary and feasible. Before finalising the list, the matter should be referred to the External Affairs Ministry, who will be charged with coordination and avoidance of overlapping. The discretion would remain with the Ministry primarily concerned.

1. Note, 18 October 1947. File No. 17(12)-U.N.O.-1/47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. In his note of 17 October, G.S. Bajpai disagreed with the States Ministry's proposal that the representation of States in Indian delegations to international conferences should be "in proportion to population, area, states, etc." or that the States Ministry should select those representatives. He, however, agreed that these delegates could include "rulers, administrators and states people." The External Affairs Ministry could coordinate the selection of the delegates to ensure representation of all interests. He agreed that the Ministry could also be kept informed of "the signing and implementation of international treaties and agreements."

3. Exchange of Diplomatic Missions with Some European Countries¹

It will be remembered that during his visits to various European capitals at the beginning of this year Mr. Krishna Menon had conversations with the Foreign Ministers and others concerned on the question of establishing diplomatic relations. The Governments, in general, agreed in principle to the establishment of diplomatic relations.

2. In the case of the Netherlands and Belgium we were soon faced with telegrams from the Governments to their Consuls-General in India announcing the opening of embassies in Delhi, before formal approval had been given and there had been an exchange of notes between the Governments. In order to avoid being taken short in this manner the King's approval was obtained in July for diplomatic representation in Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland at the embassy or legation level as the case may require. The idea at that time was to set up a temporary diplomatic establishment in London, headed by a person with the rank of an Ambassador who would be accredited to all these countries. This expedient was intended to get over the difficulties in opening separate diplomatic missions in each capital immediately. A summary was prepared for the Government asking for approval of the proposal to such an establishment in London. This idea however was subsequently given up and the summary was therefore not submitted for orders.

3. The latest position regarding the countries mentioned above is as follows :—

- (i) *Norway*—The Norwegian Government have proposed appointment of their Consul-General in Bombay as Charge d' affaires in New Delhi and have been told that we have no objection.
- (ii) *Czechoslovakia*—The Government have asked for approval to the appointment as Ambassador of Mr. Jeroslav Seinoha, who is now in their Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- (iii) *Switzerland*—Press reports indicated that the Swiss Cabinet had asked for the formal approval of the Swiss Parliament to exchange diplomatic missions with India. Our High Commissioner in London has been asked to report the latest position.
- (iv) *Sweden*—We have agreed in principle to a suggestion made by the Swiss Foreign Minister to Mrs. Pandit that our Ambassador in Moscow should also be Minister in Sweden.

1. Note, 5 November 1947. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.

- (v) *Denmark*—No definite acceptance regarding exchange of diplomatic missions has been received from the Danish Government (and no approaches have been made) since Mr. Krishna Menon's visit.

4. Asia's Dynamic Role¹

The Asian Relations Conference held here in March last was an event of considerable historic significance.² Though Asia is a huge continent and its various parts are different from one another, there is a common bond that brings them together. It is extraordinary how a casual invitation elicited that remarkable response. Another remarkable thing was the vast enthusiasm that this conference created in India. People did not probably know what they were aiming at, but there was some powerful impulse behind it. The conference avoided purely political issues. It dealt with economic matters and labour matters, too, and to some extent with matters bordering on politics, though it avoided direct political issues as far as possible. As a result of that conference, a certain organisation, called the Asian Relations Conference, came into existence. I hope it will grow and prosper and play a fairly important role in the future.

Though India and other countries in Asia are going through a period of severe crises and conflicts, there are, at the same time, tremendous constructive forces at work everywhere. Unfortunately, the newspapers and the reading public are more interested in something very wrong than in something being done. For instance, the troubles in the Punjab were undoubtedly a very bad show; coming immediately after the formation of a new Government, it was about as big a burden as any Government could carry. But we faced it with some measure of success, and we faced it not merely in a negative way but in a positive and constructive way. But I find that there is hardly any reference in the newspapers here and elsewhere to this constructive aspect. We hope that this constructive aspect will gradually overshadow all other aspects. About six million people—about three million on each side—had been evacuated from one side to the other in the Punjab and the immediate task of evacuation might be completed in another month or six weeks.

1. Speech at a reception given to the delegates to the Asian Regional Conference of the International Labour Organisation, Delhi, 8 November 1947. From *The Hindu*, 9 November 1947.
2. The first Asian Relations Conference was held in Delhi from 23 March to 2 April 1947.

The task of rehabilitating them is a tremendous one and will keep the Government occupied for a long time. But, even so, a million and a half people have been settled. In the task of rehabilitation, the Government is trying not only just to go back to the old scheme of things, but to evolve some better way, a more cooperative way, of farming and other things. I do not know how far we are likely to succeed, but we are, all the same, thinking on these lines, and have functioned on these lines to some extent.

As a result of the disturbances, at a time when India was facing a food problem all the time, the Punjab, the granary of India, had not produced about half of what it would normally produce.

Yet, behind all this turmoil, there is a tremendous urge for constructive effort, a tremendous urge to build anew. India is faced with enormous difficulties. There are all manner of problems which should have been solved generations ago. But there is a somewhat artificial set-up in India and all the relics of old times, feudal and other, have survived. There will not be any miraculous change, but still there could be fairly rapid change. While India has considerable resources and ability, the main thing in India today is that it is a vital nation, even though that vitality might go in wrong directions, occasionally, as it has done in recent months. But still it is something to be vital, because even if it went wrong, it could be brought back to the right path. And because there is that sense of vitality about India and other countries of Asia, we are, historically speaking, in a watershed of history.

For a long period, Asia performed a very great function in the world in many ways, culturally, of course, but even in regard to mechanical appliances, the processes of manufacture and the like. Then it became static, unmoving, unchanging, and naturally it fell back. For three hundred years or so, it played no vital role in world history. That static period in Asia has now ended and it is again on the verge of playing that vital and dynamic role. I hope that role will be in full cooperation with the progressive forces in the rest of the world. It will not be a role against any nation, but an entirely cooperative role. Anyway, it was going to be an important role and it was very necessary for people in other countries to realise it. Most people in other countries hardly know anything about the history of Asia and have very vague notions about this huge, sprawling continent. Asia has very much to learn from other countries and proposes to learn it, but perhaps there might be many things that Asia also can teach others if they are prepared to learn. But the Western world somehow ignores Asia. It does not see Asia in proper perspective. This is unfortunate and unrealistic because one cannot solve any problem if one excludes Asia today. Time has come when we should judge in proper perspective what is happening in the world today and the dynamic role that Asia is beginning to play in it.

5. To Mahatma Gandhi¹

New Delhi

17 November 1947

Dear Bapu,

You will be interested to know that I have just received the following telegraphic message from Radhakrishnan² via Asaf Ali. This is from U.N.E.S.C.O. Conference at Mexico :

“May I convey to you the remarkable impression which Mrs. Asaf Ali made today by her spirited appeal for the common man. I wish you were here to share in our joy at her success. We the members of the Indian Delegation are quite proud of her contribution.”

Yours,
Jawaharlal

1. Pyarelal Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Dr. S. Radhakrishnan was a member of the Executive Board of the U.N.E.S.C.O. and the Leader of the Indian delegation at the session of the General Conference held in Mexico City from 6 November to 3 December 1947.

6. The United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Bill¹

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru (Leader of the House) : I beg to move, Sir :

That the Bill to give effect to the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations be taken into consideration.

Sir, the Bill is more or less a formal one giving certain privileges and immunities to representatives of the United Nations, which are normally accorded to members of the diplomatic corps. India being a member of the United Nations Organisation should give these privileges to the U.N.O. ...

1. Speech in a debate on the resolution moved by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly, 18 November 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. 1, 1947, pp. 108 and 111-112.

Sir, I am more or less a newcomer to this House and I am not perhaps used to talking on every possible occasion. I hope, Sir, that under your guidance and guidance of the House, I will improve in course of time. But I had always thought when anybody talked there should be something worth talking about. On the other hand, some of my honourable colleagues think otherwise. I have just put forward a Bill which is essentially simple, everything that can be said about it has been said in the drafting of that which has been circulated. It is an obvious thing. Indeed, it is inconceivable to me how anybody could not accept it *in toto* and yet I am reminded that I should repeat these clauses to this House and waste the very valuable time of this House. Well, if the House so desires, of course we can do that. But I do not think it will be advantageous to this House or the country to speak when it is not necessary to speak.

I listened with great interest to the speech which my honourable friend Mr. B. Das delivered.² My interest was heightened at every stage and into every expression he used. I could not connect it with the previous words. It became a jig-saw puzzle of ideas and words thrown about without any connection and without any relevance to the subject under debate. It is our business to see how many Indians are appointed to the United Nations and of Mr. Pillai who is representing India. Mr. Das referred to the nonsense that is talked by members of the League of Nations or the United Nations. It was very interesting to have a glimpse into Mr. Das's mind and his opinion on the subject, but I should like to know what it had to do with this Bill in regard to the immunities and privileges to be granted to the members of the United Nations. Either the United Nations are good enough for us to join them or they are not. If they are not good enough, we should go out of them. If they are good enough then the inevitable consequences that must follow must be accepted. They are an international organisation and we must give them the same rank as we give normally to the representatives of nations, that is we consider them a juridical personality with all rights and privileges pertaining thereto. That means that any representative of theirs has a certain ambassadorial status in regard to searches and other customs. It inevitably follows that the question is not whether an Indian should be appointed there or an Englishman or a Frenchman or anybody else. If it is said that the United Nations is not a worthwhile organisation, that it does not play fair towards Asia or India, therefore we should not go there, I can understand that position, although I completely disagree with that. I think the United Nations, as it is, is a very important organisation. It is an organisation which has, at any rate, some element of hope in it of

2. Biswanath Das had expressed concern over the possible misuse of these immunities and privileges by the members and representatives of the U.N. He had also argued for greater Indian representation on U.N. bodies.

pulling this world out of the morass in which it has sunk. It may fail, of course, but there is an element of hope in it, and we have pinned ourselves to it, and we should, therefore, cooperate with it, and give it every possible facility. If we have any grievances against any employment or otherwise, we can take it up. If the grievances become so big that you want to come out of the United Nations you can do so, but so long as we are there, we must treat it with the respect that it deserves. In fact, we ourselves are members of it, and if we talk in that fashion and without respect, we ourselves lessen in our own respect in regard to an organisation which we have joined. When we talk of the representatives of the United Nations, we find that there are several Americans, Czechs or Russians; there may be Indians also going to other nations. Are you going to say that you will not treat the representatives of the United Nations in India as they should be treated as ambassadors, and therefore, necessarily, when your representatives go elsewhere, they also cannot have their special treatment? It is an impossible position. This Bill, Sir, I submit, is an obvious simple proposition which we must accept if we accept the United Nations. There may be some minor amendments which may or may not have been changed here and there. Some reference was made in the course of one or two speeches to them. But those documents are generally drafted in consultation with the United Nations office and various countries adopt the same wording as far as possible. Two or three amendments have been suggested. May I say, Sir, that there are one or two formal amendments, just to change article I³ or II⁴ because the change has occurred since the Bill was introduced, a change in *the whole status of India*. Otherwise, I submit, Sir, that this Bill should be passed as it is,

3. Article I of the United Nations says that "it shall possess juridical personality."
4. N.G. Ranga suggested amendment to the Article II which read, "the United Nations shall be free to transfer its funds, gold or currency from one country to another or within any country and to convert any currency held by it into any other currency."

7. India and the United Nations¹

Jawaharlal Nehru : Sir, I move : "That the Bill, to enable effect to be given to certain provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, be taken into consideration."²

This is an even shorter Bill than the previous one, and in effect it is to enable India to give effect to any general sanctions devised by the United Nations against any other country. In discussing this the only possible effect that might be considered is whether any punishment should be laid down at present, or whether it should be left for future decision. It was pointed out by an honourable member who by mistake thought he was speaking on this Bill that normally power should not be given to Government to fix any punishment. That is perfectly correct and I have no doubt that when the time comes the legislature will do it. But for us at the present moment to fix any punishment would create difficulties. This Bill enables us to participate in economic sanctions against any particular country. It is not armed warfare; nevertheless it is an approach to warfare. At the present moment certain economic sanctions are functioning as between India and South Africa. Suppose we lay down some kind of punishment for those who offend against those sanctions, we can hardly lay down a very heavy punishment. There may be a fine or a month's imprisonment; I can very well conceive of offences which are very grave even in regard to sanctions as between India and South Africa. There may be black marketing. Some Indian or other persons may try to make money by sending gunny bags from India to South Africa. I consider that a very serious offence against the nation's policy and liable to heavy punishment. How are you going to deal with such a thing, if you put it in, without knowing what the situation will be? Any punishment laid down in this Bill, as is suggested in one of the amendments, would I think be unfortunate. It is of course true that it is not desirable that Government should be given a free hand; that depends entirely on the Government, i.e., on the responsible character of Government. If an occasion arises when sanctions are to be enforced against a country it is obvious that this will be a very important matter nationally and internationally.

1. Speech on the United Nations (Privileges and Immunities) Bill moved by Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on 18 November 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. I, 1947, pp. 113-116.
2. Article 41 of the United Nations Charter detailed the measures the Security Council could take to have its decisions implemented in regard to threats to peace. The measures included, other than the use of armed forces, complete or partial interruption of economic relations, and of rail, air, postal, telegraphic and other means of communications, as also the severance of diplomatic relations.

The matter will have to come up before the Assembly and will be discussed in connection with foreign affairs, international relations, etc. It is hardly likely that this kind of thing can be done quickly and speedily and in secret. The ultimate decision may perhaps however have to be very speedy. When the United Nations begin to function it means that a large number of nations have to agree, and that takes time. But the final decision may be very speedy; the legislature may not be sitting and Government may have to take action. As soon as the legislature meets, obviously it discusses the situation and lays down any further policy to be pursued and punishments to be inflicted, etc. I would submit that in a short Bill of this kind we should not limit the Government's power to lay down punishments, etc. Also in such matters, normally speaking, we are following a draft which is an agreed draft among other countries.³

Sir, I move: "That the Bill, as amended, be passed." May I say in answer to what Mr. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar said about an assurance to the Assembly⁴ that it will be consulted before decisions on matters like this are taken, that so far as I am concerned and also so far as the Government is concerned we gladly give the assurance that every matter will be brought before the Assembly at the earliest possible moment. In fact, I can hardly conceive of such important matters being dealt with by the Government without frequent and constant reference to the Assembly and I hope that the convention may grow up that at least once in every session the Assembly will discuss foreign affairs in all their aspects.⁵

3. The Speaker then moved the Bill for consideration by the House. Thereafter Nehru spoke again.
4. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar wondered why a free Government could not apply economic sanctions as and when necessary subject to the Constituent Assembly's approval and certain safeguards.
5. The Bill as amended was then passed.

8. Foreign Policy for India¹

Jawaharlal Nehru : Sir, I welcome this occasion. Although we are discussing this subject of foreign affairs not directly but by way of a cut motion,

1. Reply to the debate on foreign policy in the Constituent Assembly on 4 December 1947 following a cut motion moved by N.G. Ranga on the budgetary demands of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations. Participants in the debate besides Ranga were Seth Govind Das, N.B. Khare, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Muthiah Chettiar and H.V. Kamath. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative Debates, Official Report, Vol. II, 1947, pp. 1259-1265.*

nevertheless it is a novel occasion for this House and I think it is good that we realise what it conveys. It means ultimately that we are entering into the international field, not only by going into conferences and the like, but by really putting international questions before the country, before this House for its decision. There is no immediate question before this House today. But undoubtedly, as time goes on, the major international questions will have to be decided by this House.

Listening to the debates, to the speeches made by honourable members, I find, as was perhaps natural, that there was no immediate issue, no particular question for discussion, but rather pious hopes, vague ideals and sometimes a measure of, let us say, denunciation of things that had happened in the world. It has been a vague debate, with nothing pointed about it to which one could attach oneself. Many of the honourable members have been good enough to speak gently and generously of what has been done in the realm of foreign affairs on behalf of the Government of India during the past year. I am grateful to them, but may I say in reply that I am in complete disagreement with them. I think the Government of India during the past year has not done what it should have done. That perhaps has not been so much the fault of the Government of India as such, but rather of circumstances. Anyway, what we had envisaged that we ought to do, and we might do, we have not been able to do, largely because other circumstances arose in this country which have prevented all that being done. We are not yet out of those difficulties, internal and otherwise, which might enable us to have a free hand in our external relations, and therefore I would beg the House to judge of this period in this context of what has been happening in this country, not only during the past unhappy three or four months, but in the course of the past year when we lived in the middle of internal conflict and confusion which drained away our energy and did not leave us time to attend to other matters.

That has been the dominant feature of our politics during the past year and undoubtedly that has affected our foreign policy in the sense of our not giving enough time and energy to it. Nevertheless, I think we have advanced in that field. Again, it is difficult to say how you measure advance in such a field. My honourable friend, Dr. Khare, was critical of various things,² as he has every right to be, and his criticism took the shape of a written speech to which your attention, Sir, was not drawn. I was glad of the honourable Dr. Khare's intrusion in this debate, because the debate was getting rather heavy and he brought a touch of comedy and humour into it

2. N.B. Khare had criticised India's opposition to the partition of Palestine and expressed dissatisfaction with the Government's attitude towards Indians in South Africa. He also expressed the hope that the Burmese constitution would not harm Indian interests.

as well as unreality. When the honourable member represented the Government in this House,³ it was a little difficult to attach much importance to what he said. I suppose now it is less difficult to do so, or little more difficult to do so. So I will not venture to say anything or to reply to what he said because it seems to me totally inconsequential and without any meaning.

But coming to other subjects, the main subject in foreign policy today is vaguely talked of in terms of "Do you belong to this group or that group?". That is an utter simplification of issues and it is all very well for the honourable Maulana to hold forth that India will go to war under this banner or that.⁴ But that surely is not the way that a responsible House or a responsible country views the situation. We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or anything else or passivity. If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless, it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral. Any person with any knowledge of international affairs knows that. The point is not what will happen when there is a war. Are we going to proclaim to the world, taking the advice of Maulana Hasrat Mohani, that when war comes we stand by Russia? Is that his idea of foreign policy or any policy? That shows to me an amazing ignorance of how any foreign affairs can be conducted. We are not going to join a war if we can help it, and we are going to join the side which is to our interest when the choice comes to it. There the matter ends.

But talking about foreign policies, the House must remember that these are not just empty struggles on a chessboard that are going on. Behind them lie all manner of things. Ultimately foreign policy is the outcome of economic policy and till that time, when India has properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather vague, rather inchoate, and will rather grope about. It is well for us to say that we stand for peace and freedom and yet that does not convey much to anybody, except a pious hope. We do stand for peace and freedom. I think there is something to be said for it. There is some meaning when we say that we stand for the freedom of Asian countries and for the elimination of imperialistic control over them. There is some meaning in that. Undoubtedly it has some substance, but a vague statement that we stand for peace and freedom by itself has no particular meaning, because every country is prepared to say the same thing, whether it means it or not. What then do we stand for? Well, you have to develop then this argument in the economic field. As it happens today in spite of the fact that we have been for some time in authority as a

3. He was a member of the Viceroy's Executive Council for Indians overseas, 1943-46.

4. Maulana Hasrat Mohani had argued for an alliance with Russia in the event of a war.

government; I regret that we have not produced any constructive economic scheme or economic policy thus far. Again my excuse is that we have been going through such amazing times which have taken up all our energy and attention that it became difficult to do so. Nevertheless, we shall have to do so and when we do so that will govern our foreign policy, more than all the speeches in this House.

We have sought to avoid these foreign entanglements of joining one bloc or the other. The natural result has been that neither of these big blocs looks with favour on us. They think that we are undependable, because we cannot be made to vote this way or that. Last year when our delegation went to the United Nations,⁵ it was the first time, more or less, that an independent delegation went from India. It was looked upon a little askance. They did not know what it was going to do. When they found that we acted according to our own will, they did not like it. We were unpopular last year in the United Nations. I do not mean individually, but in regard to our policy and they could not quite find out what we were or what we were aiming at. There was a suspicion in the minds of one group that in reality we were allied to the other group in secret, and that we were trying to hide that fact, and the other group thought that we were allied to the first group in secret and were trying to hide that fact. This year there was a slight change in this attitude. We did many things which the other group disliked but the comprehension came to them that we were not really allied to any group, that we were trying to act according to our own lights and according to the merits of the dispute as they seemed to us. They did not like that, of course, because the position today is that there is so much passion about it and so much fear and suspicion of each other between these rival groups of Great Powers that anybody who is not with them is considered as against them. So they did not like what we did in many instances; nevertheless, they respected us much more, because they realised that we had some kind of an independent policy, that we were not going to be dragooned this way or that, that we may make a mistake as anyone can. Nevertheless, we were going to stick to our own policy and programme, so that while we possibly irritated some of our friends even a little more than last year, we got on much better with everybody, because they understood that we did stand for something. That is the background of it.

To give the House an instance of how we functioned, take this Palestine affair which has given rise and will give rise to a great deal of trouble. We took up a certain attitude in regard to it which was roughly that of a federal state with autonomous parts in it. It was opposed to both the other

5. In 1946 the delegation, headed by Vijayalakshmi Pandit, consisted of M.C. Chagla, Maharaj Singh, Frank Anthony and Ali Yavar Jung.

attitudes which were before the United Nations. One was partition which has now been adopted; the other was a unitary state. We suggested a federal state with naturally an Arab majority in charge of it but with autonomy for the other regions, i.e., Jewish regions. After a great deal of thought we decided that this was not only a fair and equitable solution of the problem but the only real solution of the problem. Any other would mean just fight and conflict. Nevertheless, our solution—which as the House will remember was the solution given in the minority report of the Palestine Committee⁶—did not find favour with more people in the United Nations. Some of the major powers were out for partition and they therefore pressed for it and ultimately got it. Others were so keen on the unitary state idea and were so sure, at any rate, of preventing partition or preventing a two-thirds majority in favour of partition that they did not accept our suggestion. When during the last few days partition somehow suddenly became inevitable and votes veered round to that owing to the pressure of some of the Great Powers, then it was suddenly realised that the Indian solution was probably the best and a last minute attempt was made in the last forty eight hours to bring forward the Indian solution, not by us but by those who wanted a unitary state. It was then too late. There were procedural difficulties and many of the persons who might have accepted this solution had already pledged themselves to the partition side. And so ultimately partition was decided upon by a two-thirds majority, with a large number abstaining from voting, with the result again of trouble now and a great deal of trouble in the future in the Middle East.

I point this out to the House as an instance that in spite of considerable difficulty and being told by many of our friends on either side that we must line up this way or that, we refused to do so and I have no doubt that the position we had taken up was the right one and I have no doubt as yet that that would have brought about a solution as no other decision would. That applies to many other things. But inevitably that means that to some extent we have to plough a lonely furrow in the United Nations or in international conferences of this type. Nonetheless, that is the only honourable and right position by which we shall ultimately gain national and international prestige,

6. India had stood against the partition of Palestine and the creation of an independent Israel state in the centre of West Asia because this would destabilise the area. As member of the Palestine Commission, India had signed a minority report of the Commission which put forward a federal scheme for Palestine. The Jews were given complete local autonomy in areas populated by them and the sovereign authority rested in a federation. Though fully sympathising with the Jewish desire for a home of their own, India voted against the partition of Palestine in the second session of the General Assembly in 1947.

that is to say, when we take a long view of the situation and not a short view of getting immediately a vote here or a vote there. I have no doubt that fairly soon, in the course of two or three years, the world will find this attitude justifying itself and that India will not only be respected by the major protagonists in the struggle for power but by a large number of the smaller nations which are rather helpless today. They would probably look towards India more than to other countries for a lead in such matters.

May I in this connection say that during the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, several very difficult and very controversial issues were raised⁷ and our delegation had to face extraordinarily intricate situations? I should like to pay a tribute to our delegation, specially to the leader of the delegation.

Honourable members often put questions about appointment of ambassadors, members of delegations and the like, and rightly so, because the House should be interested in such important appointments. May I say to the House that nothing is more difficult than to make these appointments, because they are not just appointments of persons who may be able, but appointments of particular persons to particular places where they must fit in, which is an extraordinarily difficult thing? In the key places of the world, the ideal ambassador must be some kind of superman. It is so difficult now not only to understand the intricacies—that is not difficult—but to keep friends with everybody and yet to advance your cause. After all, we have, in the past, been discussing foreign affairs outside, in other assemblies, or incidentally here, rather in an academic way, rather in the manner of a college debating society. That is, we talk of high policies but we do not come to grips with the question when we have to say 'yes' or 'no' to a question and take the consequences of that.

If the House will forgive my saying so, even in today's debate, many of the speeches were of an academic kind which did not take into account the vital questions which concern the world today, which may mean peace or war. But when the House will have to face the question by having to take a decision which may lead to war or peace, when one comes face to face with realism, then one cannot rely merely on idealistic principles. Foreign affairs is utterly realistic today where a false step, a false phrase, makes a difference. The first thing that an ambassador of ours has to know is to shut his mouth and give up public or even private speaking. It is not a habit which we have developed in our past careers—of being completely silent almost. Yet that has to be developed, and in private one has to be silent lest what one says might injure the cause of the nation, might create international ill will and so on and so forth. It is in this background that I should like the House to consider international affairs—this realistic background, this notion

7. Such as the issue of South Africa, the trusteeship question and the veto problem.

that this is not merely some naughty men playing about and quarrelling with each other, some statesmen in America and the U.S.S.R., or the British imperialism lurking in the distance behind the curtain and doing something. We have talked so much about British imperialism that we cannot get out of the habit of it, whether it is there or not. But it is coming to grips with this subject in its economic, political and various other aspects, trying to understand and realise it that ultimately matters.

Whatever policy you may lay down, the main feature of the foreign policy of any country has to be to find out what is most advantageous to her. We may talk about international goodwill and may mean what we talk. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis a government functions for the good of the country it governs and no government dare do anything which in the short or long run is manifestly to the disadvantage of that country. Therefore, whether a country is imperialistic or Socialist or Communist, its foreign minister thinks primarily of the interests of that country. And no doubt so. But there is a difference of course. Some people may think of the interests of their country regardless of other consequences or take a short-term view. Others may think "No, in the long-term policy, the interest of another country is as important to me as that of my own country." The interest of peace is more important because if war comes everyone suffers, so that in the long-distance view self-interest may itself demand a policy of cooperation with other nations, goodwill for other nations, as indeed it does demand. Every intelligent person can see that if you have a narrow national policy, it may enthuse the multitude for the moment, just as a communal cry has done, but it is bad for the nation, and it is bad internationally, because you lose sight of the ultimate good and thereby endanger your own good. Therefore, we propose to look after India's interests in the context of world cooperation and world peace, in so far as world peace can be preserved. We propose to keep the closest terms of friendship with other countries unless they themselves create difficulties. We shall be friends with America. We intend co-operating with the United States of America and we intend cooperating fully with the Soviet Union. We have had, as the House knows, a distinguished representative of the United States here for some time past.⁸ Within a week or two we shall have a distinguished representative of the Soviet Union here,⁹ in the Soviet Embassy which is being opened in New Delhi.

I should not like to say much more at this stage about foreign affairs, partly for lack of time, partly because it is a little difficult to discuss these

8. Henry Frances Grady.

9. Kirili Vasilyevich Novikov (1905-1983); Russian diplomat; counsellor, Soviet Embassy, London, 1940-42; head, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1942-47; ambassador to India, 1947-52.

matters. Some of the honourable members may perhaps let themselves go about what should be done in China, Japan, Siam and Peru, but I fear it is a little and it will be a little irresponsible for me to talk about these various matters. Naturally, India is interested in Asian countries even more than the rest of the world. We have had an Asian Conference, and at this moment we have a distinguished visitor, the Prime Minister of Burma,¹⁰ here. May I say in this connection that some people are under a misapprehension that we are conducting special negotiations with the Burmese delegation here? That is not quite true. It has been primarily a visit of courtesy. At the same time, of course, we have broadly explored the various questions, discussed various matters of common concern, not with the idea of suddenly coming to decisions in regard to these intricate matters now but rather to lay the foundations for future. May I also say that the Prime Minister of Burma is interested, as many of us have been, in closer association, not only between Burma and India but between various other countries of Asia also? We have discussed that also, not again with a view suddenly to come to decisions because these things take a little time to grow. They all indicate the new spirit of Asia which wants Asian countries to draw closer together in defence of themselves and in promoting world peace.

Coming to another part of this cut motion in regard to Indians in the British Commonwealth, that is an old subject and a painful subject. I entirely agree with any criticism that might be made that we have not been able to do anything substantial in this direction. Something has been done in Canada¹¹ or elsewhere but nothing substantial has yet been done. Now, the odd thing is that this subject gets more and more difficult to deal with. Indians have gone to these British colonies and Dominions in the past in various forms, as merchants, traders, workers, indentured labourers and the rest. Looking back on this history of Indian emigration abroad which included some of the humblest persons who went from India, it reads almost like a romance as to how these Indians went abroad. They were not even citizens of a free country, yet, working under all disadvantages, they made good wherever they went. They worked hard for themselves and for the country where they were in. They made good themselves and profited the country they had gone to.

It is a romance and it is something which India can be proud of, and may I say, most of all, of those poor indentured labourers who went out

10. Thakin Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma, arrived at Delhi on 1 December 1947.

11. The Indians domiciled in Canada were granted municipal franchise. Permission was also granted to those Indians who wished to enter Canada for marrying Indian girls, legally resident in that country, and for the relatives of those Indians who needed assistance in the management of their properties in Canada.

under unhappy conditions, and who, through their own labour, gradually worked their way up. That is so. It is also true that India is a country, that, in spite of everything, has abounding vitality and spreads abroad. It rather frightens our neighbouring countries, just like China which is also a country with abounding vitality and an abounding population. We spread. We tend to overwhelm others both by virtue of our numbers, and sometimes by virtue of the economic position we might develop there. That naturally frightens others who may not have that vitality in them, and they want to protect themselves against it, and then questions arise of vested interests which India has developed or Indians have developed there. Those questions have arisen, and while, on the one hand, we are obviously intent on protecting the interests of Indians abroad, on the other hand, we cannot protect any vested interests which injure the cause of the country they are in. There is that difficulty. Nevertheless, we shall undoubtedly try to do our best to protect all legitimate interests.

Now one word more. I will not take more of the time of the House. An honourable member, Mr. Kamath, I think, referred to the expenditure incurred in embassies.¹² Now first of all, one of the minor headaches, I have had to suffer from, is a relatively new tendency in old and new newspapers alike to publish without check or hindrance the most amazing lies. It is impossible to keep pace with that. It is undesirable always to go about contradicting every little thing they say. It just cannot be done, and Delhi has been inflicted by some new types of papers and journals I have come across, which do not raise either the status of Indian journalism or anything else. So many of these stories are not true that have appeared. I read somewhere about the U.P. Government presenting (I think in a Delhi paper) Rs. 20,000 and 200 saris to Vijayalakshmi Pandit on her departure to Moscow. I read all manner of the most malicious and unfounded and false statements in these papers about Mr. Asaf Ali.

Now, coming to this question of cost, the figure Mr. Kamath mentioned of 5 lakhs of course has no relation to facts. I do not know what the figure is.

I suggest that if Mr. Kamath makes any statements, he might investigate them before he makes them.

What I should like this House to remember is that these ambassadorial appointments have to keep up a certain dignity and a certain status. It is no good our sending an ambassador and not giving him a house to live in, not giving him furniture in the house, not providing him with the minimum wherewithal to meet others properly and decently. I doubt if any country,

12. H.V. Kamath had stressed the need for official supervision of expenses incurred by Indian embassies.

big or small, is conducting its ambassadorial establishments in such a cheap way as we are doing. A great deal of criticism has been made about our ambassador in Moscow getting furniture from Stockholm. Well, how a house has to be furnished in Moscow, of course, honourable members do not realise. It is just not possible to furnish it easily in Moscow. You get an empty house. We thought of sending things from India, but it was almost a physical impossibility unless we spent vast sums over aeroplanes carrying chairs and tables from here. Of course, it could be furnished alternatively with Russian furniture. The Russian people, and all credit to them for this, ever since this war, are so intent on doing what they consider to be the fundamental things that they refuse to waste their time on the accessories of life. They had to build up their country after the most horrible suffering and damage they suffered in the war and they are building it up in regard to the major undertakings. They go about in patched up clothes and broken down shoes. It does not matter, but they are building dams, reservoirs and factories and the rest which they consider more important. The only things you can get in Russia are antique pieces of Czarist days which are frightfully expensive. The result is that our embassy in Moscow has to go to Stockholm for its chairs and tables, and as these were urgently required—office equipment, etc.—our ambassador had to go there. But, of course, the visit to Stockholm was not merely, members of the House should realise, to buy furniture. When an ambassador goes elsewhere, the ambassador does other work too, and any kind of shopping that might be done is incidental thereto.

I am grateful to the House for their kind sentiments and their expressions of goodwill for our attempt to follow a certain rather vague policy in regard to foreign affairs. I wish it was a more definite policy. I think it is growing more definite, and in this connection, may I say that at the present moment, no country, including the Big Powers, with their long traditions of foreign affairs, has got anything which might be called a precise and definite foreign policy, because the world itself is in a fluid condition. Of course, if you call it a definite policy of one great country looking with bitter dislike upon another and suspecting it, that may be the foundation of policy, but that is not policy, that is just passion and prejudice. Otherwise, there is hardly any very definite policy in any country and they are trying to fit in their policy from day to day to changing circumstances.¹³

13. The motion was then withdrawn by N.G. Ranga.

BRITAIN

1. Happy Augury for the Future¹

Today has been a great day for us and I think it has significance for other nations also. You have seen what has taken place in Delhi today and similar scenes were no doubt witnessed all over India. You saw what effect even the breath of freedom produced on our people—their joy and enthusiasm, their vast numbers gathering to do honour to our Flag and all that it represents to them. You must have wondered what miracle lay behind this. We deal with political and economic problems in boudoirs or committee rooms and council chambers and however wise we might be, we miss their essence and fail to solve them. For all problems are essentially human problems affecting human beings, their lives and joys and sorrows and, if you are to solve them, you have to understand and appeal to the human heart even more than the mind. The Indian people are a friendly people, responsive to friendly approaches but resenting compulsion and domination.

During the brief period you, Sir, have been here, you have shown remarkable psychological insight and understanding of the human heart and, supported by the British Government, you have succeeded where so many have previously failed. You saw today how our people feel towards you. It is these very people who have struggled for freedom against British rule for a generation and yet it has not taken long to win them when a right approach was made. To you pre-eminently belongs the honour of this approach and the success it has brought in its train.

This is a happy augury of the future relations of India and England. We want them to be close and friendly and whatever political form they may take in the future if the hearts and minds are united then all will be well.²

- 1 Undated draft of a speech made in Delhi at a state banquet on the night of 15 August 1947. Mountbatten was the chief guest. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
- 2 In his Personal Report dated 16 August 1947, Mountbatten said: "Nehru made a speech in the most friendly terms possible prior to proposing the toast of the King. I replied and proposed the Dominion of India."

2. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
22nd October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 21st.² I appreciate very much what you say about your going to England next month for the marriage of Princess Elizabeth³ to your nephew.⁴ I have given earnest consideration to this matter and consulted my colleagues also. We are all of opinion that you should certainly go to England. As you know, we rely upon your advice a great deal, and more especially during the past two and a half critical months your presence and advice have been of very great help. Nevertheless, I feel that there is no adequate reason for your not going to England for the wedding.

As regards a successor for the period of your absence, we can discuss this later.

Ever since you mentioned the possibility of my going to England also for the wedding I have thought about it and have been attracted by the suggestion. I realise that from many points of view a visit to England by me would be worthwhile. But I am afraid that it will be very difficult for me to leave India in the present state of affairs, more especially if you are away at the same time. The next month is going to be a very full one and apart from our normal occupations and worries, we are going to have meetings of the Congress Working Committee and the All India Congress Committee and a session of the Legislative Assembly which begins on the 17th November. This will be the first session of the Constituent Assembly for legislative purposes and all manner of important decisions will have to be made. All the Ministers will be expected to attend it. In view of all this, I am very sorry that I cannot accept the kind invitation of the King to attend the wedding. I hope, however, that some time later, either in December or January next year, I might be able to pay a brief visit to England.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 27-GG/47. President's Secretariat.
2. While expressing his desire to visit England for two weeks to attend the marriage of Princess Elizabeth on 20 November 1947, Mountbatten stressed that his personal feelings did not enter into the matter and that he would be guided only by what was best for the good of the country.
3. (b. 1926); eldest daughter of King George VI; married Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten, 1947; proclaimed Elizabeth II, 1952; crowned, June 1953.
4. Philip Mountbatten (b. 1921); entered Navy as lieutenant, 1939; married Princess Elizabeth and given the title of Duke of Edinburgh, 1947.

If we look back at India's long history we find ^{that} our forefathers made wonderful progress whenever they looked out at the world with clear and fearless eyes and kept the windows of their minds open to give and to receive. And, in later periods, when they grew narrow in outlook and ^{shrank} ~~shrank~~ from outside influences, India suffered a setback, politically and culturally. What a magnificent inheritance we have got, though we have abused it often enough. India has been and is a vital nation, in spite of all the misery and suffering she has experienced. That vitality in the realm of constructive and creative effort spread to many parts of the ^{and elsewhere} Asian world and brought splendid conquests in its train. These conquests were not so much of the sword but of the mind and heart, which bring healing and which endure when the men of the sword and their work are forgotten. But that very vitality if not rightly ~~sustained~~ and ~~used~~ creatively directed may turn inward and destroy and degrade.

3. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
26th October 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Thank you for your letter of the 24th October.²

I have noted the dates when you are likely to be away from Delhi when you visit London.

I agree that a press statement may be issued simultaneously in India and London about your visit. It will be desirable to mention the name of the acting Governor-General in this statement. We have invited Mr. C. Rajagopalachari to act in your absence. We have not had a final reply from him yet. On receipt of this reply, I shall arrange for the statement to be issued.³

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 27-GG/47, President's Secretariat.
2. Mountbatten appreciated the reasons given by Nehru for his inability to attend the wedding of Princess Elizabeth. He also thanked Nehru for appreciating his role during the months following the attainment of independence.
3. A press statement was issued on 27 October 1947 which said, "Mr. C. Rajagopalachari, Governor of West Bengal, is expected to act as the Governor-General of India during Lord Mountbatten's visit to England to attend the Royal Wedding next month."

4. To Princess Elizabeth¹

New Delhi
9 November 1947

Your Royal Highness,

On behalf of the Government and the people of India, I have great pleasure in sending Your Royal Highness two examples of Indian craftsmanship as a wedding present.² They are tokens of our affection and good wishes. It is our sincere hope that Your Royal Highness and Lt. Philip Mountbatten will live long to enjoy your married felicity.

I had hoped to be able to deliver our modest gift to you personally and also to be present at the marriage. My responsibilities in India at the present

1. *The Hindu*, 21 November 1947.
2. Nehru sent two brocade tablecloths as his present,

time have, unfortunately, made this impossible.³ I have, therefore, asked our Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, to discharge this pleasant duty for us.

With my personal good wishes for your happiness.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. See *ante*, item 2.

5. To Philip Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
9 November 1947

Dear Lieutenant Mountbatten,
Our Governor-General, His Excellency Lord Mountbatten, is proceeding to England to attend your marriage to H.R.H. Princess Elizabeth. His Excellency will represent us at the wedding and I am availing myself of his kindness to send you, through him, a small present as token of our good wishes. The Government and the people of India earnestly hope that Her Royal Highness and you will live long to enjoy your married happiness.

With my personal good wishes.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. *The Hindu*, 21 November 1947.

6. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
9th November 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,
I have pleasure in informing you that the Government of India have decided to request you and our High Commissioner in London, Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, to represent the Government and people of India at the wedding of Her Royal Highness Princess Elizabeth with Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten.

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.

We shall be grateful if you will discharge this pleasant duty on our behalf.

The Government of India desire to send on this occasion to Princess Elizabeth and Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten some examples of Indian craftsmanship as tokens of their affection and good wishes. We shall be grateful to you if you will kindly take these with you and deliver them to Princess Elizabeth and Lieutenant Mountbatten.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To C. R. Attlee¹

New Delhi
27 December 1947

My dear Attlee,

Thank you for your letter of the 18th December.

I am grateful to you for your invitation to me to visit London. I have been wanting to do so and I still hope that it may be possible to go there sometime late in January or in February. I am afraid, however, that it is very difficult to be definite about this owing to new developments in India. I shall certainly try to come. As soon as I find that this can be done I shall immediately let you know.

With all good wishes,

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

SOUTH AFRICA

1. To M.C. Setalvad¹

New Delhi
19th August 1947

My dear Mr. Setalvad,

Thank you for your letter of the 16th August. My office will communicate with you direct and send you all the relevant literature and papers. There

1. Extracts. File No. 2(6)-U.N.O. 1/47 (Secret), M.E.A., N.A.I.

are a number of important questions before the Assembly. There is the South Africa-India issue, which is the most important of all from our point of view. I have carried on correspondence with Field-Marshal Smuts during the last few months,² but this has yielded no results³ and Smuts refuses to agree to the implementation of the United Nations resolution.⁴

Then there is the question of South-West Africa. Smuts has practically flouted the U.N.O. resolution about this also.⁵

The Palestine issue will also come up there, presumably in the shape of a report of the Palestine Special Committee of the U.N.O.⁶

We expect that right at the beginning Smuts, or some other people, will raise the issue of India's status in the United Nations. His case is likely to be that after the constitutional and other changes in India, India ceases to be an original and continuing member.⁷ This is a purely legal and constitutional issue. The preliminary ruling of the United Nations Secretariat is in our favour and the recent agreement with Pakistan also acknowledges our continuing status.⁸ So, I do not anticipate any great difficulty. Nevertheless, we should be fully prepared...

2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 1, p. 171, fn. 9 and p. 459, fn. 2, Vol. 2, pp. 493 and 495; and Vol. 3, p. 387.

3. The correspondence between Nehru and Smuts did not yield any common basis for discussion. Not only did South Africa take no action to implement the resolution but by refusing to agree to the Indian request to accept the terms of the resolution as a basis for discussion, they had refused to remove the discrimination against Indians and other Asiatics.

4. Smuts refused to implement the U.N. resolution of 8 December 1946 as he regarded the question of Indians in South Africa as a domestic issue.

5. On 18 August 1947, the South African Government informed the U.N. of its rejection of trusteeship for South-West Africa and its decision to maintain the *status quo*.

6. See *post*, p. 640, fn. 2.

7. It was, in fact, Argentina which objected to the U.N. treating India as the original member-state following the division of the country into two independent states. She argued that either both were entitled to original membership or neither. Both should apply afresh.

8. The Congress claimed that the Dominion of India would continue as the international personality of pre-partition India. The Muslim League, on the other hand, maintained that the existing Government of India would, on 15 August, disappear altogether as an entity and would be succeeded by two independent Dominions of equal international status, both of which would be eligible to the existing rights and obligations. The United Nations Organisation, to which the question was referred, held that the situation was that of a part of an existing state breaking off to form a new state with all its treaty rights and obligations, and consequently with all the rights and obligations of membership in the United Nations. The new Dominion of India, therefore, continued as an original member state of the U.N. It was open to Pakistan, in order to become a member of the U.N., to apply for admission.

2. The South African Question¹

I agree to this brief generally.² But I do not like the idea of our asking for a fact-finding committee. While it is perfectly true that there is no chance of sanctions being applied, perhaps the next step should be a more firm direction by the U.N. to South Africa which may envisage some future sanctions. It is a difficult time and much will depend on the circumstances prevailing in the U.N. On the whole it is better not to pitch our demand too low.

1. Rajendra Prasad Papers, N.A.I.
2. The representative of Vietnam appealed for Indian support in their struggle for freedom and urged stopping of overflights and refuelling facilities in India to French aircraft.

3. Problem of Indians in South Africa¹

I have consulted Mahatma Gandhi and the members of the Cabinet in regard to the proposal communicated to us by Mrs. Pandit.²

2. The first reaction was that the suggestion to have a Round Table Conference in the manner proposed was meant to get rid of the subject from the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly and secondly to create further division in the Indian ranks in South Africa. Field-Marshal Smuts has already succeeded in creating a split, or rather in emphasising it, among

1. Note to the Secretary-General, Ministry of External Affairs, 9 October 1947. File No. 54-3/47-O.S.I., pp. 43-46, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Following discussions between representatives of the two countries, it was proposed that a Round Table Conference be convened at which agreements of the years 1927-32 should form the basis of discussions. Meanwhile, the South African Government should undertake not to implement the Asiatic Act nor insist upon the return of the Indian High Commissioner. The Government of India should also temporarily suspend the embargo on trade.

the Indians in South Africa.³ His policy appears to be based on dividing the Indian community there.

3. A further reaction was that we cannot desert or isolate the Indians in South Africa who have been carrying on the passive resistance struggle for nearly two years now. Anything that we should do should be done after some consultation with the representatives of the Indian passive resisters. Probably there are representatives of these in New York at present, just as there are representatives of the other and much smaller group of Indians under Mr. Kajee's leadership. We cannot and have not taken sides in this matter officially as between different groups of Indians in South Africa. But undoubtedly our moral support has been with the passive resistance movement of which the leaders are Messrs. Dadoo,⁴ Sorabjee and Naicker⁵ etc.

4. It is felt that the proposal made could not be rejected outright in spite of misgivings which it has aroused. The reply should be constructive.

5. In Mrs. Pandit's telegram reference is made to the Asiatic Act. In the Secretary-General's note the reference is to the Pegging Act. Is this the same thing or does one include the other ?⁶ Mrs. Pandit states that Andrews⁷ told Vellodi that it might be difficult to suspend operation of the Act even for a limited period. Secretary-General is of opinion that any such declaration of suspension will be formal only and will do little good to help the Indian community. It is not clear to me why it should be difficult to suspend the operation of any such Act. I should have imagined that a Government can suspend operation by executive order without doing violence to the Act. Apart from this, I have little doubt that the act of suspension would have considerable effect on public opinion both in India and South Africa. Such a suspension would, of course, be accompanied by a suspension, for the time being, of the operation of the embargo on trade.

3. Field-Marshal Smuts had made it clear that the Government had no intention of repealing or modifying the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act of 1946.

4. Yusuf Mohammed Dadoo (b. 1909); leader of the Indian people in South Africa; arrested in London in 1929 for participating in demonstrations against the Simon Commission; led passive resistance struggles since 1946; imprisoned several times since 1940 for political activities.

5. G.M. Naicker (b. 1910); leader of the Indian community in South Africa; chairman of Anti-War Nationalist Bloc, 1939; chairman, Anti-Segregation Council which opposed political, economic and social segregation of Indians, 1948; President, Natal Indian Congress, 1945.

6. They were, in fact, the same.

7. Harry Thomson Andrews (b. 1897); South Africa's Permanent Representative in the U.N., 1945-49.

This will materially profit South Africa by allowing them to get jute, etc. That cannot be helped. On a balance the advantage seems to me in favour of both these suspensions from the point of view of creating an effect on public opinion. Merely stating that we are going to meet in R.T.C. and have further postponed consideration of the matter in the U.N. Assembly seems rather a bare and lifeless announcement.

6. In view of the prevailing conditions today, a discussion in the U.N. Assembly on this subject need not lead to any profitable result for us. At the same time, it will be wrong to withdraw this consideration and thus put an end to it for the time being so far as the U.N. Assembly is concerned. Of course, it is always possible to raise it again later. Nevertheless the approach might be different and whatever we might do might be made subject to the U.N. resolution. In other words it should be without prejudice to India's right to come back to the U.N. for further consideration of the resolution. Perhaps a suitable way will be to say that the consideration of the United Nations General Assembly resolution be postponed to the next session when the parties concerned should report.

7. The attitude that Pakistan might take up has also some bearing on this matter. If Pakistan does not agree to our postponement of the resolution, we might be put in a difficulty both in the Assembly and before the Indian public. However this risk has to be taken. It is not desirable, I think, for our delegation to discuss the matter with Pakistan representatives at this stage.

8. Gandhiji referred to the Srinivasa Sastri Agreement in South Africa. I am not quite clear what this was. I imagine it is included in the 1927-32 agreements.⁸

9. I suggest, therefore, that a reply might be drafted on the following lines :

- (1) It is important that any agreement arrived at should have the concurrence of the Indian passive resistance party in South Africa. Their delegation in New York should, therefore, be consulted at the proper time. It is for the leader of our delegation to decide when

8. The reference is to the Capetown Agreement of 1927. It envisaged an 'assisted emigration' scheme to enable Indians domiciled in South Africa to emigrate to India and other countries if they wished to do so. The South African Government also decided not to proceed with the controversial Areas Reservation Bill. Reviewing the Agreement in 1932, the two governments agreed, as the 'assisted emigration' scheme was not working satisfactorily, to explore a colonisation scheme for settling these Indians in other countries.

this should be done. We cannot leave our countrymen in South Africa, who have been putting up this brave fight, in the lurch.

- (2) Clause 1 of the tentative suggestions made should be accepted.
- (3) Clause 2 should run thus: "Discussions at this conference should be on the basis of the 1927-32 agreements and the resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations passed on the 8th December 1946."
- (4) Clause 3 (a) should run thus: "The South African Government should, during the period of the Round Table Conference, suspend the operation of the Asiatic Act, and a statement to this effect should be made by the Union Government."
- (5) Clause 3 (b) is hardly necessary; but it may be put in if desired. The point is that the High Commissioner will not return. This fact need hardly be mentioned.
- (6) Clause 3 (c) should run thus: "During the period of this conference the Indian Government will on their part temporarily suspend the operation of the embargo on trade."
- (7) A further clause might be added to the following effect: "In view of this agreement between the two Governments for a consideration of the South Africa-India issue at a Round Table Conference both the Governments recommend to the U.N. General Assembly that the further consideration of last year's resolution of the General Assembly be postponed to the next session when parties concerned are to report."

10. A reply might be drafted on the lines indicated above. The language to be used need not be the same.

4. India's Resolution at the United Nations¹

Received your telegram dated 21st November.² Sending separately

1. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit, New Delhi, 23 November 1947. File No. 54-14/47-O.S.I., Part II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Vijayalakshmi Pandit had asked for instructions on the attitude to be adopted on the American proposal calling upon India and South Africa to discuss at a Round Table Conference all matters pending between them, and requesting Pakistan to attend the same.

instructions about your attitude to American proposal.³

While we are naturally sorry because you did not get two-thirds majority for your resolution we do not consider this a defeat but moral victory. We congratulate you and delegation on able-spirited advocacy of India's cause. Please convey my gratitude to countries which have specially supported us, particularly Iceland.

3. G.S. Bajpai on 23 November 1947 instructed the Indian delegation to convey to the American delegate India's inability to support their resolution. However, if the resolution was presented to the Assembly and secured the requisite majority, India would carry out the wishes of the Assembly.

5. Indians in South Africa¹

The Honourable Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru: Sir, I seek the indulgence of the House to make a statement on a subject which is of deep interest to the House and the country.

The House is aware of the text of the resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on the 8th December 1946, on the treatment of Indians in South Africa. To refresh the memory of Honourable Members, I would quote the substantive part of the resolution :

The General Assembly... is of the opinion that the treatment of Indians in the Union should be in conformity with the international obligations under the agreements concluded between the two Governments and the relevant provisions of the Charter; and,

Therefore requests the two Governments to report at the next session of the General Assembly the measures adopted to this effect.

The House is also aware of the correspondence which took place between me and Field-Marshal Smuts³ with a view to giving effect to this resolution. The Prime Minister of South Africa was insistent that, before any negotiations could take place between the two Governments, the so-called sanctions which India had applied against South Africa, namely the severance of trade

1. Statement in the Legislative Assembly, 12 December 1947. *Constituent Assembly of India (Legislative) Debates, Official Report*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1947, pp. 1808-1809.
2. See *Selected Works* (Second Series), Vol. 2, pp. 493-496, Vol. 3, pp. 387-388, 400-401.

relations between the two countries,³ should be withdrawn and the High Commissioner for India should return to the Union. We, on our part, while expressing a sincere desire to settle the problem of the treatment of Indians in South Africa by friendly means, expressed our inability either to resume trade relations, or to enter into negotiations, except on the basis of the Assembly resolution of 1946.

2. Since no agreed basis for discussion between the two Governments could be reached as a result of this correspondence, we instructed our delegation to the second session of the United Nations Assembly, which commenced in New York last September, to work for a resolution which, after expressing the regret of the Assembly at the failure of South Africa to accept last year's resolution as a basis of settlement by negotiation with the Government of India, would require South Africa to enter into negotiations with this country on the aforesaid basis and would request both India and South Africa to report the result to the Security Council not later than three months from the end of the Assembly session. Subject to this broad directive, the delegation was given discretion to adjust the exact terms of the resolution to the exigencies of the atmosphere and the mood of the Assembly.

3. After sounding opinion amongst other delegations, the Indian delegation presented a resolution, of which the operative part ran as follows :

The General Assembly, having considered the reports submitted by the Government of India and by the Government of the Union of South Africa pursuant to the aforesaid resolution;

Expresses its regret at the refusal by the Government of South Africa to accept implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly dated December 8, 1946 as a basis of discussion with the Government of India, and at its failure to take any other steps for such implementation; Reaffirms its resolution dated December 8, 1946;

Requests the two Governments to enter into discussions at a Round Table Conference on the basis of that resolution without any further delay and to invite the Government of Pakistan to take part in such discussions;

3. As a protest against the South African Government's continued indifference to the representations made by the Government of India for postponement of the Asiatic Land Tenure and the Indian Representation Bill, the Government of India had decided in June 1947 to terminate the existing trade relations between the two countries and recall their High Commissioner.

Requests that the result of such discussions be reported by the Governments of South Africa and India to the Secretary-General of U.N.O., who shall, from time to time, make inquiries from them; and Submit a report on the action taken on this resolution by the two Governments to this Assembly at its next session.

In the course of the discussion of this resolution by the Political Committee, the delegations of many countries who had supported India's cause during the 1946 debate⁴ urged that the part of our resolution which invited the Assembly "to express its regret at the refusal by the Government of South Africa to accept the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly dated December 8th, 1946, as a basis of discussion with the Government of India and at its failure to take any other steps for such implementation" was tantamount to a codemnation of South Africa and likely to be regarded as evidence of a desire on the part of India to humiliate the South African Union. Since our purpose was not to humiliate the Union Government or show any spirit of vindictiveness but only to work for a settlement which would safeguard Indian interests, the delegation, with our approval, agreed to accept an amendment, moved by the Mexican delegation, which had the effect of deleting the words which I have just quoted. With this amendment, the resolution was adopted by the Committee by 29 votes against 16. On the 20th November, the same resolution was placed before the Assembly. Thirty-one countries voted for the resolution and 19 against it.⁵ The resolution runs as follows :

The General Assembly, having, considered the reports submitted by the Government of India and the Government of the Union of South Africa pursuant to the aforesaid resolution;

Reaffirms its resolution, dated 8th December 1946;

4. The countries which had supported India were China, Egypt, France, Haiti, Iran, the Philippines, Poland, Syria, Byelorussia, Ukraine and the U.S.S.R.
5. The Indian delegation introduced a resolution in the political committee of the General Assembly on 12 November 1947 proposing a Round Table Conference between South Africa and India on the basis of the Assembly's resolution of 8 December 1946 and inviting the Pakistan Government to take part in it. The resolution was carried on 17 November 1947 by 29 votes to 16 but failed to secure the requisite 2/3rds majority in the General Assembly on 20 November 1947, the voting being 31 for, 19 against, with 6 abstentions. A joint resolution moved by Belgium, Brazil, Cuba, Denmark and Norway proposing direct negotiations between the two countries or, failing that, a reference to the International Court, was rejected by 29 votes to 24 with 3 abstentions. Field-Marshal Smuts stated that the failure of the resolution to secure a 2/3rds majority had nullified the previous year's resolution but expressed his willingness to enter into friendly negotiations.

Requests the two Governments to enter into discussions at a Round Table Conference on the basis of that resolution without any further delay and to invite the Government of Pakistan to take part in such discussions;

Requests that the result of such discussions be reported by the Governments of the Union of South Africa and India to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall, from time to time, make enquiries from them and submit a report on the action taken on this resolution by the two Governments to the Assembly at its next session.

4. The majority in favour of this resolution, though substantial, fell short of the requisite two-thirds figure by three. According to the rules of the Assembly which requires a two-thirds majority for all resolutions on important subjects, this year's resolution is not binding. Its moral importance, however, is in no way diminished by the shortfall of three votes in the requisite two-thirds majority. In any case, we are advised that last year's resolution remains operative. I should like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to all those countries which supported us on this occasion and to pay a tribute to our own delegation for the ability with which they pressed India's case. The outcome of debate on issues such as that of the treatment of Indians in South Africa is to be measured not in terms of arithmetic but the intrinsic merit of the cause and the support of enlightened world opinion for that cause. Judged by these tests, the stand taken by the Government of India at the last session of the Assembly has been fully vindicated. In supporting the cause of Indians in South Africa, we have worked not only for the rights of people of our own race but for the rights of oppressed people throughout the world. That attitude we are determined to maintain with the firm faith that our cause is right and that ultimately right will prevail.

5. The House will not expect me, so soon after the conclusion of the Assembly session, to make any definite announcement as to our future course of action in this matter. Government must have time to study developments and to chart their future course in the light of such developments, particularly in the light of the views of those Indians in South Africa who, in order to uphold the honour of their race, have undergone and still are undergoing heavy sacrifices. All that I can do now is to give the House the assurance that we shall not falter either in our resolve to secure justice for Indians in South Africa or in our desire to achieve this object by methods which are consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

SRI LANKA

1. Discussion with the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka¹

The Prime Minister of India opened the discussion by saying that, so far as India was concerned, if all Indians in Ceylon wished to retain their Indian nationality, they were welcome to do so. However, there were a number of Indians, who had been long resident in Ceylon, had made that country their home and were, therefore, desirous of becoming citizens of Ceylon. India was anxious that they should be given the opportunity of doing so. The Prime Minister further made it clear that it was not contemplated that an Indian who elected for Ceylon citizenship should also retain his Indian nationality. It was to be clearly understood that an Indian admitted to the citizenship of Ceylon would cease to be an Indian national.

Jawaharlal Nehru was anxious to know from the Prime Minister of Ceylon what the attitude of Ceylon was in the matter. On previous occasions, the Prime Minister of India pointed out, Ceylon's approach to the problem seemed to have been "exclusive" in the sense that the aim of the Ceylon Government was to limit the number of Indians who might be admitted to Ceylon citizenship. Pandit Jawaharlal wished to know whether there had been any advance on the position.

Appreciating the Indian viewpoint, D.S. Senanayake pointed out that the position of the two countries had changed since 1941.² Sri Lanka could now determine who should be her citizens and control immigration into the country. He was keen on granting citizenship to all who had made Sri Lanka their home. Application for citizenship should be dealt with by a court of law so that a mere declaration of intention might not be considered a sufficient test without real desire for citizenship.

The Indian side pointed out to Mr. Senanayake that acquisition of Ceylon citizenship as now proposed would involve loss of Indian citizenship. It would be possible for an Indian who elected for Ceylon citizenship to

1. Minutes of the meeting at New Delhi with D. S. Senanayake on 28, 29 and 30 December 1947. The discussions on 29-30 December centred on the determination of qualifications which would enable Indians in Sri Lanka to acquire citizenship and the procedure for admitting qualified persons to citizenship. File No. 69-1/47-O.S., Vol. I, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Discussions on the question of Indians in Sri Lanka had been held at Colombo between 5 and 21 September 1941. A joint report at the end of the discussions defined the agreed terms under six heads: immigration and re-entry, quotas, franchise, registration, status and general provisions.

relapse into Indian citizenship without going through the process of naturalisation applicable to an alien, which would include residence for a prescribed period. Jawaharlal Nehru pointed out the dangers inherent in prescribing formalities involving proceedings in civil courts. In view of the poverty and illiteracy of the persons concerned, such a complicated procedure would deny citizenship in practice to many who possessed the necessary qualifications. He was therefore anxious that the procedure adopted should be simple and inexpensive. He felt that residence for a prescribed period of years, say five years, and a declaration of intention to make Ceylon his home should be enough to admit the applicant to citizenship. If considered necessary, such an application could be supported by an affidavit in support of residence. Pandit Nehru further observed that any period of previous residence that might be prescribed should precede the actual date of the new agreement and not some date in 1941 or 1945, neither of which, because of their associations, would be popular with the Indian public.

D.S. Senanayake felt that qualifications agreed upon in 1941 for grant of franchise should now be adopted for citizenship.³ The period prescribed should be related to the year the agreement was drawn up. The power to grant citizenship rights should be vested in civil courts. He mentioned certain difficulties in the way of Indians conforming to Sri Lanka law e.g. an Indian Hindu with two wives would be guilty of bigamy in Sri Lanka.

Jawaharlal Nehru said that there was no objection to the general qualifications for citizenship being subject to a specific disqualification arising out of a circumstance such as having two wives. They were concerned only with the general principles. He then suggested that it would be of assistance if the Ceylon Prime Minister could set down in writing the qualifications which in his view would be adequate for citizenship.

D.S. Senanayake agreed to this.⁴

Jawaharlal Nehru said that the exact meaning of the clause⁵ was not clear. It was also unusual that, while agreement was being reached at the end of 1947, the qualifying period of residence was to be linked to 1941 and 1945. Omitting for the moment the differentiation between married

3. These qualifications were a declaration that the applicant intended to remain in Sri Lanka indefinitely, proof of means of livelihood, and proof that his wife and minor children ordinarily resided with him. The prescribed period of residence prior to application be fixed at seven years for those married on the date of application and ten years for others, provided that this period had been completed within four years from the date of the agreement.
4. The qualifications were set out in four clauses in a letter to Nehru of 29 December and were discussed on 30 December.
5. Clause (1) read: "A period of continuous residence of seven years of persons who are married and ten years for other persons preceding 31 December 1941, provided that such period of residence shall have been completed prior to 31 December 1945. Absence exceeding one year shall constitute a break of continuous residence."

and unmarried persons, the clause really meant that people with seven years residence on 31-12-1945 would be qualified to become citizens of Ceylon. He did not see the point of a reference to 31st December 1941 in this clause.

D.S. Senanayake explained why mention of 31 December 1941 as the cut-off date was necessary because when discussions were suspended on Indian Government's request in 1941 for the period of war, he had assured his colleagues that the delay in agreement would not be allowed to enlarge the class of persons entitled to citizenship or include fresh immigrants. He added that the prescribed residence of 7 years for married and 10 years for unmarried persons before 31 December 1945 would help omission of a reference to 1941.

Jawaharlal Nehru said that it would appear to be better to relate the period of residence to the present date of agreement rather than to a date in the past. It might be suggested that the qualifying period of residence for an applicant with reference to a date now or in the future should be 9 years for married and 12 years for unmarried persons. This, however, would be a very much longer period than was specified in the naturalisation laws of most countries, which usually prescribe a residence of 5 years. Even if it was considered for certain reasons that this period of 5 years' residence should have been completed by 31st December 1945 it would appear sufficient to prescribe a residence of 7 years before the end of 1947.

Jawaharlal Nehru further observed that he was unable to understand the differentiation proposed in the qualifying periods, between married and unmarried persons. He personally thought that, having fewer contacts in India, an unmarried Indian would take root more easily in Ceylon than a married one, so that the period for unmarried persons should be shorter and not longer than that prescribed for married persons. He agreed that for married persons the test of residence of family with them in Ceylon might be applied, but there was no reason to increase the qualifying period if the applicant for citizenship was unmarried.

D.S. Senanayake observed that in Ceylon it was considered that a married person with his family resident in Ceylon had greater attachment to Ceylon than a bachelor resident there, hence the differentiation in periods of residence.

The Secretary-General, G.S. Bajpai, pointed out that having accepted in other countries less than nine years as the qualifying period for citizenship, acceptance of a longer period in case of Sri Lanka would embarrass India. Jawaharlal Nehru put it to the Prime Minister of Ceylon that the qualifying period of residence should be a continuous residence of seven years prior to the date of agreement for married as well as unmarried persons, it being understood that absence from Ceylon for a period of one year or less at one time would not constitute a break in the continuity of residence.

While expressing his inability to fix the same qualifying period for both



WITH THAKIN NU, 2 DECEMBER 1947



BIDDING GOODBYE TO SHRINIATI VIJAYALAKSHMI,
DEGHI AIRPORT, 26 DECEMBER 1947

married and unmarried persons, D.S. Senanayake agreed to consider fixing the date for the qualifying period in consultation with his colleagues.

Jawaharlal Nehru remarked that this was a very wide phrase.⁶ He could understand it if it were proposed to exclude destitutes from citizenship. It appeared to him that a man who had been in Ceylon for such a long period as 7 years might be reasonably regarded as having a claim to be absorbed. Unfortunately, the capitalist system of economy was based on a reserve of unemployed and, at any given time, there was bound to be a certain number of unemployed. Further, even fully employed workers were today earning a wage which was inadequate for livelihood. He hoped that it was not the intention to exclude from citizenship persons who were temporarily unemployed owing to a depression in some industry or to other causes.

D.S. Senanayake said that he had no intention of excluding the temporarily unemployed, but only the destitutes, beggars and others like dependents of estate labourers who were there due to the presence of their supporters in Sri Lanka.

G.S. Bajpai pointed out that available figures indicated that adult dependent residents were very small compared to the total number of workers.

Jawaharlal Nehru suggested that the phrase "adequate means of livelihood" should be avoided and that, while destitutes and vagrants should be ineligible for citizenship, no person who was employed or temporarily unemployed, but employable, should be precluded from citizenship.

D.S. Senanayake agreed to consider this proposal.

This was agreed to by Jawaharlal Nehru.⁷

Jawaharlal Nehru began by saying that he did not understand the significance of the word "customs" in this context.⁸

D.S. Senanayake explained that it was intended to cover customary laws as distinct from statutory laws.

Jawaharlal Nehru said that he appreciated that every person should be subject to the general law of a country, but the customary law was generally a derogation from the general law and would apply only to persons belonging to a particular group which was subject to such customary law. He could not understand, for example, how an Indian Hindu who became a Ceylon citizen could become subject to a customary law appropriate to a

6. Clause (2) read: "Adequate means of livelihood."

7. The reference is to Clause (3) which read: "If married, the wife and minor unmarried children, if any, should have ordinarily resided with him."

8. Clause (4) read: "The applicant should also be in a position to comply with the laws and customs of the country."

group to which he did not belong. He observed that the customary law of Jaffna Tamils might be different from that of the Singhalese in the matter of inheritance.

D.S. Senanayake said for example a Sri Lankan Hindu who married a second time would under the Sri Lankan law be disqualified for citizenship.

Jawaharlal Nehru observed that his view was that every citizen should be required to comply with the general law of the country applicable to all persons, but it was not reasonable to expect that citizens of Indian origin should be debarred from following their customs and be subjected to customary laws of other groups. However, he was not urging that citizens of Indian origin should be allowed to have more than one wife. In India also law in matters of this kind was being changed by statute. He considered that it should be enough to state that the applicant should comply with the laws of the country on becoming a citizen.

D.S. Senanayake agreed to consider this suggestion in consultation with his colleagues and said applications for citizenship should be dealt with by courts.

Jawaharlal Nehru observed that under the law of most countries, naturalisation was effected by an executive order by officers empowered by law in that behalf and that such order had full legal validity. Qualifications and disqualifications for citizenship were also laid down in such naturalisation laws. In his view, it would be sufficient if Commissioners duly authorised by the Government of Ceylon satisfied themselves regarding the validity of an applicant's claim and granted him naturalisation. The procedure that he envisaged was that the applicant would make an application setting out his qualifications and supported by an affidavit and accompanied by a declaration of intention to make Ceylon his home. Ordinarily such applications supported by an affidavit should be sufficient; they should be accepted and should lead to the grant of naturalisation by the Commissioner. If necessary, the actual order may be signed by a court to whom the Commissioner may submit his recommendations. It may, in some cases, be necessary for the Commissioner to verify the period of residence etc. stated by the applicant; for this purpose the Commissioner could cause necessary enquiries to be made, for instance, by visiting the estate of the labourer and examining the various registers. If the Commissioner considered that, even after such verification, he was not in a position to grant the application, he should refer the matter himself to a civil court which would ask the applicant to satisfy it on the points on which satisfaction was necessary. What he was anxious to ensure was that the procedure should be simple. If the approach to the present discussions was an inclusive one, there should be no difficulty in accepting this procedure. Considering the nature of the persons involved, any detailed and complicated procedure before a court would exclude, in practice, many with the necessary qualifications from citizenship.

D.S. Senanayake expressed his anxiety to have a simple procedure and said he would have the proposed procedure examined to see if it was feasible.

D.S. Senanayake felt that legislation would be necessary to prevent the retention of dual citizenship.

Jawaharlal Nehru said that presumably some steps would be taken, in Ceylon, such as notification in the gazette of those admitted to citizenship, copies of which could be communicated to the Government of India or their High Commissioner. What further steps should be taken in India to prevent continuation of Indian citizenship of those admitted to Ceylon citizenship would be examined by law officers.

INDONESIA

1. Offer of Mediation by the United States¹

The reported statement by President Sockarno to the American Consul-General appears to me to represent more the latter's views than Sockarno's.² It is an odd statement to make. The whole telegram makes one suspicious. I hesitate to give any firm advice to the Indonesian Government and thus make ourselves responsible for the consequences of accepting it. In this matter the U.S.A. have not played quite fair. They have been rather partial to the Dutch.

It would be worthwhile to have a talk with Sudarsano³ and point out the various possibilities.

1. Note, 19 August 1947. File No. 114-F.E.A./47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. The American Consul-General at Batavia reported that Soekarno was agreeable to the offer of mediation by the United States but the Republican Cabinet feared that the offer might be "too honest."
3. Sudarsano came to India as an envoy of the Indonesian Republic. He was later adviser to the Foreign Ministry of the Republic.

2. Proposal for Mediation by the United States¹

I agree that we might suggest to Dr. Shahrir to take advantage of the U.S. proposal.² Even if that proposal has been scotched the Indonesian approval will be helpful in the long run. Of course the final decision must lie with the Indonesians—we can only advise on the limited facts before us.

1. Note, 25 August 1947. File No. 114-F.E.A./47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. The U.S. proposed that the Security Council tender "its good offices to the parties" in settling the issue through a committee consisting of three members of the Council. Indonesia, however, rejected this proposal.

3. Cable to A. Soekarno¹

I am most grateful for your message of congratulations and greetings on behalf of the people of Indonesia. The Government and people of India have watched with sympathy the efforts of the Indonesian people to achieve their own freedom and, consistently with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, have given what assistance they could to help Indonesia assume her rightful place in the community of free nations. On the continuance of this support Indonesia can confidently rely. As for ourselves, we face many problems, full of difficulty and of anxiety. We shall apply ourselves to their solution with energy and faith. Disappointments will not daunt us. The courage and fortitude which brought our peaceful struggle for national freedom to a successful end will sustain us in our social and economic ventures and crown our effort with success. On behalf of the Government and people of India, I send you and the Indonesian people our sincere good wishes.

1. New Delhi, 27 September 1947. File No. 207(III)PS/47 (Special Section), PMS.

4. To N. Raghavan¹

8 October 1947

My dear Raghavan,²

I enclose three letters addressed respectively to President Soekarno, Vice-President Hatta, and Prime Minister Amir Sharifoeddin. You will kindly deliver them personally or, if this is not possible, send them to the addressees with my greetings.

2. You should first stay for a while in Batavia and fix up your office there. At the same time you should try to get in touch with the Indonesian authorities. Somewhat later you should try to visit Jogjakarta to meet the Indonesian leaders personally and explain to them how you propose to function. You have to tell them that in view of possible international complications we have decided to have a consulate-general in Batavia and not in Jogjakarta. But we propose to have a consulate in Jogjakarta which will function under the consulate-general. Any other course would have simply meant the denial of facilities for our representatives to go to Indonesia or to function there in any way. Whatever our personal desires might be, a government has to function within certain limitations imposed by international law. In effect, however, the whole purpose of sending our representatives is to develop close contacts with the Indonesian Republic and people.

3. You will yourself act in a manner so as not to create any complications between our Government and the Dutch. You will request the Indonesian Republic to appreciate this position as otherwise your usefulness will be considerably limited.

4. Any important messages that the Indonesian leaders may desire to send me can be sent through you—telegrams through cypher and letters presumably through the bag. You will send us frequent reports. As letters may take some time to reach us, fairly brief telegraphic reports should be sent regularly.

5. I think you should take an early opportunity to establish a consulate at Jogjakarta. I should like Yunus³ to work with you for some time. But it would be desirable to give him a definite status and position in the organisation. He may, a little later, be appointed Consul at Jogjakarta. That is

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. India's Consul-General in Indonesia at this time.

3. Mohammad Yunus.

for you to judge. It is undesirable for either you or Yunus to use my name unnecessarily. You are the representative of the Government of India, and not anyone's personal representative.

6. You will, of course, get into touch with the Indians in Indonesia and try to help them in every way without regard to the fact that they are citizens of India or of Pakistan. You should, of course, make it clear that you represent the Government of India only, and not Pakistan. But your services should be free to everyone from India.

7. You are leaving India at a time when we have to face great stresses and strains. Probably our present difficulties will not resolve themselves for a considerable time. What is happening in India is something very big in its own way with a mixture of good and evil. For the moment the evil seems to predominate, and because of this, these days and weeks and months have been full of distress and horror for us. Yet one has to keep some sense of perspective and some sanity of outlook. You will have to interpret conditions in India to others abroad in true perspective and make it clear to them that we stand for a democratic secular state in which all citizens, whatever their religion, will have equal rights. All that has happened recently has in no way changed our ideals or our objectives. It has greatly added to our difficulties.

8. I am sure that you and Yunus and, of course, Mrs. Raghavan, will uphold the honour, dignity and interests of India wherever you might go.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To A. Soekarno¹

8 October 1947

My dear President,

I am happy that at last the representatives of our Government are going to Indonesia. Raghavan is going as Consul-General and with him my good friend, Mohammad Yunus Khan, is also going. We have taken considerable care to choose our representatives and I hope they will be able to do their duty there efficiently and in the fullest cooperation with you.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. We have had some difficulty in getting the agreement of the Dutch Government to the appointment of our Consul-General. In view of the circumstances prevailing, we could not function exactly as we would have liked to do. We did not wish to delay matters by raising technical questions with the Dutch Government. We have, therefore, appointed Raghavan as Consul-General at Batavia. We have instructed him, however, to take the earliest opportunity to get in touch with your Government and open a consulate at Jogjakarta. I do not know what the communications are like between Batavia and Jogjakarta, and there may be some difficulties in immediate contacts being established.

3. It is not necessary for me to assure you that the main purpose of our sending Raghavan and Mohammad Yunus Khan is to maintain full contacts with you and to have continuous information about developments in Indonesia. They have been instructed to consult you and your Government and to work in cooperation with you. In view of the international situation² in regard to the Indonesian Republic, we feel that they will be of greater use by establishing a consulate-general in Batavia and keeping in touch with us from there. They will naturally have to conform to international practice and diplomatic usage.

4. Raghavan is an able lawyer who practised for long at Penang in Malaya and who was connected intimately with the Indian independence movement. I am sure that in his capacity as Consul-General he will be of service to India and Indonesia and bring them closer together. I am glad that Mrs. Raghavan is accompanying him. She will carry a message of good cheer and friendship from the women of India to the brave women of Indonesia.

5. Mohammad Yunus Khan comes from the North West Frontier Province of India. He has been closely associated with the great leader of that province, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. He is a dear friend and colleague of mine and I am sure that he will make good in Indonesia and that you will like him. I hope that later his wife may join him in Indonesia.

6. Both our countries are passing through difficult times. You have had to face a severe crisis and war during the past few months and the burdens you carry are heavy indeed. We in India have not had any external aggression, but have had to face a severe internal crisis and we are not out of the

2. The Dutch offensive of July 1947 against the Republican territory cutting it off from ports and sources of food supply was strongly condemned by several countries. In the Security Council, Australia, Colombia, Poland and the U.S.S.R. lent support to the Republic, Belgium and France were openly hostile while Britain and the United States were ambivalent.

wood yet. Perhaps all these troubles and difficulties which you and we have to face are inevitable accompaniments of the birth of freedom in our countries. We have to face them with courage and determination, keeping the ideals we have held and not allowing them to be tarnished. I have no doubt that both India and Indonesia will pull through and make good. Even when difficulties encompass us in our respective countries, it is heartening that we should look to each other and try to think in terms of cooperation and the larger good of Asia.

7. Our Consul-General carries with him the greetings of the Indian people and our Government to your Government and people. Perhaps some day in the future I might have the privilege of visiting your beautiful country. I shall look forward to that day.

With all good wishes to you and *Merdeka*,

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

6. To Mohammad Hatta¹

8 October 1947

My dear Hatta,

This letter is being taken by Raghavan, who has been appointed by our Government as their Consul-General in Batavia. With him is going Mohammad Yunus Khan as well as a small staff.

2. We have followed the happenings in Indonesia² with close attention during the last few months and have endeavoured to help in the cause of Indonesian freedom. We have appreciated your great difficulties. We ourselves have had to face a grave crisis in this country and our difficulties are not over.

3. It is a matter of deep satisfaction to me that at a time when both our countries have to face crisis and difficulty, our contacts should grow closer. You will understand that the chief purpose of our sending our representatives to Indonesia is to develop closer contacts with you. We have chosen our representatives with care and I am sure that they will carry out the pur-

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

pose of their mission. They are both tried men and friends and colleagues of mine. You can trust them. Should you desire to send any message to us, you can entrust it to them.

With all good wishes, *Merdeka*.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

7. To Amir Sharifoeddin¹

8 October 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

Our Consul-General, who is going out to Indonesia, will carry this letter and our greetings to you and your people. I am happy that at last we have been able to send our representatives to Indonesia and I hope this will lead to ever closer relations between us, to our mutual advantage.

2. Raghavan, who is our Consul-General, is an old and tried worker in the cause of Indian independence. He practised as a lawyer in Malaya for many years. I am sure that he will carry out his new duties in Indonesia efficiently and with success.

3. Mohammad Yunus Khan, who is going with Raghavan, is young but old in the service of his country. He comes from the North West Frontier Province of India and is a dear friend of mine. I commend both of them to you and your Government.

4. In view of the peculiar situation existing today, we have decided to have our Consulate-General at Batavia and to open a Consulate in Jogjakarta. We have to observe international etiquette and to follow diplomatic practice. We did not wish technicalities to come in the way of our representation in Indonesia. But the main purpose of sending our representatives is to keep in close touch with you and your Government.

5. I received your letter of August 28th some time ago and I was happy to have news from you.² Sudarsano has been here and we meet from time to time and he keeps me in touch with developments in Indonesia.

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

2. Requesting further medical aid, Sharifoeddin thanked Nehru for India's help and support to Indonesia. He thought it futile to seek U.N. help in solving the Indonesian crisis.

6. You have asked me in your letter to despatch to you materials which you need. I fear that in the position we are in today we are unable to send many of the things that you require. We are ourselves passing through a grave crisis. Apart from this we have to observe certain rules of international law. But whatever we can do for you, we shall gladly do.

7. Our Consul-General or Consul will gladly convey to us any message that you might like to send.

With all good wishes to you, *Merdeka*.

Yours very sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

8. Cable to N. Raghavan¹

Your telegram No. 70 dated 6th December.² I do not think that it would be proper for me to send a formal message of good wishes to both delegations or to Committee. You might, however, at your dinner party read out following on my behalf.

I am happy that representatives of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic will be meeting tonight as your guests at dinner. India's sympathy for Indonesian freedom is well known. As a lover of peace, India earnestly desires that the differences which, unhappily, have arisen between the Governments of the Netherlands and of the Republic of Indonesia, and which have led to armed conflict between the two, should be settled without further bloodshed as quickly as possible. In India, the transfer of power from British to Indian hands has been achieved without strife by the exercise of understanding and a spirit of give and take. I would appeal to our Indonesian and to our Dutch friends to work for similar consummation in a similar spirit. India will watch the negotiations now in progress under the auspices of a sub-committee of the United Nations with interest and hope.

2. It is regretted that Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru is too ill to move, and Sir B. N. Rau, who is now engaged in the final stages of the framing of our own

1. New Delhi, 11 December 1947. File No. 114-FEA/47, Vol. II, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

2. Raghavan requested Nehru to send a message of good wishes to the delegations of Indonesia and the Netherlands before they met on 8 December 1947.

constitution, cannot be spared.³ We cannot think of any other constitutional expert of comparable quality who could be made available from India.

3. Raghavan had conveyed an Indonesian request for the assistance of T.B. Sapru, B.N. Rau or any other constitutional expert in their negotiations with the Dutch.

BURMA

1. Cable to Thakin Nu¹

New Delhi
22 September 1947

I am grateful to you for your letter which Sir B. N. Rau has handed to me. I thank you for your invitation to me to visit Burma. I can assure you that I would gladly avail myself of this invitation as soon as I am free to do so from pressing work here. My Government and I are anxious and eager to develop closest relations with the Burmese Government and people and I entirely reciprocate your sentiments that we should remove all misunderstandings that exist between India and Burma.

2. I understand that you will be visiting England in the near future. I hope you will be able to break journey in Delhi on your way to England. You will be very welcome here. All good wishes to you and to Burma.

Yours sincerely
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. New Delhi, 22 September 1947. File No. 27-2/47-O.S.; M.E.A. & C.R.; N.A.I.

2. The Independence of Burma¹

The independence of Burma is an event of significance to the whole of Asia, and to India particularly. I should like to express on behalf of the Government and the people of India our deep satisfaction at this consummation

1. Message written on 5 December 1947 for *Burma Independence Souvenir* published by the Government of India on the occasion of Burma becoming independent on 4 January 1948.

of Burma's struggle for freedom. India and Burma have been so closely associated in the past that anything that happens in either country affects the other. In the future I have no doubt that our association will be ever closer. Not only our common sentiments demand it, but the whole trend of events in the world and in Asia point towards this closer association. A time will no doubt come before very long when we may develop, in common with other nearby countries, machinery for this close cooperation.

We have just had a distinguished visitor in Delhi, Thakin Nu, the Prime Minister of Burma. We welcome this visit, both on personal and national grounds, and he will take back with him the good wishes of the people of India for the well-being and progress of Burma as an independent nation in close friendship with India.

3. Cable to Thakin Nu¹

Our difficulties in the matter of food which have given us anxiety enough during the last few years have been accentuated this year by the troubles which have broken out in the Punjab. After 18 months of most careful husbanding of resources we are now in danger of running out of foodgrains before we get assistance from our next crop. An official approach has been made to your Government by our High Commissioner.² To that I would add my personal appeal. Whatever additional quantities of rice Burma can find for us in the coming two months will be of the greatest value and I would be most grateful for whatever you can do to assist us.

1. Undated, but written about this time. File No. 31(2)/47, PMS.

2. M.A. Rauf.

PALESTINE

1. Cable to Abdur Rahman¹

Your telegram No. 13 of August 20th Palestine. There is much to be said

1. New Delhi, 23 August 1947. File No. 2(71)-U.N.O.-I/47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.

in principle in favour of a unitary Palestinian state.² Such a solution, however, does not appear practicable to us in relation to existing facts and in Palestine as in India and elsewhere we shall have to adopt a middle course between what may be theoretically just and what is factually practicable. We are in favour of a federal solution of the Palestinian problem which while securing substantial autonomy to constituent provinces both Jewish and Arab will leave centre with effective authority to control and regulate essential common services. Our view therefore is that you should recommend solution on these lines and should not pursue the idea proposing a democratic unitary Palestinian state as an alternative.

2. As regards Jewish immigration we are in agreement with you on principle but would leave the question of machinery of supervision to be worked out by you in your discretion.³

2. Abdur Rahman had opposed the partition of Palestine, favoured the establishment of a democratic unitary state with safeguards for the Jews, or alternatively, a federal structure with substantial provincial autonomy. Arab opinion desired a unitary state wherein all minorities would enjoy equality of status with the majority and complete religious freedom.
3. Abdur Rahman was willing to consider it on personal and religious grounds but opposed immigration on political grounds.

2. Cable to Mustafa Alumar¹

I have received your telegram of 6th instant.² Indian delegation³ to United Nations Assembly has been instructed to deal with Palestine problem in spirit of sympathy with legitimate Arab aspirations which has always characterised the attitude of the Government and people of India.

1. 16 September 1947. File No. 17(8)-U.N.O.-I/47, M.E.A., N.A.I. Mustafa Alumar was Vice-President of the Iraqi Senate.
2. He had conveyed the opposition of the Arabs to the proposed creation of a Jewish state in Arab Palestine and requested Indian support in fulfilling Arab hopes of an independent Arab state.
3. The Indian delegation in 1947 to the U.N. consisted of Vijayalakshmi Pandit (leader), Maharaj Singh, Fazl Ali, M.C. Setalvad and K.M. Pannikar.

3. Cable to Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

You should vote against partition.² This refers to your telegram³ of 27th regarding Palestine.

1. New Delhi, 28 November 1947. File No. 2(53)-U.N.O.-I/47 (Secret), M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. The U.N. Special Committee on Palestine submitted its report on 31 August 1947. The majority recommendation provided for the partition of Palestine into independent Arab and Jewish states, with an independent city of Jerusalem under international control. The minority proposals, submitted by India, Iran and Yugoslavia, provided for an independent federal state comprising Arab and Jewish states with full internal autonomy. The General Assembly voted for the partition on 29 November 1947 by 33 votes to 13.
3. Vijayalakshmi Pandit had cautioned that India's abstention from voting on the question would, besides ensuring success of the partition plan, cost her Arab support.

OTHER COUNTRIES

1. To Vijayalakshmi Pandit¹

New Delhi
26 August 1947

Dear Nan,

Two days ago I received your letter from Moscow in which you described the ceremony of presenting credentials. Chandralekha also sent me a letter giving her impressions. Both were very interesting reading. The U.S.S.R., and Moscow especially, continue to be unique and your personal impressions are, therefore, of great value to us.

2. Dr. Ghoshal is suffering under a grave misapprehension.² A telegram will be sent to you soon clearing up his position. First of all it must be clearly understood that his wife is not going to Russia now or later. This was made perfectly clear to him. Subject to developments we intended

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Vijayalakshmi had written that Dr. Hiranmoy Ghoshal had refused to work as an interpreter as he thought this was not part of his duties and preferred to undertake research for which he wished to purchase books and journals. He also wished his wife to join him in Moscow.

keeping him there for about six months and then perhaps to send Mujeeb³ who also knows Russian. He was to function as official interpreter as well as cultural attache. Apparently to please his vanity he was given the status of First Secretary. So long as he is there he will function as official interpreter, as well as do some cultural work. There is no reason why he should have a graduate secretary. He may have some leisure to study, but he must not do this at the cost of his official work. If he is not prepared to function as we want him to function, then he will have to return and seek some other job.

3. Research is rather a high-sounding word. What one expects from Ghoshal is to study cultural trends in Russia, especially literary developments. He may buy a few books, but we cannot provide a library for him. If he wants to consult books he should go to the existing libraries there.

4. My mind is just too full of the horrors that are being enacted in the Punjab to think of any other matter at present. We are seeing the first fruits of Pakistan with a vengeance.

Yours,
Jawahar

3. Mohammad Mujeeb (b. 1902-1985); educationist; Vice-Chancellor, Jamia Millia University, 1948-73; author of many books including *The Indian Muslims, Our Heritage, World History and Dr. Zakir Husain: A Biography*.

2. To Vallabhbhai Patel¹

New Delhi
27 September 1947

My dear Vallabhbhai,

I enclose a letter from the India League, America, forwarding a letter from the World Jewish Congress.² You will remember that this matter was raised many months ago and you agreed to give six months' more grace to the Jewish refugees from Afghanistan. We made it clear then that extensions of this grace period would not be considered. We are thus on strong grounds. The only point to be considered is whether in the midst

1. File No. 2(5)-IA/47, M.E.A., N.A.I.

2. The World Jewish Congress desired that Jewish refugees who had fled from Afghanistan be allowed to stay in India till they secured permits to enter Palestine.

of our present troubles when world opinion is looking with very unfavourable eyes towards us, we should not do anything which might add to ill will towards India. World Jewry is a very powerful group, and more especially in the U.S.A.

If you think it possible and desirable in all the circumstances to allow this matter to rest till our present internal crisis is over, it might be worthwhile doing so, but it is entirely for you to decide.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal

3. Message to E. de Valera¹

I greatly appreciate the friendly tone and the contents of your reply to Mr. Sean Macbride's² question regarding the manner in which our delegation voted on the question of the admission of new members to the United Nations during the session of the General Assembly which has just ended.³ India has the warmest feeling of friendship for you and the Irish Free State, and I sincerely hope that the relations of amity which exist between our two countries will be steadily strengthened.

May I take this opportunity of thanking you for your great kindness to our Constitutional Adviser, Sir B.N. Rau, who greatly enjoyed his visit to Eire and is most grateful for all the help and hospitality that he received?

1. New Delhi, 17 December 1947. This was sent through V.K. Krishna Menon. File No. 2(18)-U.N.O.-1/47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. (b. 1904); lawyer and politician; Minister for External Affairs, 1948-51; President, United Nations Commission for Zambia, 1973-77; awarded Nobel Peace Prize, 1974. President, International Commission for the study of communication problems, 1977.
3. de Valera had stated that India had voted against Ireland's admission to U.N. because some clauses in the resolution were "contrary to U.N. rules of procedure."

4. India and the United States¹

On the occasion of your tenth anniversary, I send you all a message of greetings and good wishes. Free India now faces tasks different but no less difficult than those which confronted her before attainment of independence last August. Principal among these are rehabilitation of millions of refugees, consolidation of administration and active pursuit of economic reconstruction at home and, in international field, unfailing endeavour, in concert with all like-minded nations, for establishment of enduring peace. The Government and people of India look forward to continued friendly cooperation with the Government and people of United States during the year which has just begun. In Ambassador Grady, we have a statesman of wide experience who is eminently qualified to understand us and to interpret America to India. I wish your annual gathering, with him as your guest of honour, every success.

1. Message to J.J. Singh, President of the India League of America, New York, 26 December 1947. File No. 9(25)/47-PMS.

FOREIGN POSSESSIONS IN INDIA

1. No Tolerance of French Rule in India¹

Pandit Nehru expressed his complete sympathy with the movement that was going on in different parts of French India. Questioned whether he had agreed to the French Government staying on in India for the purpose of establishment of cultural relations between France and India, he explained that he had only expressed his desire to have cultural relations with France, but would never tolerate political domination of the French over any section of the people in India.

1. Interview with K.V. Subbiah at New Delhi. From *The Leader*, 21 August 1947. K.V. Subbiah (b. 1911); member, Congress Party, Pondicherry, 1930-42; launched the Communist Party of French India in September 1942; member, Communist Party of India, from 1942; member, French Parliament, Pondicherry, 1946-48; Secretary, Communist Party, Tamil Nadu, 1952-54; Minister for Agriculture Pondicherry, 1969-73.

2. To M. Bidault¹

30 September 1947-

Mr. Minister,

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated 12th August 1947, which was received by me on the 22nd of this month.²

The Government of India welcome and accept the decision of the Government of the French Republic regarding the renunciation of the historic rights which France has exercised in the areas known as the French Loges³ in India, in favour of the Dominion of India. Owing to the late receipt of your letter, it was not possible for the ceremony of the transfer to be held on the date you proposed. I am, however, arranging with your Embassy here for a convenient date in the immediate future.

May I take this opportunity of expressing on behalf of the Government of India my sincere appreciation of this friendly gesture which will help to strengthen the cordial relations existing between the Governments of the French Republic and India?

I avail myself of this opportunity to convey to you, Mr. Minister, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 26(46)-X/47, M.E.A. & C.R., N.A.I.
2. Bidault had expressed his Government's desire to renounce its rights over the French loges in India by 1 September 1947.
3. Loges were French commercial settlements surrounded by Indian territory. These were formally ceded to the Indian Union on 6 October 1947.

3. To Rashid Ali Baig¹

New Delhi
10th December 1947

My dear Rashid,

I am sorry to say that owing to many preoccupations I have been unable to keep abreast of your reports.² I sent for them however when complaints

1. File No. 26(26)-X/47, corr. M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. The reports related to the deterioration in relations between Baig and the Aurobindo Ashram. Baig had adopted a stiff attitude towards the Ashramites following reports of some anti-Indian activities.

reached me that you were running down the Aurobindo Ashram. I have now gone through these reports and found them as usual very interesting reading.

2. I am not enamoured of the Ashram or of the mystery that surrounds it. But I think it would be a safe policy for you to adopt not to get entangled in its affairs or in any conflicts with it. Nor would I like you to function publicly or otherwise against the Ashram. I know that there is feeling against the Ashram in Pondicherry and I have no doubt that there is justification for it. But if you are involved in this matter, it does no particular good and it might harm us a little in other parts of India. I should like you of course to continue to send us full reports about the Ashram and other activities in Pondicherry.

I see that in one of your latest letters dated 26th November³ you have asked for a ruling and it is this : We cannot enforce any rule of etiquette on non-officials. Therefore, we cannot ask any Indian, distinguished or not, who visits Pondicherry to call on the Consul-General or to seek the Consul-General's help in interviewing the Governor or ministers. Naturally it is desirable for Indians going to Pondicherry to call on the Consul-General and for him to help them in every way.

4. Apart from this general ruling it is to be remembered that the Ashram and its votaries cannot be judged by normal standards. You have compared them to the Vatican City. Many of these votaries have been regularly going to Pondicherry and in the course of their visit they have often called on the Governor. It must be a little difficult for them to get out of this habit and to realise that an Indian Consul-General is installed there. Previously, of course, there was a European and nobody wanted to call upon him.

5. There is no question of our drawing Mr. Surendra Mohan Ghosh's⁴ attention to these so-called lapses. Indeed they can hardly be called lapses. But if and when I meet Mr. Ghosh I shall suggest to him that when he goes to Pondicherry next to pay his respects to the deities there, he might see you also.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

3. Baig objected to Ghosh's meeting the Governor and the Ministers in Pondicherry without his knowledge.

4. (1893-1976); prominent Congressman from West Bengal; member, Constituent Assembly, 1946-47, Provisional Parliament, 1950-52, Lok Sabha, 1952-56, Rajya Sabha, 1956-68; deputy leader, Congress Parliamentary Party, 1962-67.

4. To Rashid Ali Baig¹

New Delhi
25th December 1947

My dear Rashid,

I have your letter of the 16th December.²

I think we realise sufficiently the difficulties of your position both in Goa and Pondicherry. In Goa the work you did was appreciated by us and that was the reason why we asked you to take charge of Pondicherry also.

The information you are sending from Pondicherry is very helpful in understanding the situation there. I am not concerned with people's criticism of your work very much so long as that work does bear fruit but you are in a diplomatic position and diplomats have to act in a certain manner and as far as possible not get entangled in local disputes. It is for them to report everything fully; they cannot be in possession of all the facts which govern foreign policy.

Take Pondicherry for instance. This is not merely a local matter but involves the relations of India with France. These relations, apart from Pondicherry, have been good and we have received help from France in the United Nations. France is technically still a great power and has prestige to keep up. We cannot deal with it casually. A new Ambassador has come from France.³ He has been chosen specially to please India. He is the son of Professor Sylvain Levi,⁴ the famous Indologist.

I have no doubt that these questions of the French and Portuguese possessions in India will be solved in accordance with our wishes sooner or later. If we had been free from our other troubles, we could have taken them up immediately, but in the world context today we cannot afford to fight on all fronts and we do not want to pick up a quarrel with France on this particular issue at the moment. Our representatives must realise this as well as many other factors which go to govern our general policy.

So while your own reactions may be perfectly justified, they have to be controlled and governed because of these other factors. Your interest in your work and your exuberance are admirable qualities but sometimes exuberance might cross the diplomatic frontier and create new problems for us. Of course, you have my confidence.

1. File No. 26(26)-X/47, corr., M.E.A., N.A.I.

2. Baig complained of the Ashram's increasing hostility towards him making his position as Consul-General untenable. He referred to his refusal, as India's representative, to accept an invitation for a public audience with Sri Aurobindo when the French representatives had been given a private audience.

3. Daniel Levi, Ambassador to India, 1947-51; to Czechoslovakia, 1952-53, and to Japan, 1953-56; died in 1967.

4. (1863-1935); author of *Le Theatre Indien* (1890) and *Buddacarita* (1893).

To the French we have always said that while politically it is inevitable that Pondicherry should form part of the Indian Union, we have no objection whatever to Pondicherry continuing to be a seat of French culture, university, etc.⁵ How all this can be adjusted is another matter but there is no point in telling them that we object to their university or to the French culture having a place in India. Indeed we do not object if this can be done in conformity with a political settlement.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. Baig had written that the Governor of Pondicherry wished to make Pondicherry a seat of French culture.

MISCELLANEOUS

I. Personal

1. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
27th August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

Nearly two weeks ago I received your letter of the 14th August; also your photograph which you were good enough to send and the special folder for the Cabinet. Normally I do not delay in answering letters; but somehow I have almost unconsciously refrained from answering your letter. It is true that there was no special urgency about it and it is also true that we have all been fairly well occupied during this period. But this was not the reason for the delay.

2. I hesitated and postponed because I didn't quite know what to write to you, and your suggestion that I should send you a photograph of mine also came in the way. I am photographed frequently enough by pressmen and others; but as a matter of fact I have not had what might be called a regular photograph taken for many years. I didn't know what to send you. I am now sending you a very recent photograph taken by somebody in Mussoorie two or three months ago.

3. Need I say that I greatly appreciated your letter and your gift of your photograph and the special folder for Cabinet? We have all passed through difficult times and I fear our difficulties still encompass us. I have no doubt whatever that the history of India would have been different if you had not come here. If I may add a personal note, it has been a privilege to get to know you and Edwina more during these past months. I have appreciated greatly your friendship and this has helped me tremendously. What the future will bring, I do not know. The future is seldom in line with one's hopes and it is always playing some trick or other as it turns into the present. But in any event our association has been of great value to me and I feel sure it has had a wider significance. I am grateful to you and Edwina for this.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. To Krishna Hutheesing¹

New Delhi
13 September 1947

My dear Betty,

This is just a line to thank you and Raja for your telegram. It was hardly necessary, for I know that you must have been thinking of me just as I think of you. We have had a difficult time in Delhi and in the Punjab, and the future is not going to be an easy one. Anyhow, I hope that we have turned the corner.

With love,

Yours affectionately,
Jawahar

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

3. To Tej Bahadur Sapru¹

New Delhi
24 September 1947

My dear Tej Bahadurji,

Thank you for your letter of the 19th September.² It is always a pleasure to hear from you. I am glad that you are a little better now and I must say that I am also glad that you have switched on to allopathic treatment.

We are taking steps to prepare a documented narrative of the situation as suggested by you.

It is very good of you to write as you have done. It heartens me greatly to have your good wishes and goodwill.

Please do not believe all the rumours that you hear. The situation is serious enough but rumour makes it much worse.

Yours affectionately,
Jawaharlal

1. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.
2. Sapru had suggested that the Government of India should prepare a documented narrative of the situation in the Punjab and Bengal to refute the allegations of Zafrullah Khan at the U.N. He also wrote of a rumour of a gun-powder plot by some Muslim Leaguers in Delhi.

4. To Krishna Hutheesing¹

New Delhi

1-11-47

Betty darling,

I have your letter. Raja, I hope, will be coming here in a couple of days and I shall speak to him.

It is a little difficult for me to explain to you the situation here and the difficulties we have to face all round. It has been impossible in these circumstances to do many of the things which we wanted to do. All planning has been postponed.

We live here from crisis to crisis and almost all normal work is suspended.

Tomorrow is your birthday. All my love and good wishes to you.

Love.

Your loving brother,
Jawahar

1. *Nehru's Letters to His Sister* (London, 1963), p 187.

5. To Baldev Singh¹

New Delhi

November 1, 1947

My dear Baldev Singh,

You must have received a letter dated 29th October from C.J. Stracey, Joint General Secretary of the I.N.A. Enquiry and Relief Committee. He mentions therein that many important documents of the I.N.A., diaries, photographs and other papers are at present lying in the Historical Section of former General Headquarters, India. They are apparently under the control of the Supreme Commander.

I think it is important that all these documents should be carefully preserved. They would help us to understand exactly what happened. I suggest that you might write to the Supreme Commander and ask him to transfer all these documents and papers to Army Headquarters, India, where they can be safely kept and referred to.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 35/GG/47, p. 8, President's Secretariat.

6. To Tara Chand¹

New Delhi
2 December 1947

My dear Tara Chand,

I have your letter of November 26th. I am glad you have decided to confer the degree of Doctor of Laws on Vijayalakshmi Pandit. She has done remarkably well in many difficult works and negotiations abroad and she deserves honour and recognition for this. Unfortunately it is a little difficult to make public all that she has done but this has been of a very high standard and she has served the cause of India with great distinction. She is due back here on the 5th or 6th and I shall give your letter to her. I shall try to bring her with me on the 13th morning.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. File No. 8(18)/PS-47, Sr. No. 11-A-PMS.

7. To Hare Krushna Mahtab¹

New Delhi
4 December 1947

My dear Prime Minister,

Enquiries have come to me again about the employment of ex-I.N.A. personnel in the police and other services in the provinces. I have been surprised to receive them as the Government of India's policy has been repeatedly declared in regard to this matter. There is absolutely no ban on the employment of I.N.A. men in our services, except for the fact that they are not being reinstated in the Army because of certain difficulties. Some time back I mentioned this matter in one of my letters to the Prime Ministers of provinces. I am again repeating this to make it perfectly clear. In particular I.N.A. men should be considered suitable for the police service, for the Home Guards and the like. They should be good as trainers and instructors also for the Home Guards. Of course the people who are taken in will have to undergo some process of selection.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. H.K. Mahtab Papers, N.M.M.L.

8. To Agatha Harrison¹

New Delhi
12 December 1947

My dear Agatha,

Indira is not here. But I happened to see your letter addressed to her. It was good to hear from you after many months.

I am hastening to write to you because you have asked about some person who is apparently writing a book about me. I want to tell you that I have nothing to do with this man or his book. In fact I do not remember having ever heard of him. All manner of people are trying to exploit me in this way and I have no means of stopping them. I would advise you not to have anything to do with the book.

I am going to Allahabad tomorrow morning after many months and I shall see Indira there. My visit will be very brief and very full. I am afraid I have had no peace whatever for an age and I think rather longingly sometimes of the quiet days I had in prison.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

MISCELLANEOUS

II. General

1. Greetings to Diplomatic Representatives Abroad¹

On this day of India's achievement of freedom I send you greetings and through you to our compatriots abroad. Freedom brings responsibility and burdens, but we face the future with strength and confidence and faith in India's destiny in the full hope that every Indian, whatever his station or field of effort, or wherever he may be, will give his best to the service of India. *Jai Hind*.

1. *The Times of India*, 15 August 1947.

2. To the Archbishop of Canterbury¹

I am deeply grateful to you for your greetings and good wishes on the occasion of India achieving freedom. We hope that this freedom will be utilised for the furtherance of peace, brotherhood and prosperity and for closer cooperation with the other nations of the world.

1. *The Times of India*, 15 August 1947.

3. The Work of the India League¹

Many thanks for your greetings and good wishes. The India League has done yeoman's service in the cause of India's freedom. Our task now is to work for the emancipation of those peoples who have not yet attained full liberty. In this work the India League can play an active and fruitful part.

1. Cable to India League, London, 19 August 1947. V.K. Krishna Menon Papers, N.M.M.L.

4. To J.C. Smuts¹

On behalf of the people of India and my colleagues in the Government I wish to thank you warmly for your message of congratulations and good wishes. The attainment by India of sovereign status is only one though memorable landmark along the high road of her future history. In the onward march of mankind towards enduring peace and rising prosperity, we shall be staunch and steadfast companions of all peoples that are determined to march towards that goal.

1. *The Statesman*, 21 August 1947.

5. To Lord Mountbatten¹

New Delhi
28th August 1947

Dear Lord Mountbatten,

I have your letter of the 28th August about awards being made for gallantry in the Police Service and the Fire Services.² I entirely agree with you that these awards should be made.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.
2. In his letter of 28 August 1947 Mountbatten said that although the award of the King's Police and Fire Services Medal and the Indian Police Medal had become "technically impossible" because of the transfer of power he wanted them to be bestowed as he had received a number of recommendations.

6. Grant of King's Medals¹

The Prime Minister stated that he had received a letter from the Governor General regarding the stoppage of all titles and decorations. He had received certain recommendations for the grant of King's Police Medal, Fire Services Medal and Indian Police Medal, before the 15th August 1947, but he was unfortunately unable to deal with them immediately, and now he could not accept the recommendation unless the Dominion Government were agreeable to a slight modification of their general decision. It was, in his view, desirable and in the interests of the Dominion to continue the grant of decorations of this nature, and in any case there should be no objection to the recommendations which had been received by him before the 14th August 1947. The Prime Minister said that he was inclined to agree with the Governor General.

1. Remarks at a Cabinet meeting, 28 August 1947. Cabinet Secretariat Papers.

7. Arrest of Tulsi Mehar Shrestha¹

The attached telegram has been sent to me by Mahatma Gandhi.² He is gravely perturbed at the news it contains. He knows Tulsi Mehar³ well and so do many others including Rajkumari Amrit Kaur. They tell me that Tulsi Mehar is a saintly person whose methods of working are peaceful and friendly. It is fantastic nonsense that such a man should be proceeded against as a goonda.

I think that Nepalese Charge d'Affair's⁴ attention should be drawn to this and he should be asked to convey our distress at this action taken against Tulsi Mehar. Gandhiji's name might be mentioned in this connection.

1. Note, 21 October 1947. File No. 64(3)-C.A./47, M.E.A., N.A.I.
2. It contained the news of the imprisonment of Tulsi Mehar Shrestha for twelve years.
3. (1896-1979); a follower of Mahatma Gandhi; established several institutions in Nepal for basic education, development of cottage industries and rehabilitation; set up Nepal Gandhi Smarak Nidhi, 1951, and Gandhi Adarsh Vidyalaya and an ashram for orphans and destitute women, 1953; awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding, 1977.
4. General Singha Shumshere Jung Bahadur Rana (b. 1893); Nepal's representative in India, 1947-51.

8. The Allahabad Museum¹

I praise the ancient culture and civilization of India. It is a travesty of facts that to see the relics and monuments and manuscripts of ancient India one has to go to London today. I hope these relics and monuments of India will be brought back and a suitable house will be built where they will all be lodged together. The museum will bring home to us the ancient glories of India and its influence on the world outside. After years of bondage, India has now come to her own. It is time that we took lessons from the past and, by making further advances, assumed once more a leading role in the world. I wish the Allahabad Museum success and hope that in time to come it will be one of the leading museums of India. I donate the original manuscript of my *Autobiography* to the Museum.

1. Speech, at Allahabad, 14 December 1947. Based on reports published in *The Hindustan Times*, *National Herald* and *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 15 December 1947.

9. Indian Cotton Textiles¹

I cannot say that I have read this book for it is difficult to find time to read any book thoroughly, and in any event it is not easy to read a manuscript or a proof copy. But I have read parts of the book and found them rather fascinating.

The history of cotton and of textiles is not only the history of the growth of modern industry in India, but in a sense it might be considered the history of India during the past one hundred years. The British policy which dominated India during this period circled round cotton to a large extent. A reader of this book will find not only a great deal of information but will also understand the inner springs of many policies that have powerfully affected India for good or ill. When I think of textiles my mind runs back some thousands of years to the period when India perhaps was the only country producing these textiles and exporting them to distant lands. The early beginnings of civilization are tied up with the manufacture of textiles and history might well be written with this as the leading motif.

We stand at the threshold of a new age. Politically we are at least free to function as we will. But in an even larger sense we are passing through an age of transition and probably the next ten or fifteen years will see great changes as the new atomic age begins to affect our daily lives. But whatever changes come, they have their roots in the present and the past. Tomorrow will grow out of today just as today is an offspring of yesterday. So it is necessary for us to know about yesterday and to understand fully today. This book helps us in doing so in regard to an important aspect of our economy, and I commend it to the reader.

1. New Delhi, 17 December 1947. Foreword to *A Hundred Years of Indian Cotton* by M.L. Dantwala (Bombay, 1947).

10. Women's Role in National Life¹

I send you my good wishes for the 20th session of the All India Women's Conference. The last few months have seen terrible happenings in northern India and women have perhaps been the chief sufferers. It is for the women of India to organise themselves for effective work not only to help those who have suffered but also to prevent such happenings in future. Women can and must play an important role in our national life, otherwise we function in a lopsided way and our nation does not find fulfilment.

1. New Delhi, 25 December 1947. Message to the All India Women's Conference at Madras, from 29 December 1947 to 1 January 1948. J.N. Papers, N.M.M.L.

11. The Era of Mahatma Gandhi¹

This is a book on a worthy theme. To appreciate this period and what has happened during the last quarter of a century in India we shall have to look back after many years have passed and view it in the perspective of history. We are too near it at present to understand it and appraise it aright, and no book can do justice to it. This book is not a history or an appraisal but rather a glimpse into various aspects of this Gandhi era in India's history.

Already a generation has grown up which has no personal knowledge of the feelings and urges of the people of India a quarter of a century ago. They may read about it or they may hear stories. But it is difficult to appreciate that mighty surge of feeling which shook India when Gandhiji first blew his trumpet of non-violence and non cooperation. Much has happened since then and we have seen many ups and downs. But with every crisis in our history, when lesser men have often failed, Gandhiji has risen a step higher not only in the affections of his countrymen but also in the deep regard for his greatness. Truly this has been a Gandhi era and all of us, who have lived through it, bear some impress of it. India is changing and will change, as it must, but in ages to come it will still remember and be influenced by the teachings of this great son of hers. And not only India, but the world will realise more and more the essential truth and effectiveness of this message of his, which is essentially the message of India.

1. New Delhi, 25 December 1947. Foreword to *To the Gates of Liberty* by G.C. Sondhi (Calcutta, 1948).

12. Nicholas Roerich¹

I hope that when we are a little freer from the cares of the moment we shall pay every special attention to the ancient cultural monuments of the country, not only just to protect them from decay but somehow to bring them more in line with our education and with our lives, so that we may imbibe something of the inspiration that they have.

1. Speech inaugurating an exhibition of paintings by Nicholas Roerich, New Delhi, 29 December 1947. *The Hindu*, 31 December 1947.

When I think of Prof. Nicholas Roerich, I am astounded at the scope and abundance of his activities and creative genius. A great artist, a great scholar and writer, archaeologist and explorer, he touched and lighted up so many aspects of human endeavour. The very quantity is stupendous—thousands of paintings and each one of them a great work of art. When you look at these paintings—so many of them of the Himalayas—you seem to catch the spirit of those mountains, which have towered over the Indian plains and have been our sentinels for ages past. They remind us of so much in our history, our thought, our cultural and spiritual heritage, not merely of the India of the past but of something that is permanent and eternal about India, that we cannot help feeling a great sense of indebtedness to Prof. Nicholas Roerich, who has enshrined that spirit in these magnificent canvases.

It is right that this exhibition should be held in spite of the sad fact that the creator of these canvases died recently,² because art and the kind of work Prof. Roerich did have, and ought to have, little to do with the life or death of an individual. They are superior to that. It lives on and is in fact much more permanent than human lives.

One other fact so many of you may know about him, and which is very pertinent in India especially, is his conception of preserving artistic and cultural monuments and the like. He started a kind of a pact between nations for the preservation of these cultural and artistic monuments. Many nations agreed to it. I do not know exactly what the value of their agreement was, because we agree to many things which we forget in times of war and trouble. We have seen recently, in the last war, the destruction of so many great monuments of culture in spite of all the previous agreements to protect them. Nevertheless, the fact remains that it is a tragedy for destruction to overtake these great cultural monuments of the past. We in India have a great number of them and it should be our duty to respect them, honour them, learn from them and imbibe their inspiration.

2. He died on 13 December 1947 at Nagar in Kulu district in Himachal Pradesh.

1. To Lilamohan Singh-Roy¹

New Delhi

Dear Lilamohan Singh,²

I have your letter.³ You mention various public institutions which are supported out of the proceeds of your estate. This, no doubt, is a good use made of the income of the estate, but where does the income come from? Surely from the poor peasants of the estate. Our first care and your first care should be to remove the burden on the poor peasantry. I do not know what is going to happen to the zamindari system in Bengal, but I am quite sure that this system will have to go from India fairly soon. Probably compensation will be given to the present owners. The system is utterly bad for the mass of the people even though beneficent work might be done out of the proceeds. There will be far more scope for these beneficent works when the mass of the people are freed from this burden and their productive capacity increases. Then there will be far more schools, hospitals, etc.

Every human being should try to produce more than he consumes. Otherwise he is a burden on society. No one has a right to say that he depends on the protection of others even though he might live a simple life. I suppose you will have no great difficulty even if the zamindari system is abolished for you will receive some compensation. But the point is that you and other members of the family must try to become producers in some way yourselves.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection. Undated. Nehru wrote this in reply to Singh-Roy's letter of 17 April 1946.
2. (b. 1918); a zamindar from Burdwan district whose ancestors migrated from Rajasthan; joined the Congress in 1945.
3. In his letter Singh-Roy was concerned that if landlordism were abolished the institutions run with the incomes from his estates "will die".

2. To George Catlin¹

Allahabad
20 April 1946

Dear Mr. Catlin,²

It was very good of you to send me your book. It is a very attractive volume and I am sure it is full of the wisdom of the ages. I shall gladly read it whenever I have the chance to do so.

I must apologise to you for not having acknowledged previously your cable about Pulin Seal. As a matter of fact just previously I had sent a cable to Seal on the same subject. It was not possible for us to invite Seal specially to come here for various reasons, among them being that we were inviting nobody from abroad. It is not our normal practice to invite people from abroad, whether Indians or others, on such occasions and I could not conceive how Seal or anyone else could be of any help to us at this stage. Seal, of course, many of us have known for a number of years.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.
2. George Edward Gordon Catlin (1896-1979); Professor of Politics, Cornell University, 1924-35; Professor of Political Science, McGill University, 1956-60; author of several books on politics including, *Study of the Principles of Politics* (1929), *The Story of the Political Philosophers* (1939), *The Unity of Europe* (1945), *The Atlantic Community* (1959) and an autobiography, *For God's Sake, Go* (1972); husband of Vera Brittain.

3. To the Raja of Bilaspur¹

New Delhi
15 November 1946

Dear Raja Sahab,²

I have received your letter of the 1st November. I have read it with surprise. The report of what happened in the course of Mr. Brish Bhan's³

1. J.N. Collection.
2. Anand Chand (b. 1913); became ruler of Bilaspur State in Simla Hills in 1927 and was invested with full powers in 1933; as a member of the Chamber of Princes, he told the Cabinet Mission that the States had as much right to independence as the British India; signed the merger agreement only on 15 August 1948.
3. (b. 1903); a lawyer from Patiala State; member, Standing Committee, All India States People's Conference; arrested four times during the popular movement in Patiala; President, Punjab States People's Regional Council.

attempted visit to Bilaspur, which is more or less confirmed by your own account of it, has astonished me. It is obvious that there is a vast difference not only between our approach to political problems but also in regard to standards of good behaviour. At your request I arranged to send Mr. Brish Bhan to Bilaspur. The treatment accorded to him was lacking in courtesy to him as well as to me. You state that you are not prepared to accept a representative of the All India States People's Conference though you have no objection to a personal envoy sent by me. In other words any personal envoy that I might send must not be associated with the All India States People's Conference. You seem to forget that I am myself closely connected with the All India States People's Conference and I cannot divide myself up into compartments. I am unable to understand why a person should not choose his own route to go to his place when he is going peacefully and after full information. It appears, however, that in Bilaspur peaceful movement is forbidden or is confined to certain routes. It also appears that you object to the companions which a person may have with him. That would mean that you would place a restriction on my choice of friends and companions.

These are novel propositions to which I have so far not been accustomed. I do not propose to send anybody to Bilaspur when there is every chance of his being treated with discourtesy.

The visit of Mr. Brish Bhan was intended to help me in understanding the situation in Bilaspur. It has indeed succeeded in doing so and now I appreciate better than I might otherwise have done the true state of affairs that prevail in your State.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

4. To Master Tara Singh¹

New Delhi
27 July 1947

My dear Master Tara Singh,

I received your letter a few days ago. As you had said in this letter that you would be seeing me here, I did not reply to it earlier. I am afraid it will not be possible to add to the staff my sister is taking with her to Russia. The staff is a very small one and is a pure service staff, i.e., each person has been selected for a particular job and belongs to either the I.C.S. or the lower services in our departments. There is no space available in the plane she is

1. J.N. Collection.

going by for additional persons. Staffs accompanying an Ambassador have to be explained and justified to the country where they are going to. They are particularly told not to indulge in any kind of propaganda. In Russia particularly we have to be careful about this kind of thing.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

5. To G.B. Pant¹

New Delhi
14 November 1947

My dear Pantji,

I enclose four copies of my drafts.² I realise that they are very unsatisfactory, but my mind is too tired to produce anything fresh or good. At any rate I hope they will offer your committee some basis for consideration. I suggest that your committee might go through them carefully, revise them or add to them, and then bring the revised copies for the consideration of the Working Committee.

Yours sincerely,
Jawaharlal Nehru

1. J.N. Collection.

2. The draft of a resolution on the elimination of foreign rule in India has been printed on pp. 180-181 in this volume. The drafts of the remaining three resolutions are the following three items.

6. Migration and Rehabilitation of Refugees¹

The tragic events that have taken place in recent months in the Punjab and elsewhere have resulted in vast migrations of populations, and consequently in tremendous suffering to millions of people. New problems of relief and rehabilitation have arisen of a magnitude which is unparalleled in history. The Government of India have faced these problems with courage and deter-

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru and adopted by the A.I.C.C. in New Delhi on 16 November 1947. J.N. Collection. The differences between this draft and the final text published in the newspapers on 17 November have been given in footnotes.

mination. Nevertheless it is necessary to state clearly what the national policy should be in dealing with these problems.

The A.I.C.C. has looked with disfavour on this large-scale migration which brings suffering to millions, upsets the nation's economy, and does injury² to the ideal which the Congress has held since its inception. It is of opinion that these migrations should be discouraged and conditions should be created both in the Indian Dominion and in Pakistan for minorities to live in peace and security. If such conditions are created the desire to migrate to another part of the country will disappear. In the opinion of the Committee it is wrong to coerce by various means³ Hindu and Sikh inhabitants of Pakistan into leaving their homes and migrating to the Indian Union, and Muslims of the Indian Union in similar circumstances⁴ into migrating to Pakistan.

While it is impossible to undo all that has been done, every effort should be made to make the evacuees and refugees from either Dominion to return to their homes and to their original occupations under conditions of safety and security. Those who have not left their homes already should be encouraged to stay there unless they themselves desire to migrate, in which case facilities for migration should be made available. It is the duty of the Central Government of the Indian Union and the Government of Pakistan to negotiate on this basis and to create conditions which enable the evacuees and refugees to return with safety.

In any event the policy to be followed in the Indian Union is to protect the minorities still residing there and to prevent their removal by force or by creating circumstances which compel evacuation.⁵

Such being the policy of the Congress the refugees in the Indian Union are to be regarded as temporary sojourners entitled to every care and attention from the authorities and the people within the Union. They are not to be regarded as interlopers grudgingly placed upon charity. They will have the same rights and be under the same obligations as any other citizen. They will, therefore, be expected to render some social service in cooperation with fellow refugees, and for the benefit of the whole camp and India and

2. "injury" replaced by "violence".

3. "by various means" omitted.

4. "in similar circumstances" omitted.

5. An amendment moved by Jayaprakash Narayan and incorporated in the resolution at this place stated that no civilized people could recognise forcible conversions, that there was nothing more heinous than abduction of women and that every effort must be made to restore them to their original homes. The A.I.C.C. expressed satisfaction with the declarations of the Governments of India and Pakistan not to recognise forcible conversions and to cooperate in recovering abducted women.

subject to the rules framed for the good government of the camp.⁶ Sanitary and other services should be performed by the inmates of the camps under instructions from those fitted for the work and who will themselves take part in these services. Refugees should be engaged in productive work as far as possible on a cooperative basis.

Refugees from West Punjab shall be accommodated in East Punjab. Those from the other parts of Pakistan shall be accommodated in places that the Central Government, in cooperation with the Provincial Governments, may consider more suitable. Those from a particular locality should, as far as possible, be kept together.

In this task the Provincial Governments should offer their full cooperation and should take in and make suitable arrangements for as many refugees as they can.

No house, not vacated willingly by a Muslim,⁷ shall be used for the accommodation of refugees.

Movements of refugees, which are already taking place by train, convoy or otherwise, should be regulated in accordance with the policy laid down above and no one should be sent away unless he expresses his desire to migrate.

This principle should apply also to the States which have acceded to the Indian Union and from which large numbers of Muslims have been evacuated or driven out.

The A.I.C.C. trusts that the Central Government of the Indian Union, the East Punjab Government, and the Governments of the States affected by these migrations, will give effect to the policy indicated above and will issue directions to all their officers to act strictly in accordance with it.

6. This sentence read in the final draft: "Where they are living in camps they will be expected to render some social service in cooperation with fellow refugees subject to the rules framed for the good government of the camp".
7. The words "except by proper legal authority" were added by an amendment at this place.

7. Resolution on Princely States¹

The A.I.C.C. congratulates the Government and people of Mysore on the success, through peaceful means, of the struggle for freedom and establishment of an Interim Government in preparation for full responsible government in the near future.

1. Resolution for the A.I.C.C. drafted by Nehru and adopted on 16 November 1947. J.N. Collection. The final text is printed in *The Hindustan Times*, 17 November 1947.

The A.I.C.C. also congratulates the people of Kashmir State on their gallant resistance to a barbarous invasion which has been accompanied by massacre and vandalism. It trusts that the raiders in the Kashmir State territory will be driven out soon and that full responsible government will be established in the State.

The A.I.C.C. regrets to note however that in many States no progress whatever has been made towards freedom, and indeed in some States an effort has been made by the authorities, under cover of communal slogans and activities, to crush the popular movement. The Congress views with strong disfavour these reactionary, communal and separatist attempts of certain States. It wishes to make it perfectly clear that the Congress will combat all such tendencies which run counter to the freedom which it seeks to achieve for the people of India.

8. Economic Objectives of the Congress

India, in common with most other countries of the world, is facing a grave economic crisis which has been heightened by the recent disorders in the North. This crisis is due partly to its economic growth having been arrested during the long period of foreign rule and partly it is the result of the gradual decline of the structure of capitalist society all over the world, accentuated as this has been by two successive World Wars. It is essential that this crisis be faced and overcome, not merely by temporary palliatives, but by a planned approach to social structure which increases production and ensures a fair and equitable distribution so as to raise the standards of the people as a whole. This involves a progressive socialisation of the means of production and the growth of social services and social security. Advance must be made on all fronts on a planned and balanced basis, always bearing in mind that the claims of the masses are given the first priority.

With a view to drawing up an economic programme for the Congress in accordance with the above mentioned principles and the election manifesto of the Congress, dated December 19, 1945, the following committee is appointed :²

1. Resolution drafted by Nehru for the A.I.C.C. J.N. Collection. The final text adopted of the A.I.C.C. and printed in the *The Hindustan Times* of 17 November was very different from and much milder than Nehru's version.
2. The members of this committee, not mentioned in the draft, were Nehru, Azad, Jayaprakash Narayan, N.G. Ranga, Gulzarilal Nanda, J.C. Kumarappa, Achyut Patwardhan and Shankarrao Deo.

GLOSSARY

Bustee	an inhabited place
Char land	alluvial land created by a river changing course
Dargah	a tomb of a Muslim saint
Dastkar	a craftsman
Kirpan	a small sword

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